Judgment :- C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, J. INTRODUCTION: A Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Sanjay Kumar.,J) was a member, has referred this case to the Full Bench on noticing conflicting views between a Division Bench of this Court in Yusuf Qureshi and others Vs. Moulana Mohammed Jamaluddin Deccani and others ( 1996(1) ALT 236 (D.B.) and an unreported Judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Wakfs Protection Joint Action Committee Vs. The State of Karnataka (W.P.No.22437 of 2005, dt. 7-11-2005)on a question arising before it. The question was whether the term of the members of the Wakf Board under Section 14(1)(b)(i) & (ii) of the Wakf Act, 1995 (for short "the Act") is co-terminus with their terms as the Members of Parliament and the State Legislative Assembly? II. THE BACKGROUND FACTS: Respondent No.1 has reconstituted the A.P. Wakf Board under G.O.Ms.No.53 dated 16-12-2008. Respondent No.3 who was a Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha) and respondent No.2 who was a Member of the A.P. State Legislative Assembly, were elected as the members of the A.P. State Wakf Board under Section 14(1)(b)(i) & (ii) of the Act, respectively. The terms of respondent Nos.3 and 4 as the Members of Parliament and the A.P. State Legislative Assembly, respectively, ended in May 2009. Both of them have not contested in the General Elections held in May 2009, as a result of which they ceased to be the Members of Parliament and A.P. State Legislative Assembly, respectively, from 16-5-2009. By Memo No.232/Wakf-1/A1/2008, dated 19-5- 2010, respondent No.1 has notified to the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No.2- Wakf Board that an elected Member of Parliament or Legislative Assembly will not cease to be a member of the Wakf Board merely on account of his ceasing to be such Member of the Parliament or the Legislative Assembly and that such Member will continue to be a member of the Wakf Board till expiry of the term of the present body. Respondent No.1 has accordingly notified that respondent Nos.3 and 4 will continue to hold their office as members of the Wakf Board till they complete their five year term. Respondent No.1 has accordingly notified that respondent Nos.3 and 4 will continue to hold their office as members of the Wakf Board till they complete their five year term. The petitioner, who claimed to be a disciple of Dargah Hazrath Shahbaaz Hussaini (RH), Guntur and Musalli of Jama Masjid, Guntur, filed this Writ Petition as a person interested under Section 3(k) of the Act questioning the above mentioned Memo issued by respondent No.1 and for setting aside the same, and for a consequential declaration that continuance of respondent Nos.3 and 4 as Members of respondent No.2-Wakf Board is illegal, void and unconstitutional. As stated at the outset, the Division Bench before which the case came up, opined that in view of the difference of opinion between the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Yusuf Qureshi (1-supra) and of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Wakfs Protection Joint Action Committee (2supra), the controversy needs to be resolved by a Bench of three Judges. III. SUBMISSIONS: We have heard Sri A.M. Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Srikanth Reddy, learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the Additional Advocate- General, Sri Shafath Ahmed Khan, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.2-Wakf Board and Sri N. Vijay, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4, and carefully perused the record. The learned counsel for the petitioner has taken us through the relevant provisions of the Act and submitted that the legislative intent in providing for the elected Members of Parliament, State Legislature and Bar Council of the State is to ensure that the representatives of public must be on the Wakf Board and that therefore with the expiry of their term as members of public representatives, they must automatically cease to be the Members of the Wakf Board, otherwise the very legislative intent for which the provisions of Section 14(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act are incorporated will be defeated. The learned counsel relied upon Section 31 of the Act under which it is made clear that the offices of the Chairperson or members of the Wakf Board will not operate as a disqualification for the holders thereof for being chosen as, or for being, the Members of Parliament. The learned counsel relied upon Section 31 of the Act under which it is made clear that the offices of the Chairperson or members of the Wakf Board will not operate as a disqualification for the holders thereof for being chosen as, or for being, the Members of Parliament. He submitted that a converse provision to save the membership of the Wakf Board of a Member of Parliament, or of Legislative Assembly, on the expiry of his term as a Member of Parliament or Legislative Assembly, has not been incorporated and that therefore it must be presumed that the Parliament did not intend to continue the elected Members of Parliament or Legislative Assembly as the Wakf Board members on their ceasing to be the Members of Parliament or Legislative Assembly. While commending the correctness of the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Yusuf Qureshi (1-supra), the learned counsel submitted that the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Wakfs Protection Joint Action Committee (2supra) did not properly consider the legislative object behind enacting Section 14(1)(a) & (b) of the Act. The learned counsel relied upon the Judgment of a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in SyedShah Muhammad Al Hussaini Vs. Union of India and others (AIR 1999 Karnataka 112 (DB)in order to bring home his submission that the object of the provisions of Section 14(1)(b)(i) & (ii) is to ensure that public representatives always and at all times continue to be members of the Wakf Board. He has also placed reliance on the Judgment in Mohd. Akram Ansari Vs. Chief Election Commissioner (2006 (TLS) 137339 (Delhi High Court)and a Full Bench of this Court in Muslim Minority Front Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh ( 1996(2) ALT 30 (FB). He submitted that cessation of membership of the Wakf Board due to expiry of term of the Members of Parliament or Legislative Assembly, falls within the expression “or otherwise” in Section 21 of the Act, dealing with filling of vacancies. Mr. The Government of Andhra Pradesh ( 1996(2) ALT 30 (FB). He submitted that cessation of membership of the Wakf Board due to expiry of term of the Members of Parliament or Legislative Assembly, falls within the expression “or otherwise” in Section 21 of the Act, dealing with filling of vacancies. Mr. Srikanth Reddy, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1, submitted that the Act has prescribed a term of five years for the members of the Wakf Board and that as respondent Nos.3 and 4 have been elected for a full term of five years under Section 14(1)(b)(i) & (ii) respectively, their term cannot be cut-short unless they have incurred any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 16 of the Act. He has submitted that Section 16 of the Act has not prescribed expiry of the term of the Members of Parliament and Legislative Assembly as a disqualification for continuation as the members of the Wakf Board and that therefore respondent Nos.3 and 4 are entitled to continue as members of the Wakf Board till expiry of the five year term for which they were elected. The learned Government Pleader has referred to the Haj Committee Act, 2002, which has incorporated a specific provision in Section 4 thereof, providing for making the membership of the Wakf Board co-terminus with the term of the elected representatives. He submitted that in the absence of such a provision in the Act, it cannot be presumed that the Parliament has intended any such cessation of membership of the Wakf Board. He placed reliance on the Judgment in MoinuddinQureshi Vs. State of Chattisgarh (2011(1) MPJR-CG83). While strongly supporting the line of submissions made by the learned Special Government Pleader, the learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4, further submitted that with the election of the Members of Parliament and the Legislative Assembly as members of the Wakf Board, a right came to be vested in them to continue for a full term of five years as prescribed under Section 15 of the Act and that such a right cannot be curtailed or abridged by the Court’s intervention. The learned counsel has drawn a distinction between the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1954 (for short “the 1954 Act”) and the Act on the ground that under the former Act, the members from their respective categories were nominated unlike under the latter Act, which envisaged election. Such elected members, argued the learned counsel, have a right to continue as the members of the Wakf Board till expiry of their term of five years irrespective of whether they ceased to be the Members of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly. The learned counsel further submitted that the only criterion for election of members under Section 14(1)(b)(i) & (ii) was their being the Members of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly, as the case may be, as on the date of their election to the Wakf Board and that in the absence of any specific provision under Section 16 of the Act, they cannot be disqualified to be continued as the members of the Wakf Board on the ground of expiry of their term as the Members of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly. The learned counsel also submitted that Section 31 of the Act was incorporated only to save the elected Members of Parliament from disqualification as envisaged under Article 102(1) (a) of the Constitution of India and that therefore the said provision has no relevance whatsoever on the issue pertaining to the continuance of the Members of Parliament and the State Legislature as members of the Wakf Board after the expiry of their term as the Members of Parliament and the State Legislature. He has strongly urged that only those members who fall within the provisions of Section 16 of the Act and consequently removed by the State Government under Section 20 of the Act, will cease to be the members of the Wakf Board and that in the absence of a clear provision enacted by the Parliament, acceptance of the plea of the petitioner would amount to adding a new clause of disqualification of the members of the Wakf Board to the said provision. The learned counsel further urged that it is not necessary to gather the legislative object when the provisions of the Act are clear and unambiguous. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the Judgments in PadmaSundara Rao (dead) and others Vs. The learned counsel further urged that it is not necessary to gather the legislative object when the provisions of the Act are clear and unambiguous. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the Judgments in PadmaSundara Rao (dead) and others Vs. State of T.N. and others (2002) 3 SCC 533 ), Union of India and another Vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323), Union of India and another Vs. Shardindu (2007) 6 SCC 276 ), State of Bombay Vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha ( AIR 1960 S.C. 610 ), Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda (1990) 3 SCC 447 )and Yusuf Qureshi (1-supra). IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT: Before dealing with the submissions of the learned counsel for the respective parties, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. The long title of the Act discloses that it was brought into existence for providing better administration of wakfs and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2 makes the Act applicable to all wakfs whether created before or after its commencement, with the exception of Dargah Khawaja Saheb, Ajmer. Section 9 provides for Establishment and constitution of Central Wakf Council. For the present purpose, some of the provisions falling under Chapter IV are very relevant. Section 13 envisages that every State Government shall establish a Board of Wakfs which shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal. Section 14 is a pivotal provision which envisages Composition of the Board. The Board comprises a Chairperson under Section 14(1)(a); one and not more than two members as the State Government may think fit to be elected from each of the electoral colleges consisting among others, Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or, as the case may be, the Union Territory of Delhi, Muslim Members of the State Legislature, Muslim Members of the Bar Council of the State and Mutawallis of the wakfs having annual income of rupees one lakh and above under sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii) & (iv) of Section 14(1)(b), respectively. Besides, the elected members under Section 14(1)(b), the State Government is empowered to nominate one and not more than two members representing eminent Muslim organizations, one and not more than two members each from the recognized scholars in Islamic Theology, and an officer of the State Government not below the rank of Deputy Secretary, under Clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act, respectively. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 specifies that election of the members specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) thereof shall be held in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote, in such manner as may be prescribed. Under the first proviso thereof, where the number of Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or the State Bar Council, as the case may be, is only one, such Muslim Member shall be declared to have been elected on the Board. Under the second proviso, where there are no Muslim Members in any of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1), the ex-Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or exmember of the State Bar Council, as the case may be, shall constitute the electoral college. Under sub-section (3) of Section 14, where the State Government is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to constitute an electoral college for any of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1), the State Government may nominate such persons as the members of the Board as it deems fit. Section 15 of the Act envisages that the members of the Board shall hold office for a term of five years. Section 16 of the Act, which is an equally important provision for the present purpose, prescribes disqualification for being appointed or for continuing as a member of the Wakf Board. Section 15 of the Act envisages that the members of the Board shall hold office for a term of five years. Section 16 of the Act, which is an equally important provision for the present purpose, prescribes disqualification for being appointed or for continuing as a member of the Wakf Board. This provision reads as under: “A person shall be disqualified for being appointed, or for continuing as, a member of the Board if- (a) he is not a Muslim and is less than twenty-one years of age; (b) he is found to be a person of unsound mind; (c) he is an undischarged insolvent; (d) he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude and such conviction has not been reversed or he has not been granted full pardon in respect of such offence; (e) he has been on a previous occasion- (i) removed from his office as a member or as a mutawalli, or (ii) removed by an order of a competent court or tribunal from any position of trust either for mismanagement or for corruption.” Section 20 of the Act empowers the State Government to remove the Chairperson or any member of the Board if he is, or becomes subject to any disqualifications specified in Section 16, or refuses to act or is incapable of acting or acts in a manner which the State Government, after hearing any explanation that he may offer, considers to be prejudicial to the interests of the wakfs, or fails in the opinion of the Board, to attend three consecutive meetings of the Board, without sufficient excuse. Sub-section (2) thereof envisages that where the Chairperson of the Board is removed under subsection (1), he shall also cease to be a member of the Board. Section 21 provides for filling of vacancies. It postulates that when the seat of a member becomes vacant by his removal, resignation, death or otherwise, a new member shall be appointed in his place and such member shall hold office as long as the member whose place he fills would have been entitled to hold office, if such vacancy had not occurred. Section 31 of the Act declares that the offices of the Chairperson or members of the Board shall not be disqualified and shall be deemed never to have been disqualified for being so chosen as, or for being, a Member of Parliament. Section 31 of the Act declares that the offices of the Chairperson or members of the Board shall not be disqualified and shall be deemed never to have been disqualified for being so chosen as, or for being, a Member of Parliament. V. CONSIDERATION : Keeping the above noted provisions of the Act in view, we shall now consider the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent Nos.3 and 4 ceased to be the members of the Wakf Board, is mainly based on the purported legislative intention to provide for continuous representation to the sitting Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature and the Bar Council of the State and that by continuing them as Wakf Board members after expiry of their term, this legislative intention is defeated. (i) THE RULE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: The golden rule of interpretation when the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, is that the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences (See: Nelson Motis Vs. Union of India ( 1992(4) SCC 711 ). In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj ( AIR 1963 S.C. 946 ), KokaSubba Rao.,J (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the Bench held: “When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself”. In Emperor Vs. Benoarilal Sarma (AIR 1945 P.C. 48), Viscount Simonds, L.C. said: “Again and again, this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used”. Gajendragadkar., J(as his Lordship then was) in KanailalSur Vs. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan ( AIR 1957 S.C. 907 )observed : “If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.” While interpreting the words “any person” in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Lord Atkin speaking for the Privy Council in Pakala Narayanaswami Vs. Emperor (AIR 1939 P.C. 47) held: “When the meaning of the words is plain, it is not the duty of courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions”. His Lordship further added: “It, therefore, appears inadmissible to consider the advantages or disadvantages of applying the plain meaning whether in the interests of the prosecution or accused.” While construing Section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as it then stood, where it was sought to be argued that persons employed by the father and paid by him who assisted the son in his election, were in relation to the son mere volunteers and not employed by him, on the ground that that such a construction would give the candidates with rich friends or relations an unfair advantage over a poor rival and would, therefore, be against the spirit of the election law, the Supreme Court rejected the said argument. In the said context, S.R. Das.,J observed : “The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.” The scheme of the Act as a whole does not give any scope for the assumption, much less a presumption, that at every given point of time, the members specified under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act must continue to be the Members of the respective bodies which they represented at the time of their election as the members of the Wakf Board. Section 16 of the Act is a self-contained provision in itself. It provides for specific contingencies by which a member of the Wakf Board becomes disqualified. Besides Section 16 of the Act, there is no provision which deals with disqualification of a member of the Wakf Board. The expiry of term of a Member of Parliament, Legislature or Bar Council, is not included in this provision as a disqualification for continuing as a member of the Wakf Board. In this context, it is necessary to consider the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. The expiry of term of a Member of Parliament, Legislature or Bar Council, is not included in this provision as a disqualification for continuing as a member of the Wakf Board. In this context, it is necessary to consider the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. The language of this provision is so clear that only if a member incurs disqualification under Section 16 or refuses to act or is incapable of acting or acts prejudicial to the interests of the Wakf or fails to attend three consecutive meetings of the Board, that he is liable to be removed by the State Government. Section 21 of the Act, on which the learned counsel for the petitioner laid heavy emphasis, is an enabling provision for filling up of a vacancy. It recognizes three specific contingencies by which a vacancy in the Wakf Board arises. For better appreciation, this provision is reproduced hereunder: “When the seat of a member becomes vacant by his removal, resignation, death or otherwise, a new member shall be appointed in his place and such member shall hold office so long as the member whose place he fills would have been entitled to hold office, if such vacancy had not occurred.” The two specific contingencies i.e., removal and resignation, referred to in this provision, are traceable to Sections 20 and 19 of the Act, respectively. Even though the event of death is not envisaged by any other provision of the Act, it is indubitable that a vacancy would necessarily arise on account of the death of a member. The Act does not envisage any other specific contingency by which a vacancy in the membership of the Wakf Board arises. Therefore, the State Government cannot arrogate to itself the power to declare that on the expiry of term of a Member of Parliament, Legislature or Bar Council, cessation of membership of a member occurred and that thereby a vacancy had arisen in the Wakf Board. Section 15 of the Act is couched in plain and unambiguous terms. It is useful to reproduce this provision in this context, which reads as under: “The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of five years.” This provision is not circumscribed by, or hedged-in, with any conditions whatsoever. It gives one and the only meaning and the same does not admit of any other meaning. It is useful to reproduce this provision in this context, which reads as under: “The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of five years.” This provision is not circumscribed by, or hedged-in, with any conditions whatsoever. It gives one and the only meaning and the same does not admit of any other meaning. It mandates that the members of the Board shall hold office for a term of five years. The right vested in a member of the Board for holding office for a term of five years is curtailed