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2012 DIGILAW 1133 (GAU)

Kalpana Datta v. State of Tripura

2012-09-25

S.R.SEN, U.B.SAHA

body2012
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. The appellant before us was convicted by the learned Sessions Judge, Tripura West, Agartala under Section 302 IPC for committing murder of her husband and sentenced to suffer R.I. for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, i.e. to suffer five months and also convicted under Section 201 IPC and sentenced to suffer R.I. for seven years vide judgment dated 25.8.2005 passed in S.T. 35 (WT/A) of 2004. Both the sentence will run concurrently. Heard Mr. S. Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State respondent. 2. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is as follows:- On 26.3.2003, P.W. 2 Babul Datta lodged an FIR with the Officer In-charge, West Agartala Police Station, stating, inter alia, that the accused appellant Kalpana Datta and the deceased Gouranga Ch. Datta, the brother of P.W. 2, was husband and wife and they used to reside in the same hut situated at West Joynagar. They had two sons, namely, Sajal Datta (P.W. 11) and Uttam Datta (P.W. 8) who were residing at Kailashahar and Dharmanagar respectively in their place of service. The deceased Gouranga was missing on and from 24.2.2003. On 25.3.2003, the informant, P.W. 2 received a letter from the office of his elder brother informing him that his elder brother Gouranga Datta had been remaining absent for the last few days in his office. On that day at night, P.W. 11, his nephew, son of the deceased, over telephone informed him that his mother, i.e., the accused appellant went to Kailashahar on 24.3.2003 and on being asked by him about his father, she told him that on 24.2.2003, she killed his father Gouranga and buried his dead body in their house on a plea of family dispute. 3. Getting such information from P.W. 11, the informant P.W. 2 lodged the written FIR on 26.3.2003, on the basis of which, a specific police case was registered being West Agartala P.S. case No. 61 of 2003. It was alleged that on 26.3.2003, Uttam Datta (P.W. 8) and Sajal Datta (P.W. 11) came to Agartala along with their mother the accused appellant Kalpana and reported to the West Agartala Police Station. Then police went to the house of the deceased Gouranga Datta along with the appellant Kalpana accompanied by an Executive Magistrate. 4. It was alleged that on 26.3.2003, Uttam Datta (P.W. 8) and Sajal Datta (P.W. 11) came to Agartala along with their mother the accused appellant Kalpana and reported to the West Agartala Police Station. Then police went to the house of the deceased Gouranga Datta along with the appellant Kalpana accompanied by an Executive Magistrate. 4. After reaching the house of the deceased Gouranga, the appellant Kalpana had shown them a place of the floor in the room and told them that she had buried the dead body of her husband Gouranga under the floor. As per direction of the police, two sweepers, namely, Amar Ch. Pal (P.W. 15) and Thakurchan Malakar (P.W. 16) dug the floor and disinterred the dead body of the deceased Gouranga which was kept concealed in a polythine sheet. The hands of the deceased were chopped off and the internal abdominal organs were removed. 5. Upon recovery of the dead body of the deceased in course of investigation, the police arrested the appellant Kalpana in connection with the aforesaid police case and the case was endorsed to SI Samiran Chakraborty (P.W. 14) for investigation. But though the investigation was almost complete, he could not file the charge sheet as he was transferred from the West Agartala police station. Thereafter, P.W. 18 SI Manas Debbarma completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet against the accused appellant Kalpana for commission of offence punishable under Sections 302/201 IPC. 6. As the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused appellant Kalpana is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala for trial. 7. In due course, the learned Sessions Judge on being satisfied with the materials on record framed the charges against the accused appellant Kalpana which are as follows: That, you on 24.2.2003 at any time after 10-30 a.m. at Bara Ban Pukur Par, West Joynagar, under West Agartala PS committed murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of your husband namely, Gouranga Datta (49 years), S/o late Jyotish Ch. Datta and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and within my cognizance. Secondly, that you on the same date, time and place at knowing that certain offence, to wit to commit murder of your husband (lamely Gouranga Datta, S/o It. Jyotish Ch. Datta and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and within my cognizance. Secondly, that you on the same date, time and place at knowing that certain offence, to wit to commit murder of your husband (lamely Gouranga Datta, S/o It. Jyotish Ch. Datta punishable with death or life imprisonment has been committed, did cause certain evidence of the said offence to disappear, to wit, hide the dead body of your husband namely Gouranga Datta in the underground of your dwelling hut with the intention of screening yourselves from legal punishment, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC and within my cognizance. 8. To prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses including the official witnesses and also exhibited some documents and materials. None was examined on behalf of the accused appellant as the case of the defence was of total denial. On completion of the examination of the witnesses, the accused appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr. P.C. 9. The trial Court upon hearing the parties and on going through the evidence of witnesses and exhibited documents and materials convicted the accused appellant and sentenced her by the judgment and order as stated supra. 10. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence, the accused appellant has preferred the instant appeal. 11. Mr. Roy, learned Counsel while urging for setting aside the impugned order of conviction and sentence would contend that the whole case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence and the prosecution failed to prove the chain of events showing that with all human probability, the offence cannot be committed by any other person except the accused. Thus, the accused appellant is liable to be acquitted from the charge leveled against her. 12. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on paragraph-28 of Suresh Rajbongshi & other vs. State of Assam reported in 2012 (1) GLT 708: (2012) 3 GLR 371 which is as follows:- 28. It is settled law mat, in order to base the conviction on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, the events of circumstances must form a complete chain leading to the irresistible conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused persons. It is settled law mat, in order to base the conviction on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, the events of circumstances must form a complete chain leading to the irresistible conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused persons. It is also settled law that, the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and in the event of existence of two views, i.e., one is going in favour of the accused person and another is in favour of the prosecution, the view which goes in favour of the accused person is to be accepted. 13. He further submits that the P.W. 2 in his deposition stated that he received a letter from the office of his deceased brother that his brother was not attending office for few days, but the said letter was not produced by the prosecution before the trial Court. Not only that though he stated that his nephew P.W. 11 informed him by a telephonic call on 25.3.2003 that the accused appellant went to Kailashahar on 24.3.2003 and on being asked, she told him that on 24.2.2003 relating to a quarrel with the deceased Gouranga, she murdered him and thereafter buried the dead body in their house, but P.W. 11 in his deposition did not state such facts. Thus, the story narrated by the P.W. 2 in the FIR is wholly contradictory to the evidence on record. 14. He also contends that though the learned Trial Court believed the prosecution case on discovery of the dead body of the deceased Gouranga, but the same was not proved on recording the statement of the accused appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. More so, none of the seizure witnesses were examined. 15. He also submits that the prosecution mainly depends upon the theory of last seen together. In that case, it is bounden duty of the prosecution to establish the type of death and the gap between the last seen together and the dead body recovered. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to prove the time of death. 16. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Niranjan Panja vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 177, wherein the Apex Court noted that. