ORDER 1. Heard Sri E. Manohar, learned Senior Counsel and Sri Ch. Samson Babu, learned counsel for the petitioner, Smt. Rachana S. Waddepalli, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri N.V. Suryanarayana Murthy, learned Senior Counsel and Sri B.P. Mohan, learned counsel for the third respondent. 2. The petitioner, represented by its Public Relations Officer, claims that Sri T. Seshagiri Rao, its Director earlier worked with Regency Ceramics Limited and differences between that company and the petitioner company led to C.C.No.759 of 2003, on the file of the IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, against Sri T. Seshagiri Rao and others. In the said case, a direction was given to the Inspector of Police, Abids, Hyderabad, to search for the alleged stolen material belonging to the complainant therein in the premises of the accused therein and to take custody of any suspected stolen material, if found, to produce the same before the IV Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court. The third respondent, who was the then Inspector of Police, Abids, Hyderabad, was alleged by the petitioner to have abused the order of the Court in conducting the search and seizure through six to seven persons belonging to Regency Ceramics Limited and to have taken away material belonging to the petitioner company described in detail in the writ affidavit. The computer of the petitioner was also said to have been taken away along with its software and accounts details resulting in the petitioner filing a complaint before the IV Metropolitan Magistrate under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Sections 190 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The said complaint in C.C.(SR).No.8922 of 2003 was disposed of by the Metropolitan Magistrate by an order, dated 16.10.2003, by which the learned Magistrate stated that on account of the prima facie case made available, cognizance could be taken against the accused, but subject to the sanction for prosecution against the first accused by the concerned authorities and the matter could be considered for taking cognizance and proceeding with trial on obtaining the required sanction for prosecution against the first accused by the complainant from the concerned authorities within the period of limitation. The petitioner claimed to have made an application before the authorities seeking such sanction to prosecute the third respondent and the inaction of the authorities was questioned in W.P.No.5705 of 2004, in which on 25.03.2004 the first respondent was directed to pass appropriate orders on the application of the petitioner within four weeks. The first respondent, having not passed any such orders, resulted in contempt notice from the petitioner, in response to which the first respondent served the impugned order, dated 10.06.2004, on 26.06.2004. The order is contrary to the findings of the Metropolitan Magistrate and the findings of the first respondent in the impugned order are unsustainable about adequate care being taken while conducting the searches and submitting a report to the Magistrate and further about the allegations in the representation of the petitioner being not true. The petitioner, therefore, desired that the failure to accord sanction of the prosecution of the third respondent be declared as illegal and colourable exercise of power, etc., and directing the first respondent to accord sanction for prosecution of the third respondent. 3. The first respondent, in his counter, had stated that in obedience of the directions of the Court in C.C.No.759 of 2003, dated 23.07.2003, the third respondent carried out the search and seized the materials detailed in the counter affidavit. The seizure of every item by the third respondent was in relation to C.C.No.759 of 2003 and the first respondent examined the issue thoroughly and found that there was no need to accord sanction to prosecute the third respondent, as there was ample evidence to confirm the bona fides of the search by the third respondent. The third respondent had conducted the search simultaneously at several places on the directions of the Court and adequate care was taken in the form of Videography and Panchas, in respect of which a detailed report was submitted to the Magistrate. The allegations in the representation of the petitioner, dated 23.10.2003, are false and the absence of any need to issue sanction orders to prosecute the third respondent was concluded after careful perusal of the material placed before the first respondent. Therefore, the first respondent desired the writ petition to be dismissed. 4. The allegations in the representation of the petitioner, dated 23.10.2003, are false and the absence of any need to issue sanction orders to prosecute the third respondent was concluded after careful perusal of the material placed before the first respondent. Therefore, the first respondent desired the writ petition to be dismissed. 4. The third respondent, in his counter affidavit, stated that the petitioner, in the writ affidavit, extracted only a portion of the order of the IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, excluding the observation that the first accused, in his official capacity with the assistance of the second accused, executed the warrant issued by this Court, for which no mala fides could be attributed without further enquiry. The third respondent claimed that he was thoroughly ignorant about the relevancy or otherwise of the documents, papers, CDs, floppies, etc., directed to be seized from the premises of the petitioner and it is exclusively between the petitioner and M/s. Regency Ceramics Limited whether the documents seized were relevant or not. The first respondent has rightly refused to sanction prosecution of the third respondent, as the third respondent merely happened to be the Officer entrusted with the warrant execution by the Court. The High Court in Crl.P.No.3322 of 2004 also expressed the view of absence of any mala fides and the Supreme Court and the High Court also found that whatever material was seized from the premises of the petitioners in the course of execution of the warrant was relevant for the purposes of the case. Therefore, the third respondent desired the writ petition to be dismissed. 