JUDGMENT : GHULAM MINHAJUDDIN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the award dated 27th January, 2011 passed by the 5th Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur (in short "the Tribunal"), in Claim Case No. 95/2010, fastening the liability to pay the amount of compensation upon the appellant, jointly and severally, along with respondent Nos. 5 & 6. Cross-objection has also been filed by respondents No. 1 to 3/claimants for enhancement of the amount of compensation. 2. Brief facts of the case, as per version of the claimants in the claim petition, are that on 7.11.2008 at about 5.30-5.45 pm, Rakesh Tamrakar was going from Malenia Dam to Gourela by motorcycle. However, as soon as he reached in front of Millennium Hotel, respondent No. 5 came there from the opposite direction by driving auto in a rash and negligent manner and dashed the motorcycle of Rakesh Tamrakar. After the accident, respondent No. 5 fled from the place of occurrence alongwith the auto. On account of the said accident, Rakesh Tamrakar sustained grievous injuries and he was taken to Govt. Hospital, Gourela, where during the course of treatment he died. Report of the accident was lodged at Police Station Gourela, whereupon offence u/s 304A of the IPC was registered against respondent No. 5 under Cr. No. 271/08. After completing investigation, charge sheet was filed against respondent No. 5 before the competent criminal Court. 3. At the time of accident, the deceased was aged about 22 years. He was a plumber by profession and thereby used to earn Rs. 8,000-10,000/- per month. The entire family was dependent upon the deceased. Therefore, the parents, brother and sister of the deceased, being his legal heirs/dependents, filed a claim petition u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short "the Act, 1988") before the Tribunal for a total compensation of Rs. 19,10,000/- against the death of Rakesh Tamrakar under various heads. 4. However, learned Tribunal, after hearing counsel for the parties and on close scrutiny of the evidence adduced by the parties before it, by the impugned award granted a total compensation of Rs. 3,54,732/- in favour of the claimants, fastening the liability, jointly and severally, upon the appellant alongwith respondents No. 5 & 6. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the LCR as also the impugned award. 6. 3,54,732/- in favour of the claimants, fastening the liability, jointly and severally, upon the appellant alongwith respondents No. 5 & 6. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the LCR as also the impugned award. 6. In addition to oral arguments, learned counsel for the appellant/Trust has also submitted written arguments. On behalf of the appellant/Trust, five-fold arguments have been advanced. Firstly, that respondent No. 1 to 3/claimants have not been able to prove that the alleged offending vehicle i.e. auto rickshaw was involved in the accident dated 7.11.2008. Secondly, the claimants have not been successful in proving that the accident had occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the alleged vehicle by driver/respondent No. 5 Jeevan Kumar Rathore because for filing a claim petition u/s 166 of the Act, 1988, rashness and negligence on the part of driver of the offending vehicle is a sine qua non. Thirdly, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued and has also contended in his written arguments that on the date of accident i.e. 7.11.2008, the appellant/Trust was neither the owner nor was in possession of the alleged offending vehicle, as the same was sold prior to the accident on 22.8.2008 and possession was delivered on the same date to respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav and all the necessary papers were handed over to him for getting the vehicle transferred in his name in the records of the RTO, which is apparent from perusal of the agreement of sale (Ex. D/4) and the consent letter (Ex. D/5), both dated 22.8.2008. Fourthly, it has been contended that the compensation has been assessed by the Tribunal on the higher side and instead of applying multiplier of 10, the multiplier of 17 has been adopted. Lastly, the counsel has argued that the claim petition u/s 166 of the Act, 1988 was wrongly entertained by the Tribunal which was not 1 having the territorial jurisdiction as the claimants are residents of Gourela and simply to present the claim petition before the Tribunal at Bilaspur, that they have shown their residence at Belgahna. 7. On the contrary, learned counsel for respondents No. 5 & 6 has supported the impugned award. 8. The following facts are not in dispute: (i) That initially sale letter and cash memo were issued by J.P. Motors, Raurkela in favour of the appellant/Trust with respect to the offending vehicle. 7. On the contrary, learned counsel for respondents No. 5 & 6 has supported the impugned award. 