or taken away only by application of Sections 20 and 21 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act gives liberty to the Chairperson or any member to resign his office by writing to the State Government. None of these provisions either expressly or by necessary implication brought in the eventuality of expiry of the tenure of a Member of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or the Bar Council, as a ground for cessation of the membership in the Wakf Board or disqualification under Section 16 of the Act. On a close scrutiny, we find no basis for the above mentioned submission of the learned Counsel. (ii) EJUSDEM GENERIS & NOSCITUR A SOCIIS: Banking on the words “or otherwise” in Section 21 of the Act, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the eventuality of the expiry of term of the Members of Parliament, State Legislature or State Bar Council, falls under this residual phrase. When the Parliament has left these words which are general in nature unexplained anywhere else in the statute, the only option left to this Court is to construe these words by applying the principles ejusdem generis/noscitur a sociis as urged by Sri N. Vijay, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4. Craieson statute law (7th Edition-page 179), traced the law relating to ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis to the Judgment by Lord Campbell in R vs. Edmundson (1859) 28 L.J.M.C. 213, 215). Craieson statute law (7th Edition-page 179), traced the law relating to ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis to the Judgment by Lord Campbell in R vs. Edmundson (1859) 28 L.J.M.C. 213, 215). It is instructive to reproduce the relevant passage of the learned author hereunder: “This rule of law, generally known as ejusdem generis rule, or the rule nosciitur a sociis, was thus enunciated by Lord Campbell in R v. Edmundson: “I accede”, said he, “to the principle laid down in all the cases which have been cited, that, where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified….” In another passage of his book, Craies referred to the Judgment in Eton R.D.C. Vs. Thames Conservators (1950) Ch. 540, 544), wherein the Court has interpreted the words “or otherwise” by applying the rule of ejusdem generis with the preceding words. Justice G.P. Singh, in his Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 8th Edition, explained this rule in the following words: “The rule of construction noscitur a sociis as explained by Lord Macmillan means: “The meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps (Law and Other Things, p.166; referred to in Salmond, Jurisprudence, 11th Edition, p.153).” As stated by the Privy Council: “it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them (Angus Robertson Vs. George Day (1879) 5 AC 63 p.69 (PC). It is a rule wider than the rule of ejusdem generis; rather the latter rule is only an application of the former.” In State of Bombay (10-supra) Gajendragadkar.,J (as his Lordship then was) while dealing with this maxim, held as under: “This rule, according to Maxwell (Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, p.321), means that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. The same rule is thus interpreted in Words and Phrases (Vol.XIV p.207). They take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. The same rule is thus interpreted in Words and Phrases (Vol.XIV p.207). Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that the meaning of the doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it; such a doctrine is broader than the maxim ejusdem generis. In fact, the latter maxim ‘is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis. It must be borne in mind that noscitur a sociis, is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the Legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied.” (Emphasis added). The House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions Vs. Jordon (1976) 3 All.ER.775 (HL),applied this doctrine while construing the words “or other objects of general concern” in Section 4(1) of the Obscene Publications Act, 1959, and held that the said general words operated in the same area which was covered by the words science, literature, art or learning and that these words did not fall in a totally different area of sexual behaviour and could not enable the accused to prove that the articles seized, which were hard pornography, had some psychotherapeutic value for various categories of persons e.g., for persons of heterosexual taste and perverts to relieve their sexual tensions. Explaining this doctrine further, the Supreme Court in Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Vs. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal (2010) 3 SCC 786 )held at para-28 as under: “This ejusdem generis principle is a facet of the principle of noscitur a sociis. The Latin maxim noscitur a sociis contemplates that a statutory term is recognized by its associated words. The Latin word “sociis” means “society”. Therefore, when general words are juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot be read in isolation. The Latin maxim noscitur a sociis contemplates that a statutory term is recognized by its associated words. The Latin word “sociis” means “society”. Therefore, when general words are juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot be read in isolation. Their colour and their contents are to be derived from their context (See similar observations of Viscount Simonds in Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover (1957) 1 All.ER 49 (HL).” While applying this maxim, in RasilaS. Mehta Vs. Custodian (2011) 6 SCC 220 ), the Supreme Court held at paras 73 to 75 as under: “The contention of the appellants is that since they have not been charged for any offence, they cannot be notified under the Act. According to the appellants, the phrase “involved in the office” could only mean “accused of the offence” and since they are not charged with any offence they cannot be notified. In construing the above mentioned words which are used in association with each other, the rule of construction – noscitur a sociis may be applied. It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. The actual order of these three words in juxtaposition indicates that meaning of one takes colour from the other. The rule is explained differently: that meaning of doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with them (vide Ahmedabad (P) Primary Teachers’ Assn. v. Administrative Officer (2004) 1 SCC 755 ). (Emphasis added) On a careful consideration of the various provisions of the Act and the settled principles of law as discussed above, we have no hesitation to hold that the words “or otherwise” which are general in nature in contrast to the words ‘removal, resignation, death’ in Section 21, take their colour from the specific words preceding them and they must be read ejusdem generis/noscitur a sociis. This necessarily means that an event similar to those events described in the preceding words must occur for a vacancy to arise and to be filled up. This necessarily means that an event similar to those events described in the preceding words must occur for a vacancy to arise and to be filled up. From the analysis of the provisions of Sections 14, 16, 19, 20 and 21 of the Act, we hold that the words “or otherwise” in Section 21 do not take into their fold the event of expiry of the term of the Members of Parliament, State Legislature or State Bar Council, as the case may be, for a vacancy to arise in the Wakf Board. (iii) CASUS OMISSUS: There is another angle from which the petitioner’s plea requires to be examined i.e., by application of the principle of casus omissus, which means that a matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute, cannot be supplied by the Courts. The Privy Council, inKumar Kamalaranjan Roy Vs. Secretary of State (AIR 1938 P.C. 281), while dealing with Section 114 (1) and (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act felt that those provisions were deficient in providing certain contingencies in special cases. In that context, their Lordships observed as under: “…..It may be that there is here a casus omissus, but if so, that omission can only be supplied by statute or statutory action. The Court cannot put into the Act words which are not expressed, and which cannot reasonably be implied on any recognized principles of construction. That would be a work of legislation, not of construction, and outside the province of the Court…..” A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in PadmaSundara Rao (7-supra) at para12, held : “….It is well-settled principle of law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them (See: Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage(218 FR 547).” In Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. Vs. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them (See: Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage(218 FR 547).” In Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. Vs. Punjab National Bank Capital Services Limited (2000) 5 SCC 515 ), the Supreme Court held that while interpreting the provisions of an enactment, the Courts only interpret the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused or subjected to abuse of process of law, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it by having recourse to appropriate procedure if deemed necessary. In Union of India (8-supra), the Supreme Court held at para-14 as under: “….The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities. Vide P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries (1990) 2 SCC 378 ; Mangilal v. Suganchand Rathi ( AIR 1965 SC 101 ); Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1959 S.C. 459 ); Hira Devi (Smt) v. District Board, Shahjahanpur ( AIR 1952 S.C. 362 ); Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar ( AIR 1953 S.C. 148 ); Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (1980) 2 SCC 593 ); G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 ); N.S. Vardachari v. G. Vasantha Pai (1972) 2 SCC 594 ); Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth (1977) 4 SCC 193 ) and CST v. Auriaya Chamber of Commerce, Allahabad (1986) 3 SCC 50 ). Modifying and altering the scheme and applying it to others who are not otherwise entitled to under the scheme, will not also come under the principle of affirmative action adopted by courts sometimes in order to avoid discrimination. If we may say so, what the High Court has done in this case is a clear and naked usurpation of legislative power.” The event of expiry of the term of Members of Parliament, the State Legislature and the Bar Council of the State, is something which happens in its natural course by efflux of time. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that such event was not in the contemplation of the Parliament when it has enacted the provisions of the Act. In contrast, under Section 4 of the Haj Committee Act, 2002, a specific provision for cessation of such members is prescribed. A fortiori, non-inclusion of this event as a ground for disqualification in Section 16 of the Act has to be necessarily attributed to the legislative wisdom. The aspect whether the omission of this event in Section 16 of the Act is proper or not, does not fall for examination by this Court, for, the function of the Parliament is to legislate law and that of the Courts is to interpret the law as it is enacted. Had it been the intention of the Parliament to make the membership in the Wakf Board co-terminus with that of the Parliament, the State Legislature or the Bar Council of the State, it would have simply added one more clause to Section 16 of the Act providing for their disqualification to continue as members of the Wakf Board on the expiry of their terms as the Members of Parliament, Legislature or Bar Council, as the case may be. In the absence of such a provision, to hold that the membership of a Member of Parliament, or a Member of Legislative Assembly or of a Member of Bar Council of the State, in the Wakf Board, is co-terminus with his membership in the body which he represents, amounts to supplying a clause in Section 16 of the Act by the Court. It is neither the function nor the forte of the Courts to legislate or to interpret the plain language of a legislation in the manner which will fit into their thinking of what should be the law. It is neither the function nor the forte of the Courts to legislate or to interpret the plain language of a legislation in the manner which will fit into their thinking of what should be the law. If something in the opinion of the Court which ought to have been included is not included in a legislation, the Court cannot supply such omissions as the same is forbidden by the doctrine of casus omissus. (iv) THE CLEAVAGE IN THE VIEWS: As mentioned in the introductory paragraph, the conflicting views expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Yusuf Qureshi (1-supra) and of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Wakfs Protection Joint Action Committee (2-supra) have given rise to referenceof the case to the Full Bench. It is hence necessary to discuss these Judgments. In Yusuf Quereshi (1-supra), constitution of the Wakf Board under Sections 10 and 11 of the 1954 Act was challenged before this Court. A learned single Judge has set-aside the appointments of as many as ten members of the Wakf Board on the ground that the State Government did not have the complete details of the qualifications before it. One among the members of the Wakf Board appointed by the Government was Mohd. Shakir, a Member of A.P. Legislative Assembly. The Division Bench reversed the Judgment of the learned single Judge on the ground that the procedure adopted in appointing the members of the Wakf Board by the State Government was in conformity with the business rules framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India and that there was no material to hold that any of the members appointed by the Government did not possess the qualifications prescribed under the 1954 Act. Having so held, the Division Bench, however, did not interfere with the Judgment of the learned single Judge to the extent of Sri Mohd. Shakir, on the ground that the tenure of five years prescribed in Section 12 thereof applies to the members appointed under clauses (b) to (d) of Section 11 but not to the Members of the Legislature and the Parliament falling under clause (a) thereof. Shakir, on the ground that the tenure of five years prescribed in Section 12 thereof applies to the members appointed under clauses (b) to (d) of Section 11 but not to the Members of the Legislature and the Parliament falling under clause (a) thereof. This finding of the Division Bench is based on the reasoning that the continuance of the Members of Legislature or the Parliament, as the case may be, for five years is dependent upon their membership in the said bodies and that their tenure as Wakf Board members is co-terminus therewith. With due respect to the Division Bench, we must say that this finding is not supported by reasons. It has not given specific reasons as to what distinguished between the members falling under clause (a) of Section 11 of the 1954 Act from those falling under clauses (b) to (d) thereof. In the absence of reasons, it is reasonable for us to presume that the fact that the Members of the State Legislature and the Parliament were appointed by nomination as members of the Wakf Board by the Government, must have weighed with the Division Bench. But, as held by the Full Bench of this Court in Muslim Minority Front (5-supra), the Wakf Board under the Act is different in its composition from that under the 1954 Act. The salient features which distinguished the Wakf Boards under the two Acts are succinctly brought out by the Full Bench in para-7 of its Judgment as under: “It is clearly seen that the Board under the Wakf Act, 1995 has a different composition from the Board under the Wakf Act, 1954. The mode of representation of different categories of persons in the New Board is also different from the mode of representation of the members by appointment by the State Government as envisaged in under the Wakf Act, 1954. Members of Parliament, State Legislature and mutawallies were given representation in the Board appointed under Section 11 of the Wakf Act, 1954 but the State Government exercised the power to nominate their representations in the Board. Members of Parliament, State Legislature and mutawallies were given representation in the Board appointed under Section 11 of the Wakf Act, 1954 but the State Government exercised the power to nominate their representations in the Board. Free wheeling movement of the State Government, however, in appointing any person of its choice as a member of the Board under the Wakf Act, 1954 from amongst the members of the Parliament and State Legislature as well as mutawallis is subsequently curtailed by a right created in such persons to elect their representatives and it is only when such election is not possible that the State Government is given the power to nominate in their respective categories. While in the case of mutawallis an income limit is introduced for being qualified to be included in the electoral college, a new category altogether of the electoral college is introduced in the new Act in the shape of a representative of the State Bar Council. To make a rider to the Board Section 14 of the new Act has extended representations from persons having special knowledge of Muslim Law etc., under Section 11(b) of the Wakf Act, 1954 to persons representing eminent Muslim Organisations and one not more than two members to be nominated by the State Government each from recognized scholars in Islamic Theology.” (Emphasis added). In paragraph-8, the Full Bench further held as under : "The nominated Board or the Board appointed under Section 11 of the Wakf Act 1954 thus is not one which can stand the composition of the Board as envisaged under the Wakf Act, 1995. Even going by the wider meaning to the expression ‘corresponding provisions’ in sub-section (2) of Section 112 of the Wakf Act, 1995, it will be difficult to find any traces of continuance of the Board appointed under Section 11 of the Wakf Act, 1954 beyond the enforcement of the new Act.” The issue before the Full Bench was whether the Board constituted under the 1954 Act was entitled to continue till it had completed its tenure of five years, notwithstanding its repeal and coming into force of the Act with effect from 1-1-1996. The Full Bench, after drawing a distinction between the two Acts in paragraphs 7 and 8 of its Judgment reproduced hereinabove, answered the said question in the negative. The Full Bench, after drawing a distinction between the two Acts in paragraphs 7 and 8 of its Judgment reproduced hereinabove, answered the said question in the negative. In our considered view, the opinion of the Division Bench in Yusuf Qureshi (1-supra) expressed while interpreting the provisions of 1954 Act, which are substantially dissimilar to that of the Act qua the method of appointment of the members of the Wakf Board, will not have the same weight when it is sought to be applied to the provisions of the Act, because, the very basis of appointment of the members of the Wakf Board from the categories of the Members of Parliament and State Legislature has been radically changed from the one of appointment by nomination to the one by election. In the latter case, superior right for the continuance of the members would flow by virtue of their election, while in the former case, the pleasure doctrine will curtail the rights of the nominated members. Therefore, the view of the Division Bench in Yusuf Qureshi (1- supra) will not operate as a ratio in the present case. Even otherwise, for the aforementioned reasons, we are not in agreement with the said view of the Division Bench. In Karnataka Wakfs Protection Joint Action Committee (2-supra), one of the Muslim Members of Parliament was elected as a member of the Karnataka Wakf Board on 8-9- 2003 under Section 14(1)(b)(i) of the Act. By the time the State Government has issued notification constituting the Wakf Board in September 2005, he ceased to be a Member of Parliament as he has lost his election held in April 2004. In a Public Interest Litigation, his appointment as the member of the Wakf Board was challenged on the ground that as on the date of issuance of the notification constituting the Wakf Board he ceased to be a Member of Parliament. In a Public Interest Litigation, his appointment as the member of the Wakf Board was challenged on the ground that as on the date of issuance of the notification constituting the Wakf Board he ceased to be a Member of Parliament. After considering the provisions of Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act, the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court has taken the view that by merely ceasing to be a Member of Parliament, he did not cease to be a member of the Board as, under Section 15 of the Act the term of office of a member of the Board is fixed as 5 years and that Section 16 did not include cessation of the membership of the Parliament as one of the disqualifications. Even though the Karnataka High Court has not supported its view with elaborate reasons, as in the case of our Division Bench in Yusuf Quereshi (1-supra), its conclusion is based on the two core provisions i.e., Sections 15 and 16 of the Act. We, therefore, prefer to concur with the view of the Karnataka High Court for the detailed reasons we have given in the foregoing. In SyedShah Muhammad Al Hussaini (3-supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Constitutional validity of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act was questioned. One of the contentions advanced by the petitioner therein was that by making a provision for appointment of the Members of Parliament and State Legislature, the very spirit of the Wakf as envisaged under the Muslim law was defeated. It was argued that the Members of Parliament, Legislature and Bar Council are elected by the whole section of the society including non-muslims and that such an elected person cannot really represent the interests of the Muslims or protect the community or preachings of the Islam. While repelling this argument, the learned Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court held that the elected Muslim members are sought to be included in the Board upon consideration of their obligation and responsibility to the people in general and Muslims in particular; that the responsible elected Members of Parliament, State Legislature and Bar Council are rightly intended and expected to come to the expectation of the law makers and contribute positively for providing better administration of the wakfs, or for matters connected therewith, or incidental thereto. Thus the Court has upheld the validity of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act providing for appointment of the Members of Parliament and State Legislature as members of the Wakf Board. The issue whether these members cease to be the members of the Wakf Board with the expiry of their term as the Members of Parliament or State Legislature, did not fall for consideration of the Court. In the context in which the above noted observations were made, the Division Bench cannot be understood as opining that always and at all times, persons holding the office of Member of Parliament, State Legislature and the Bar Council, alone should continue as members of the Wakf Board. Such an understanding of the observations of the Division Bench, in our opinion, is wholly misplaced and misconceived. In Mohd. Akram Ansari (4-supra), the election of a Member of Legislative Assembly of Delhi was questioned under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 on the ground that as the Chairman of the Delhi Wakf Board, he was holding an ‘office of profit’. The said challenge was turned down by the Delhi High Court based on the provisions of Section 31(a) of the Act, inserted by the Wakf (Delhi Amendment) Act 2006, whereunder it was made clear that the offices of the Chairperson or members of the Board constituted for the Union Territory of Delhi shall not be disqualified and shall be deemed never to have been disqualified for being chosen as, or for being, a Member of the Legislative Assembly of National Capital Territory of Delhi. In other words, the exemption provided in case of the Members of Parliament by Section 31 of the Act has been extended to the Members of the Delhi Legislature by introduction of Section 31(a) in order to see that the elected Legislative Members of the National Capital Territory of Delhi holding the offices of the Chairperson or the members of the Delhi Wakf Board do not fall within the expression ‘office of profit’ under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India or Section 15 of the Government of National Capital Territory Act, 1991. We do not really understand as to how this Judgment would advance the case of the petitioner. Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution of India disqualifies a person from being elected as a Member of Parliament, if he holds any office of profit. We do not really understand as to how this Judgment would advance the case of the petitioner. Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution of India disqualifies a person from being elected as a Member of Parliament, if he holds any office of profit. Section 31 of the Act was inserted on account of the said provision, to save the Chairperson or the members of the Wakf Board from incurring such disqualification. The same analogy was extended for the Members of Legislature of the National Capital Territory of Delhi. In our opinion, a converse provision to save the membership of the Wakf Board of the Members of the Parliament and State Legislature on the expiry of their term is wholly unnecessary under the scheme of the Act as discussed above. In the ultimate analysis, the real test is whether any of the provisions of the Act, either expressly or by necessary implication, curtails the term of the members of the Wakf Board elected under Section 14(1)(b)(i) to (iii) before completion of five years’ term. If the result of this test is in the negative, no further question on the right of such members to continue as members of the Wakf Board till completion of their five year term would arise. We are of the firm opinion that the test result is in the negative. On the premises as above, our answer to the reference is as under: The term of the elected members under Section 14(1)(b)(i), (ii) & (iii) of the Act, is not co-terminus with their tenure as the Members of Parliament, State Legislature or State Bar Council and that their term as the Chairperson or members of the Wakf Board, as the case may be, will last till completion of five years as envisaged under Section 15 of the Act unless they resign, or, are removed by the State Government by applying the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. In the result, we do not find any merit in the Writ Petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. (Sanjay Kumar, J.) (for himself and V.Eswaraiah,J) 44. In the result, we do not find any merit in the Writ Petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. (Sanjay Kumar, J.) (for himself and V.Eswaraiah,J) 44. The controversy referred to this Full Bench for resolution, as succinctly put in the order of reference, is as under: “The question that has been raised is whether an elected Member of Parliament or the State Legislature, who is elected as a Member of the Wakf Board, loses his Membership in the Wakf Board when he ceases to be a Member of Parliament or a Member of Legislative Assembly. In other words, whether his election term to the Wakf Board is co-terminus with his election as a Member of Parliament or a Member of Legislative Assembly.” 45. Our learned brother, C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy,J, upon a meticulous and painstaking analysis of the facts and law, answered the reference as under: “The term of the elected members under Section 14(1)(b)(i), (ii) & (iii) of the Act, is not co-terminus with their tenure as the Members of Parliament, State Legislature or State Bar Council and that their term as the Chairperson or members of the Wakf Board, as the case may be, will last till completion of five years as envisaged under Section 15 of the Act unless they resign, or, are removed by the State Government by applying the provisions of Section 20 of the Act.” 46. Having given thoughtful consideration to the issue, we regret our inability to accede to the broad and extensive conclusion of our learned brother that Members of Parliament or the State Legislature, once elected to the State Wakf Board under Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1995’), are entitled to continue as such for a full term of five years irrespective of the circumstances in which they cease to be Members of Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be. There may be situations where the tenure of the Members of Parliament or the State Legislature, who were elected to the Wakf Board by virtue of that status, may be cut short in such manner as to have an impact on their eligibility to continue as Members of the Wakf Board for a full term of five years. 47. There may be situations where the tenure of the Members of Parliament or the State Legislature, who were elected to the Wakf Board by virtue of that status, may be cut short in such manner as to have an impact on their eligibility to continue as Members of the Wakf Board for a full term of five years. 47. Ergo, we are constrained to express our reservations as to the comprehensive and all-encompassing nature of our learned brother’s conclusion by way of this separate opinion. We strive hereunder to elaborate on this aspect as certain nuances of this conundrum are subtle and elusive. 48. The Division Bench, while making the reference, alluded to the cessation of elected Wakf Board Members as Members of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly and in that context, framed the question whether the term of such Member of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly in the Wakf Board would be co-terminus with his ‘election’ as Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislative Assembly. However, the election of a Member of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly is liable to cessation not only by expiry of the term but by other intervening circumstances also, such as the election itself being set aside. This aspect would therefore have to be borne in mind while resolving the controversy. 49. The facts of the case have been set out impeccably by our learned brother and we see no reason to recount the same. Suffice it to state that respondents 3 and 4, who were elected as Members of the Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board, by virtue of their being Members of Parliament and the Andhra Pradesh State Legislative Assembly respectively completed their term as such in May, 2009 and failed to contest the General Elections held in 2009. The short question raised in the writ petition is whether they are entitled to continue as Members of the Wakf Board, despite their demitting office as Members of Parliament and the State Legislative Assembly respectively. 50. The legal backdrop of the case is provided by the Act of 1995. Chapter IV thereof, comprising Sections 13 to 35, deals with the establishment of Wakf Boards and their functions. Section 13 speaks of incorporation of a Board of Wakfs by the State Government through a notification in the Official Gazette. 50. The legal backdrop of the case is provided by the Act of 1995. Chapter IV thereof, comprising Sections 13 to 35, deals with the establishment of Wakf Boards and their functions. Section 13 speaks of incorporation of a Board of Wakfs by the State Government through a notification in the Official Gazette. The Board is to be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal under Section 13(3). Section 14 deals with composition of the Board and reads as under: “14. Composition of Board:–– (1) The Board for a State and the Union Territory of Delhi shall consist of–– (a) a Chairperson; (b) one and not more than two members, as the State Government may think fit, to be elected from each of the electoral colleges consisting of–– (i) Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or, as the case may be, the Union Territory of Delhi, (ii) Muslim Members of the State Legislature, (iii) Muslim Members of the Bar Council of the State, and (iv) Mutawallis of the wakfs having an annual income of rupees one lakh and above; (c) one and not more than two members to be nominated by the State Government representing eminent Muslim Organizations; (d) one and not more than two members to be nominated by the State Government, each from recognized scholars in Islamic Theology; (e) an officer of the State Government not below the rank of Deputy Secretary, (2) Election of the members specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be held in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that where the number of Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or the State Bar Council, as the case may be, is only one, such Muslim Member shall be declared to have been elected on the Board: Provided further that where there are no Muslim Members in any of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) the ex-Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or ex-member of the State Bar Council, as the case may be, shall constitute the electoral college. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where the State Government is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to constitute an electoral college for any of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1), the State Government may nominate such persons as the members of the Board as it deems fit. (4) The number of elected members of the Board shall, at all times, be more than the nominated members of the Board except as provided under sub-section (3). (5) Where there are Shia Wakfs but no separate Shia Wakfs Board exists, at least one of the members from the categories listed in sub-section (1), shall be a Shia Muslim. (6) In determining the number of Shia members or Sunni members of the Board, the State Government shall have regard to the number and value of Shia Wakfs and Sunni Wakfs to be administered by the Board and appointment of the members shall be made, so far as may be, in accordance with such determination. (7) In the case of the Union Territory other than Delhi, the Board shall consist of not less than three and not more than five members to be appointed by the Central Government from amongst the categories of persons specified in sub-section (1): Provided that there shall be one mutawalli as the member of the Board. (8) Whenever the Board is constituted or re-constituted, the members of the Board present at a meeting convened for the purpose shall elect one from amongst themselves as the Chairperson of the Board. (9) The members of the Board shall be appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette." 51. Section 15 stipulates that Members of the Wakf Board shall hold office for a term of five years. Section 16 deals with disqualification for being appointed, or for continuing as, a Member of the Wakf Board and reads as under: “16. Section 15 stipulates that Members of the Wakf Board shall hold office for a term of five years. Section 16 deals with disqualification for being appointed, or for continuing as, a Member of the Wakf Board and reads as under: “16. Disqualification for being appointed, or for continuing as, a member of the Board:–– A person shall be disqualified for being appointed, or for continuing as, a member of the Board if–– (a) he is not a Muslim and is less than twenty-one years of age; (b) he is found to be a person of unsound mind; (c) he is an undischarged insolvent; (d) he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude and such conviction has not been reversed or he has not been granted full pardon in respect of such offence; (e) he has been on a previous occasion- (i) removed from his office as a member or as a mutawalli, or (ii) removed by an order of a competent court or Tribunal from any position of trust either for mismanagement or for corruption.” 