Judgment : Crl.P.No.4223 of 2012 by A4, A9 and A10, Crl.P.No.4631 of 2012 by A1, A11, A12 and A17 and Crl.P.No.4725 of 2012 by A5 to A8 are filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.44 of 2012 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Palakol. West Godavari District. 2. It is alleged in the complaint that A1 is the elder sister of A2 and A3 is the daughter of A2. A2 and A3 are residing in New York. A2 and A3 executed General Power of Attorney in favour of A1 on 28-02-2009 to sell their house property. A1 sold away a bit of house site consisting of 700 sq. yards situated at 14th Ward Palakol Revenue Mandal within the jurisdiction of A5, in favour of the complainant and L.W.4 by way of registered sale deed, dated 21-03-2009, which possess assessment Nos.1079009317 and 1079009318. Though bit of house consists of 700 sq. yards, due to certain factors, which are incapable of measurements, on account of the existence of certain old structures, the bit actually consists of more than 700 sq. yards. When this peculiarity was pointed out to A1 at the time of sale, she incorporated a specific recital in the sale deed as follows: “IF, AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT OF THE SITE IN FUTRE, THERE ARE LESSER EXTENTS AND GREATER EXTENTS IN THE TOTAL EXTENT OF THE SITE, YOU HAVE TO BEAR THE LOSS IF THE EXTENT IS LESS, OR IN CASE THE EXTENT IS MORE, YOU ARE ENTITLED TO ENJOY THE SAME WITH FULL RIGHTS OF ALIENATION OR ENJOY THE SAME YOURSELVES”. Therefore, the complainant is entitled to enjoy with full rights any extent beyond 700 sq.yards. It is further alleged that after purchase of bit of site, they demolished the existing structures thereof, in which process the total extent of the site came to be identified as consisting of 1015 sq. yards. The complainant started plotting this bit of 1015 sq. yards and started selling plots one by one and sold five plots. While so, A4 came to know through A11 that the house site of the complainant consists of 1015 sq. Yards, started demanding him to give away 315 sq. yards. A4 is very authoritative in this demand since his wife A9 happens to be Councilor of 1st Ward Palakol. yards and started selling plots one by one and sold five plots. While so, A4 came to know through A11 that the house site of the complainant consists of 1015 sq. Yards, started demanding him to give away 315 sq. yards. A4 is very authoritative in this demand since his wife A9 happens to be Councilor of 1st Ward Palakol. A11 is in fact behind A4 is black mailing the complainant to part with the site of the complainant by giving him away 315 sq. Yards. A4 used various coercive tactics against the complainant in collusion with A10 to A12 and A13 to A17 to intimidate him to give him away 315 sq. yards. However, the complainant and L.W.4 remained firm with their possession and enjoyment of the total extent of 1015 sq.yards. A4 in order to grab 315 sq. yards of site entered into an illegal conspiracy with A5 to A8 who are the Municipal Commissioner and employees of Municipality and A9 who is his wife and with a dishonest intention to defeat and defraud the rights of the complainant over 1015 sq. yards, hatched up a plan in collusion with A9 to A17, who are his close friends and associates without reference to the sale deed, dated 21-03-2009 made by A1 in favour of the complainant and L.W.4, executed a Rectification Deed, dated 26-12-2009, unilaterally showing A11 as one of the witnesses along with A13 to the said document and A11 and A13 acted as attestors to the said Rectification Deed and also as identifying witnesses before the Sub-Registrar, Palakol without making the complainant as parties to the said Rectification Deed and without knowledge of the complainant in the office of Sub-Registrar causing prejudice and loss and injury to him. It is further alleged that all the accused with a common intention to deceive the complainant and to set apart 315 sq. yards of site, fabricated an un-registered will, dated 14-11-1998 said to have been executed by Bangaru Sarojini Devi, mother of A1, A2, A14 and A15 with false allegations alleging that the above 315 sq. yards, which is part and parcel of complainant’s property should have enjoy the same by A2 after the death of B.Sarojini Devi, who is his mother and to the said will, A14 and A15 acted as attestors to defeat and defraud the rights of the complainant. yards, which is part and parcel of complainant’s property should have enjoy the same by A2 after the death of B.Sarojini Devi, who is his mother and to the said will, A14 and A15 acted as attestors to defeat and defraud the rights of the complainant. A2 went to extent of executing another General Power of Attorney, dated 27-02-2010 for 315 sq. yards of site in favour of A1 stating that he succeeded the property through the Will. Then all the accused conspired together and collusively brought into existence the registered sale deed, dated 20-03-2010 for 315 sq. yards of site executed by A1 in favour of A4 to knock away the property of the complainant, in which A16 and A17 acted as attestors and also