5. The petitioner, in his reply affidavit to the counter affidavit of the first respondent, stated that the first respondent appeared to have disposed of the application for sanction in consultation with the second respondent, the Commissioner of Police, without application of his independent mind for generation of a genuine satisfaction as to whether the prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The very consultation with a totally extraneous authority was illegal and the very order discloses references to the report made by the Commissioner of Police in this regard for concluding the allegations in the representation of the petitioner to be not true and to be not calling for any further action. The very consultation with a totally extraneous authority was illegal and the very order discloses references to the report made by the Commissioner of Police in this regard for concluding the allegations in the representation of the petitioner to be not true and to be not calling for any further action. The petitioner further alleged the third respondent to have colluded with the complainant in C.C.No.759 of 2003 and seized confidential material belonging to the petitioner, as described in the reply affidavit showing needless anxiety and bias in favour of the complainant in C.C.No.759 of 2003. The petitioner further alleged that only suspected stolen material was permitted to be seized, but not confidential information relating to the petitioner and the impugned order, contrary to the order of the IV Metropolitan Magistrate, is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 6. The relevant original file has been placed before the Court by the first respondent and has been perused. 7. Before examining the merits of the rival contentions, the principles laid down in the precedents cited by the learned counsel for both sides need to be referred to and in JASWANT SINGH VS. STATE OF PUNJAB (AIR 1958 SUPREME COURT 124), the Apex Court observed that it should be clear from the form of sanction that the sanctioning authority considered the evidence before it and after a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, sanctioned the prosecution. The Apex Court further observed that the sanction is not intended to be, nor is an automatic formality and the provisions in this regard should be observed with complete strictness. The facts should be referred to indicate that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. In MANSUKHLAL VITHALDAS CHAUHAN VS. STATE OF GUJARAT(AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 3400), the Apex Court dealing exhaustively with the issue with reference to the earlier precedents, emphasized that the grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosant act, which affords protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecutions. The Apex Court pointed out that the validity of the sanction depends upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. The Apex Court pointed out that the validity of the sanction depends upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration was stated to imply application of mind and the order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it, which may be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all the relevant facts have been considered by the sanctioning authority. The Supreme Court made it clear that it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. In that case, from the notings of the Secretariat file, the Supreme Court found that both the Secretary and Deputy Secretary tried to exhibit that they had faithfully obeyed the mandamus issued by the High Court and attempted to save their skin, destroying, in the process, the legality and validity of the sanction which constituted the basis for the prosecution of the appellant therein. 9. In P.K. PRADHAN VS. THE STATE OF SIKKIM REPRESENTED BY THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION(AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 2547), the Apex Court again pointed out that what a Court has to find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of his official duty, though, possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of situation and the question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can be raised at any time after the cognizance also. 10. In KOOTHA PERUMAL VS. STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE, VIGILANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION ((2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases 491), the Apex Court referring to JASWANT SINGH VS. 10. In KOOTHA PERUMAL VS. STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE, VIGILANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION ((2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases 491), the Apex Court referring to JASWANT SINGH VS. STATE OF PUNJAB (1 supra) observed that it should be clear from the form of the sanction that the sanctioning authority considered the evidence before it and after a consideration of all the circumstances of the case sanctioned the prosecution and, therefore, unless the matter can be proved by other evidence, in the sanction itself the facts should be referred to indicate that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Apex Court in that particular case found from the contents of sanction order that the sanctioning authority has duly recorded its satisfaction that the appellant therein should be prosecuted for the offences. 11. Keeping the principles laid down by the Apex Court in view, the relevant File produced by the first respondent has to be examined. It is seen from the relevant Note File that the note put up on the subject referred to the representation made on behalf of the petitioner and the material having been referred to the Director General and Inspector General of Police, who in turn enclosed the letter from the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad, while submitting his report. The Note further referred to the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad, and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, stating that no further action need be taken on the complaint of the petitioner for the reasons stated by them. The Note further referred to the judgment of this Court in W.P.No.5705 of 2004 directing the first respondent to pass appropriate orders on the application of the petitioner and the Note concluded stating that it is for consideration and orders whether the petitioner may be informed that the Commissioner of Police has reported in the manner in which he has reported and the allegations in this petition are not true and no further direction has to be given. This Note submitted by the Section was signed and approved by the Deputy Secretary and the Principal Secretary, in pursuance of which the impugned letter was issued to the petitioner. This Note submitted by the Section was signed and approved by the Deputy Secretary and the Principal Secretary, in pursuance of which the impugned letter was issued to the petitioner. Thus, the Note, while referring to the request of the petitioner and the reports of the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Commissioner of Police and the Deputy Commissioner of Police or the order of this Court did not refer at all to the reasons for which no further action need be taken on the representation of the petitioner in brief or in detail. Para 10 of the Note File is only for consideration and orders whether the petitioner be informed about what has been reported by the Commissioner of Police and the consequential absence of any need for further action but not about any independent examination of the material placed before the sanctioning authority. A significant aspect is the reproduction in verbatim of what has been stated by the Deputy Commissioner of Central Zone in his letter, dated 17.12.2003, in the impugned letter, dated 10.06.2004. The markings in pencil on the letter, dated 17.12.2003, in the CF of the relevant file, the last paragraph of the Note File in Para 10 and the contents of the impugned Memo, dated 10.06.2004, being exact replicas of each other do not suggest in any way an independent application of mind by the sanctioning authority to the issue in question. 