Judgment : 1. The appellant, Bachan Ram, has challenged the legality of the judgment and decree dated 25.05.2001 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Degana, whereby the earned Civil Judge has dismissed the suit filed by the appellant for cancellation of a sale-deed dated 06.07.1989. He has also challenged the judgment and decree dated 15.09.2005 passed by the District Judge, Merta, whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant, and has confirmed the judgment and decree dated 29.05.2001. 2. In brief, the facts of the case are that Bachan Singh had filed a suit, inter-alia, on the ground that, Tikuda and Ratna Ram (respondent Nos.5 & 6 before this Court) and he are sons of Mangu Ram. According to the appellant-plaintiff, their father, Mangu Ram had certain land in Khasra Nos. 654 & 655. After his death, the said parcels of land devolved to the plaintiff, and to Tikuda and Ratna Ram. They were in joint possession of the said property. However, the respondent-defendants Nos. 1 to 3, Ratna Ram s/o Prabhu Ram, Ramji Ram s/o Prabhu Ram and Nathu Ram s/o Prabhu Ram, played a fraud on his brother Tikuda, who was a simpleton. They convinced him that they had prepared the papers for partition of the family property. However, they got him to sign a saledeed dated 06-07-1989. Therefore, the plaintiff prayed that he had the right to get the said sale-deed cancelled. 3. The respondent-defendants Nos. 1 to 3, filed their written statement and denied the averments made in the plaint. Respondent Nos. 5 & 6. Tikuda and Ratna Ram filed a reply supporting the case of the plaintiff. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned trial Court framed either issues including the issue of relief. 4. In order to buttress the case, the appellant-plaintiff examined four witnesses and submitted a few documents. After going through the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 29.05.2001. 5. Since the appellant-plaintiff was aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, he filed a first appeal before the learned Judge. However, vide judgment dated 15.09.2005, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal. Hence, this second appeal before this Court. 6. Mr. 5. Since the appellant-plaintiff was aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, he filed a first appeal before the learned Judge. However, vide judgment dated 15.09.2005, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal. Hence, this second appeal before this Court. 6. Mr. Arvind Samdariya, the learned counsel for the appellant, has vehemently contended that the learned trial Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-plaintiff while framing issue No.3, which was whether the plaintiff was the biological son of Boduram Bhambho, or the son of Mangu Ram? According to the learned counsel, it was the respondent-defendants, who had claimed that the appellant-plaintiff was biologically the son of Boduram Bhambho, to whom their mother was earlier married to. Thus, according to the respondent-defendants, the appellant-plaintiff had no interest in the land that belonged to Mangu Ram. According the learned counsel, since this was the plea raised by the respondent-defendants, the burden of proof should have been placed upon them to establish this plea. Therefore, the learned trial Court has erred in placing the burden of proof upon the appellant-plaintiff. He has relied on the case of B.B. Bhalla v. Rameshwar Kishore Badhwar [2001 DNJ (Raj.) 298], in order to support his contention that where the burden of poof is wrongly placed, then it is a question of law. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, a substantial question of law does emerge in the present case. 7. Secondly, that the finding given by the learned trial Court in Issue No.3 a finding in favour of the respondent-defendants-would adversely affect the revenue suit, which is pending between the parties, wherein the respondent-defendants are claiming that Tikuda sold the entire land to them and not merely a share in the land. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the judgment of the learned trial Court needs to be interfered with. 8. Lastly, that the learned Judge was required to discuss the evidence and express his opinion on each issue framed by the learned trial Court. However, the learned Judge has merely dealt with Issue No.1. With regard to the other issues, the learned Judge regard to the other issues, the learned Judge has merely observed that “the judgment pronounced by the learned trial Court has been passed properly. Therefore, it requires no passed properly. Therefore, it require no interference, “ Relying on the case of Madhukar & Ors. With regard to the other issues, the learned Judge regard to the other issues, the learned Judge has merely observed that “the judgment pronounced by the learned trial Court has been passed properly. Therefore, it requires no passed properly. Therefore, it require no interference, “ Relying on the case of Madhukar & Ors. [2001 (1) WLC (SC) (Civil) 412] : ( AIR 2001 SC 2171 ), the learned counsel has contended that first appeal is a valuable right of the appellant and the duty of the first appellate Court is to discuss the evidence which was produced before the leaned trial Court, and to give finding on each issue. However, the same has not been done in the present case. Therefore, the judgment deserves to be interfered with. 9. Heard the learned counsel and perused the impugned judgments, and considered the case law cited at the Bar. 10. The crux of the case of the