ORAL ORDER Writ Application was filed by the erstwhile District Magistrate, Nalanda at Biharsharif as well as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate -cum- Returning Officer, Biharsharif at Nalanda. The present Writ Application has been filed against the judgment/order dated 07.05.2007, passed by the Court of Sub-Judge-VII, acting as Election Tribunal, Biharsharif at Nalanda in Election Petition No. 1 of 2006, by virtue of which, while allowing the election petition, a cost of Rs. 50,000/- (fifty thousand) was imposed on these petitioners as compensation to the petitioner of the election petition, for the harassment caused to him. 2. The stand of the petitioners is that the Election Tribunal had no authority or power to award such compensation against the officials, while acting as a Presiding Officer of the Election Tribunal under the Bihar Gram Panchayat Act, 2006. 3. One Satyendra Kumar, Respondent-1st set instituted Election Petition No. 1 of 2006 before the Court of Sub-Judge-VII, Biharsharif at Nalanda. His grievance was that he was a successful candidate for Biharsharif East in the election conducted for Zila Parishad Member. However, by certain manipulation and mischief caused by the officials involved with the election process, one Manju Devi was illegally declared as returned candidate. 4. After a detailed hearing of the election petition and based on the evidence which emerged, the election petition was allowed in favour of the petitioner of the election petition. A declaration in his favour was made. However, while deciding issue no. 5, the Presiding Officer saddled responsibility upon the officials conducting the election for having caused loss to the petitioner and awarded compensation of Rs. 50,000/-. This is said to be over and above the cost of the election petition etc. 5. The stand of the petitioners is that the Tribunal had no power and authority to impose or grant compensation to the extent of 50,000/- against the officials, even though there could have been some findings or evidence of them not having performed their duty in a satisfactory manner in the declaration of result. The finding is that in the final counting of votes before declaration, the counting of votes was not properly done, which led to a wrongful declaration of the result, even though Satyendra Kumar, the petitioner in election petition was the successful candidate. 6. The finding is that in the final counting of votes before declaration, the counting of votes was not properly done, which led to a wrongful declaration of the result, even though Satyendra Kumar, the petitioner in election petition was the successful candidate. 6. Submission on behalf of the petitioners is that the trial of an election petition is held under a codified law and the Tribunal working as an Election Tribunal only has attributes of a Civil Court. The powers are to be exercised strictly in terms of the statutes and provisions and the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act, 2006, which does not envisage award of compensation to a successful candidate, on success of an election petition. 7. The Court has been taken through the several sections, which deal with the election petition. The manner in which such petitions have to be filed, tried and the kind or nature of relief, which can be granted by the Tribunal. Attention of the Court has also been drawn to the provisions, which have some reflection as to what action can be taken under the Act against the officials involved in the election process or its conduct. 8. Section 137 of the Panchayati Raj Act deals with what an election petition is supposed to be, who shall join as parties or respondents and what would be the basis for such petition to be filed. The corresponding rule which is known as Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 2006 provides for the details which will regulate the election petition and the proceeding. The relevant rules are rule 106 to rule 112 etc. Attention of the Court has also been drawn to section 130 of the Act which talks of electoral offences. What is of relevance so far as the present case is concerned is Section 130, sub-clause (12), sub-sub-clause (1), (2) and (3). The above provisions are reproduced here-in-below for easy reference and appreciation:- “(12) Breaches of official duty in connection with election – (1) If any person to whom this section applies is without reasonable cause guilty of any act or omission in breach of his official duty, he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees:- (1-A) An offence punishable under clause (1) shall be cognizable. (2) No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against any such person for damages in respect of any such act or omission as aforesaid. (2) No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against any such person for damages in respect of any such act or omission as aforesaid. (3) The persons to whom this section applies are the District Election Officers (Panchayat), Returning Officers, Assistant Returning Officers, Presiding Officer, Polling Officers and any other person appointed to perform any duty in connection with the receipt of nominations or withdrawal of candidatures, or the recording or counting of votes at an election; and the expression “official duty” shall for the purposes of this section be construed accordingly, but shall not include duties imposed otherwise than by or under this Act.” 9. Based on the above parameters and provisions, counsel for the petitioners re-enforces his argument by placing reliance on certain decisions of the Apex Court rendered. In the case of Jagan Nath Vrs Jaswant Singh, reported in AIR 1954 Supreme Court 210, the Apex Court had this to say in paragraph 6 and 7, which are quoted hereinbelow:- “6. In this appeal it was contended before us that the Election Tribunal was not a court of general jurisdiction, that it was established by the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for the special purpose of trying election petitions, that its jurisdiction was derived from the statute upon certain specified terms and conditions precedent, contained in the statute itself and that it had no general and inherent powers of an existing court and that being so, if the terms and conditions precedent prescribed by the statute were not complied with, it had no jurisdiction to act ............... (emphasis mine). 