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to prove the time of death. 16. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Niranjan Panja vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 177, wherein the Apex Court noted that. Where the prosecution depends upon the theory of 'last seen together', it is always necessary that the prosecution should establish the time of death, which the prosecution has failed to do in this case." In the said judgment, the Apex Court also, noted in para-20 that "For effecting a discovery, a statement has to be recorded on the part of the accused showing his readiness to produce the material object and it is only the part of the statement which is not incriminating and leads to discovery which becomes admissible. 17. He further urges that there was a delay of recovery of the alleged weapon, (shavol), a crowbar on the date of recovery of the dead body though the investigating officer was very much there in the alleged place of occurrence and such delay of recovery of the weapon also creates doubt regarding the use of the said weapons in the alleged offence. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision in A. Shankar vs. State of Karnataka, (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 915, particularly, para-17 of the said report wherein the Apex Court stated inter alia: 17. As per Abdul Suban (P.W. 17), the accused in the presence of panchas had seen the occurrence and also took out a scissors hidden under a stone slab near the saloon. He seized the scissors, MO 1 in the presence of panchas under panchnama, Ext. P-8. As per the evidence of Ganganarasaiah (P.W. 9) the scissors was in the bucket which was filled with water. The bucket was inside the shop. The police alone saw it. Narayanaswamy (P.W. 15) stated that the accused told him that he committed the offence and he took out a scissors kept under a stone slab. Police seized the same and wrapped it a cloth and drawn a mahazar. He signed the mahazar and stated that MO 1 was the scissors seized by the police. 18. He again contends that the prosecution failed to show any special mark to prove that the said weapon was only used in the alleged offence. Police seized the same and wrapped it a cloth and drawn a mahazar. He signed the mahazar and stated that MO 1 was the scissors seized by the police. 18. He again contends that the prosecution failed to show any special mark to prove that the said weapon was only used in the alleged offence. He has taken us to the deposition of P.W. 11 who was not declared hostile by the prosecution to show that the said witness did never inform anything to P.W. 2 as he himself got information regarding missing of his father deceased Gouranga from his uncle Sankar over telephone and admittedly the said uncle of P.W. 11 was not examined by the prosecution. 19. The learned Counsel for the accused appellant further stated that the said witness (P.W. 11) in his deposition nowhere stated that his mother confessed to him regarding the murder of his father deceased Gouranga and burial of the dead body in their room. Hence, this Court cannot take inference against the accused appellant on the basis of the statement of the P.W. 1 and P.W. 14. 20. He again submitted that Nityananda Karmakar P.W. 1, police constable, who accompanied P.W. 14 SI Samiran Chakra-borty, IO, P.W. 10 Khokan Ch. Dey, Executive Magistrate and P.W. 14, Investigating Officer nowhere stated in their deposition that the accused appellant made a confessional statement to them regarding the murder of the deceased Gouranga and buried him subsequently in their house. Thus, mere accompanying by the accused appellant with the police personnel from the police station to her residence would not itself connect her with the alleged offence. 21. He also submits that so called extra judicial confession of the accused appellant that she had killed her husband deceased Gouranga and buried the dead body of him in their hut has not been established. He further submits that though after disinterring, the police discovered the dead body, but on that date, they did not recover the weapon namely shavol (crowbar) used in the alleged offence on that data. The prosecution also did not explain as to why the said crowbar could not be noticed by the Investigating Officer, had there been the same and the delay of discovery of the weapon used in the alleged offence also creates doubt for which the petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of doubt, he contends. 22. The prosecution also did not explain as to why the said crowbar could not be noticed by the Investigating Officer, had there been the same and the delay of discovery of the weapon used in the alleged offence also creates doubt for which the petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of doubt, he contends. 22. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. E. Satyanarayana, (2009) 14 SCC 400 , particularly Para-3, 6 and 8 which are as follows: 3. In appeal, the primary stand taken by the respondent-accused was that the evidence of P.W. 1 is not believable. It contradicts the evidence of P.W. 2, and the investigating officer. The High Court analyzed the evidence and came to the conclusion that the so-called extrajudicial confession has not been established. The High Court analyzed the position in law relating to extra-judicial confession, namely, that the Court has to be satisfied that the so-called extra-judicial confession is voluntary and not as a result of any inducement, threat or promise as envisaged in Section 24 of (he Evidence Act, 1872 (in short Evidence Act) or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. 4…………………. 5…………………. 6. We find that there are some relevant aspects which the High Court has rightly taken note of. Firstly, the extra-judicial confession is said to have been made at about 8.00 a.m. The first information report was given at 11.30 a.m. It has not been explained as to why there was delay in lodging the FIR by the Village Administrative Officer. 7…………………… 8. Another piece of material on which the trial Court had placed reliance related to the recovery of the bloodstained sickle on the basis of the disclosure made by the accused. The High Court has noticed that the police was at the place of occurrence from 8.00 a.m. till 4.00 p.m. If that was so, no explanation has been offered as to why the bloodstained sickle in the house of the accused was not noticed. The conclusions of the High Court leave no manner of doubt that the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. 23. The conclusions of the High Court leave no manner of doubt that the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. 23. He also contended that the learned Sessions Judge did not properly survey the evidence of the prosecution witnesses; rather mere on suspicion convicted the accused appellant for commission of alleged murder. Thus, it would be proper for the Court to acquit the accused appellant from the charge leveled against her. 24. He again contended that even if for the argument sake, it is admitted that the accused appellant killed her husband Gouranga, then also it is evident from the evidence of P.W. 5 that there was quarrel between the accused appellant and her husband Gouranga, P.W. 9 in his cross by the prosecution stated that there was a fight between the deceased Gouranga and the accused appellant and at the time of fighting, the accused appellant was in possession of a crowbar and with the said crowbar the deceased Gouranga was assaulted. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that there was a certain provocation on the part of the deceased Gouranga to the accused appellant and the accused appellant is thus entitled to get the benefit of exception-4 of Section 300 IPC. 25. He also urges that considering the age of the accused appellant, it would be proper for the Court to alter the order of conviction from Section 302 to 304 P-1 or Part-II IPC and modify the sentence accordingly. 26. Mr. Debnath, learned Addl. P.P while supporting the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge and resisting the contention of Mr. Roy, would contend that out of 18 witnesses examined by the prosecution, eight witnesses were declared hostile who are P.W. 3 to 9 and P.W. 12. In support of the prosecution case, Mr. Nath, has taken us to the evidence of P. W. 11 who in his statement specifically stated that on 26.3.2003 he went to the P.S. with others and from the P.S. he also went to their house at Ramsundarnagar when his mother and one Executive Magistrate, Khokan Ch. Dey (P.W. 10) also accompanied them and the dead body of his father Gouranga was recovered from the room. He also admitted that there was only one hut in their house. 27. Dey (P.W. 10) also accompanied them and the dead body of his father Gouranga was recovered from the room. He also admitted that there was only one hut in their house. 