Judgment : Since both these Writ Petitions have been filed questioning the imposition of power restrictions and prescription of penalties, they are heard and being disposed of together. The petitioner in W.P.No.29621/2012 is a H.T. consumer of respondent No.2-DISCOM. It has a contracted demand of 1600 KVA with a connected load of 2000 KW. The power is being supplied under the H.T. agreement dated 28-1-2010. The petitioner filed this Writ Petition feeling aggrieved by proceedings No.APERC/Secy/3/2012-13, dated 7-9-2012 of the A.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission-respondent No.3 herein (for short "the APERC") to the extent it has prescribed the penal charges for non-compliance of restrictions and control measures. It is the pleaded case of the petitioner that there is no justification for imposition of power cuts which altogether come to around 64%, while the shortage of power is only to the extent of 14%. Alternatively, the petitioner pleaded that even if the respondents have justification to impose power cuts, the APERC has no power to prescribe penalties for violation of the restrictions imposed by it and respondent No.2-DISCOM has no power to levy and recover such penalties. Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that any penalty can be levied under specific statutory provisions; that wherever the Electricity Act, 2003 (for short "the 2003 Act") intended to empower the licensees to levy and collect penalties, it has made express provisions for that purpose. To illustrate the same, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to Sections 29, 33, 43, 140, 144 and 170 of 2003 Act. In support of his pleas, the learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the following Judgments : Tolaram Relumal Vs. State of Bombay ( AIR 1954 S.C. 496 ), Sanjay Dutt Vs. State, through C.B.I., Bombay (1994) 5 SCC 410 ), State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Azad Bharat Finance Co. ( AIR 1967 S.C. 276 ), O. Konavalov Vs. Commander, Coast Guard Region (2006) 4 SCC 620 ), Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-I (2007) 9 SCC 665 ), Principal Chief Conservator of Forests Vs. J.K. Johnson (2011) 10 SCC 794 ), Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India Vs. Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (2007) 12 SCC 210 ). The learned Senior Counsel has distinguished the Judgment in The Adoni Cotton Mills Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-I (2007) 9 SCC 665 ), Principal Chief Conservator of Forests Vs. J.K. Johnson (2011) 10 SCC 794 ), Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India Vs. Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (2007) 12 SCC 210 ). The learned Senior Counsel has distinguished the Judgment in The Adoni Cotton Mills Vs. A.P. State Electricity Board (1976) 4 SCC 68 ) on the ground that the said Judgment was rendered under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (for short "the 1910 Act") and Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (for short "the 1948 Act"). He has also submitted that the said Judgment has not noticed the Judgments in Tolaram Relumal (1-supra) and O. Konavalov (3-supra) and that therefore the same cannot be treated as laying down the correct law. Opposing the above submissions, Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.2-DISCOM, has heavily relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in The Adoni Cotton Mills (8-supra). He has taken the Court through the relevant provisions of the 1910 Act, the 1948 Act and the 2003 Act, and has pleaded that even though the first mentioned two Acts were repealed by the latter Act, in view of parity in the statutory provisions between the 1910 Act, the 1948 Act and the 2003 Act, the ratio laid down in The Adoni Cotton Mills (8-supra) still continues to hold the field. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Respondent No.2-DISCOM along with the three other Distribution Companies (DISCOMS) which are involved in the supply of power to the consumers in the State of Andhra Pradesh, approached the APERC with a representation seeking the latter's permission to impose restrictions on the power supply. Accordingly, the APERC has issued the above noted proceedings dated 7-9-2012. In the said proceedings, the APERC has taken note of the energy deficit in the State during the year 2012-13 as pleaded by all the four DISCOMS. The APERC has noted in the impugned proceedings that the DISCOMS claimed that as against the demand of 276 Million Units per day, the power availability is to the extent of 202 Million Units and that there is a short-fall of 74 Million Units per day. The APERC has noted in the impugned proceedings that the DISCOMS claimed that as against the demand of 276 Million Units per day, the power availability is to the extent of 202 Million Units and that there is a short-fall of 74 Million Units per day. Upon considering the projected demand and supply for the period from August 2012 to May 2013, the APERC has imposed restrictions on the contracted demand and energy consumption from September 2012 to March 2013 in exercise of its power conferred under clause (k) of sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the 2003 Act. Different percentages of power cuts have been imposed by the APERC on the contracted maximum demand and the energy during off-peak and peak hours, the details of which need not be stated in the context of the present cases. Para-11 of the impugned proceedings, which is relevant in this case, reads as under: "Penal charges or non-compliance of R&C measures: The Clause 213.6(8) and Clause 213.3(4)(iv) of Tariff Order 2012-13, specifies the penal charges to be paid by a consumer for exceeding the contracted demand. In view of the shortage scenario and in order to maintain grid discipline and equitable distribution of available power among different consumer categories, the following penal charges are approved in place of clause 213.6(8) and clause 213.3(4) of Tariff Order 2012-13. (a) Demand Charges on excess over Permitted Demand Limited (PDL) shall be billed at the rate of 3 times of Normal tariff. (b) Energy charges on excess over PCL during Off-peak period shall be billed at the rate of 3 times of Normal tariff. (c) Energy charges on excess over PCL during peak period shall be billed at the rate of 5 times of Normal tariff consumed during that particular peak time period i.e., 18:30 Hrs. to 22:30 Hrs. of that date. (d) The DISCOMs shall levy these penal charges based on MRI readings. The learned Senior Counsel has not pressed the first mentioned plea raised by the petitioner in the Writ Petition i.e., that the shortage of power is only to the extent of 14% and that therefore the imposition of cuts to the extent of 64% is illegal. He has only harped on the plea of lack of power and authority in the APERC to prescribe penalties for violation of the power restrictions imposed by it on the consumers. He has only harped on the plea of lack of power and authority in the APERC to prescribe penalties for violation of the power restrictions imposed by it on the consumers. In The Adoni Cotton Mills (8-supra), a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has dealt with the same question that has been raised by the petitioner in this Writ Petition. When that case was decided, the provisions of the 1910 Act and the 1948 Act were in force. The brief facts of that case are that, on 6-4-1972, on account of the acute shortage of power, the A.P. State Electricity Board (APSEB), to which respondent No.2-DISCOM and the three other DISCOMS have succeeded, imposed power restrictions by fixing quotas for consumption of power. It has also prescribed higher charges at double the normal tariffs if consumption of power by the consumers was exceeded in any month. The said order was made by the State Government in exercise of its power under Section 22-B of the 1910 Act. This order was followed by various other orders issued by the State Government to the similar effect. These orders came to be questioned by various consumers of the erstwhile APSEB before this Court. A Division Bench of this Court by its Judgment dated 26-8-1975 dismissed the said Writ Petitions. Assailing the same, the consumers filed Special Leave Petitions, wherein the Supreme Court granted Leave and disposed of the Civil Appeals. While affirming the Judgment of the Division Bench, the Supreme Court repelled the plea of the consumers that the APSEB had no power under Section 49 of the 1948 Act either to impose different percentages of cuts in the power supply to the consumers or to impose penalties, more so when the earlier order issued by the State Government has ceased to operate. The Apex Court has also turned down the plea of the consumers that the ABSEB had no power to levy and collect penal charges in excess of the prescribed tariffs. Para-30 of the Judgment in the said case, which is relevant in the present context, is as follows: "The terms and conditions contain the power of the Board to enhance the rates. Para-30 of the Judgment in the said case, which is relevant in the present context, is as follows: "The terms and conditions contain the power of the Board to enhance the rates. Section 49(3) of the 1948 Act states that the Board has power to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and public purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors. The expression "any other relevant factors" is not to be construed ejusdem generis because there is no genus of the relevant factors. The combined effect of Section 49 of the 1948 Act and the terms and conditions of supply is that having regard to the nature of supply and other relevant factors particularly when there is shortage of electricity the Board has power to enhance the rates. If there is shortage of electricity there is to be restriction on supply. The Board can disconnect supply if the quota is exceeded. The imposition of higher rates is only to sanction the rigour of ration by making persons who exceed the quota liable to pay higher rates." (Emphasis added) The above mentioned Judgment has thus answered the similar questions which have been raised in these Writ Petitions. The learned Senior Counsel has strongly urged that as the said Judgment was rendered under a completely different legal