identifying witnesses. It is further alleged that the complainant obtained certified copy of the registered sale deed, dated 20-03-2010 from the office of Sub-Registrar, Palakol, and as seen from the document, A1 only got prepared it for the best reasons known to her and photograph attached to the registered sale deed is not that of the property. The registered sale deed in favour of A4 and Rectification Deed do not contain any recitals with regard to the original recitals in the complainant registered sale deed, dated 21-03-2009. Basing on the said collusive and fraudulent nominal sale deeds, A4 tried to interfere with the possession of complainant’s 1015 sq. yards in collusion with A9 to A12, for which complainant resisted. A4 with the aid of his wife-A9, who is a Councilor and A5Commissioner of Palakol Municipality, simply struck of the above assessment numbers covering the entire sites of the complainant consisting of 1015 sq. yards in collusion with A6 to A8 by taking some bribe from A4 and A9. A5 went one step further by giving A4 an assessment No.23164 in respect of 315 sq.yards in an effort to create in favour of A4 a domain over 315 sq. yards, which is nothing but part and parcel of 1015 sq. yards. When the complainant made an objection to A5 with regard to this illegal allotment of assessment No.23164 to A4, A5 gave a puzzled answer, dated 07-06-2010 stating that he is not able to give information to the complainant in view of the objections awaiting from A4. yards, which is nothing but part and parcel of 1015 sq. yards. When the complainant made an objection to A5 with regard to this illegal allotment of assessment No.23164 to A4, A5 gave a puzzled answer, dated 07-06-2010 stating that he is not able to give information to the complainant in view of the objections awaiting from A4. It is further alleged that complainant made representations to A5 on 03-05-2010 and 06-04-2010 requesting him to levy the tax in the name of the complainant for Water Tap and to cancel the Tax in the name of A4. They also sent application, dated 31-07-2010 to the Regional Director-cum-Appellate Commissioner, Municipal Administration, Rajahmundry, informing about the illegal acts of A5 to A8, but the attempts became futile and A4 with the help of A10 to A17 high handedly tried to trespass into the property of complainant number of times since 20-03-2010, for which the complainant resisted and reprimanded him not to interfere with his possession over 1015 sq. yards. Thereupon the complainants filed Writ Petition against A1, A4 and A5 questioning the illegal acts of A5 before this Court and the same is pending. It is further alleged that A5 without hearing the complainant, recording their objections and giving an opportunity ought not to have struck of the assessment numbers and ought not to have assigned assessment No.23164 to A4 without their knowledge. A5 is not the Civil Court to adjudicate the issue pertaining to the civil rights and create property rights in favour of A4 basing on the so called Rectification Deed in which the complainant and L.W.4 were made as parties and so called Sale deed both of which came to be executed by and between A1 and A4 illegally, fraudulently and collusively with the help of all the accused to grab the property of the complainants by hook or crook. It is further alleged that one M.Pardhasaradhi constructed a house in one of the plots sold by A1 and A5 levied the tax and issued tax receipt. A5 failed to follow Rule 3 of the law of Alteration of Ownership of property in assessment book rules, 1966 while giving assessment number to A4. It is further alleged that one M.Pardhasaradhi constructed a house in one of the plots sold by A1 and A5 levied the tax and issued tax receipt. A5 failed to follow Rule 3 of the law of Alteration of Ownership of property in assessment book rules, 1966 while giving assessment number to A4. On the instructions of A5, A6 to A8 without following the A.P. Municipalities Act and Rules framed thereunder acted according to their wish and will by taking law into their hands and assigned assignment No.23164 to A4 by taking some bribe from A4. A5 to A8 did not discharge their official duties according to the A.P. Municipalities Act and the Rules framed thereunder and gave helping hand to A1 to A4 and A9 to A17 to grab the property of the complainant by taking law into their hands by striking of assessment numbers of the complainant unilaterally and thereby committed the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 423, 468, 469 and 471 r/w 34 IPC. The complaint was forwarded to the S.H.O. Town P.S. Palakol for investigation and after receipt of complaint, police registered a case in Cr.No.22 of 2011 and subsequently did not investigate into the matter due to the influence of accused. On 13-12-2011, S.H.O. Town P.S. called the complainant and issued notice, dated 21-10-2011 stating that the complaint filed by him is civil in nature and therefore, referred the case and the complainant can file a protest complaint within a week. After receipt of notice, the complainant filed the complaint. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that even if the entire allegations in the complaint and the sworn statements of the complainant and any witness are taken as true and correct, at this stage, they do not make out prima facie case of offences alleged against them, that in respect of said dispute, already civil Suits in O.S.Nos.65 of 2011 and 37 of 2011 are pending before the competent civil Court, that the complainant is having a right beyond 700 sq. yards of site vide registered sale deed, dated 21-03-2009 and hence, he prays to quash the proceedings. 4. yards of site vide registered sale deed, dated 21-03-2009 and hence, he prays to quash the proceedings. 4. He relied on a decision reported in INDIAN OIL CORPN V NEPC INDIA LTD AND OTHERS (2006) 6 SCC 736 ), wherein it was held thus (para 15): “COMING to the facts of this case, it is no doubt true that IOC has initiated several civil proceedings to safeguard its interests and recover the amounts due. It has filed C.S. No. 425/1997 in the Madras High Court and O.S. No. 3327/1998 in the City Civil Court, Chennai seeking injunctive reliefs to restrain the NEPC India from removing its aircrafts so that it can exercise its right to possess the Aircrafts. It has also filed two more suits for recovery of the amounts due to it for the supplies made, that is CS No. 998/1999 against NEPC India (for recovery of Rs. 5,28,23,501/90) and CS No. 11/2000 against Skyline (for recovery of Rs. 13,12,76,421/25), in the Madras High Court. IOC has also initiated proceedings for winding up NEPC India and filed a petition seeking initiation of proceedings for contempt for alleged disobedience of the orders of temporary injunction. These acts show that civil remedies were and are available in law and IOC has taken recourse to such remedies. But it does not follow there from that criminal law remedy is barred or IOC is estopped from seeking such remedy” 5. He further relied on a decision reported in KLE SOCIETY AND OTHERS V SIDDALINGESH (2008) 4 SCC 541 ), wherein it was held thus (para 9): “AS noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The high Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary ( 1992 (4) SCC 305 ), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings” 6. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings” 6. He further relied on a decision reported in SUNEET GUPTA V ANIL TRILOKNATH SHARMA AND OTHERS (2008) 11 SCC 670 ), wherein it was held thus (paras 18 and 25): “THE High Court, in our opinion, rightly considered the facts in their proper perspective and observed that the dispute related to settlement of accounts between principal and its agent; the principal being m/s Johnson and Johnson Ltd. and the agent being m/s K. M. Agencies (earlier) and M/s Mangla agencies (later ). The High Court also noted that it was M/s K. M. Agencies which informed the principal i. e. M/s Johnson and Johnson Ltd. that M/s K. M. Agencies had closed its business and the business was thereafter continued by m/s Mangla Agencies and all drafts be issued in favour of M/s Mangla Agencies. The High Court took note of the fact that even the complainant had informed the principal that there was dispute between the partners of M/s K. M. Agencies and hence no payment should be made to m/s Mangla Agencies till the dispute was finally resolved between the parties. That, however, does not give rise to criminal liability and entitle the complainant to initiate criminal proceedings, particularly when M/s Johnson and Johnson Ltd. substituted in the Company record name of M/s Mangla Agencies in place of M/s K. M. Agencies. The resultant effect of substitution of name was that whatever sums were due to M/s K. M. Agencies were considered to be due to M/s Mangla agencies IN the case on hand, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that a civil dispute pure and simple - between the parties was sought to be converted into a criminal offence only by resorting to pressure tactics and by taking police help which was indeed abuse of process of law and has been rightly prevented by the High Court” 7. He further relied on a decision reported in STATE OF ORISSA THROUGH KUMAR RAGHVENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS V GANESH CHANDRA JEW (2004) 8 SCC 40 ), wherein it was held thus (paras 10 and 11): “SUCH being the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression, 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty', be understood? What does it mean? 