27. To prove the fact that the deceased was last seen together with the accused appellant, he placed reliance on the evidence of P.W. 7, Sanjoy Paul, a hostile witness and the next door neighbor of the accused appellant and the deceased Gouranga, who in his cross by prosecution specifically stated that he did not state to IO that at about 10.30 a.m. on 24.2.2003 while he was playing with Suraj Banik (P.W. 9) in the courtyard they had seen that Gouranga (since deceased) and his wife (accused appellant) were assaulting each other and the accused appellant was armed with a crowbar and assaulted the deceased Gouranga with that crowbar. Each of them was pushing each other towards their dwelling hut. Attention of the said witness was drawn to his previous statement recorded by the IO that such statement was there in his previous statement. Such portion of the statement was marked as Exbt. 8 and ultimately the said Exbt. 8 was proved by the IO of the case (P.W. 14). Thus it would be proper on the part of the Court to rely upon the said exhibit for corroboration, he contended. 28. He also placed reliance on the deposition of P.W. 9, particularly, the cross by the prosecution wherein this witness admitted that he stated to IO that in the morning on 24.2.2003, he had seen Gouranga, the deceased, and his wife, accused appellant were fighting with each other in the courtyard and the accused appellant was possessing a crowbar and with the said crowbar the accused appellant assaulted Gouranga, The said witness also stated that the accused appellant also pushed Gouranga to their room. Thereafter, he did not see the deceased Gouranga. This witness also stated to the IO that afterwards police recovered the dead body of Gouranga digging the floor of the hut as shown by the accused appellant. Thus, if the Court considers Exbt. Thereafter, he did not see the deceased Gouranga. This witness also stated to the IO that afterwards police recovered the dead body of Gouranga digging the floor of the hut as shown by the accused appellant. Thus, if the Court considers Exbt. 8 proved by the IO and evidence of P.W. 9 with the aid of evidence of P.W. 10, the Executive Magistrate and P.W. 15 and 16, the sweepers, then it would be clear that it is only the accused appellant who killed her husband deceased Gouranga and thereafter, buried the dead body in the room. 29. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Kashi Ram, AIR 2007 SC 144, Wherein the Apex Court while dealing with an appeal preferred against an order of acquittal, considered the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and also noted that the following incriminating circumstances are clearly established against the respondent: (a) That he was not on cordial terms with his wife Kalawati. (b) On the evening of February 3, 1998 he was seen in his house with his wife Kalawati (deceased). (c) The house of the respondent was found locked on the 4th, 5th and 6th February, 1998. (d) On February 6, 1998 when his house was opened the dead bodies of his wife and daughters were found, and the medical evidence established that they had been strangulated to death, the cause of death being asphyxia. (e) Since the respondent was not traceable the mother of the deceased P.W.-5, Jai Kauri became anxious to know about their whereabouts and requested P.W.s-1 and 6 to search for them. (f) In the course of investigation the respondent never appeared at any stage, and for the first time he appeared on the scene when he was arrested on February 17, 1998. (g) Even after his arrest he did not offer any explanation as to when he parted company with his wife nor did he offer any exculpatory explanation to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 30. Placing the aforesaid circumstances of the case of Kashi Ram (supra), Mr. (g) Even after his arrest he did not offer any explanation as to when he parted company with his wife nor did he offer any exculpatory explanation to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 30. Placing the aforesaid circumstances of the case of Kashi Ram (supra), Mr. Nath would contend that in the instant case also, it is evident from the evidence of P.W. 5, Khokan Sana that the relation between the accused appellant and the deceased Gouranga was not cordial, rather the accused appellant was always suspecting her deceased husband on the plea that he developed relation with the mother of P.W. 5. The matter was once discussed and settled in a village level meeting 31. He further submits that from the evidence of P.W. 5, P.W. 7 and P.W. 9, it would be evident that in the morning of 24.2.2003, the deceased Gouranga was last seen with the accused appellant when they were quarreling with each other. He again submitted that from the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 10 and P.W. 14/15 and 16, it appears that it is the accused appellant who had confessed and shown the place where the deceased Gouranga was buried in the room and she also did not give any explanation in her 313 statement as to what happened to her husband after quarrel, rather she tried to misdirect the villagers regarding her deceased husband Gouranga by way of stating that he went for a tour which would be evident from the evidence of P.W. 5 and 6. 32. It is the admitted position that dead body was recovered at the instance of the accused appellant which would be evident from the evidence of P.W. 1, 10 and P.W. 14/15 and 16 and this conduct of the accused appellant can be considered by the Court as admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, he contended. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision in Rama @ Dhaktu Worak vs. State, AIR 1969 Goa, Daman & Diu 116, particularly, para-8 of the said Report. The relevant portion which was relied upon by Mr. Nath reads as under:- It is true that the appellant did not conceal it in a ditch or some such place but for the purposes of Section 27 of the Evidence Act this is not an indispensable requirement. The relevant portion which was relied upon by Mr. Nath reads as under:- It is true that the appellant did not conceal it in a ditch or some such place but for the purposes of Section 27 of the Evidence Act this is not an indispensable requirement. This evidence is admissible and can be used against the appellant under Section 27. This section is based on the theory of confirmation by subsequent facts. Production of articles by an accused is relevant as evidence of subsequent conduct under Section 8 and statements accompanying such conduct are also admissible. 33. Though he stated that here in the instant case, it is not a case of recovery on the basis of the statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, as the statements were not made before the police while the accused was after arrest under the custody of police, rather the statements were made to the police in presence of the Executive Magistrate and other witnesses and on the basis of such a disclosure of the accused appellant, the dead body of the deceased Gouranga was recovered. Not only the crowbar which was used while committing offence was also recovered, which on being shown, Dr. Mridul Das, (P.W. 13) stated that such injuries may be caused by such weapon. 34. He also relied upon the evidence of doctor, P.W. 13 who had done the autopsy and stated that injury No. 6 mentioned in the autopsy report relates to neck injury and such injury is sufficient to cause death of a person in ordinary course. To establish the fact relating to the recovery of the dead body of the deceased Gouranga at the instance of the accused appellant, he has further placed reliance on the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 10, 14, 15 and 16. 35. He further contended that there is a clear distinction between Section 27 and Section 8 of the Evidence Act vis-a-vis Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code as Section 8 deals with the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged subject to such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue and the statement made to a police officer in course of investigation is hit by Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and such a statement is not an evidence relating to the conduct of an accused person. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Prakash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1979 SC 400 , particularly Para-8 and 9 of the said Report. 36. He finally contended that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly convicted the accused appellant under Section 302 IPC as well as 201 IPC as this is not a case where the accused appellant can be provided the benefit of exception-4 of Section 300 IPC and consequent thereto can be convicted under Section 304, Part-I or II of the IPC. 37. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Suresh Chandra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2005 SC 3120 , particularly para-7 of the said Report which is reproduced as under: 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the incident had happened without any premeditation or prior concert, upon a sudden quarrel and the resultant attack on the victims was unintentional and, therefore, the offence would appropriately fall under Exception 4 punishable under Section 304 Part I or II. We find it difficult to countenance this argument. Though there was absence of premeditation and it was a case of sudden fight that is not sufficient to bring the offence committed by the accused within the purview of Exception 4. The further requirement of Exception 4 that the offender should not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner should be satisfied. The very fact that the accused-appellants used the fire arms in the course of a frivolous quarrel triggered off by the sarcastic remarks of Ravindra Singh would demonstrate beyond doubt that the appellants acted in a cruel manner and it would further demonstrate the intention to cause death or at any rate, to cause a bodily injury of the nature mentioned in clause thirdly of Section 300. Such intention is writ large on the acts done by the accused. Thus, it is a case in which Clauses I to III of Section 300 IPC are attracted and, as already observed, Exception 4 would not come to the rescue of the appellants for the reason that they have acted in a cruel and unusual manner by shooting at unarmed victims who merely indulged in a verbal duel with them. Thus, it is a case in which Clauses I to III of Section 300 IPC are attracted and, as already observed, Exception 4 would not come to the rescue of the appellants for the reason that they have acted in a cruel and unusual manner by shooting at unarmed victims who merely indulged in a verbal duel with them. The fact that the other two accused who were said to have exhorted the three appellants to attack the members of the other party were acquitted has no material bearing on the question whether the appellants could be given the benefit of Exception. 4. Thus, the argument in regard to the nature of offence cannot be sustained. On the facts of this case, it is only Section 302 IPC that is attracted. 38. The learned Addl. P.P also submits that at the time of quarrel between the accused appellant and the deceased Gouranga, the latter was fully unarmed and the accused wife appellant was armed with a crowbar. Therefore, it can be presumed that she was with an intention to kill her husband deceased Gouranga and on that count also, the exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not applicable. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Rajendra Singh & other vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 1779 , wherein their Lordship discussed about the exception-4 to Section 300 IPC which are as follows: 5. So far as the third contention of Mr. Mishra is concerned, the question for consideration would be as to whether the ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been satisfied? The necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 are: (a) A sudden fight. (b) Absence of pre-meditation. (c) No undue advantage or cruelty. But the occasion must be sudden and not as a cloak for pre existing malice. It is only an un-premeditated assault committed in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel which would come within Exception 4 and it is necessary that all the three ingredients must be found. 39. In reply to the submission of Mr. Debnath, Mr. But the occasion must be sudden and not as a cloak for pre existing malice. It is only an un-premeditated assault committed in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel which would come within Exception 4 and it is necessary that all the three ingredients must be found. 39. In reply to the submission of Mr. Debnath, Mr. Roy placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Ramesh Sabbar vs. State of Assam, 2012 (1) GLT 508, wherein this Court converted the order of conviction from under Section 302 to 304, Part-II IPC, and the decision in Suman Rajowar vs. State of Assam, 2011 (3) GLT 375, wherein this Court noted in para-25 of the said Report, inter alia that:- Suspicion, however, cannot be the basis of conviction. The conduct of the appellant in burying the body in the corner of the pond in his compound and offering different explanations to the villagers with regard to Sabitri being not at home do indicate that there is a possibility of his committing murder of Sabitri. But there is another side of the story. The possibility that the deceased committed suicide by consuming poison, cannot be ruled out. We recollect that there was no mark of injury on the dead body. This effectively scuttles the prosecution case that death was the result of an assault by a lathi. The prosecution sought to implicate the appellant in the offence of committing murder of Sabitri by his assault on her by a lathi. 40. Before dealing with the submission of the learned Counsel of the parties, it would be proper on our part to survey on the evidence as recorded by the trial Court and discussed the same. 41. P.W. 2 Babul Datta is the brother of the deceased Gouranga as well as the informant of this case. In his deposition, he has stated that his brother Gouranga used to live with his wife accused appellant at West Joynagar. His sons, namely, Uttam Datta (P W 8) and Sajal Datta (P.W. 11) were residing at Kailashahar and Dharmanagar respectively. On 25.3.2003, he received a letter from the office of his brother to the effect that his brother Gouranga was not attending office for few days. His sons, namely, Uttam Datta (P W 8) and Sajal Datta (P.W. 11) were residing at Kailashahar and Dharmanagar respectively. On 25.3.2003, he received a letter from the office of his brother to the effect that his brother Gouranga was not attending office for few days. On the night of 25.3.2003, he also received a telephonic call from his nephew Sajal (P.W. 11), son of the deceased Gouranga who informed that on 24.3.2003, his mother accused appellant Kalpana went to Kailashahar and on being asked his mother about his father, she told him that on 24.2.2003 relating to a quarrel, she had murdered his father, i.e. her husband, and buried the dead body in their house. 42. This witness has also stated that after getting such information, he went to the West Agartala police station and lodge the information and thereafter the police went to the house of his brother deceased Gouranga and disinterred the dead body of Gouranga digging the floor of his dwelling hut. 43. P.W. 1 Nityananda Karmakar is a police constable who in his deposition has stated that on 26.3.2003, in the afternoon, he accompanied SI Samiran Chakraborty (P.W. 14) to the house of deceased Gouranga at West Joynagar, At that time, one Executive Magistrate also accompanied them in the said house. He has farther stated that in the house of the deceased Gouranga as shown by the accused appellant, two sweepers, P.W. 15 and 16 respectively, as per direction of P.W. 14, disinterred the dead body digging the floor of the room of deceased Gouranga in presence of P.W. 10, the Executive Magistrate and he was also present at the time of disinterring the dead body of Gouranga. This witness has also stated that the dead body was found concealed by the polythene sheet and the son of the deceased Gouranga as well as the accused appellant identified the dead body of Gouranga. It is also stated that right hand of the dead body was chopped off and the internal organs were removed from the body. This witness has further stated that P.W. 14 prepared the inquest of the dead body of Gouranga in presence of the Executive Magistrate who endorsed something on the body of the inquest report. After preparation of the inquest report as per direction of P.W. 14, he removed the dead body to IGM Hospital for holding post mortem examination. 44. This witness has further stated that P.W. 14 prepared the inquest of the dead body of Gouranga in presence of the Executive Magistrate who endorsed something on the body of the inquest report. After preparation of the inquest report as per direction of P.W. 14, he removed the dead body to IGM Hospital for holding post mortem examination. 44. P.W. 3 Krishna Paul, a hostile witness, in his deposition has stated that the accused appellant and her husband used to reside in the house of deceased Gouranga and the dead body of Gouranga was recovered by the police after digging the floor of the dwelling hut of the deceased Gouranga. 45. P.W. 5 Khokan Saha, in his deposition, has stated that in the year 2003, on a certain day, at about 4 p.m., police went to the house of deceased Gouranga along with accused appellant and sons of the deceased Gouranga and disinterred the dead body of Gouranga digging the floor of the dwelling hut. This witness also stated that the deceased Gouranga and his wife, the accused appellant used to reside in the said hut and the accused appellant suspected her husband Gouranga on the ground that he developed relation with his (P.W. 5) mother. Relating to this, there was a quarrel between the accused appellant and the deceased Gouranga to which a village meeting was also held. He has also stated that in the morning of 24.2.2003, there was a quarrel between the deceased Gouranga and the accused appellant. Thereafter, the accused appellant informed the villagers that her husband had left the house after the quarrel. 