ORDER 1. Invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C, these three petitions have been preferred by the respective petitioners seeking the relief of quashing the criminal proceedings pertaining to the case in Crime No. 879 of 2011 pending investigation on the file of the Inspector of Police Pollachi East Police Station, Coimbatore District. 2. With the petitioners in the above petitions have been ranked as A4, A3 and A5 respectively in the case in Crime No. 879 of 2011 and since the respondent in all the three petitions are one and the same and the relief which is sought for in all the petitions is also one and the same, all the three petitions have been clubbed together, heard and disposed of in this common order. 3. The common facts which are absolutely necessary for the disposal of these three petitions may be summarized as follows: 4. The second respondent Mr. P. Mohan Kumar has lodged a complaint before the first respondent on 24.11.2011 and on the basis of his complaint, the first respondent who is the Inspector of Police attached to Pollachi Police Station has registered a case in Crime No. 879 of 2011 for the alleged offences under Sections 120(B), 409, 420, 147 and 506(i) of I. P. C., 5. Excerpt of the Complaint: One Mr. C.V. Jayaprakash who is none other than the sister’s husband of the second respondent (hereinafter he may be referred to as the complainant) had applied for a loan on 30.1.2003 and 30.5.2003 with the State Bank of India, Pollachi Branch for the purpose of establishing a theme park. One C.V. Jayaprakash who is the younger brother of C.V. Jayaprakash has been working in Pollachi Branch of State Bank of India and hence, the banking officials without properly scrutinizing the title deeds offered by the principal borrower as security and without properly verifying the payments said to have been made by the principal borrower to the supplier of equipments, had sanctioned the loan of Rs. 59 lakhs. 6. The complainant had offered his property viz., P.R.M Complex bearing Door No. 133/199, Kovai Road, Pollachi, Coimbatore District as security :for the aforesaid loan as a guarantor. 59 lakhs. 6. The complainant had offered his property viz., P.R.M Complex bearing Door No. 133/199, Kovai Road, Pollachi, Coimbatore District as security :for the aforesaid loan as a guarantor. While availing the loan the principal borrower viz., C.V. Jayaprakash had submitted false receipts which were purported to have been issued by the supplier of machinery and since the complainant had brought the aforesaid facts to the notice of the higher authorities in the bank, the banking officials with a view to wreck vengeance had initiated proceedings under SARFAESI Act by entering into a criminal conspiracy with the petitioners. 7. The complainant has alleged in his complaint further that the petitioners are the tenants in respect of the portion of the said P.R.M. Complex and they had represented as if there was an association of tenants and with a view to deter any bona fide purchaser from participating in the tender/auction had caused an advertisement to be published in Dinamalar on 1.3.2010 to make it appear as if the said property is subjected to encumbrance and with an intention to avoid a fair and wider participation in the tender cum auction they had colluded with the bank officials and purchased the property for a price lesser than the fair market price. 8. It is also alleged that the property was not properly valued before it was brought to sale under the SARFAESI Act and therefore, the sanction of the loan in favour of C.V. Jayaprakash was fraudulent and hence, the sale of the property has got to be set aside. It is also alleged that the auction made on 10.3.2010 was conducted by the so called association and the complainant was not even allowed to enter into the auction hall. 9. The case in Crime No. 879 of 2011 has been registered against the following accused viz., 1) C.V. Jayaprakash 2) C.V. Mohan Prakash 3) Krishnan 4) M. Muthukumar 5) S. Vincent and other bank officials. As observed earlier, the petitioners are ranked as A4, A3, and A5 respectively. 10. It appears from the records that as there was default in repayments of the aforesaid loan, the State Bank of India, Pollachi Branch had initiated auction before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore under the provisions of Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 by way of filing an Application No. 171 of 2006. 10. It appears from the records that as there was default in repayments of the aforesaid loan, the State Bank of India, Pollachi Branch had initiated auction before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore under the provisions of Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 by way of filing an Application No. 171 of 2006. Since the loan had become a non-performing asset, the bank had resorted to proceedings under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 and issued notice under Section 13(2) of the said Act on 16. 2.2006 on the principal borrower and the guarantor demanding a sum of Rs. 74,99,966.44 within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. The bank had also issued notice under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act on 1.6.2006 and subsequently taken symbolic possession of the property which was offered as security by the principal borrower and the guarantor. 