'Official' according to dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In B. Saha and Ors. v. M.S. Kochar ( 1979 (4) SCC 177 ), it was held : "The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197 (1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197 (1), an Act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution and the said provision." Use of the expression, 'official duty' implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The Section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. The Section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. (11) IT has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. ITs operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty and without any justification therefor then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty and without any justification therefor then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained b,y this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari ( AIR 1956 SC 44 ) thus: "The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty... there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” 8. He further relied on a decision reported in BVSS RAMANA MURTHY V STATE OF AP (2006 ALT (CRL) 3), wherein it was held thus (para 3): “The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that no sanction as contemplated under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is also obtained. As pointed out, there are inherent improbabilities in the complainant’s case. The Supreme Court in State of Orissa Through Kumar Raghvendra Singh and others V Ganesh Chandra Jew held that where the complaint is coupled with inherent improbabilities, it can be quashed. .” 9. He further relied on a decision reported in M.DURGA REDDY V STATE OF AP (2011 LAWS (APH) 3), wherein it was held thus (para 4): “As per the said provision, specimen signatures are expected to be collected in the presence of a Magistrate of the First Class, Such specimen signatures can be collected from any person including an accused person. The proviso under this Section which contemplates that the person should have been arrested in connection with the investigation or proceeding, refers to the person who is an accused person. In my opinion ‘person’ contemplated under the proviso is the accused person and it cannot be referred to any person. No doubt, the accused is the alleged beneficiary in case there is manipulation or interpolation of the extent from 73 square yards to 150 square yards; but that itself cannot conclude that the accused had committed the forgery. In my opinion ‘person’ contemplated under the proviso is the accused person and it cannot be referred to any person. No doubt, the accused is the alleged beneficiary in case there is manipulation or interpolation of the extent from 73 square yards to 150 square yards; but that itself cannot conclude that the accused had committed the forgery. I am of the opinion that the investigation proceeded on the basis that what was agreed to be purchased by the accused from the 3rd respondent was only 73 square yards and not 150 square yards. Proceeding with investigation on the said assumption cuts at root of the prosecution case. It would be a matter for evidence during trial of a civil dispute to find out and decide whether what was sold by the3rd respondent and what was intended to be purchased by the accused was 73 square yards or 150 square yards. Having regard to absence of officials of the sub-registrar’s office who are the custodians of the documents during the period of pending registration and absence of co-executants of the sale deed along with the 2nd respondent as co-accused in this case, the basis for prosecution of the accused for the alleged forging for the purpose of cheating etc., cannot be proceed with. There is also no evidence collected by the investigating officer to show that it was the accused who committed the alleged forgery. In those circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that prosecution of the petitioner/accused for the above offences is nothing but abuse of process of the Court. It is a matter of civil litigation between the parties, to be decided in an appropriately framed civil suit by a civil court.” 10. In those circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that prosecution of the petitioner/accused for the above offences is nothing but abuse of process of the Court. It is a matter of civil litigation between the parties, to be decided in an appropriately framed civil suit by a civil court.” 10. He further relied on a decision reported in J. SRI RAM SURYA PRAKASHSHARMA V STATE OF AP (2011 CRL.L.J. 2027), wherein it was held thus (paras 12 and 13): “HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the observations made in the decisions cited supra and the statements of the second respondent and the Chief Manager (Vigilance Department) recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C, I find force in the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the allegations made against the petitioners in the complaint as well as the charge-sheet are only procedural lapses in discharging their official functions and so initiation of criminal proceedings against them in the absence of any accusation or allegation of abetment on their part in commission of offence is an abuse of process of law and that the averments made against the petitioners either in the report or in the charge-sheet, prima facie, do not constitute any offence much less the charges framed against them for the offences and if the proceedings against them are allowed to continue, it is nothing but harassment and even abuse of process of law, and so the same are liable to be quashed. The case on hand clearly falls under the Guideline Nos.1, 3 and 5 extracted supra laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajanlal's case (supra). 