46. P.W. 6, Dhirendra Ch. Shil in his deposition has stated that the deceased Gouranga as well as his wife, the accused appellant was known to him. He also identified the accused appellant in dock. In his statement, he has stated that about one year six months back, the accused appellant informed the villagers that her husband Gouranga had gone for a tour. He also stated that son of Gouranga told him that his mother after killing his father buried the dead body in their dwelling hut. The police disinterred the dead body digging the floor of the room. He also stated that son of Gouranga told him that his mother after killing his father buried the dead body in their dwelling hut. The police disinterred the dead body digging the floor of the room. The accused appellant suspected her husband Gouranga that he was maintaining illicit relation with one Lina Saha and relating to this, there was a village meeting and villagers cautioned the accused appellant not to spread such unfounded allegation against her husband. In his cross, he also confirmed that the accused appellant told him that her husband went on tour. 47. P.W. 7 Sanjoy Paul, a next door neighbor of the deceased Gouranga who was declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution, deposed that the deceased Gouranga was found missing from the month of February, 2003 and after about one month, the accused appellant accompanied by police went to the house of the deceased Gouranga. Seeing them, he entered into that house, but police asked him to leave that house. Accordingly, he left that house. Afterwards, he came to learn that the dead body of the deceased Gouranga was disinterred from the dwelling hut. At this stage, this witness was declared hostile by the prosecution. 48. P.W. 8, Uttam Datta, the son of deceased Gouranga, was declared hostile and crossed by the prosecution. In his cross, he has deposed that he did not state to IO that on 26.3.2003, he came to Agartala along with his mother and Sajal and reported to the West Agartala Police station where he found his uncles Babul Dutta, P.W. 2, and Sreenibas Dutta (P.W. 12). Police of West Agartala P.S went to their residential house at Joynagar with his mother and disinterred the dead body of his father digging the floor of their hut as shown by his mother. 49. Attention of this witness was drawn to his previous statement recorded by the IO of the case as such statement was found there and the aforesaid portion of the previous statement of this witness was marked as Exbt. 9/2 subject to proof by the IO. 50. P.W. 9, Suraj Banik who is a vital witness in this case was also turned hostile, but during his cross-examination by the prosecution, he has confirmed that in the morning of 24.2.2003, he had seen Gouranga and his wife accused appellant were fighting with each other in the courtyard. 9/2 subject to proof by the IO. 50. P.W. 9, Suraj Banik who is a vital witness in this case was also turned hostile, but during his cross-examination by the prosecution, he has confirmed that in the morning of 24.2.2003, he had seen Gouranga and his wife accused appellant were fighting with each other in the courtyard. The accused appellant was in possession of a crowbar and with the said crowbar, she assaulted Gouranga. She also pushed Gouranga in the room and thereafter, he did not see Gouranga This witness has also stated to the IO that afterwards police recovered the dead body of Gouranga digging the floor of the hut as shown by the accused appellant This witness also identified the crowbar which was possessing by the accused appellant at the time of assaulting the deceased Gouranga. 51. P.W. 10 Khokan Ch. Dey, was the Executive Magistrate and on 26.3.2003, was posted at Agartala. On that date, as per direction of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Agartala, he went to Ramsundarnagar along with police personnel in the house of the deceased Gouranga. He has also stated that the accused appellant also accompanied them and she was taken there by woman police. After going to the house of deceased Gouranga, the accused appellant pointed out the place in the floor of the northern viti hut and told the police in his presence that the dead body of Gouranga was buried in that place. Accordingly, as, per direction of the police officer, two sweepers, P.W. 15 and 16 who were brought there by the police officer, dug the floor in his presence and disinterred the dead body of the deceased Gouranga which was found wrapped by a piece of polythene. He also found that the hands of the dead body were chopped off and the internal organs were removed before burial of the dead body. This witness also stated that the police officer after disinterring the dead body prepared the inquest report of the same in his presence and in presence of other officers and he put his signature on the body of the inquest report to the effect that the dead body of deceased Gouranga was disinterred digging the floor of his dwelling hut as shown by the accused appellant in his presence. This witness also stated that the son and brother of the deceased Gouranga identified the dead body when it was disinterred. 52. P.W. 11 Sajal Datta, son of the deceased Gouranga and the accused appellant in his deposition has stated that on 25.3.2003, he got the information from his uncle Sankar that his father was missing and on 26.3.2003 he came to Agartala and went to his house at Ramsundarnagar and saw some people there. Then he went to West Agartala P.S. and saw his mother, uncle and his elder brother Uttam. All of them then came to their house along with police. One Executive Magistrate also accompanied them. This witness also stated that the dead body of his father deceased Gouranga was recovered from the room. He also confirmed that there was only one hut in the said house. He further stated that the inquest on the dead body of his father was prepared by the police officer in his presence. As a witness, he put his signature therein. This witness also confirmed that his mother the accused appellant was arrested for the murder of his father Gouranga. 53. P.W. 12, Srinibas Dutta is the brother of the deceased Gouranga who in his deposition has stated that on 26.3.2012, he came to learn from his brother Sankar Datta that he went to the house of his elder brother and found the dead body lying on the courtyard. Getting such information, he rushed to the house of the deceased Gouranga and saw the dead body of the deceased Gouranga which was recovered from the room. 54. P.W. 13, Dr. Mridul Das held the post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased Gouranga. He in his deposition has stated that on examination of the dead body, he found that two hands of the deceased was amputated. He also found lacerated injuries in the occipital region of the deceased and injuries in the right thigh and below left knee. He also found that internal abdominal organs of the dead body were removed. First vertebra and 2nd and 3rd trachea region was found fractured. In cross, this witness stated that the injury No. 6 mentioned in the report is sufficient to cause death of a person in ordinary course. On being shown the seized a crowbar (shabal), this witness stated that such injuries may be caused by such weapon. 55. First vertebra and 2nd and 3rd trachea region was found fractured. In cross, this witness stated that the injury No. 6 mentioned in the report is sufficient to cause death of a person in ordinary course. On being shown the seized a crowbar (shabal), this witness stated that such injuries may be caused by such weapon. 55. P.W. 14 S.1. Samiran Chakraborty is the Investigating Officer who has investigated the case and proved the Exbt. 2 the previous statement of P.W. 3, Krishna Paul, Exbt. 5, previous statement of P.W. 4, Ratan Dey, Ext. 7, previous statement of Dhirendra Shil, P.W. 6, Exbt. 8, previous statement of Sanjoy Pal, P. W 7, Exbt. 9, the previous statement of Uttam Datta, P.W. 8 respectively. 56. P.W. 15 Amar Ch. Pal and P.W. 16 Thakurchan Malakar in their deposition stated that on 26.3.2003, they went to the house at Dashamighat along with SI Samiran Chakraborty, P.W. 14 and one Executive Magistrate also accompanied the police party. Pointing at the accused appellant, this witness stated that she had shown the place inside the hut of that house and told the police officer that he had buried the dead body in that place. Both the witnesses have also stated that as per direction of the police officer and the Magistrate they dug the floor of the hut and recovered a dead body of a person which was wrapped by a polythene sheet. Both the hands of the dead body were chopped off and internal organs were also removed. The accused appellant and the brother of the deceased identified the dead body. These witnesses also stated that after disinterring of the dead body, the police officer prepared the inquest of the same. Thereafter, they removed the same to the IGM Hospital accompanied by the police personnel. 57. Before proceeding further, it would be proper on our part to look into the salient feature of the findings of the trial Court as recorded. 