8. The following facts are not in dispute: (i) That initially sale letter and cash memo were issued by J.P. Motors, Raurkela in favour of the appellant/Trust with respect to the offending vehicle. (ii) That, on the date of accident i.e. 7.11.2008, the vehicle was neither registered in the records of the RTO nor was it insured. (iii) That on account of alleged accident dated 7.11.2008, the offending vehicle was seized by the police in connection with offence punishable u/s 304A of the IPC and Sections 39/ 192 and 146/ 196 of the Act, 1988 and charge sheet was filed against respondents No. 5 & 6 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gourela, Pendra Road. (iv) That, on the basis of authority given by the Managing Trustee of the appellant/Trust that Swami Dharmanand (NAW-4) had moved an application for obtaining interim custody of the said offending vehicle, which was given to him. (v) That, the said vehicle was first registered in the name of the appellant/ Trust on 19.1.2009 and thereafter, on 4.11.2009 the said vehicle was registered in the name of respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav in the records of the RTO. 9. The main question to be decided in this appeal is as to under whose exclusive possession and control the offending vehicle was on the date of accident i.e. 7.11.2008? 10. It is an admitted fact that on the date of accident, the offending vehicle was in the ownership of the appellant/Trust by virtue of sale letter and cash memo issued by J.P. Motors, Rourkela, in favour of the appellant/Trust and the period of temporary registration had expired and permanent registration was not got done. According to the appellant/Trust, the offending vehicle was lying unused at their Ashram and on the persistent request and demand of respondent No. 6, that the same was sold to him for a consideration of Rs. 70,000/- on 22.8.2008 and an agreement of sale (Ex. D/4) as well as consent letter (Ex. D/5) were got executed, under which possession of the offending vehicle was handed over to respondent No. 6 alongwith Form No. 29 & 30 for getting the vehicle transferred and insured in his (respondent No. 6) name. At the same time, respondent No. 6 had given an undertaking through Ex. D/4) as well as consent letter (Ex. D/5) were got executed, under which possession of the offending vehicle was handed over to respondent No. 6 alongwith Form No. 29 & 30 for getting the vehicle transferred and insured in his (respondent No. 6) name. At the same time, respondent No. 6 had given an undertaking through Ex. D/4 & D/5 that the responsibility of getting the vehicle registered and insured will be on him and he will not use the vehicle without getting it registered and insured, and in case of any claim arising out of the use of the said vehicle, he will be liable for the same. 11. On behalf of the appellant, the impugned award, apart from other grounds, has also been challenged on the ground that the claims Tribunal at Bilaspur was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition filed u/s 166 of the Act, 1988 as the respondents/claimants are residents of Gourela and with intent to present the claim petition before the claims Tribunal at Bilaspur that they have shown their residence at Belgahana. 12. Rajkumar (AW-1), who is father of deceased Rakesh Tamrakar, has stated that on account of untimely death of his elder son, who was aged about 22 years on the date of accident i.e. 7.11.2008, his wife Laxmibai (mother of the deceased) due to shock was not keeping well and on the advice of doctor for change of place that they had shifted to Belgahana, which happens to be the place where her parents reside. The objection regarding territorial jurisdiction has only been raised by the appellant. In this regard, judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Mantoo Sarkar Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 244 , makes an illuminating reading, in which provisions of Section 166(2) of the Act, 1988 as well as Section 21 of the CPC have been discussed. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the abovementioned judgment in para-16 & 18 has observed as under: 16. We say so because ordinarily an appellate court shall not, having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entertain an appeal on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the court below unless he has been prejudiced thereby. Other respondents did not raise any question of jurisdiction. Other respondents did not raise any question of jurisdiction. Although one witness each had been examined on behalf of the truck owner and owner of the bus, neither a question of lack of territorial jurisdiction was raised nor the question of any prejudice had been argued. It is only the first respondent who raised the question of territorial jurisdiction. However, no prejudice was caused to the appellant by the claim petition being tried by MACT at Nainital. 18. The Tribunal is a court subordinate to the High Court. An appeal against the Tribunal lies before the High Court. The High Court, while exercising its appellate power, would follow the provisions contained in the CPC or akin thereto. In view of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the appellate court to pose unto itself the right question viz. whether the first respondent has been able to show sufferance of any prejudice. If it has not suffered any prejudice or otherwise no failure of justice had occurred, the High Court should not have entertained the appeal on that ground alone. 