1 am also in agreement with the contention of the learned Senior Counsel, relying upon the observations made in C. Chenga Reddy's case (supra), that violation of any circulars and instructions and commission of administrative irregularities cannot be said to have been done by the official concerned with any corrupt or dishonest intention and such irregularities or administrative lapses could only have resulted in a departmental action against the officials but criminal prosecution is not justified. THEREFORE, 1 hold that continuation of proceedings against the petitioners in C.C. No.1444 of 2004 on the file of the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, is nothing but an abuse of process of law and the same are liable to be quashed” 11. THEREFORE, 1 hold that continuation of proceedings against the petitioners in C.C. No.1444 of 2004 on the file of the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, is nothing but an abuse of process of law and the same are liable to be quashed” 11. He further relied on a decision reported in VVS RAMA SHARMA AND OTHERS V STATE OF UP AND OTHERS ( AIR 2009 SC 3258 ), wherein it was held thus (para 23): “AS far as quashing of FIR is concerned, the scope of power under Section 482 CrPC has been explained in a series of decisions by this Court. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shiualingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736 , it was held that the Magistrate while issuing process against the accused should satisfy himself as to whether the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in the conviction of the accused. It was held that the order of Magistrate issuing process against the accused could be quashed under the following circumstances: (SCC p. 741, para 5) "(1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like." 12. He further relied on a decision reported in RAGHUNATH ANANT GOVILKAR V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (2008) 11 SCC 289 ), wherein it was held thus (para 12): “IT has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty; that is under the colour of office. He further relied on a decision reported in RAGHUNATH ANANT GOVILKAR V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (2008) 11 SCC 289 ), wherein it was held thus (para 12): “IT has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty; that is under the colour of office. Official duty, therefore, implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in the course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in the course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in the course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in the discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that an act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in the discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in the course of service but not in the discharge of his duty and without any justification therefor then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in the discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari ( 1955 (2) SCR 925 ). To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in the discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari ( 1955 (2) SCR 925 ). (15) THE offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. (16) THERE must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim), but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” 13. He further relied on a decision reported in JOSEPH SALVARAJA V STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS (2011) 7 SCC 59 ), wherein it was held thus (para 17): “IN our opinion, the matter appears to be purely civil in nature. There appears to be no cheating or a dishonest inducement for the delivery of property or breach of trust by the Appellant. The present FIR is an abuse of process of law. The purely civil dispute, is sought to be given a colour of a criminal offence to wreak vengeance against the Appellant. It does not meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation. IN such type of cases, it is necessary to draw a distinction between civil wrong and criminal wrong as has been succinctly held by this Court in Devendra Vs. State of U.P., 2009 (7) SCC 495 , relevant part thereof is reproduced herein below: "A distinction must be made between a civil wrong and a criminal wrong. When dispute between the parties constitute only a civil wrong and not a criminal wrong, the courts would not permit a person to be harassed although no case for taking cognizance of the offence has been made out." 14. He further relied on a decision reported in GORIGE PENTAIAH V STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS (2008) 12 SCC 531 ), wherein it was held thus (para 26): “A three judge Bench of this court in Inder Mohan goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal and Others air 2008 SC 251 has examined scope and ambit of section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The court in the said case observed that inherent powers under section 482 should be exercised for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers of the court” 15. He further relied on a decision reported in INDER MOHAN GOSWAMI AND ANOTHER V STATE OF UTTARANCHAL AND OTHERS (2007) 12 SCC 1 ), wherein it was held thus (para 46): “THE court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressure the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.” Basing on the above principles in mind, it has to be seen whether it is a case of quashing Calendar Case. 16. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court or to secure the ends of justice or to carry out the orders passed under this Code. There cannot be any dispute that if uncontroverted allegations in the complaint do not make out prima facie case of the offences alleged, then only question of quashing the complaint arises. 17. It is not in dispute before this Court that the de facto complainant purchased 700 sq. yards of site vide registered sale deed, dated 21-03-2009 from A1 being the General Power of Attorney Holder of A2 and A3. In the said sale deed, a specific recital is incorporated as follows: “IF, AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT OF THE SITE IN FUTRE, THERE ARE LESSER EXTENTS AND GREATER EXTENTS IN THE TOTAL EXTENT OF THE SITE, YOU HAVE TO BEAR THE LOSS IF THE EXTENT IS LESS, OR IN CASE THE EXTENT IS MORE, YOU ARE ENTITLED TO ENJOY THE SAME WITH FULL RIGHTS OF ALIENATION OR ENJOY THE SAME YOURSELVES”. It seems that on ground, the total extent of site is 1015 sq. yards i.e., excess of 315 sq. yards over and above 700 sq. yards. On coming to know abut the same, A1 executed Rectification Deed, dated 26-12-2009 without the knowledge of the complainant. The allegation is that A4 demanding the complainant to give him 315 sq. yards of site, which is excessive. The further allegation is that one unregistered will, dated 14-11-198 was fabricated as if B.Sarojini Devi (mother of A1, A2, A14 and A15) executed the will bequeathing 315 sq. yards of site in favour of A2, for which A14 and A15 acted as attestors. Thereafter, A2 executed another General Power of Attorney, dated 27-02-2010 for an extent of 315 sq. yards stating that he succeeded the property through the Will, dated 14-11-1998 in favour of A1, for which A16 and A17 acted as attestors and identifying witnesses. When A4 tried to interfere with the possession of the complainant in collusion with A9 to A12, the complainant resisted. Originally, the complaint was lodged with the police and police registered a case in Cr.No.112 of 2010 under various sections of law. After completion of investigation, police referred the case as ‘mistake of fact’. Thereafter, again another complaint was filed and the same was registered as Cr.No.22 of 2011, which was also after collecting the evidence, referred as purely civil in nature. Challenging the same, the de facto complainant filed protest petition. The learned Magistrate examined two witnesses and took cognizance basing on the material available on record. The case was taken on file for the offence punishable under Section 471 IPC against A1, A2, A4, A11, and A13 to A15, for the offence punishable under Section 423 IPC against A1 to A4 and A16 and A17, for the offence punishable under Section 447 IPC against A4 and A9 to A17 and for the offence punishable under Section 468 IPC against A5 to A8. 18. Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document, which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document is an offence punishable under Section 471 IPC. Whoever makes any false document with intent to cause damage or injury to any persons or to support any claim or title or to cause any person to part with property with an intention to commit fraud is forgery. Whoever makes any false document with intent to cause damage or injury to any persons or to support any claim or title or to cause any person to part with property with an intention to commit fraud is forgery. Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently executes any instrument with regard to change of any property and which contains false statement relating to the consideration for such transfer or change is an offence punishable under Section 423 IPC. Whoever enters into or upon property in possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate or insult or annoy any person in possession of such property is an offence punishable under Section 447 IPC. Whoever commits forgery intending that the (document or electronic record) forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, is an offence punishable under Section 468 IPC. 19. Insofar as A5 to A8 are concerned, they are the employees of the Municipality. The allegation against them is without any notice to the complainant, they struck of municipal assessment numbers in respect of the complainant’s property and assigned another assessment number to the property of A4. Except alleging that they have connivance with A4, there is no other allegation to show that they have any criminal intention to cheat the complainant. Not giving a notice to the de facto complainant before correcting the assessment numbers, at best, amounts to a negligence or misconduct because A4 produced the document showing his title. There is every possibility for the municipal employees to give separate assessment number in respect of same survey number basing on the document produced by A4, which was carved out from the original assessment numbers.. 