58. Thereafter, they removed the same to the IGM Hospital accompanied by the police personnel. 57. Before proceeding further, it would be proper on our part to look into the salient feature of the findings of the trial Court as recorded. 58. The learned trial Court considering the evidence of P.W. 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 and P. W. 9 came to the conclusion that the deceased Gouranga and his wife accused appellant used to reside in the house of the deceased at West Joynagar as husband and wife and from the evidence of P.W. 9, he found that the said witness had seen the accused appellant and the deceased Gouranga were fighting with each other in the courtyard in the morning of 24.2.2003 and at that time the accused appellant was in possession of a crowbar and with the said crowbar the accused appellant assaulted the deceased Gouranga and she also pushed the deceased Gouranga towards the hut. Thereafter, the deceased Gouranga was missing. Similarly from the evidence of P.W. 5, the learned Trial Court found that there was a quarrel between the deceased Gouranga and the accused appellant on 24.2.2003. The accused appellant also misdirected the villagers telling that her husband i.e. the deceased Gouranga after quarrel left the house. 59. The learned Trial Court also considered the evidence of P. W. 2 informant and P.W. 8 and 9, the son of the deceased Gouranga and P.W. 10, the Executive Magistrate and P.W. 14, the IO of the case and found that the accused appellant accompanied the aforesaid witnesses from the police station to their hut at West Joynagar and from the evidence of P.W. 1, 10, 15 and 16, the trial Court found that the accused appellant had shown the P.W. 10 and 14 the portion of the floor of their dwelling hut and told P.W. 10 and 14 that she had buried the dead of her husband deceased Gouranga beneath the floor of the hut. He also found that P.W. 15 and 16 after digging the floor recovered the dead body of the deceased Gouranga which was identified by the accused appellant and the brother of the deceased Gouranga, i.e. P.W. 2, P.W. 12 and the son of the deceased Gouranga, P.W. 11. He also found that P.W. 15 and 16 after digging the floor recovered the dead body of the deceased Gouranga which was identified by the accused appellant and the brother of the deceased Gouranga, i.e. P.W. 2, P.W. 12 and the son of the deceased Gouranga, P.W. 11. The Other witnesses in their evidence have also stated that the dead body of the deceased Gouranga was disinterred from the floor of their hut of West Joynagar. The trial Court also considered the evidence of other witnesses including the evidence of P.W. 13. 60. Now let us examine the Law Reports cited by the learned Counsel for the parties. In Satyanarayana (supra), their Lordship of the Apex Court found that the High Court has rightly taken note of extrajudicial confession made in that case at about 8.00 a.m. and the delay of lodging FIR by the Village Administrative Officer was not properly explained though the police was at the place of occurrence from 8.00 a.m. to till 4.00 p.m. Not only that, in that case, the whole prosecution case was rested on the alleged extra judicial confession as allegedly made by the accused before the Village Administrative Officer around 8.00 a.m. In the instant case, the FIR was lodged first and thereafter, P.W. 10 and 14 proceeded to the place of occurrence as disclosed and shown by the accused appellant. In that case, there was contradiction in evidence of P.W. 1 and other witnesses and some circumstances were also not explained for which High Court awarded acquittal and ultimately, the Apex Court affirmed the same. According to us the case of Satyanarayana (supra) in no way helps the case of the accused appellant. 61. In Suresh Rajbongshi (supra), a Division Bench of this Court in paragraph-28 only reiterated the settled position of law that in a case of circumstantial evidence, an order of conviction is to be passed basing on the evidence of circumstance which must form complete chain leading to the irresistible conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused person. 62. We have no quarrel with the proposition of law as settled by the Apex Court and reiterated by the Division Bench of this Court. In the instant case, it has to be seen whether the prosecution by way of placing its case established the circumstances which must have formed a complete chain. 62. We have no quarrel with the proposition of law as settled by the Apex Court and reiterated by the Division Bench of this Court. In the instant case, it has to be seen whether the prosecution by way of placing its case established the circumstances which must have formed a complete chain. In that case, there was no evidence to show that the appellant of that case and the accused Suresh Rajbongshi had any plan to cause death of the deceased Himangshu. In that case, the learned Sessions Judge while convicting the appellant had heavily relied on the statement Exbts. 5 and 6 made by the accused person before the Investigating Officer and the Division Bench very rightly considered that the extra-judicial confession made in that case cannot be the basis for conviction as the said statement recorded by the Investigating Officer is hit by 25 of the Evidence Act. In the instant case, no statement has been recorded by the police which is used subsequently as extra judicial confession, rather in the instant case, this statement relating to information so far as the fact of discovery of the dead body, as a proof was accepted being the same is admissible. Therefore, the said case also in no way helps the case of the accused appellant. 63. In Niranjan Panja (supra), the Apex Court rightly did not rely upon the evidence of Sunil Kumar Samanta (P.W. 5) of that case who was the witness of discovery of weapon, as the said weapon Hansua allegedly produced by the accused of that case never saw the light of the day nor had the witness identified the same and the prosecution had also not given any explanation whatsoever about the disappearance of this weapon. In the instant case, it is not the case of the accused appellant that seized weapon used in the offence was not produced by the prosecution before the trial Court and the same was also not identified by any witness, rather from the evidence of the witnesses, particularly, the evidence of P.W. 9, who has stated in his cross by the prosecution on being shown the crowbar that the accused appellant possessed such type of crowbar and P.W. 10, who also identified the seized polythene by which the dead body was wrapped as would be evident from the cross-examination of this witness. From the evidence of P.W. 13, it also appears that the said crowbar was shown to him and on being shown the said crowbar; he has stated that such injuries may be caused by such weapon. Therefore, the case in which the seized article was not placed before the Trial Court and the case where seized article not only produced before the Court, but also identified by the witnesses cannot be considered at par. Thus the case of Niranjan Panja (supra) is also distinguishable. 64. In the case of A. Shankar (supra), the identity of the accused was doubtful. According to Sriram (P W 4) of that case, the brother of Umesh assaulted them: "I do not know who is brother of Umesh. I do not know the accused." Not only that, Shankara (P.W. 8) of that case referred to the accused as brother of Rudresh. Regarding the recovery of the weapon also, there was a doubt and there was delay in lodging the FIR. In that case, the alleged occurrence took place at 2 a.m. and the police station was hardly at a distance of 1 km from the place of the occurrence and the FIR was lodged at about 6 a.m. Not only that, it appears from the evidence of the witnesses that one of the witnesses contradict others. Thus, according to us, the said case also in no way helps the case of the accused appellant. 65. In Kashi Ram (supra) as referred by Mr. Debnath, learned Addl. P.P, the Apex Court noted where inference can be drawn under Section 106 IPC has to be considered upon appreciation of the evidence, as each case rests on its own facts and in that case, when the Apex Court converted the order of acquittal to conviction noted in para 31 of the said Report that: In the facts and circumstances of the case the most incriminating circumstance about the respondent being seen with his wife on February 3, 1998 and disappearing thereafter, and his failure to offer any explanation when arrested, has been completely ignored by the High Court by simply recording the finding that there was nothing unusual in the husband being found with the wife in his house. The High Court failed to appreciate the other co-related circumstances namely his disappearance thereafter locking of the house, and his failure to offer a satisfactory explanation in defence. The High Court failed to appreciate the other co-related circumstances namely his disappearance thereafter locking of the house, and his failure to offer a satisfactory explanation in defence. Thus, the High Court has ignored important clinching evidence which proved the case of the prosecution. Therefore, interference with the judgment of the High Court is warranted. 