11. It also appear from the records that the complainant had filed a suit in O.S. No. 65 of 2006 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Pollachi against the bank on the ground that there was variation in terms of the guarantee and the very grant of the loan was vitiated by a fraudulent means of the officials of the bank in conspiracy with the brother of the principal borrower, C.V. Mohan Prakash, who is an employee of the very same bank at Pollachi Branch and that the security which was offered by the principal borrower was not properly tested and the remittance of the margin moneys were not properly verified by the bank and hence, the guaranteed liability stood discharged. 12. The suit in O.S. No. 65 of 2006 was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Pollachi on 13.3.2008 after hot contest. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the complainant had filed an appeal in A.S. No. 55 of 2008 on the file of the learned Principle District Judge, Coimbatore. Since no interim order was granted by the appellate Court, the banking authority had brought the property which was offered as security by the principle borrower and the guarantor for sale on 10.3.2010 after issuing a notice under Section 8(6) of the Security Interest and Enforcement Rules 2002. 13. Since no interim order was granted by the appellate Court, the banking authority had brought the property which was offered as security by the principle borrower and the guarantor for sale on 10.3.2010 after issuing a notice under Section 8(6) of the Security Interest and Enforcement Rules 2002. 13. On receipt of the sale notice the complainant had preferred an application in I.A. No. 324 of 2010 in A.S. No. 55 of 2008 on the file of the learned Principle District Judge, Coimbatore seeking the relief of interim injunction to restrain the banking authority and the authorised officer from auctioning the property. The said application was also dismissed on 10.3.2010. On the same date, the auction cum tender was conducted by the authorised officer of the bank in exercise of the power conferred on him under the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the Security Interest and Enforcement Rules. 14. It Is the contention of the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1083 of 2012 that his company viz., Sri Krishna Sweets Pvt. Ltd., through its authorised representative had participated in the said auction along with the other petitioners viz., Mr. A. Muthukumar (petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1076 of 2012) and Mr.S.Vincent (petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1084 of 2012). 15. Notwithstanding the fact that there were other participants in the said public auction-cum-tender, the bid which was offered by Mr. Krishnan (petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1083 of 2012) and his co-bidders was the highest one and as the same was higher than the reserve price which was fixed under Rule 8(5) of the Security Interest and Enforcement Rules, the authorised officer had accepted the same. 16. It also appears from the records that on the date of auction 25% of the bid amount was made and the balance of sale consideration which was to be paid within a period of 15 days was also paid within the said time and the sale was also confirmed on 12.3.2010 and subsequently the sale certificate was also issued in favour of Mr. Krishnan (petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1083 of 2012) and the other co-bidders viz., Mr. A. Muthukumar (petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1076 of 2012) and Mr. S. Vincent (petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1084 of 2012). 17. Krishnan (petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1083 of 2012) and the other co-bidders viz., Mr. A. Muthukumar (petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1076 of 2012) and Mr. S. Vincent (petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1084 of 2012). 17. In the meanwhile, the second respondent had filed a statutory appeal in S.A. No. 25 of 2010 as against the auction sale before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore. That statutory appeal was also dismissed on 20.4.2010 by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore. Challenging the Order of dismissal, the second respondent herein had preferred a securitization appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act in R.A. (SA) No. 483 of 2010 and the appeal is still pending on the file of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai. 18. When the matter stood thus, the petitioners, being the successful bidders having obtained sale certificates in their favour, had taken possession of the property, which was the subject matter of the appeal in A.S. No. 55 of 2008, got themselves impleaded in the appeal in A.S. No. 55 of 2008 and ultimately, the appeal was also dismissed by the learned Principal District Judge, Coimbatore on 29.7.2011. 19. It is also significant to note here that the property was duly delivered to the petitioners through the secured creditor and the sale deed was executed and registered by the State Bank of India in favour of the petitioners. 