13. Except raising objection regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction, the appellant has not placed any material on the basis of which it can be said that it has suffered any prejudice on account of the claim petition having been tried by the claims Tribunal at Bilaspur. As such, the objection regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction cannot be sustained. 14. Secondly, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the respondents/claimants have not been successful in proving the involvement of the vehicle in the accident as well as the fact that the accident had occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of driver/respondent No. 5 Jeevanlal, which is a sine qua non for maintainability of an application u/s 166 of the Act, 1988. 15. It is no doubt true that for maintainability of an application u/s 166 of the Act, 1988, negligence on the part of driver of the offending vehicle is the sine qua non or the condition precedent. In this connection, Rajkumar Tamrakar (AW-1) has stated that on receiving the information he had gone to the hospital where his son/deceased Rakesh Tamrakar was taken and there during the course of treatment his son had expired. In this connection, Rajkumar Tamrakar (AW-1) has stated that on receiving the information he had gone to the hospital where his son/deceased Rakesh Tamrakar was taken and there during the course of treatment his son had expired. This witness has further stated that afterwards he had gone to the site of occurrence and had enquired from the persons who had witnessed the accident and he was told by them that immediately before the accident, an auto was being driven rashly and negligently at a very high speed by driver/respondent No' 5 and in the process of overtaking an ongoing auto, that respondent No. 5 had gone on the wrong side of the road and dashed the motorcycle of deceased Rakesh Tamrakar, on account of which he sustained grievous injuries resulting in his death. It is not in dispute that report in respect of the accident was lodged at the police station, on which offences under Sections 279 and 304(A) of the IPC as well as under the Act, 1988 were registered and after investigation, the charge sheet was filed for the said offence against the driver/respondent No. 5 Jeevanlal as also against respondent No 16 Satyanarayan Yadav. In this connection, the documents relating to criminal case No. 16/09, State Vs. Jeevanlal and others, of the Court of JMFC, Pendra Road, have been filed by the respondents/ claimants and the same have been exhibited as Ex. P/1 to P/6. As such, on the basis of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the respondents/claimants, it stands proved that the accident had taken place on account of rashness and negligence on the part of driver/respondent No. 5 in driving the Mahindra Champion Auto, which was subsequently registered as MP 18L 0212. In view of the above, the objection regarding involvement of the offending vehicle and maintainability of the application u/s 166 of the Act,, 1988 deserves to be and is hereby rejected. 16. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that on the date of incident i.e. 7.11.2008, that the appellant was neither owner of the said Mahindra Champion Auto nor the same was in its possession because long before the date of accident the said vehicle was sold to respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav and its possession was handed over to him under an agreement of sale (Ex. D/4) and consent letter (Ex. D/5), both dated 22.8.2008. 17. D/4) and consent letter (Ex. D/5), both dated 22.8.2008. 17. On behalf of the appellant, Himadri Muni and Dharmanand have been examined as NAW-1 and NAW-4 respectively. Both these witnesses have stated that the said vehicle was sold to respondent No. 6 on 22.8.2008 and vide documents i.e. agreement of sale (Ex. D/4) and consent letter (Ex. D/5) of the same date, that possession of the vehicle was handed over to respondent No. 6 and since 22.8.2008 the said vehicle was in possession of respondent No. 6. Although respondent No. 6 has stated that possession of the said vehicle was not given to him, the same was with the appellant and he (respondent No. 6) had only given his consent for purchasing the said vehicle, but respondent No. 6 (NAW-1 for respondents No. 5 & 6) has admitted that after the transaction he had signed the agreement of sale (Ex. D/4) and the consent letter (Ex. D/ 5). In para-11 of his statement, he (respondent No. 6) has also stated that as per the consent letter (Ex. D/5), transaction had taken place and as the documents of the vehicle were not handed over to him, he had subsequently returned the said vehicle to the appellant. 