12. Sri B.P. Mohan, learned counsel for the third respondent had extensively brought to notice the various details of the sequence of events as disclosed by the material papers enclosed to the writ petition and the additional material papers filed subsequently, which indicated the justification for the action of the third respondent in conducting the search and seizure in the manner in which he did in obedience to the orders of the IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. While expressing no opinion on the merits of the contentions of the learned counsel, lest the rights and interests of the parties be prejudiced in the further proceedings that may have to be taken, it is suffice to state that it is not the justification or otherwise for grant of sanction against the third respondent that it is under consideration herein but the manner and method of issuing the impugned Memo, dated 10.06.2004, refusing to take any action on the request of the petitioner for sanction of prosecution against the third respondent. It is true that the matter taken up to the Apex Court in respect of the search and seizure in question, did not result in any adverse references or observations against the method and manner of the search and seizure conducted by the third respondent but what is in question herein is whether the order of refusal to grant sanction made it clear that the sanctioning authority came to that conclusion after a consideration of all the evidence and circumstances of the case placed before it, which should be self-evident from the order itself about the application of the mind of the sanctioning authority to the facts and circumstances of the case. The protection of the Government servant against a frivolous prosecution is as much required as the examination of the complaint against such Government servant of having committed any offences requiring such sanction. As observed by the Apex Court, the independent application of mind of the sanctioning authority for generation of a genuine satisfaction whether the prosecution has to be sanctioned or not should be self-evident from the order sanctioning or refusing to sanction the prosecution against the Government servant concerned and such requirement does not appear to be satisfactorily answered in respect of the impugned Memo in concluding the absence of any need for taking any further action against the third respondent. 13. The matter, therefore, needs to be reverted back to the sanctioning authority for reconsideration and as observed in MANSUKHLAL VITHALDAS CHAUHAN VS. STATE OF GUJARAT (2 supra), normally, when the sanction order is held to be bad, the case is remitted back to the authority for reconsideration of the matter and to pass fresh order of sanction, in accordance with law. STATE OF GUJARAT (2 supra), normally, when the sanction order is held to be bad, the case is remitted back to the authority for reconsideration of the matter and to pass fresh order of sanction, in accordance with law. It is true that the third respondent did not act on his own in conducting the search or seizure but was bound by an order of the competent Criminal Court to conduct such search and seizure and given the very technical nature of the documents and material involved in the search and seizure, it may be not fair to attribute any mala fides to the third respondent in the matter of conducting search and seizure ex facie, but these are matters which have to be considered on the material placed before it by the sanctioning authority which should express itself in the order granting or refusing the sanction indicating the application of mind by the sanctioning authority, which expression of arriving at the required satisfaction need not be by an elaborate reasoning but at least by such reasoning, however brief it may be, as would disclose such application of mind by the sanctioning authority. That being absent here and the relevant NF and CF of the File produced by the third respondent showing that even the Note which led to the approval by the Deputy Secretary and Principal Secretary did not indicate any consideration of the acceptability or otherwise of the reports received from the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Commissioner of Police and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, but recorded a mechanical repetition of the reports as sufficient to accept the report of the Commissioner of Police to conclude the absence of any necessity for further action. The contention that the Deputy Secretary and the Principal Secretary need not have expressed themselves again while agreeing with the Note prepared by the Section cannot justify the patent lack of application of mind in the matter. The impugned Memo has to be, therefore, set aside and the matter has to be reverted back to the first respondent for consideration, in accordance with law. The impugned Memo has to be, therefore, set aside and the matter has to be reverted back to the first respondent for consideration, in accordance with law. No part of this order or the proceedings in this writ petition should influence such reconsideration of the matter by the first respondent on its own merits, in accordance with law, and the agony to which the third respondent is put since 2003 in respect of what has been done by him in execution of an order by a competent criminal Court is there to see but whether in the process of executing the orders of the criminal Court, he subjected himself to the possibility of being justifiably prosecuted for any offences is for the sanctioning authority to consider without any expression of opinion herein, but to avoid any further prolongation of the matter to the detriment of the third respondent, the first respondent can be directed to pass appropriate orders within a specified time frame. 14. Therefore, the Memo in Lr.No.32327/Leg.II/A1/2002-2, dated 10.06.2004, is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the first respondent for reconsideration, on merits, in accordance with law, and passing appropriate orders to be communicated to both the petitioner and the third respondent, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within 30 days from the date of communication of this order. The Writ Petition is disposed of, accordingly, without costs.