Haryana Warehousing Corporation v. Gupta Electric Company
2012-09-05
L.N.MITTAL
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Mr. L.N. Mittal, J.: (Oral) - In this first appeal, judgment dated 8.9.2008 passed by learned Additional District Judge (Adhoc)/Fast Track Court, Panchkula is under challenge. By the said judgment, learned Additional District Judge dismissed the petition filed by appellants herein under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short, the Act). 2. Dispute between appellants and respondent no. 1--contractor was referred by court to respondent no. 2--Arbitrator who gave his award dated 25.9.2006 thereby awarding total amount of Rs.6,76,985/- towards claims of the contractor and awarding Rs.26,725/- towards counter claim of the appellants and thus awarding net amount of Rs.6,50,260/- to the contractor. 3. Appellants herein filed petition under section 34 of the Act to challenge the aforesaid arbitration award on various grounds. Respondent no. 1 contractor controverted the said grounds and also pleaded that petition under section 34 of the Act was barred by limitation. 4. Learned trial court vide impugned judgment dated 8.9.2008 held the petition under section 34 of the Act to be time barred and also dismissed the petition on merits. Hence this appeal. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case file. 6. As regards limitation for filing the petition under section 34 of the Act, it is stipulated in the said provision that the petition shall not be made after three months have elapsed from the date of receipt of arbitral award provided that the said period may be extended by further 30 days, if sufficient cause is shown. In the instant case, the contractor has led evidence that the award was dispatched by the Arbitrator by registered post/speed post on 4.10.2006. Case of the appellants is that the award was received by the Managing Director of appellant no. 1--Corporation on 13.10.2006 and therefore, petition under section 34 of the Act filed on 7.2.2007 was within the extended period of limitation. The plea cannot be accepted. No evidence has been led by the appellants to depict that the award was received by them on 13.10.2006. On the contrary, the award was dispatched by speed post/registered post from Panchkula on 4.10.2006. The appellants are also located at Panchkula. Consequently, it cannot be said that the award was received by the appellants after 9 days on 13.10.2006.
No evidence has been led by the appellants to depict that the award was received by them on 13.10.2006. On the contrary, the award was dispatched by speed post/registered post from Panchkula on 4.10.2006. The appellants are also located at Panchkula. Consequently, it cannot be said that the award was received by the appellants after 9 days on 13.10.2006. However, even assuming that it was received by the appellants on 13.10.2006, even then petition under section 34 of the Act could be filed within three months upto 13.1.2007. For availing further extended period of 30 days, the appellants had to satisfy the court that they were prevented by sufficient cause from filing the petition within the normal limitation period of three months. In the instant case, however, there is not even an iota of evidence on record to depict that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from filing the petition within normal limitation period of three months. Sole witness examined by the appellants has not stated even a word in this regard in his affidavit of evidence. Consequently, there being no sufficient cause, the appellants are not entitled to the benefit of extended period of 30 days. Resultantly, the petition filed by the appellants under section 34 of the Act has been rightly held to be barred by limitation. 7. Even on merits, the appellants cannot succeed. Counsel for the appellants raised solitary contention to challenge the award regarding claim no. 9 of the contractor and counter claim no. 1 of the appellants. Both these claims relate to amount of compensation to be recovered from the contractor regarding delay in execution of the work. Executive Engineer Incharge initially imposed compensation of 1% of the contract amount and subsequently enhanced it to 10% which was, however, reduced to 4.5% by the Managing Director (MD) of appellant no. 1--Corporation. The Arbitrator has restricted it to 1% as originally imposed by the Executive Engineer. 8. Counsel for the appellants contended that as per terms and conditions of the contract between the parties, decision of MD regarding quantum of compensation in this regard was to be final and therefore, the Arbitrator could not adjudicate upon the same being excepted matter. Reliance in support of this contention has been placed on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishwanath Sood versus Union of India and another, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 952.
Reliance in support of this contention has been placed on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishwanath Sood versus Union of India and another, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 952. Per contra, counsel for respondent no. 1--contractor contended that no such objection was raised by the appellants before the Arbitrator and therefore, no such objection can be raised to challenge the award in view of section 16 of the Act. It was also contended that appellants themselves submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator by making counter claim regarding quantum of compensation and in view there of also, the appellants cannot now raise this objection. 9. I have carefully considered the rival contentions. Admittedly, the appellants did not raise any objection before the Arbitrator regarding his jurisdiction to arbitrate regarding the quantum of compensation. Consequently, in view of section 16 of the Act, no such objection can be raised in petition under section 34 of the Act. Secondly, the appellants themselves submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator on the question of quantum of compensation for the delay in the execution of the work by the contractor by making counter claim regarding the said amount to be raised to 10%. In this view of the matter also, the aforesaid objection does not lie in the mouth of the appellants. Consequently, judgment in the case of Vishwanath Sood (supra) is also not applicable to the facts of the instant case. 10. Counsel for the appellants also contended that under claim no. 7, Arbitrator has awarded interest @ 12% per annum to the contractor which is excessive and should be reduced to 7% per annum. This contention is untenable because the work was executed in the year 1996-97 when rates of interest were very high. The rates of interest have come down since after the year 2000. Consequently, interest @ 12% per annum awarded by the Arbitrator cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary so as to warrant interference by the Court under section 34 of the Act. In addition to it, the appellants themselves claimed interest @ 12% per annum before the Arbitrator on the amount of their counter claim. In view thereof also, award of interest by the Arbitrator @ 12% per annum does not warrant interference or reduction. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
In addition to it, the appellants themselves claimed interest @ 12% per annum before the Arbitrator on the amount of their counter claim. In view thereof also, award of interest by the Arbitrator @ 12% per annum does not warrant interference or reduction. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. ---------------------- Nisha Rani v. State of Punjab