20. In this connection, Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned senior counsel appearing for Ms. AL. Gandhimathi learned counsel on record for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1083 of 2012 has adverted to that there was no vicarious liability on the part of the petitioners under the Indian Penal Code and that while the proceedings had been taking place before the civil Court as well as before the Debt Recovery Tribunals touching upon the liability of the complainant (second respondent) as guarantor; the entitlement of the bank to enforce the said guaranteed liability; resorting to proceedings under the SARFAESI Act; the conduct of public auction; issuance of sale certificate in favour of the petitioner could not be questioned and curtailed. He has also submitted that the lodging of complaint on 24.11.2011 by the complainant (second respondent) herein before the first respondent seemed to be in total negation of rudimentary principle of law and abuse of process of Court as well. 21. He has also submitted that the lodging of complaint on 24.11.2011 by the complainant (second respondent) herein before the first respondent seemed to be in total negation of rudimentary principle of law and abuse of process of Court as well. 21. The grievance of the complainant: The bank officials without properly scrutinizing the title deeds offered by the principal borrower C.V. Jayaprakash as security and without properly verifying the payments said to have been made by C.V. Jayaprakash to the supplier of amusement equipments viz. Gujarath Amusement Industries, had sanctioned the loan and false receipts were submitted by C.V. Jayaprakash from the supplier of machinery and despite the fact was brought to the notice of the higher authorities of the bank, the banking officials with a view of wrecking vengeance against him had initiated proceedings under SARFAESI Act by entering into a criminal conspiracy with the petitioners. 22. Specific allegations levelled against the petitioners in the complaint: (i) The petitioners being the tenants in respect of portions of the said P.R.M. Complex had represented as if there was an association of tenants and with a view to deter any bona fide purchasers from participating in the tender-cum-auction, they had caused an advertisement to be published in Dinamalar on 1.3.2010 to make it appear as if the property is subjected to encumbrance to avoid a fair and wider participation in the tender-cum-auction and they had also colluded with the bank officials and subsequently purchased the property in the tender-cum-auction sale for a lesser price than the fair market price. (ii) It is also alleged that the auction made on 10.3.2010 is vitiated on account of the advertisement given on 1.3.2010 by the petitioners in the name of their so called association and that the complainant was not even allowed to enter into the auction hall. 23. A question postulates from the above allegations as to whether these grounds are sufficient to constitute the offences under Sections 120(B), 409, 420, 147 and 506 (i) I.P.C. , The first respondent, who is the Inspector of Police attached to the Pollachi East Police Station and handling the investigation of the case is heavily burdened to answer this question rather than the second respondent, who is merely an informer about the incident. He may be the real aggrieved and interested person, but since the first respondent, representing the State, takes up the grievance of the second respondent as being the investigating agency should have reason to suspect the commission of cognizable offence. He has to subjectively satisfy himself as. to the very existence of sufficient grounds for embarking on investigation. 24. As envisaged in State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992) SCC (Cr) 426 , commencement of investigation in a cognizable offence by a police officer is subject to two conditions, firstly, the police officer should have reason to suspect the. commission of a cognizable offence as required by Section 157(1), and secondly, the police officer should subjectively satisfy himself as to whether there is sufficient ground for entering on an investigation into the facts and circumstances of the case as contemplated under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 157(1). Further, as Clause (b) of the proviso permits the police officer to satisfy himself about the sufficiency of the ground even before entering on an investigation, it postulates that the police officer has to draw his satisfaction only on the materials which were placed before him at that stage, namely, the first information together with the documents, if any, enclosed. In other words, the police officer has to satisfy himself only on the allegations mentioned in the first information before he enters on an investigation as to whether those allegations do constitute a cognizable offence warranting an investigation. 25. Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the information to the police officers and their powers to investigate. Section 154, which comes under Chapter XII specifically deals with the information in cognizable offences. Similarly, Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings before a Magistrate. Section 190, which comes under the above Chapter deals with the cognizable offence by Magistrate. It is settled proposition of law that the powers of police officers with regard to the investigation are unfettered provided it is exercised in strict compliance subject to the provisions to Chapter XII. Section 190, which comes under the above Chapter deals with the cognizable offence by Magistrate. It is settled proposition of law that the powers of police officers with regard to the investigation are unfettered provided it is exercised in strict compliance subject to the provisions to Chapter XII. Though it is appeared from Chapter XIV of the Code a Magistrate is kept in picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police as to how the investigation has to be conducted. 26. Keeping in view of the above circumstances, the Apex Court has given a different dimension as to when the Court’s interference is required with the powers of the investigation conferred on the police officers. 27. The Apex Court in State of Haryana and Others v. Ch.Bhajan Lal and Others (supra) has observed in paragraph No. 62 in the following manner: “62. The sum and substance of the above deliberation results to a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code and the Courts are not justified in obliterating the track of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the Court on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution. Needs no emphasis that no one can demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable up to unfathomable cosmos. Any recognition of such power will be tantamount to recognition of ‘Divine Power’ which no authority on earth can enjoy.” 28. From the above context, it is crystallized that so long as the. power of the police officers to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised within their legal bounds, the interference of the Court does not warrant. But, if the police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his power in breach of statutory powers causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the Courts interference is inevitable. 29. The Apex Court in the above decision in viz., State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others (supra) has also carved out the following seven categories in which the power of the High Court under Article 226 or under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, could be exercised in proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. However, the Apex Court is cautioned the High Courts to exercise its powers sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases and not invariably in all cases. Seven Categories “(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and. Seven Categories “(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and. other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a. non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding; is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 30. As observed earlier, the first respondent Police, on the strength of the complaint lodged by the second respondent has registered the case in Crime No. 879 of 2011 for the alleged offence under Sections 120(B), 409, 420 and 147 and 506 (i) I.P.C. , Insofar as the offence of criminal conspiracy is concerned, it comes under Chapter V-A of the Indian Penal Code and specifically defined under Section 120(A). Section 120(A) I.P.C., reads as follows: When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,— (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation: It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object. 31. The prime and essential ingredients to constitute an offence of conspiracy are: (i) There should be an agreement (concert or league) between two or more persons; (ii) Such an agreement should be (i) either for doing an illegal act (ii) or for doing an act by illegal means, (iii) Such an agreement must follow an overt act. 32. On careful perusal of the complaint, this Court is of view that no ingredients are made out from the averments of the complaint to constitute an offence of conspiracy, which is punishable under Section 120(B) I.P.C., 33. In order to prove a criminal conspiracy, which is punishable under Section 120(B) there must be direct or circumstantial evidence to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. This clearly envisages that there must be a meeting of minds resulting in an ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of an offence. It is true that in most cases, it will be difficult to get direct evidence of an agreement to conspire but a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. This dictum is held by the Apex Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. V.C. Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382 : (1980) SCC (Cr) 561. 34. From the careful reading of the first information report, this Court finds that nothing is available to establish that the petitioners were having pre-meeting of minds with the other two accused viz. C.V. Jayaprakash and C.V. Mohan and also with the other banking officials to conspire against the complainant (second respondent). 35. 34. From the careful reading of the first information report, this Court finds that nothing is available to establish that the petitioners were having pre-meeting of minds with the other two accused viz. C.V. Jayaprakash and C.V. Mohan and also with the other banking officials to conspire against the complainant (second respondent). 35. With regard to the offence under Section 409 I.P.C., it comes under the caption of criminal breach of trust under Chapter XVII under the caption of offences against property. Section 409 I.P.C., deals with criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent. The essential ingredients to constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust are: (i) That the accused was entrusted property in any manner; or That such property was in his dominion in his capacity of a public servant, or as banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, in the way of his business in such capacity; (ii) That the accused committed breach of trust in respect of that property. 36. It is significant to note here that it is crystallized from the averments of the first information report that the offence under Section 409 I.P.C., would not be attracted as against the petitioners, because they were the tenants of the property, which was offered by the complainant as security. On the failure of the second respondent and the principal borrower viz., first accused C.V.Jayaprakash to repay the loan to the bank the property, which was offered as security was brought to auction under SARFAESI Act and the petitioners had participated in the auction and subsequently purchased the same as they were the successful bidders. Their conduct in participation in the auction and purchase of the property cannot be brought under the purview of the offence under Section 409 I.P.C., 37. On coming to the offence of cheating under Section 420 I.P.C., the term ‘cheating’ has been defined under Section 415 I.P.C., as follows: 415. Their conduct in participation in the auction and purchase of the property cannot be brought under the purview of the offence under Section 409 I.P.C., 37. On coming to the offence of cheating under Section 420 I.P.C., the term ‘cheating’ has been defined under Section 415 I.P.C., as follows: 415. Cheating: “Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver, any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. 38. The essential ingredients to constitute offence under Section 420 are as under: (i) There must be deception i.e. the accused must have deceived someone, either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or omission; (ii) That by the said deception. The accused must induce a person (a) to deliver any property; or (b) to make, alter or destroy the whole or part of the valuable security or any thing which is signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable property. (iii) That the accused must have done so dishonestly. 39. The term ‘Deceiving’ or ‘Deceit’ has been explained in Goss, (1860) 8 Cox 262 in the following manner: Deceiving means causing to believe what is false, or misleading as to a matter of fact, or leading into error. Whenever a person fraudulently represents as an existing fact that which is not an existing fact, he commits this offence. A wilful misrepresentation of a definite fact with intent to defraud, cognizable by the senses-as where a seller represents the quantity of coal to be fourteen cwt. whereas it is in fact only eight cwt. but so packed as to look more; or where the seller, by manoeuvering, contrives to pass off tasters of cheese as if extracted from the cheese offered for sale whereas it is not is a cheating. 40. In Halsubrys Laws Of England, 4th Edn., Vol. whereas it is in fact only eight cwt. but so packed as to look more; or where the seller, by manoeuvering, contrives to pass off tasters of cheese as if extracted from the cheese offered for sale whereas it is not is a cheating. 40. In Halsubrys Laws Of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 7 para 248, page 150 the term ‘Deceit’ has been explained in the following manner: “A false and fraudulent representation as to a matter of fact, made in order to induce a person to act thereon.” 41. Section 420 I.P.C., reads as follows: “Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 42. With regard to the ingredients of Section 420 I.P.C., His Lordship Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.G. Balakrishnan while speaking on behalf of the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Alpic Finance Ltd. v. P. Sadasivan and Another AIR 2001 SC 1226 : (2001) SCC (Cr) 565 : has held follows: “To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practicing the deceit knows or believes to be false. It must also be shown that there existed a fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of commission of the offence.” His Lordship has also further held that “When somebody suffers injury to his person, property or reputation, he may have remedies both under civil and criminal law. The injury alleged may form basis of civil claim and may also constitute the ingredients of some crime punishable under criminal law. When there is dispute between the parties arising out of a transaction involving passing of valuable properties between them,. the aggrieved person may have right to sue for damages or compensation and at the same time, law permits the victim to proceed against the wrongdoer for having committed an offence of criminal breach of trust or cheating. When there is dispute between the parties arising out of a transaction involving passing of valuable properties between them,. the aggrieved person may have right to sue for damages or compensation and at the same time, law permits the victim to proceed against the wrongdoer for having committed an offence of criminal breach of trust or cheating. Here the main offence alleged by the appellant is that respondents committed the offence under Section 420 I.P.C. and the case of the appellant is that respondents have cheated him and thereby dishonestly induced him to deliver property.” 43. Based on the case of the appellant, His Lordship held further that; “According to the appellant, parties entered into a valid lease agreement and the grievance of the appellant is that the respondents failed to discharge their contractual obligations. In the complaint, there is no allegation that there was fraud or dishonest inducement on the part of the respondents and thereby the respondents parted with the property. It is trite law and common sense that an honest man entering into a contract is deemed to represent that he has the present intention of carrying it out but if, having accepted the pecuniary advantage involved in the transaction, he fails to pay his debt, he does not necessarily evade the debt by deception. Moreover, the appellant has no case that the respondents obtained the, article by any fraudulent inducement or by willful misrepresentation. We are told that respondents, though committed default in paying some installments, have paid substantial. amount towards the consideration. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, it is difficult to discern an element of deception in the whole transaction, whereas it is palpably evident that the appellant had an oblique motive of causing harassment to the respondents by seizing the entire articles through magisterial proceedings. Therefore, the learned single- judge of the High Court was perfectly justified in quashing the proceedings.” 44. Therefore, the learned single- judge of the High Court was perfectly justified in quashing the proceedings.” 44. On coming to the instant case on hand the role, according to the complainant (second respondent) played by the petitioners is that they had formed a cartel of tenants in respect of PRM Complex with a view to deter any bona fide purchaser from participating in the tender/auction and given an advertisement in Dinamalar on 1.3.2010 to make it appear that the property is subjected to encumbrance and with an intention to avoid a fair and wider participation in the tender cum auction and colluded with the bank officials and purchased the property for a price lesser than the fair market price. 45. In this connection, Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1083 of 2012 (M. Krishnan) has canvassed that the plea of alleged formation of cartel by the petitioner Mr. M. Krishnan and other two co-bidders viz., the petitioners in Crl. O.P. No. 1084 and 1076 of 2012 and thereby the second respondent and Others were prevented from entering into auction hall etc., had not been pleaded earlier in the statutory appeal in Second Appeal No. 25 of 2010 which was filed by him before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Cuddalore nor had been, raised by him in securitization appeal in R.A. (SA) No. 483 of 2010 filed by him before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai. He has also argued that the 2nd respondent had purposefully lodged the complaint before the first respondent police for the first time on 24.11.2011 nearly after 1 year and 8 months after he had failed in all his attempts to set the sale aside and that it is a clear abuse of process of Court and an after thought to harass the petitioners, who are the bona fide purchasers of the property under SARFAESI Act. 46. During the course of his arguments, he has also drawn the attention of this Court to the general notice which the petitioners had caused to be published in Dinamalar Daily dated 1.3.2010. In this connection, he would submit that a cursory perusal of the publication would go to show. that it is only a notice issued by the tenants in occupation of the property to put the intending participants to notice that they are the tenants in occupation. In this connection, he would submit that a cursory perusal of the publication would go to show. that it is only a notice issued by the tenants in occupation of the property to put the intending participants to notice that they are the tenants in occupation. He has also maintained that by no stretch of imagination it could be constituted that it had given rise to any offence under any provision of I.P.C. , much less for the provisions for which the FIR has been registered. It is also manifested from the first information report that it is not the case of the complainant (second respondent) that any bidder was prevented from participating in the public auction or that a cartel was formed only for that purpose of preventing any bidder. 47. As discussed earlier, insofar as this case is concerned, the indictment under Sections 120-B, 409 and 420 I.P.C, are said to be the major offences. We have seen in the earlier paragraphs about the essential ingredients to constitute the offence under Sections 120-B and 409 I.P.C, The offence under Section 409 I.P.C, is relating to public servant, banker, merchant or agent and the petitioners therefore do not come under the above said category. 48. As held in G. Laxminarayan Naidu v. Chitibaina Yerraiah to constitute an offence of cheating under Section 420 I.P.C., the concept of deception must exist from very start of transaction. In order to hold a person guilty of cheating, the intention of person must be dishonest and there must be mens rea 49. In Ba Shein v. Emperor, AIR 1922 Low Bur 10 : 22 Cr LJ 121 , it is held that whenever the words ‘fraud’ or ‘with intent to defraud’ or ‘fraudulently’ occur in the definition of a crime, two elements at least are essential to the commission of a crime, viz., (1) deceit or an intention to deceive or, in some cases mere secrecy, and (2) either actual injury or possible injury or an intention to expose some person either to actual injury or a risk of possible injury, by means of that deceit or secrecy. The term ