Judgment Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. In these two writ petitions preferred by the two officers of the Bihar State Financial Corporation, Patna, they have challenged the order of punishment dated 22.08.2001 whereby these two appellants have been dismissed from service by the order of Managing Director, respondent no.3. The delinquent officers preferred appeals before the Board of Directors which were partly allowed on 09.10.2000, holding the delinquent officers guilty but the punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed in place of dismissal from service. The Board of Directors also enhanced the monetary punishment of recovery of amount. The delinquent officers preferred two writ petitions before this Court being W.P.(S) Nos. 3367 of 2002 and 4267 of 2002, in which the learned Single Judge by a common order dated 13.11.2003 held that notwithstanding the fact that the charges against the petitioners have been proved, the punishment of compulsory retirement with recovery of amount is disproportionate to the misconduct and, therefore, set aside the order imposing the punishment and remitted the matter back to the appellate authority for consideration on the question of quantum of punishment. Being aggrieved against the order of learned Single Judge, dated 13.11.2003, the writ petitioners preferred these two Letter Patent Appeals. These Letter Patent Appeals were allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 20.01.2009 only on the ground that the respondent no.3, Subhas Sharma, was not whole time Managing Director of Bihar State Financial Corporation, Patna was given only the additional charge simultaneously with the charge of the Administrator, Bihar School Examination Board, Patna. Even from a letter which was relied upon by the respondent dated 21.08.2001, it was not appearing that the said Subhas Sharma was appointed as whole time Managing Director. According to said judgment of Division Bench of this Court, dated 20.01.2009, the disciplinary action could have been taken by only whole time Manging Director and since appointment of Subhas Sharma was not on the said post as a regular whole time Managing Director, he was not competent to pass the order of punishment. The Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment has relied upon a judgment of Patna High Court passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1718 of 2006 in the case of Jai Prakash Sinha Vrs. The B.S.F.C. and others for taking the above view. 3. The Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment has relied upon a judgment of Patna High Court passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1718 of 2006 in the case of Jai Prakash Sinha Vrs. The B.S.F.C. and others for taking the above view. 3. The Bihar State Financial Corporation, Patna challenged the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court allowing the L.P.As., dated 20.01.2009 before Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.4295-4296 of 2011, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : “It is well settled that in a challenge against an order passed in a disciplinary proceeding, it is not open to the court to examine or question the validity of appointment of the competent authority who passed the orders of punishment in the disciplinary proceeding.” In view of the above legal position, the judgment of Division Bench of this Court dated 20.01.2009 was set aside and, therefore, these L.P.As. have come-up for fresh consideration. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that it is true that the order of punishment has been set aside but learned Single Judge has committed error of law in accepting the finding recorded by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority with regard to guilt of the appellants. It is submitted that in fact there were no misconduct committed by any of the appellants. According to learned counsel for the appellants, it is clear from the charge-sheet itself that the demand drafts in question amounting to Rs.2,73,916/-and Rs. 28,942/-were sent by the Head-office to the Branch office where these two appellants were working. Therefore, complete sanction of loan process was completed at the level of Head office after scrutiny of the papers and the appellants were directed to hand over the demand draft of Rs.2,73,916/-to the State Bank of India, Chandwa Branch and draft of Rs.28,942/-to the concerned party. The allegation is only that in stead of depositing of draft of Rs.2,73,916/-in the State Bank of India, Chandwa Branch by the appellants themselves, they handed over the said draft to M/s Shree Katha & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., Chandwa. It is submitted that, that the representative of the said firm admittedly deposited the said draft in the same Bank for which direction was given by the Head office. It is submitted that, that the representative of the said firm admittedly deposited the said draft in the same Bank for which direction was given by the Head office. Therefore, only alleged misconduct of the appellants is that they themselves did not deposit the said draft in the Bank account of said Bank and it was deposited by the third person. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that there was no specific instruction that draft should be deposited in the Bank account and should not be given to the party concerned without holding any enquiry of the books of accounts of the borrower and without complying some directions. It is submitted that admittedly, the respondents did not suffer any loss in any manner much less in peculiar way. Therefore, it is submitted that it was not a case of misconduct and even it may be case of slight dereliction from duty. It is also submitted that even then the disciplinary authority punished the appellants-petitioners with the punishment of dismissal from service, however, that has been reduced by the appellate authority but that too, to a punishment of compulsory retirement and order was passed for recovery of the amount. This clearly indicates that the punishment was absolutely disproportionate to the charge levelled against the appellants-petitioners. 6. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the charge levelled against the appellants-petitioners and order passed by the disciplinary authority and the reasons given by the learned Single Judge. We are of the considered opinion that learned Single Judge considered the facts of the case in detail and the fact that the appellants-petitioners themselves admitted that instructions were in fact given to the appellants by the Head office for verifying certain facts before handing over the demand drafts to the Bank and the party and those instructions were not followed and the drafts were released without verifying the books of accounts etc. After considering these facts and surrounding circumstances, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the petitioners were rightly found guilty though the charge was levelled after delay of 10 years. Learned Single Judge also found that the petitioners did not follow the instructions. 7. After considering these facts and surrounding circumstances, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the petitioners were rightly found guilty though the charge was levelled after delay of 10 years. Learned Single Judge also found that the petitioners did not follow the instructions. 7. In view of the above reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioners may have made out a case for lesser punishment than the punishment of compulsory retirement but it is not a case where the petitioners can be exonerated. 8. In view of the above, we are also of the considered opinion that petitioners were rightly held guilty but the fact that the punishment was certainly disproportionate to the guilt and charge levelled after delay of 10 years, also was a relevant fact and the process of issuing draft was completed at Head office level and petitioners were only required to obey the directions of the Head office and they may not have strictly adhered to those compliances but they could not be punished in the manner in which they have been punished. Therefore, learned Single Judge has rightly directed to pass a fresh order of punishment. In view of the above reason, we do not find any merit in these appeals. 9. However, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that amounts have been recovered from the appellants-petitioners. Be that as it may, since punishment order itself has been set aside and the quantum of punishment is yet to be determined, whether the amount recovered from the petitioners are required to be refunded depends upon the order of punishment which may be passed by the appellate authority. As the matter was remanded to the appellate authority by the learned Single Judge, while passing the order of punishment, the appellate authority may also pass order of refund, if the punishment is not of recovery of any amount from the appellants-petitioners and lesser punishment is awarded. The appellate authority is directed to conclude the proceedings by passing an appropriate order after giving opportunity of hearing to the appellants within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.