18. As such, from the statement of respondent No. 6 (NAW-1) it is found that on 22.8.2008 the said offending vehicle was sold by the appellant to him and possession of the vehicle alongwith sale invoice, sale letter and Form No. 29 as well as Form No. 30 were handed over to him vide documents Ex. D/4 (agreement of sale) and Ex. D/5 (consent letter), both dated 22.8.2008. In view of this, on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties, it stands proved that respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav had purchased the said offending vehicle on 22.8.2008 from the appellant and since then the same was in his possession and on the date of accident was being plied by him through driver/respondent No. 5 Jeevanlal. 19. Now the question is as to who is responsible for payment of compensation to the respondents/claimants. 20. It is not in dispute that on 22.8.2008 when the offending vehicle was sold to respondent No. 6 vide agreement of sale (Ex. D/4) and consent letter (Ex. 19. Now the question is as to who is responsible for payment of compensation to the respondents/claimants. 20. It is not in dispute that on 22.8.2008 when the offending vehicle was sold to respondent No. 6 vide agreement of sale (Ex. D/4) and consent letter (Ex. D/ 5), the said vehicle was not registered in the name of the appellant and there was only sale invoice and sale letter issued by the dealer at Raurkela in favour of the appellant. Himadri Muni (NAW-1 for the appellant) has admitted that the said vehicle was registered in the name of the appellant for the first time i.e. 19.1.2009 and subsequently, the said vehicle was registered in the name of respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav on 4.11.2009. The accident had occurred on 7.11.2008. It is not in dispute that on 31.1.2009 an application u/s 457 of the Cr. P.C. for grant of interim custody of the offending vehicle was moved by Dharmanand (NAW-4 for the appellant) on the basis of authority letter issued by Himadri Muni (NAW-1 for the appellant) before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pendra Road, whereupon the said offending vehicle Mahindra Champion Auto bearing registration No. MP 18L 0212 was given on Supurdnama to Dharmanand (NAW-4 for the appellant). 21. Thus, on the basis of evidence adduced, it is found that after the accident, the said offending vehicle was not seized from the possession of the appellant. Himadri Muni (NAW-1 for the appellant) has stated that on 28.1.2009 respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav had moved an application (Ex. D/14) before the Managing Trustee Himadri Muni (NAW-1) with a request for helping him to obtain the seized offending vehicle on Supurdnama, on which he (Himadri Muni) had given authority to Dharmanand (NAW-4 for the appellant) to move an application for obtaining the seized offending vehicle on Supurdnama. Respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav has not specifically denied his signature on Ex. D/14 dated 28.1.2009, which he had moved before Himadri Muni (NAW-1 for the appellant) but has only given suggestion to the witnesses for the appellant that the documents-agreement of sale (Ex. D/4) and consent letter (Ex. D/5), both dated 22.8.2008 and application dated 28.1.2009 (Ex. D/14) - are forged and have been subsequently prepared, whereas respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav (NAW-1 for respondents No. 5 & 6) has admitted his signatures on Ex. D/4) and consent letter (Ex. D/5), both dated 22.8.2008 and application dated 28.1.2009 (Ex. D/14) - are forged and have been subsequently prepared, whereas respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav (NAW-1 for respondents No. 5 & 6) has admitted his signatures on Ex. D/4 and D/5 as well as the transaction which had taken place through these documents. As such, it stands proved that on the application dated 28.1.2009 (Ex. D/14) of respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav that on the direction and authority given by Himadri Muni (NAW-1 for the appellant), that an application for obtaining the seized offending vehicle on Supurdnama was moved by Dharmanand (NAW-4 for the appellant) on 31.1.2009 and the vehicle was obtained on Supurdnama. 22. Himadri Muni (NAW-1 for the appellant), who is Managing Trustee of the appellant, has admitted in para-13 of his statement that the offending vehicle could not have been transferred or insured on the basis of sale letter given by the appellant to respondent No. 6. It is true that for the first time, the said offending vehicle was got registered in the name of the appellant on 19.1.2009 and subsequently, it was transferred and registered in the name of respondent No. 6 on 4.11.2009. As such, on the date of accident i.e. 7.11.2008, the offending vehicle was neither registered in the name of the appellant nor in the name of respondent No. 6 and there was only sale invoice and sale letter issued by JP Motors, Raurkela in favour of the appellant. As such, although before the date of accident i.e. 7.11.2008, the said offending vehicle was sold and transferred on 22.8.2008 to respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav, but on the basis of sale invoice and sale letter, the appellant was the owner of the vehicle on the date of accident as per provisions of the Act, 1988. 