52. Section 19 permits the Chairperson or any Member of the Wakf Board to resign from office by writing under his hand addressed to the State Government. Section 20 deals with removal of the Chairperson or Members of the Wakf Board and reads thus: “20.Removal of Chairperson and member:–– (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, remove the Chairperson of the Board or any member thereof if he–– (a) is or becomes subject to any disqualifications specified in Section 16; or (b) refuses to act or is incapable of acting or acts in a manner which the State Government, after hearing any explanation that he may offer, considers to be prejudicial to the interests of the wakfs; or (c) fails in the opinion of the Board, to attend three consecutive meetings of the Board, without sufficient excuse. (2) Where the Chairperson of the Board is removed under sub-section (1), he shall also cease to be a member of the Board.” Section 21, dealing with filling of a vacancy, is crucial to this case and reads as follows: “21.Filling of a vacancy:–– When the seat of a member becomes vacant by his removal, resignation, death or otherwise, a new member shall be appointed in his place and such member shall hold office so long as the member whose place he fills would have been entitled to hold office, if such vacancy had not occurred.” 53. Section 64 deals with removal of mutawallis and provides for the various situations where such removal can be effected. This, then, is the legal setting. 54. It would be appropriate at this stage to analyze the case law which has bearing on the controversy. In MUSLIM MINORITY FRONT v. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ( 1996 (2) ALT 30 (FB), a Full Bench of this Court dealt with the issue whether the Wakf Board constituted under Section 11 of the Wakf Act, 1954 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1954’) was entitled to continue for a full term of five years notwithstanding the advent of the Act of 1995, which provided for a different composition of the Wakf Board. The Full Bench took note of the fact that the Act of 1954 provided for nomination by the State Government of Members of the State Legislature and the Parliament, representing the State, as Members of the Wakf Board. As per Section 10 of the Act of 1954, the Board was to consist of eleven members. Section 11 thereof provided for appointment of Board members by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette from any one or more of the following categories of persons, viz., (a) Members of the State Legislature and Members of Parliament representing the State; (b) persons having special knowledge of Muslim Law and representing associations such as State Jamiat-ul-Ulma-i-Hind (whether such persons are Hanafi, Ahle-Hadis or Shefai) or State Shia Conference; (c) persons having special knowledge of administration, finance or law; (d) mutawallis of wakfs situated within the State. 55. Section 14 of the Act of 1995, reproduced supra, however brought about a sea change in the mode and method of constituting the Board. 55. Section 14 of the Act of 1995, reproduced supra, however brought about a sea change in the mode and method of constituting the Board. The Full Bench inMUSLIM MINORITY FRONT (supra) was therefore of the view that as the Act of 1995 completely overhauled the methodology for constituting the Board and the Act of 1995 came into force in the State of Andhra Pradesh on 01.01.1996, the Board constituted under the erstwhile Act of 1954 could not be permitted to complete the term of five years under Section 12 of the Act of 1954. 56. It is interesting to note that the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984) substituted Section 10 of the Act, 1954 and omitted Section 11 altogether. The substituted Section 10 of the Act of 1954 was, in effect, a replication of the present Section 14 of the Act of 1995. However, though Act No.69 of 1984 received the assent of the President of India it was not brought into force in all respects in the State of Andhra Pradesh and the erstwhile Section 11 of the Act of 1954 continued to hold the field, notwithstanding the amendment of the provisions relating to the composition of Board. It was only under Section 14 of the Act of 1995, which came into force in the State of Andhra Pradesh from 01.01.1996, that the new provisions with regard to composition of the Wakf Board, which are practically identical to those in the substituted Section 10 of the Act of 1954, were given effect. 57. The Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board Conduct of Election Rules, 1996 (for brevity, ‘the Rules of 1996’) were framed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 109 read with Section 14 of the Act of 1995. The Rules of 1996 pertain to conduct of election of members of the Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board, to ordinary vacancies as well as casual vacancies. ‘Election’ as defined in the Rules of 1996 means an election to fill a vacancy in the office of the members of the Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board under clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act of 1995. ‘Election’ as defined in the Rules of 1996 means an election to fill a vacancy in the office of the members of the Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board under clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act of 1995. Rule 7 thereof posits issuance of a public notice of the intended election and states that after the commencement of the Act of 1995, an ordinary election for the constitution of the Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board, under Section 14 (2), shall be conducted to elect the members in categories (i) to (iv) under Section 14(1) (b) of the Act of 1995 and on the expiration of the term of the Wakf Board or on its supersession or dissolution under Section 99 of the Act of 1995 or for filling up of any casual vacancy caused in a particular category under Section 16 or Section 64 of the Act of 1995, as the case may be. 58. Under Rule 4 of the Rules of 1996, dealing with the electoral roll in so far as it pertains to election of a Mutawalli under Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Act of 1995, the Secretary of the Wakf Board shall give one week time to the Mutawalli or the Managing Committee of the Wakf Institution to elect one from among themselves, in the case of there being more than one Mutawalli, or one office bearer of the Committee, if the institution is administered by a Managing Committee, to be a member of the electoral college. A Division Bench of this Court, in ABDUL KHADEER BEIG v. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ( 2008 (2) ALD 33 ),struck down the deletion effected in this Rule under G.O.Ms.No.30 dated 29.06.2005, in so far as it pertained to election of an office bearer of a Managing Committee of a Wakf Institution. One of the contentions urged by the Government in support of the amendment was that the Managing Committee of the Wakf Institution did not have a fixed tenure and therefore it would create difficulties in applying the rule for election of an office bearer of such Committee as a member of the electoral college. The Division bench observed that as per Section 14 of the Act of 1995, the tenure of most of the persons on the basis of which they became Members of the Board was uncertain. The Division bench observed that as per Section 14 of the Act of 1995, the tenure of most of the persons on the basis of which they became Members of the Board was uncertain. The Division Bench observed that one of the categories from which persons could be taken to the electoral college was Muslim Members of Parliament from the State, another category was Muslim Members of the State Legislature and a third category was Muslim Members of the Bar Council of the State. The Bench observed that the tenure of these three categories was also uncertain and rejected the argument. This judgment therefore drew a distinction between the tenure of Members of Parliament, the State Legislature and the Bar Council, which formed the substratum for their candidature to be elected as Members of the Wakf Board as compared to the tenure of their membership of the Wakf Board. Though not explicitly stated, the tone of this judgment suggests that the two are independent. 59. In P.K.M.KUTTY HAJI v. STATE OF KERALA (W.P.(C) Nos.30649 of 2006 and 6932 & 25659 of 2007 dated 14.08.2008), a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court dealt with the issue as to whether a Muslim Member of the Legislative Assembly elected as a Member of the Wakf Board was entitled to continue in office for a term of five years despite ceasing to be a Member of the Legislative Assembly. It was contended that at the time of his election as a Member of the Board, the Member of the Legislative Assembly was fully qualified to contest therefor and upon being duly elected, his term of office would invariably be five years. It was pointed out that under Section 20 of the Act of 1995, automatic cessation from membership of the Board did not arise and there had to be specific removal from membership for the reasons stipulated therein. The Division Bench, agreeing with this submission, observed that once a Muslim Member of the Legislative Assembly was elected as a Member of the Wakf Board, he would have to continue in office for five years in the absence of a specific provision that when he ceased to be a Member of the Legislative Assembly, his membership in the Wakf Board would also automatically cease. The Court further observed that it could not fill the allowed gap and that the Legislature was free to add such a clause in the Wakf Act if it was really needed. The Court felt that it was not for it to fill up the gaps imagining the intention of the Legislature. 60. In YUSUF QURESHI v. MOULANA MOHAMMED JAMALUDDIN DECCANI ( 1996 (1) ALT 236 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with the constitution of the Wakf Board under Section 11 of the Act of 1954. Incidentally, the issue arose as to whether a Member of the Legislative Assembly who was elected as a Member of the Board was entitled to continue after ceasing to be a Member of the Legislative Assembly. In this regard, the Bench observed that the tenure of five years prescribed in Section 12 applied to persons covered by clauses (b) to (d) of Section 11 but as regards Members of the State Legislature and Parliament covered by clause (a), their continuance for five years was dependant upon their membership of the State Legislature or Parliament as the case may be; their appointment was qua the membership of the State Legislature or Parliament and when membership in that behalf ceased, they could not continue as members of the Wakf Board. The Bench concluded that when an M.L.A. or M.P. was appointed as a Member of the Wakf Board, his tenure was co-terminus with his membership in the State Legislature or Parliament. 