environment governed by the provisions of the above mentioned two repealed Acts of 1910 and 1948, the same has no application to the present cases which are governed by the provisions of the 2003 Act. In order to examine this submission, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions under which the power restrictions were imposed earlier and now under the different sets of the statutory enactments. Power restrictions between 1972 and 1975 were imposed by the State Government in exercise of its power under Section 22-B of the 1910 Act and by the APSEB while exercising its power under Section 49(1) of the 1948 Act, whereas the restrictions under the present Act i.e., 2003 Act, were imposed by the APERC under Section 23 thereof and being enforced by respondent No.2-DISCOM under Section 62 thereof. It is therefore apt to compare these provisions with each other. It is therefore apt to compare these provisions with each other. These provisions are accordingly reproduced hereunder: The Indian Electricity Act ,1910 The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 The Electricity Act, 2003 Section 22-B: Power to control the distribution and consumption of energy: (1) If the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do, for maintaining the supply and securing the equitable distribution of energy, it may by order provide for regulating the supply, distribution, consumption or use thereof. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) an order made thereunder may direct the licensee not to comply, except with the permission of the State Government, with:- (i) the provisions of any contract, agreement or requisition whether made before or after the commencement of the Indian Electricity (Amendment) Act, 1959, (32 of 1959) for the supply (other than the resumption of a supply) or an increase in the supply of energy to any person; or (ii) any requisition for the resumption of supply of energy to a consumer after a period of six months, from the date of its discontinuance; or (iii) any requisition for the resumption of supply of energy made within six months of its discontinuance, where the requisitioning consumer was not himself the consumer of the supply at the time of its discontinuance. Section 49: Provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of regulations, if any sale made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs. (2) In fixing the uniform tariffs, the Board shall have regard to all or any of the following factors, namely:- (a) the nature of the supply and the purposes for which it is required; (b) the coordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner, with particular reference to such development in areas not for the time being served or adequately served by the licensee; (c) the simplification and standardization of methods and rates of charges for such supplies; (d) the extension and cheapening supplies of electricity to sparsely developed areas. (3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the power of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors. (4) In fixing the tariffs and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, the Board shall not show undue preference to any person. Section 23: Directions to licensees: If the Appropriate Commission is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining the efficient supply, securing the equitable distribution of electricity and promoting competition, it may, by order, provide for regulating supply, distribution, consumption or use thereof. Section 86 : Functions of State Commission: (1) The State Commission shall discharge the following functions, namely, (a) ... (b) ... ... (k) discharge such other functions as may be assigned to it under this Act. Section 62: Determination of Tariff: (1) The Appropriate Commission shall determine the tariff in accordance with provisions of this Act for- (a) supply of electricity by a generating company to a distribution licensee; Provided that the Appropriate Commission may, in case of shortage of supply of electricity, fix the minimum and maximum ceiling of tariff for sale or purchase of electricity in pursuance of an agreement, entered into between a generating company and a licensee or between licensees, for a period not exceeding one year to ensure reasonable prices of electricity; (b) transmission of electricity; (c) wheeling of electricity; (d) retail sale of electricity. Provided that in case of distribution of electricity in the same area by two or more distribution licensees, the Appropriate Government may, for promoting competition among distribution licensees, fix only maximum ceiling of tariff for retail sale of electricity. (2) The Appropriate Commission may require a licensee or a generating company to furnish separate details, as may be specified in respect of generation, transmission and distribution for determination of tariff. (2) The Appropriate Commission may require a licensee or a generating company to furnish separate details, as may be specified in respect of generation, transmission and distribution for determination of tariff. (3) The Appropriate Commission shall not, while determining the