20. Insofar as the allegation against A9 is concerned, she being the wife of A4 purchased the property with a mala fide intention to cause wrongful loss to the complainant. The allegation is that she with the help of municipal authorities struck of the original assessment numbers given to the de facto complainant and separate assessment number was given covering the property to an extent of 315 sq. yards of site. Therefore, prima facie case is made out against A9. 21. Insofar as A10 to A12 and A17 are concerned, they simply attested the documents said to have been executed between the parties. yards of site. Therefore, prima facie case is made out against A9. 21. Insofar as A10 to A12 and A17 are concerned, they simply attested the documents said to have been executed between the parties. Therefore, by attesting the documents, it cannot be said that thereby they caused wrongful loss to the de facto complainant. 22. No doubt, police referred the case as purely civil in nature, but at the same time, the Magistrate is competent to take cognizance of the offences basing on the allegations in the protest petition as well as sworn statements of the complainant and another witness. There is a thin line difference between criminal prosecution and civil prosecution. That difference is mensrea. If the intention of the accused is to cause wrongful loss to other person or gain wrongfully for himself by virtue of his acts with a knowledge that his acts would cause loss to the other person, then it can be said that criminal prosecution is maintainable. Therefore, the intention of the accused is the crux of the case to determine whether the case falls under criminal prosecution or to proceed further on civil side. A1 who is the General Power of Attorney Holder of A2 and A3, sold 700 sq. yards of site for consideration and executed a sale deed in favour of the de facto complainant. If the recitals in the sale deed are not there, then certainly the de facto complainant is not entitled for over and above the extent as mentioned in the sale deed. In view of recital mentioned in the sale deed that if any excess extent of land is available on ground, the de facto complainant is entitled for the same. Therefore, A1 while executing the document ought to have careful enough to execute a document with correct extent of land. After measuring the land on ground, she ought to have executed the document. According to the de facto complainant, A1 who is the General Power of Attorney Holder of A2 and A3 brought into existence a fabricated will said to have been executed by the mother of A1 and A2 and also A1 unilaterally executed Rectification Deed without the knowledge and consent of the de facto complainant. This aspect must be having within the knowledge of A2 and A3 and with their connivance only, the rectification document was executed by A1. 23. This aspect must be having within the knowledge of A2 and A3 and with their connivance only, the rectification document was executed by A1. 23. Insofar as A4 is concerned, he said to have purchased an extent of 315 sq. yards of site. Therefore, he ought to have verified the rectification deed to see whether it is properly executed or not and also ought to have verified the recitals in the first sale deed executed by A1 in favour of the de facto complainant. Therefore, prima facie, A4 with an intention to cause wrongful loss said to have purchased the property, for which, A9 who is his wife said to have got effected the assessment numbers in the municipal records. Therefore, these acts would prima facie attract the offences under which cognizance was taken by the trial Court. Hence, there are no grounds to quash the proceedings insofar as A1 to A4 and A9 are concerned. The proceedings are liable to be quashed insofar as A5 to A8 and A10 to A12 and A17 are concerned. 24. Learned counsel appearing for A1 and A9 submits that the presence of A1 and A9 may be dispensed with before the trial Court as they are women. For that purpose, A1 and A9 have to file necessary application before the trial Court to dispense with their presence and thereafter, the same shall be considered in accordance with law. 25. Accordingly, Crl.P.Nos.4223 and 4631 of 2012 are partly allowed and Crl.P.No.4725 of 2012 is allowed quashing the proceedings C.C.No.44 of 2012 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Palakol. West Godavari District, insofar as the petitioners-A5 to A8 and A10 to A12 and A17 are concerned. 26. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in these Criminal Petitions shall stand closed.