JUDGMENT A. B. CHAUDHARI, J. 1. Heard. Rule. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel for the rival parties. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the first and main prayer clause made the following submissions. (A) That the lease-deed dated 20.2.2009 in respect of the plot purchased in auction showing user of the plot as market is liable to be ignored in view of the fact that the consent for showing the user as market was obtained by the Nagpur Improvement Trust (NIT) from the petitioner on the misleading representation that the same would be converted into commercial. (B) There are nearby plots to the plot purchased by the petitioner and in particular plot No.37, which though was initially indicated as for market, the NIT executed the lease-deed in favour of the said allottee of plot No.37 showing the user of the plot as commercial. Thus, the neighbouring plot has been shown as commercial and this action on the part of the NIT violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the NIT is making discrimination. This Court has jurisdiction to exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India particularly because the petitioner has placed all material on record for examining the merits of the case of the petitioner and therefore, this Court should not decline to exercise the writ jurisdiction. (C) The fact that the road that is required for market area is not in accordance with the policy regarding the width of the road is an indicator of the fact that plot allotted to the petitioner could not be and cannot be described as reserved for market. 3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the NIT argued that there is a lease-deed executed voluntarily by the petitioner in respect of the plot and with open eyes he signed the lease-deed, which is a registered document, showing the user of the plot as market. None compelled the petitioner to sign the lease-deed when he appeared before the Registrar for registration of the lease-deed. It is now not open to the petitioner to question the execution of the lease-deed. Pointing out the map, learned counsel for the NIT argued that a particular area has been earmarked for market and the borderline is at the edge of plot No.36 and thereafter the commercial area starts. It is now not open to the petitioner to question the execution of the lease-deed. Pointing out the map, learned counsel for the NIT argued that a particular area has been earmarked for market and the borderline is at the edge of plot No.36 and thereafter the commercial area starts. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in showing plot No.37 as commercial. He, therefore, submits that the action of the NIT cannot be faulted and thus, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the rival parties and upon perusal of the record at the outset, we find that the petitioner signed the lease-deed showing market as the use of the plot No. 36 and got it registered with the Registrar with open eyes. There is nothing on record that at that time he had protested before getting the document registered or thereafter about any misrepresentation by the NIT for execution of the said document of lease-deed. After all the allotment of plot in auction, the price of plot and the terms and conditions of lease are the matters of contract between the NIT and the party, namely the petitioner herein. If the petitioner wanted not to have the plot showing market as the reservation, the petitioner was at full liberty to refuse to accept the plot and take his money back, but then the petitioner entered into the lease agreement, which is a registered document. The contention that the user for some plots or rather plot No.37 which was for market has been changed to Commercial violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not appeal to us since it is the expert Town Planning Authority, namely NIT which decided to name the user of plots after plot No.36 i.e. starting from plot No.37 as Commercial. We cannot embark upon any enquiry on that aspect. 5. In the above factual background discussed above, we make it clear that we have not declined to exercise the writ jurisdiction in the light of the materials placed before us. We, thus, find that the lease document having been voluntarily executed by the petitioner it will not be open for the petitioner now to contend otherwise. 6. 5. In the above factual background discussed above, we make it clear that we have not declined to exercise the writ jurisdiction in the light of the materials placed before us. We, thus, find that the lease document having been voluntarily executed by the petitioner it will not be open for the petitioner now to contend otherwise. 6. The contention about the discrimination qua Article 14 of the Constitution of India pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the petitioner about change of use of the plot No.37 hardly appeals to us in the first place because plot No.37 makes the beginning of commercial zone after the boundary of plot No.36 and the use of all the plots including plot No.36 before plot No.36 have been indicated as market. On facts, therefore, we do not find that there is anything wrong with the NIT in demarcating the zones as above. As a matter of fact the map shows that plot Nos.31 to 36 have been indicated as market and at the border of plot No.36 the commercial area starts from plot No.37. It is not that a plot in between the area shown as market is being converted into commercial use. Therefore, even on facts, we find no grievance can be made on the ground of discrimination. We, therefore, do not find that there is any discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as contended. 7. The submission about the width of the road, namely 15 meters equally does not appeal to us because the same is not necessarily a factor which would indicate that the area is not the market area. At any rate, that is not a deciding factor and the best Judge in such cases would be the Planning Authority and the State Government and it is not possible to interfere with their actions. In the result, we do not find any merit in the present writ petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.