appellant-plaintiff was that he and his two brother, Tikuda and Ratna Ram, were joint co-owners of the land in Khasra Nos.654 and 655 situated in their village. According to them, no partition had taken place amongst the brothers. Yet, Tikuda has sold his share to respondent-defendant Nos. 1, 2, & 3. According to him, respondent-defendant Nos. 1, 2 & 3 had played fraud upon Tikuda. The fraud was apparent from the fact that Tikuda happes to be a simpleton and he was told that he was being asked to sign papers for the purpose of getting the partition done. But in reality, he had signed the sale-deed dated 06.07.1989. Secondly, the fraud was apparent from the fact that Tikuda was not paid any consideration by the respondent-defendant Nos. 1 to 3. Therefore, the principal issue involved in this case was whether the sale-deed dated 06-07-1989 deserves to be cancelled or not? In order to adjudicate on this issue, the learned trial Court had discussed the entire evidence threadbare. The learned trial Court had noted the fact that although Tikuda would have been the star witness of the suit, he was never produced as a witness by the plaintiff. Therefore, it was not for the plaintiff to claim that a fraud had been played on Tikuda. Moreover, according to the sale-deed, a consideration was, indeed, paid to Tikuda. The learned trial Court had noted the fact that although Tikuda would have been the star witness of the suit, he was never produced as a witness by the plaintiff. Therefore, it was not for the plaintiff to claim that a fraud had been played on Tikuda. Moreover, according to the sale-deed, a consideration was, indeed, paid to Tikuda. Therefore, plaintiff could not claim that Tikuda had sold his share without being paid a consideration thereof Furthermore, there is no bar in law for a joint owner to sell his share to a third party. Therefore, the learned trial Court was legally justified in concluding that no case was made out for cancelling the sale-deed. 11. Of course, it is true that while framing Issue No.3 with regard to the parentage of the plaintiff, the learned trial Court had placed the burden on the appellant-plaintiff. But, a bare perusal of the impugned judgment clearly reveals that burden of proof was eventually placed on the respondent-defendants No. 1 to 3. The learned Civil Judge has clearly noted as under: (Vernacular matter omitted …….Ed.) Thus, obviously while discussing the evidence, the learned trial Court had clearly held that burden of proof was on the respondent-defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to prove the fact as claimed by them. After discussing the evidence, the learned trial Court has clearly held that” (Vernacular matter omitted……Ed.) The learned trial Court has further observed that (Vernacular matter omitted……..Ed.) Thus, obviously, the learned trial Court has not given any clear finding on Issue No.3. 12. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act defines the words, “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved”. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither proved, nor disproved. Thus, obviously, the learned trial Court was of the opinion that this issue “has not been proved”. Therefore, the anxiety of the appellant, that a clear cut, unambiguous and a definite finding has been given on this issue by the trial Court, is highly misplaced. As best, the learned trial Court has held that the fact whether the plaintiff was real son of Boduram Bhambho, or a son of Mangu Ram, has not been conclusively proved by either of the parties. As best, the learned trial Court has held that the fact whether the plaintiff was real son of Boduram Bhambho, or a son of Mangu Ram, has not been conclusively proved by either of the parties. Hence, the first contention raised by the learned counsel that the learned trial Court had erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-plaintiff and has come to a wrong finding, it without any basis. Moreover, the anxiety expressed by him is, equally, misplaced. 13. A bare perusal of the impugned judgment dated 15.09.2005 reveals that according to the learned Judge, the main contention raised before him was with regard to Issue No.1: Whether the sale-deed dated 06-07-1989 should be cancelled or not? In para 8 of the judgment, the learned Judge has gone through the evidence and has concluded that since Tikuda was not examined as a witness, the appellant-plaintiff has failed to prove the twin pleas that the sale-deed was entered into due to a fraud played by the respondent-defendant Nos. 1, 2 & 3, and that no consideration was received by Tikuda. Therefore, the learned Judge had agreed with the reasoning given by the learned trial Court. 14. Since the crux of the matter was whether the sale-deed deserves to be cancelled or not, since the learned Judge has discussed the entire evidence on this issue, it is immaterial if he has not discussed the other issues which were framed by the learned trial Court. After all, the entire civil suit basically rested on issue No.1. Moreover, no elaborate discussion is required if the appellate Court is agreeing with the finding of the trial Court. [Ref.to. Dr. Gyan Prakash v. Som Nath & Ors.[1996 (1) RCR (SC) 342]. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel that the learned Judge is required to give elaborate reasons for upholding the judgment of the trial Court, is unacceptable. 15. Hence, this second appeal does not raise any substantial question of law. This appeal being devoid of merit; is, hereby, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.