tariff under this Act, show undue preference to any consumer of electricity but may differentiate according to the consumer's load factor, power factor, voltage, total consumption of electricity during any specified period or the time at which the supply is required or the geographical position of any area, the nature of supply and the purpose for which the supply is required. (4) No tariff or part of any tariff may ordinarily be amended, more frequently than once in any financial year, except in respect of any changes expressly permitted under the terms of any fuel surcharge formula as may be specified. (5) The Commission may require a licensee or a generating company to comply with such procedures as may be specified for calculating the expected revenues from the tariff and charges which he or it is permitted to recover. (6) If any licensee or a generating company recovers a price or charge exceeding the tariff determined under this section, the excess amount shall be recoverable by the person who has paid such price or charge along with interest equivalent to the bank rate without prejudice to any other liability incurred by the licensee. A careful comparison of the above reproduced provisions would undoubtedly reveal that the provisions of Section 23 of the 2003 Act are in pari materia with Section 22-B(1) of the 1910 Act. Under Section 23 of the 2003 Act, the same regulatory powers which were conferred on the State Governments by Section 22-B of the 1910 Act, have been conferred on the APERC. Section 86(1)(k) of the 2003 Act is a general provision, which, by itself does not confer any power on the APERC, but the same empowers it to discharge the functions specifically assigned to it under the Act. Under Section 62 of the 2003 Act, the APERC is vested with the similar powers which were conferred by Section 49 of the 1948 Act on the State Electricity Boards. Therefore, even though the provisions of the 1910 and the 1948 Acts were repealed by the 2003 Act, the latter Act carried similar provisions relating to regulating power supply and fixing different tariffs. Therefore, even though the provisions of the 1910 and the 1948 Acts were repealed by the 2003 Act, the latter Act carried similar provisions relating to regulating power supply and fixing different tariffs. The only difference being, the powers of the State Government and the State Electricity Boards under the repealed Acts are conferred on the Electricity Regulatory Commissions. Even though under the two repealed Acts specific power to collect higher tariffs from the consumers who exceed the quotas fixed for them was not conferred either on the State Government or on the APSEB, the Supreme Court has read such power into Section 49 of the 1948 Act by holding that the purpose of collecting the higher charges is to "enforce the rigour of ration". In other words, mere imposition of restrictions without the corresponding liability on the consumer to pay higher charges would be of no consequence as there will be no deterrent for the consumers on exceeding the quotas fixed. Therefore, the Supreme Court has construed the provisions of Section 49 of the 1948 Act as empowering the APSEB to collect higher tariffs from the consumers who exceeded their quotas. The same analogy would apply in these cases as the APERC is conferred with similar powers under Section 62 of the 2003 Act, which Section 49 of the 1948 Act conferred on the APSEB. The various Judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel referred to above, undoubtedly laid down two legal propositions, namely, (i) that penal statutes should always be strictly construed; and (ii) that if a statutory provision is capable of two possible and reasonable constructions, the Court must lean towards the construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than which imposes penalty. None of the Judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel have dealt with the provisions similar to the provisions of Section 49(1) of the 1948 Act and Section 62 of the 2003 Act. All these Judgments were rendered while dealing with questions of different nature arising under different statutory enactments. It is not in dispute that no Judgment subsequent to The Adoni Cotton Mills (8-supra) has disagreed with the opinion in the said case. All these Judgments were rendered while dealing with questions of different nature arising under different statutory enactments. It is not in dispute that no Judgment subsequent to The Adoni Cotton Mills (8-supra) has disagreed with the opinion in the said case. I cannot therefore agree with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that the Judgment of the Supreme Court in The Adoni Cotton Mills (8-supra) has lost its precedential value or that it has not laid down the correct law. Unless and until the Judgment in the said case has been referred to and over-ruled either expressly or by necessary implication, it continues to hold the field and binds all the Courts in the country as the law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. For the above mentioned reasons, I do not find any merit in W.P.No.29621/2012. W.P.No.31777/2012 has been filed by a Cotton Mill which is classified as a seasonal industry. It operates only during the season as declared by respondent No.2-DISCOM. The petitioners pleaded that considering the fact that seasonal industries are closed down after completion of the season, separate tariffs have been fixed for them during the season and off-season and that while envisaging power cuts, the APERC ought to have considered them as a separate class. At the hearing, Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the seasonal period for petitioner No.1 commences in November and extends upto May and that if huge power cuts are imposed on it during this period, it will have a serious effect on its functioning. He has further submitted that unlike the industries which run throughout the year, the seasonal industries will not be able to make up for the lost period during the power cuts by working continuously after the relaxation or the lifting of power cuts. I see force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Even though the seasonal industries have been treated separately while fixing the tariffs by the APERC, in its proceedings imposing the power restrictions, it has not considered these industries separately. As rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, as the period of working of a seasonal industry is limited to a part of the year, their functioning will be seriously affected due to the imposition of power restrictions during the season. As rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, as the period of working of a seasonal industry is limited to a part of the year, their functioning will be seriously affected due to the imposition of power restrictions during the season. Unlike the industries which work throughout the year, the seasonal industries cannot make good the lost period due to imposition of power cuts even after removal of the power restrictions in the off season period. Section 62 of the 2003 Act, which is in pari materia with Section 49 of the 1948 Act, empowers the APERC to fix uniform tariffs. In M/s. Rohtas Industries Ltd. Vs. Chairman, Bihar State Electricity Board ( AIR 1984 S.C. 657 ), the Supreme Court held that where a Corporation is an instrumentality or an agency of the Government, it would, in exercise of its powers and function, be subject to the same constitutional or public law limitations as apply to the Government and the principles of law inhibiting arbitrary action by the Government would apply equally where such a Corporation is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise and that it cannot act arbitrarily and enter into relationship with any person in any manner it likes according to its sweet will. It was further held that the acts of such a Corporation must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reasonableness and relevance. In The Adoni Cotton Mills Ltd. (8-supra), the Apex Court held that the provisions of Article 14 of our Constitution and Section 49(4) of the 1948 Act are similar in principle and that it is the principle of equality or non-discrimination. It was further held that equality does not mean a mechanical equal treatment; that things which are different shall not be treated as though they are the same and that the obligation not to discriminate involves both the right and the obligation to make reasonable classification on the basis of relevant factors. It was further held that equality does not mean a mechanical equal treatment; that things which are different shall not be treated as though they are the same and that the obligation not to discriminate involves both the right and the obligation to make reasonable classification on the basis of relevant factors. The Supreme Court illustrated this principle by observing that cutting down 50% needs of the hospital and the needs of industries producing consumer goods cannot be treated on the same footing and that it would be justifiable to treat them with reference to their urgency, their social utility and also the impact on the conservation and economies in the available supply of electric power. The APERC, while regulating the power supply, is expected to take into consideration the above mentioned principles of law laid down by the Apex Court. The APERC is therefore bound to consider the peculiarities in the working pattern and consumption of power by consumers such as the seasonal industries which are different from the other industries and the serious adverse effects which they suffer on account of imposition of power restrictions during the seasonal period. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the APERC shall reconsider its decision regarding imposition of power restrictions on the seasonal industries. It shall give a general notice to all the seasonal industries in the State and after hearing their views and that of the DISCOMS, it shall take a fresh decision within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order. In the analysis as above, W.P.No.29621/2012 is dismissed and W.P.No.31777/2012 is disposed of with the above directions. As a sequel, WPMP Nos. 37823 and 40238 of 2012 and 40535 of 2012 are disposed of as infructuous.