23. In case of movable property, the ownership is transferred the moment the price consideration is paid and the possession is handed over to the purchaser, but as per the provisions of Section 2(30) of the Act, 1988, the person whose name is recorded as a registered owner in the records of the RTO is deemed to be the owner unless the vehicle is transferred in the name of purchaser following the procedure prescribed in Section 50 of the Act, 1988. Reliance is placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matters of Pushpa @ Leela and Others Vs. Shakuntala and Others, (2011) 2 SCC 240 : (2011) 1 SCC(Cri) 682; P.P. Mohammed Vs. K. Rajappan, (2008) 17 SCC 624; Dr. T.V. Jose Vs. Chacko P.M. alias Thankachan and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 748 and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Kailash Nath Kothari and other etc., (1997) 7 SCC 481 24. In the instant case, on receiving the price consideration and handing over the possession of the vehicle to respondent No. 6 on 22.8.2008, he (respondent No. 6) had in law become the owner of the vehicle, but as per the provisions of the Act, 1988, the appellant still continued to be the owner of the vehicle on the basis of sale invoice and sale letter issued in its favour. It has been proved beyond doubt that since 22.8.2008 the offending vehicle was in possession of respondent No. 6 Satyanarayan Yadav and on the date of accident i.e. 7.11.2008 the same was being plied by him through driver/respondent No. 5 Jeevanlal. As such, the Tribunal has not committed any illegality in fastening the liability to pay compensation, jointly and severally, upon the appellant as well as respondents No. 5 & 6 as respondent No. 6 was in possession of the offending vehicle since 22.8.2008 as well as on the date of accident. Therefore, if the amount of compensation has been paid by the appellant to the claimants, then the appellant is definitely entitled to recover the same from respondents No. 5 & 6 by taking recourse to law available to it. 25. The appellant has also challenged the quantum of compensation terming it to be excessive. On the other hand, the respondents/claimants have filed cross-objection for enhancement of the amount of compensation. 26. Initially, the parents, unmarried sister and brother of the deceased had filed claim petition for grant of compensation and an award of Rs. 3,54,732/- has been passed by the Tribunal. On behalf of the appellant, it has been contended that as the deceased was a bachelor and his parents are the claimants, therefore, 50% ought to have been deducted towards his personal and living expenses and multiplier on the basis of average age of the parents should have been applied. 27. 3,54,732/- has been passed by the Tribunal. On behalf of the appellant, it has been contended that as the deceased was a bachelor and his parents are the claimants, therefore, 50% ought to have been deducted towards his personal and living expenses and multiplier on the basis of average age of the parents should have been applied. 27. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the deceased was a bachelor on the date of accident and he was 22 years old. In the present case, during the pendency of this appeal, brother of the deceased had expired and parents are not the only claimants, but in addition to parents, unmarried sister/respondent No. 3, aged about 19 years, is also one of the claimants. The claims Tribunal has applied a multiplier of 17 in view of the second Schedule of the Act, 1988, which is in respect of claims u/s 163A of the Act, 1988. Looking to the age of the deceased, which was 22 years and in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , as in addition to parents, unmarried sister of the deceased is also one of the claimants, multiplier of 18 would be applicable. After that, even if 50% of the earnings is deducted towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, then also by applying multiplier of 18, the amount of compensation would almost remain the same. Therefore, there is no good ground for interfering with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. 28. In the result, the appeal and the cross-objection being devoid of substance are dismissed. The impugned award fastening liability to pay compensation, jointly and severally, upon the appellant as well as respondents No. 5 & 6 is hereby affirmed. However, in view of the proved fact that on the date of accident i.e. 7.11.2008, the offending vehicle was in possession of respondent No. 6 and was being plied by him through driver/respondent No. 5 Jeevanlal, in case the amount of compensation is paid by the appellant, then the appellant shall be free to take recourse to law available to it for recovering the same, jointly and severally, from respondents No. 5 &6. No order as to costs.