61. As pointed out by our learned brother, this judgment is not supported by any detailed reasoning. The same is the situation with the conflicting judgment of the Karnataka High Court in KARNATAKA WAKFS PROTECTION JOINT ACTION COMMITTEE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA (W.P.No.22437 of 2005 dated 07-11- 2005.). This judgment turned on Sections 15 and 16 of the Act of 1995 but again, elaborate reasoning is wanting. The issue before us would therefore have to be resolved independently on the touchstone of the statutory provisions and their interpretation. 62. Ordinarily, the canon of interpretation adopted by the Courts would be the golden rule of literal interpretation. This judgment turned on Sections 15 and 16 of the Act of 1995 but again, elaborate reasoning is wanting. The issue before us would therefore have to be resolved independently on the touchstone of the statutory provisions and their interpretation. 62. Ordinarily, the canon of interpretation adopted by the Courts would be the golden rule of literal interpretation. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in KANAI LAL SUR v. PARAMNIDHI SADHUKHAN ( AIR 1957 SC 907 ),the words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only, when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. 63. In his concurring opinion in KEHAR SINGH v. STATE (DELHI ADMN.) (1988) 3 SCC 609 ), Justice K.Jagannatha Shetty observed: “230. Before I come to consider the arguments put forward by each side, I venture to refer to some general observations by way of approach to the questions of construction of statutes. In the past, the judges and lawyers spoke of a ‘golden rule’ by which statutes were to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word. They took the grammatical or literal meaning unmindful of the consequences. Even if such a meaning gave rise to unjust results which legislature never intended, the grammatical meaning alone was kept to prevail. They said that it would be for the legislature to amend the Act and not for the court to intervene by its innovation. 231. During the last several years, the ‘golden rule’ has been given a go-by. We now look for the ‘intention’ of the legislature or the ‘purpose’ of the statute. First, we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. We now look for the ‘intention’ of the legislature or the ‘purpose’ of the statute. First, we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provision out of the framework of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences. 232. Let me here add a word of caution. This adventure, no doubt, enlarges our discretion as to interpretation. But it does not imply power to us to substitute our own notions of legislative intention. It implies only a power of choice where differing constructions are possible and different meanings are available.” 64. In STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT (2005) 4 SCC 530 ),a Constitution Bench had occasion to interpret the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1973. Justice K.G.Balakrishnan, as the learned Judge then was, opined that the distinction between a strict construction and a more free one has disappeared in modern times and that the question was “what is the true construction of the statute?” The learned Judge referred to Craieson Statute Law, 7th Edition: ““The distinction between a strict and a liberal construction has almost disappeared with regard to all classes of statutes, so that all statutes, whether penal or not, are now construed by substantially the same rules. ‘All modern Acts are framed with regard to equitable as well as legal principles.’ ‘A hundred years ago,’ said the court in Lyons’ case [Lyons v. Lyons, 1858 Bell CC 38 : 169 ER 1158], ‘statutes were required to be perfectly precise and resort was not had to a reasonable construction of the Act, and thereby criminals were often allowed to escape. This is not the present mode of construing Acts of Parliament. They are construed now with reference to the true meaning and real intention of the legislature.” At p.532 of the same book, observations of Sedgwick are quoted as under: “The more correct version of the doctrine appears to be that statutes of this class are to be fairly construed and faithfully applied according to the intent of the legislature, without unwarrantable severity on the one hand or unjustifiable lenity on the other, in cases of doubt the courts inclining to mercy.” ” 65. The learned Judge therefore concluded that the question would be as to what was the intention of the legislature. In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Dharmadhikari, in his concurring opinion, observed that the rule of interpretation requiring strict construction of penal statutes did not warrant a narrow and pedantic construction of a provision so as to leave loopholes for the offender to escape. The learned Judge stated that a penal statute has also to be so construed as to avoid a lacuna and to suppress mischief and to advance a remedy and that a common-sense approach for solving a question of applicability of a penal statute is not ruled out by the rule of strict construction. In his dissenting opinion, Justice B.N.Srikrishna, however, took a different view. The observations of the learned Judge in this regard are extracted hereunder: “62. We are unable to subscribe to the view that by “judicial heroics” it is open to the court to remedy an irretrievable legislative error by resort to the theory of presumed intention of the legislature. It was contended that the court should adopt a purposive construction of statutes. The dicta of Denning, L.J. in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher [(1949) 2 All ER 155, p.164 (CA)] were pressed into service for emulation. The view of Denning, L.J., that “judicial heroics” were warranted to cope with the difficulties arising in statutory interpretation, was severely criticized by the House of Lords in Magor& St. The dicta of Denning, L.J. in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher [(1949) 2 All ER 155, p.164 (CA)] were pressed into service for emulation. The view of Denning, L.J., that “judicial heroics” were warranted to cope with the difficulties arising in statutory interpretation, was severely criticized by the House of Lords in Magor& St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corpn. [(1951) 2 All ER 839 : 1952 AC 189 (HL)] Lord Simonds said: (All ER p.841 E) “The duty of the court is to interpret the words that the legislature has used. Those words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited:” “It appears to me”, said Lord Simonds, “to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation”. Lord Morton observed “these heroics are out of place”. Lord Tucker said: (All ER p.850 A) “Your Lordships would be acting in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity if the view put forward by Denning, L.J., … were to prevail.” This disapproval of Denning, L.J.’s approach was cited with approval by this Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court [ (1990) 3 SCC 682 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 71]. The argument of purposive interpretation, therefore, does not appeal when the statute in plain terms says something.” 66. The learned Judge pointed out that a judicial opinion is limited to finding solutions within specified parameters and anything more than that would be ‘judicial heroics’ and ‘naked usurpation of legislative function’. 67. Thus, precedential wisdom weighs in favour of giving full meaning to the actual language used in the statute. Viewed thus, there is no getting over the fact that the Act of 1995 does not prescribe a disqualification, whereby Members of Parliament or of the State Legislature automatically cease to be Members of the Wakf Board upon completion of their office as Members of Parliament or of the State Legislature. Significantly, Section 4 of the Haj Committee Act, 2002, dealing with composition of a Haj Committee, provides that a Member of Parliament nominated as a Member of the Haj Committee shall, upon ceasing to be a Member of Parliament, cease to be a Member of the Committee. No such provision is made in the Act of 1995. Significantly, Section 4 of the Haj Committee Act, 2002, dealing with composition of a Haj Committee, provides that a Member of Parliament nominated as a Member of the Haj Committee shall, upon ceasing to be a Member of Parliament, cease to be a Member of the Committee. No such provision is made in the Act of 1995. It is also pertinent to note that Members of Parliament and of the State Legislature are elected by the electoral college as Members of the Wakf Board, unlike earlier when they were nominated by the State Government. The present provision also contemplates former Members of Parliament and of the State Legislature being elected as Members of the Wakf Board in certain circumstances. Thus, there is no statutory mandate that only sitting Members of Parliament and of the State Legislature should be elected as Members of the Wakf Board. There is therefore no manifest dictate in the legislation that membership of the Wakf Board under Section 14(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act of1995 would terminate upon such Members of Parliament/State Legislature ceasing to be so. We therefore agree with the view taken by our learned brother to the extent that the Act of 1995 does not contemplate cessation of membership of the Wakf Board of Members of Parliament and of the State Legislature upon their demitting office as such upon expiry of their term. 68. However, our conclusion, unlike our learned brother’s, is not absolute as is evident from the language in which we have couched it. The nature of cessation of office of such Members of Parliament and of the State Legislature would be utmost relevant to decide their entitlement to continue as Members of the Wakf Board. Demission of office by them upon successful completion of their term, as stated supra, would have no impact on their continuance as Members of the Wakf Board for a full term. There may however be other circumstances in which their office could be cut short. 69. To elaborate, under Section 20 of the Act of 1995, a Member of the Wakf Board can be removed if he attracts the disqualification specified in Section 16. There may however be other circumstances in which their office could be cut short. 69. To elaborate, under Section 20 of the Act of 1995, a Member of the Wakf Board can be removed if he attracts the disqualification specified in Section 16. Section 16(e) states that a person shall be disqualified for being appointed or for continuing as a Member of the Wakf Board if he has been, on a previous occasion, removed by an order of a competent Court or a Tribunal from any position of trust either for mismanagement or for corruption. However, under Section 100 of The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1951’), election of a Member of Parliament or of the State Legislature can be declared void if, on the date of such election, he was not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat or if any corrupt practices had been committed by him or his agent or by any other person with his consent or if a nomination was improperly rejected or if the result of the election had been materially affected by any of the reasons mentioned in Section 100 (1)(d) of the Act of 1951. Disqualification of candidates for membership of Parliament and of the State Legislatures is dealt with under ChapterIIIof the Act of 1951, comprising Sections 7 to 11. It is pertinent to note that an elected Member of the Parliament/State Legislature faces the risk of having his election declared void under Section 100 of the Act of 1951, not only for corrupt practices but also on various other grounds, such as disqualification owing to a subsisting contract between him and the appropriate Government or because he holds office in a Government company. 