66. In the instant case also, it would be evident that the police at the instance of the accused appellant went to the house of the deceased and after removing the bricks from the floor of the dwelling hut and by digging the said floor disinterred a dead body of a male which has been identified by Sreenibas Datta, P.W. 12 to be the dead body of deceased Gouranga, Not only that P.W. 5 also in his cross stated that in the morning of 24.2.2003, there was a quarrel between the deceased Gouranga and his wife accused appellant and the accused appellant told the villagers that her husband after quarrel left the house and thereafter the deceased Gouranga was never seen by anybody. Thus, the theory of last seen together is established and the accused appellant is liable to explain relating to the fact of disappearance of her husband Gouranga (deceased) on and from 24.2.2003 which she failed to do. 67. In Girja Prasad vs. State of M.P. AIR 2007 SC 3106 , the Apex Court while referring the evidence of police personnel stated in para 24 as under: 24. It is well settled that credibility of witness has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. It is quite possible that in a given case, a Court of Law may not base conviction solely on the evidence of complainant of a Police Official but it is not the law that police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. The presumption that every person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a Police Official as any other person. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of Police Officials merely because they belong to Police Force. There is no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of Police Officials even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of Police Officials merely because they belong to Police Force. There is no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of Police Officials even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. But, if the Court is convinced that what was stated by a witness has a ring of truth, conviction can be based on such evidence. 68. Therefore, in view of the above decision of the Apex Court, the evidence of P. W. 14 and 1 can also be relied upon so far the statement of the accused appellant relating to discovery of the dead body of her husband Gouranga (deceased). 69. In Uttam Rajbangshi & other vs. State of West Bengal, 2011 Cri. LJ. 928, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court while discussing regarding the failure of the accused on missing link between 11.00 p.m. and 7.00 a.m. noted that such missing link is however filled up by the complete silence of the accused and in that regard, their Lordship of the Calcutta High Court placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Kashi Ram (supra). 70. In Prakash Chand (supra), the Apex Court while discussing regarding Section 8 and 27 of the Evidence Act, noted in Para- 8 and 9 of the said Report as under: 8. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the evidence relating to the conduct of the accused when challenged by the Inspector was inadmissible as it was hit by Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code. He relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in D.V. Narasimham v. State AIR 1969 A.P. 271 . We do not agree with the submission of Shri Anthony. There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code. What is excluded by Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence relating to the conduct of an accused person (not amounting to a statement) when confronted or questioned by a Police Officer during the course of an investigation. For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simplicitor, that an accused person led a Police Officer and pointed out the place where stolen Articles or weapons which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act (vide Himachal Pradesh Administration vs. Om Prakash, AIR 1972 SC 975 . 9. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on which Shri Anthony placed reliance does not support his contention. There the learned Judges were not prepared to go into the question whether the evidence relating to the conduct of the accused was admissible as that question did not directly arise for consideration. On the other hand in Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madh Pra AIR 1954 SC 15 , this Court appeared to be inclined to hold that evidence to the effect that the accused started trembling and showed signs of being frightened on being questioned by the Police officer, if proved, was admissible, and, in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindh Pra, AIR 1954 SC 322 , and State of Madras vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61 , this Court actually relied on evidence relating to the conduct of the accused on being confronted by the Police Officer with the allegation that he had received a bribe. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh's case the evidence relating to conduct on which reliance was placed was to the effect that the accused was confused and could furnish no explanation when questioned by the Police officer. In Vaidyanatha Iyer's case also evidence to the effect that the accused was seen trembling and that he silently produced the notes from the folds of his dhoti was acted upon. In Vaidyanatha Iyer's case also evidence to the effect that the accused was seen trembling and that he silently produced the notes from the folds of his dhoti was acted upon. We, therefore, do not see any reason to rule out the evidence relating to the conduct of the accused which lends circumstantial assurance to the testimony of P.W. 6. 71. In the instant case, the accused appellant failed to explain in her 313 statement as to what happened to her husband Gouranga after quarrel between them on 24.2.2003 as stated by the prosecution evidence. On revisiting the evidence of P. W. 5, 7 and 9 as well as P.W. 1, 10, 14, 15, 16, it is the admitted fact that none of these witnesses was aware about the place where the dead body of the deceased Gouranga was buried before disclosing by the accused. Even if for the argument sake, we consider that the appellant did not conceal the dead body under the floor of the hut, then also the dead body of her deceased husband Gouranga was recovered at her instance is relevant in view of her subsequent conduct and such subsequent conduct of the accused is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, even if such statement is not recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 72. In V Ravi S/o Velayudhan vs. State of Kerala, 1994 Cri. L.J. 162, a Division Bench of Kerala High Court discussed regarding the applicability of Section 27 as well as Section 8 of the Evidence Act which is as follows: 32. The evidence of P.W. 9 along with that of P.W. 19 would show that the accused led the police to the paddy field near the burial ground and pointed out the knife which was seen lying abandoned on the bund of the paddy field and was seized under Ext. P7. Thus, M.O. 27 was recovered as pointed out by the accused. This has got enough corroboration from the evidence of P.W.s. 9 and 10. The evidence would show that the place from where M.O. 27 was recovered was near the burial ground. The very character and nature of the place is such that the same was not frequented by others. Thus, M.O. 27 was recovered as pointed out by the accused. This has got enough corroboration from the evidence of P.W.s. 9 and 10. The evidence would show that the place from where M.O. 27 was recovered was near the burial ground. The very character and nature of the place is such that the same was not frequented by others. Though the confession of the accused is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act the very conduct of the accused in leading the police to the said place and pointing out the place of concealment of M.O. 27 is relevant and admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court in the decision in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1979 SC 400 : (1979 Cri. L.J 329) held that the evidence of the circumstance that the accused led to the police officer and pointed out the place where the weapon which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden would be admissible as conduct, under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Thus the seizure of M.O. 23 shirt that belonged to the accused which had human blood stain, and M.Os. 26 and 27 sold to the accused by P.W. 10 are circumstances which would support the prosecution case. 73. In State of Rajasthan vs. Kheraj Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 224 , the Apex Court discussed regarding the conduct of the accused as admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act and noted that "the conduct of the accused in going to the house of Gaina Ram (P.W.9) and giving false news further aggravates the guilt point finger at the accused. In answering the last question do you have to say any more the accused has not even whispered a word as to what he did to protect at least anyone of the victims or what type of resistance, if any, he offered or with what result. The accused has tried to draw red herrings to confuse and divert the attention of everyone including the investigating agencies from himself. One of such futile attempts was to highlight the footprints. The accused has tried to draw red herrings to confuse and divert the attention of everyone including the investigating agencies from himself. One of such futile attempts was to highlight the footprints. Merely because the trail was not followed by the police, that is really of no consequence. The investigating officer (P.W.-18) has clarified this aspect and justifiably explained the reasons as to why that was not considered necessary or possible." 74. In the instant case also, the accused misdirected her neighbours so far the whereabouts of her husband Gouranga (deceased) after the quarrel with her. Such a conduct of the accused appellant also help the case of the prosecution for presuming that she is guilty for alleged offence. 75. In the instant case also, it is established from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that it is the accused appellant who led the police officer and the Executive Magistrate and pointed out the place where the dead body of her husband deceased Gouranga was buried and such conduct of the accused appellant regarding recovery of the dead body is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act even in absence of Contemporaneous statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, according to us, the argument of Mr. Debnath has some force. 76. In Suresh Chandra (supra), the Apex Court considered the exception 4 of Section 300 IPC and noted that though there was absence of premeditation and it was a case of sudden fight that is not sufficient to bring the offence committed by the accused within the purview of Exception 4. The further requirement of Exception 4 that the offender should not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner should be satisfied. The very fact that the accused-appellants used the fire arms in the course of a frivolous quarrel triggered off by the sarcastic remarks of Ravindra Singh would demonstrate beyond doubt that the appellants acted in a cruel manner and it would further demonstrate the intention to cause death or at any rate; to cause a bodily injury of the nature mentioned in clause thirdly of Section 300. Such intention is writ large on the acts done by the accused. Such intention is writ large on the acts done by the accused. Thus, it is a case in which Clauses I to III of Section 300 IPC are attracted and, as already observed, Exception 4 would not come to the rescue of the appellants for the reason that they have acted in a cruel and unusual manner by shooting at unarmed victims who merely indulged in a verbal duel with them. 77. In the instant case also, it appears from the evidence of the witnesses, particularly, P.W. 5, 7 and 9, that though the deceased Gouranga was unarmed, the accused appellant was armed with weapon like crowbar. It further appears on the discovery of the dead body of the deceased Gouranga and also from the post mortem report that the deceased was killed in a cruel manner, from which it can be presumed that the accused appellant caused bodily injury in such a manner which resulted death of the deceased Gouranga and thereafter also, before burial of the dead body under the floor of the hut, lower abdominal organs were removed and his two hands were also chopped off. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused appellant had no intention to commit murder at the time of causing bodily injury upon the deceased Gouranga. 78. In Paramjeet Singh @ Pamma vs. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2011 SC 200 , the Apex Court considering its earlier judgment held in para-13 of the said Report that "in a criminal trial involving a serious offence of a brutal nature, the Court should be wary of the fact that it is human instinct to react adversely to the commission of the offence and make an effort to see that such an instinctive re-action does not prejudice the accused in any way. In a case where the offence alleged to have been committed is a serious one, the prosecution must provide greater assurance to the Court that its case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt." 79. In the said Report, the Apex Court also took note of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 , wherein the Apex Court observed that it is well settled that the prosecution's case must stand or fall on its own legs and cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence put up by the accused. However, a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the Court where various links in the chain of circumstantial evidence are in themselves complete. 80. The Apex Court in Shared Birdhichand Sarda, (supra), also discussed the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone and held as under:- (1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 81. In the said decision, the Apex Court also discussed regarding admissibility of the evidence on hostile witnesses and reproduced Para-7 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & other vs. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450 which is as follows: It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in to merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. 82. In the instant case, in his cross by the prosecution, P.W. 9 admitted that on 24.2.2003 he had seen deceased Gouranga and his wife accused appellant were fighting with each other in the courtyard and the accused appellant was possessing a crowbar (shabal) and with the said crowbar the accused appellant assaulted the deceased Gouranga and also pushed him towards the hut and thereafter he did not see the deceased Gouranga. The facts narrated by him in cross can be treated as admissible evidence. 83. The facts narrated by him in cross can be treated as admissible evidence. 83. From the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the prosecution established the following incriminating circumstances: (i) That the accused Kalpana was not with good relations with her deceased husband Gouranga. (ii) On 24.2.2003, while quarrelling, she was seen assaulting her husband (deceased) with a crowbar by the prosecution witnesses. (iii) When she was asked by the villagers, she misdirected them telling that her husband Gouranga (deceased) left the house after quarrel. (iv) She had remained in the house from which dead body was recovered till she went to the house of her son, P. W 11, on 24.3.2003. (v) On 26.3.2003, at the instance of her, the dead body of her husband (deceased) was recovered from beneath the floor of the hut where they resided. (vi) She was, also unable to explain in her statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C. as to how she came to know that beneath the floor of their residential hut, the dead body of her husband (deceased) was buried after his murder. 84. In view of the above circumstances and the reasons stated supra, according to us, the prosecution has proved all the links in the chain as required for proving the circum stances and does not suffer from any infirmity from which only hypothesis can be drawn that it is the accused appellant who committed the offence, none else. 85. In the light of the above materials on record, we are of the considered opinion that it was fully established that the deceased was last seen in the company of the appellant following which the dead body of the deceased was disinterred from under the floor of the hut of the deceased Gouranga as shown by her, the accused appellant. The above facts established by the prosecution are found to be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused appellant to the exclusion of any other hypothesis consistent with her innocence. Therefore, in view of what has been stated above, we conclude that, in all human probability, the murder of the deceased Gouranga was caused by the accused appellant. Therefore, in view of what has been stated above, we conclude that, in all human probability, the murder of the deceased Gouranga was caused by the accused appellant. Upon analysis of the entire evidence on record and in the backdrop of the principles of law highlighted above, we are of the inevitable conclusion that the prosecution could establish its accusation brought against the accused appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Judge committed no illegality by holding the accused appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 as well as 201 IPC and recording her conviction and sentence as stated supra. For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in this appeal. Therefore, the appeal stands dismissed. The conviction and sentence passed in the impugned judgment and order are upheld and affirmed. Send down the lower Court records. Appeal dismissed.