7. The general rule is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the court possesses no common law power (emphasis mine) It is also well settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law. None of these propositions however has any application if the special law itself confers authority on a Tribunal to proceed with a petition in accordance with certain procedure and when it does not state the consequences of non-compliance with certain procedural requirements laid down by it. It is always to be borne in mind that though the election of a successful candidate is not to be lightly interfered with, one of the essentials of that law is also to safeguard the purity of the election process and also to see that people do not get elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt practices. In cases where the election law does not prescribe the consequence or does not lay down penalty for non-compliance with certain procedural requirements of that law, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal entrusted with the trial of the case is not affected.” 10. Same view has been reiterated by placing reliance on the above judgment in the case of Jyoti Basu and others versus Debi Ghosal and others, reported in AIR 1982 Supreme Court 983, emphasis is on paragraph 7 and 8, which are also quoted hereinbelow:- “7. The nature of the right to elect, the right to be elected and the right to dispute an election and the scheme of the constitutional and statutory provisions in relation to these rights have been explained by the Court in N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, 1952 SCR 218 : ( AIR 1952 SC 64 ) and Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210 . We proceed to state what we have gleaned from what has been said, so much as necessary for this case. 8. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law Right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action at Common Law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action at Common Law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to Common Law and Equity must remain strangers to Election Law unless statutorily embodied. A Court has no right to resort to them on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such matters, as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes, Court is put in a straight jacket (emphasis mine) 11. The view of the Hon'ble Apex Court right from the year 1954 till date remains the same. The power which the Election Tribunal is required to exercise is straight jacketed and it can never have the attributes of a Court, where certain relief over and above what can be provided for can be granted. If this is the law falling from the highest court of the land, then prima facie the petitioners have made out a case for interfering with that part of the declaration made in the election petition which has imposed cost by way of a compensation upon two petitioners who are before the High Court, in the present Writ Application. 12. Counsel representing Respondent No. 1 of the 1st set submits that there may not be an occasion to interfere with the award of compensation to him by the Election Tribunal, because it was the conduct of the officials which had created a lot of harassment and a successful candidate was denied opportunity to represent the people who voted him to majority. He had a long battle to fight before the Tribunal, which entailed expenses and harassment and also had to defend the said order right up till LPA Bench. The Tribunal, therefore, had come to the correct opinion that a compensation or cost of the kind was required to be imposed also may be as an example to other officials so that nobody would dare to commit mischief of the kind in declaration of results in future. 13. The Tribunal, therefore, had come to the correct opinion that a compensation or cost of the kind was required to be imposed also may be as an example to other officials so that nobody would dare to commit mischief of the kind in declaration of results in future. 13. The stand of Respondent 1st set may have some merit, but whether the same stands, the scrutiny of law is the question which is required to be answered by this Court. No doubt, the protracted litigation which the said respondent had to undergo to succeed and claim his rightful place of being called the returned candidate cannot be disputed but when it comes down to imposing a compensatory amount of 50,000/- over and above the cost of the election petition, is a transgression of powers by the Tribunal which cannot be justified and requires interference in this Court. I.A. No. 8036 of 2011 Interlocutory Application has been filed on behalf of the State Election Commissioner and the Commission for transposing them as petitioners in the present Writ Application from the category of respondents, because they also apprehend that the order of the Tribunal may be interpreted widely to rope them in as well. It was with this apprehension that the above Interlocutory Application was filed. 15. The Court can only opine that there is no necessity to allow the said Interlocutory Application. Whatever be the apprehension of the authorities of the State Election Commission a reading of the judgment of the Election Tribunal itself would indicate that the thrust or the ire of the Tribunal was directed against the people who were directly involved in the election process in the field in the counting and declaration of results and the same cannot be expended to include the State Election Commissioner or any other officials, situated at the headquarter. 16. It is clarified, therefore, that the order of the Election Tribunal will have no application so far as the State Election Commissioner or the officials located at Patna are concerned. 17. Interlocutory Application, therefore, is rejected. 18. The Writ Application, however, for the reasons indicated above, is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the Court of Sub-Judge-VII-cum-Election Tribunal, Biharsharif in Election Petition 01 of 2006 to the extent of award of compensation of 50,000/- against the petitioners or such officials is quashed.