70. The anomalous situation which arises by juxtaposing the Act of 1951 and the Act of 1995 would be that in a given case, a Member of the Parliament/State Legislature who, by virtue of such office, is elected a Member of the Wakf Board would continue for the full term of five years, notwithstanding the fact that his election as a Member of the Parliament/State Legislature is declared to be void under Section 100 of the Act of 1951. Under the Act of 1995, it is only if he is removed from a position of trust owing to mismanagement or corruption that disqualification under Section 16(e) of the Act of 1995 would be attracted. But as pointed out supra, there are various grounds, other than corrupt practices, under Section 100 of the Act of 1951 for declaring void the election of a Member of the Parliament/State Legislature. It would, indeed, be incongruous if a Member of the Parliament/State Legislature loses office owing to his election being declared void but, having been elected as a Member of the Wakf Board by virtue of his being a Member of the Parliament/State Legislature, he would continue to hold office as a Member of the Board for the full term of five years! Once his election as a Member of the Parliament/State Legislature is itself declared void, it would be non est in the eye of law and his candidature, even if valid at the time of his election as a Member of the Wakf Board, would stand nullified by the subsequent voiding of his election as a Member of the Parliament/State Legislature. Such a person cannot obviously continue to garner the benefit of his election to the Wakf Board when the very substratum thereof, his election as a Member of the Parliament/State Legislature, stood wiped out by the declaration of such election as void under Section 100 of the Act of 1951. 71. In our considered opinion, it is to meet such a situation that provision has been made in Section 21 of the Act of 1995 for filling up the vacancy that would consequently arise in the Wakf Board. The words used in the provision may be referred to again, at the cost of repetition. Section 21 comes into play when the seat of a member becomes vacant by his removal, resignation, death or otherwise. 72. The phrase ‘or otherwise’ has not been defined to mean any particular instance. The issue is as to what is the scope of the phrase ‘or otherwise’ in the above provision. Our learned brother has taken the view, applying the principles of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, that this phrase would take colour from the words preceding it. With due respect, we must disagree. The issue is as to what is the scope of the phrase ‘or otherwise’ in the above provision. Our learned brother has taken the view, applying the principles of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, that this phrase would take colour from the words preceding it. With due respect, we must disagree. It is a settled principle of statutory construction that every word and phrase used in the provision must be given its full effect. Just as it is not open to the Courts to supply words to fill in perceived omissions or gaps in the statute, it is not open to them to render any word or phrase in the provision meaningless or ineffective. 73. In this regard, the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. APHALI PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1989) 4 SCC 378 )is relevant. Therein, it was observed that every word in a statute is to be given meaning and a construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute would normally be rejected. Every clause of a statute, per the Supreme Court, is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act so as to make, as far as possible, a consistent enactment of the whole statute. 74. Again, in SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY EMPLOYEES CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT SOCIETY EMPLOYEES UNION, SECUNDERABAD v. REGISTRAR OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES (1998(1) ALT 20 (SC), the Supreme Court held that it is a cardinal principle of construction not to brush aside words used in a statute or in a notification issued under a statute and that full effect must be given to the entire words of an instrument. 75. It is in the context of interpreting Section 21 of the Act of 1995 that the above principles gain relevance. The words ‘or otherwise’ are markedly disjunctive and contemplate situations other than removal, resignation or death of an existing Member. The words cannot therefore be restricted to mean an event similar to those mentioned earlier. We are fortified in taking this view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in MAHARASHTRA UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH SCIENCES v. SATCHIKITSA PRASARAK MANDAL (2010) 3 SCC 786 ). Therein, the Supreme Court was dealing with the definition of ‘teachers’ under Section 2(35) of the Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Act, 1998. We are fortified in taking this view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in MAHARASHTRA UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH SCIENCES v. SATCHIKITSA PRASARAK MANDAL (2010) 3 SCC 786 ). Therein, the Supreme Court was dealing with the definition of ‘teachers’ under Section 2(35) of the Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Act, 1998. This definition reads as under: "‘teachers’ means full time approved demonstrators, tutors, assistant lecturers, lecturers, readers, associate professors, professors and other persons teaching or giving instructions on full time basis in affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the university;" 76. The High Court dealing with this definition applied the principle of ejusdem generis in construing the phrase ‘and other persons teaching or giving instructions’ and held that the respondents, being unapproved teachers, did not come within the definition of ‘teachers’. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this construction. The observations of the Supreme Court in this regard are relevant: “23.The definition of teachers under Section 2(35) is wide enough to include even unapproved teachers. In fact the said definition has two parts, the first part deals with full time approved demonstrators, tutors, assistant lecturers, lecturers, etc. and the second part deals with other persons teaching or giving instructions on full-time basis in affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the University. Even though the approved teachers and those “other persons” who are teaching and giving instructions fall in two different classes both are encompassed with the definition of teacher under Section 2 (35) of the Act. The word “and” before “other persons” is disjunctive and indicates a different class of people. ……… 27. The Latin expression "ejusdem generis" which means "of the same kind or nature" is a principle of construction, meaning thereby when general words in a statutory text are flanked by restricted words, the meaning of the general words are taken to be restricted by implication with the meaning of restricted words. This is a principle which arises "from the linguistic implication by which words having literally a wide meaning (when taken in isolation) are treated as reduced in scope by the verbal context". It may be regarded as an instance of ellipsis, or reliance on implication. This principle is presumed to apply unless there is some contrary indication [See Glanville Williams, The Origins and Logical Implications of the Ejusdem Generis Rule, 7 Conv (NS) 119]. 28. It may be regarded as an instance of ellipsis, or reliance on implication. This principle is presumed to apply unless there is some contrary indication [See Glanville Williams, The Origins and Logical Implications of the Ejusdem Generis Rule, 7 Conv (NS) 119]. 28. This ejusdem generis principle is a facet of the principle of noscitur a sociis. The Latin maxim noscitur a sociis contemplates that a statutory term is recognized by its associated words. The Latin word “sociis” means “society”. Therefore, when general words are juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot be read in isolation. Their colour and their contents are to be derived from their context [See similar observations of Viscount Simonds in Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, 1957 AC 436 at 461]. 29. But like all other linguistic canons of construction, the ejusdem generis principle applies only when a contrary intention does not appear. In the instant case, a contrary intention is clearly indicated inasmuch as the definition of “teachers” under Section 2 (35) of the said Act, as pointed out above, is in two parts. The first part deals with enumerated categories but the second part which begins by the expression "and other" envisages a different category of persons. Here “and” is disjunctive. So, while construing such a definition the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be applied. ” 77. The case before us stands on firmer footing as the words ‘or otherwise’ are decidedly disjunctive as compared to the words ‘and other persons…’ considered by the Supreme Court, which were nonetheless held to be disjunctive. The words ‘or otherwise’ therefore have to mean something distinctive and other than instances of removal, resignation or death of a Member. 78. We would therefore use this instance of a membership of the Wakf Board falling vacant under the disjunctive caption of ‘or otherwise’ to cover a situation where the Member of the Parliament/State Legislature suffers termination of his office as such owing to his election being declared void under Section 100 of the Act of 1951 and consequently, his membership of the Wakf Board based thereon would be adversely affected. To hold otherwise, as detailed supra, would lead to an absurd and patently bizarre situation. 79. To hold otherwise, as detailed supra, would lead to an absurd and patently bizarre situation. 79. To conclude, we concur with the view taken by our learned brother that mere expiry of the term of a Member of Parliament or of the State Legislature would not impact his elected membership of the Wakf Board under Section 14(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act of 1995 and he would be entitled to continue as a Member of the Wakf Board for the full term. However, if the tenure of such Member of Parliament or of the State Legislature is cut short owing to his election being declared void under Section 100 of the Act of 1951, he would not be entitled to continue as a Member of the Wakf Board and recourse must necessarily be taken to Section 21 of the Act of 1995 for filling up the resultant vacancy. 80. As in the present case, challenge to the continuance of respondents 3 and 4 as Members of the Andhra Pradesh Wakf Board is only on the ground that they have successfully completed their term and are not presently sitting Members of Parliament and of the State Legislature, it is without merit for the reasons set out hereinabove. The writ petition therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.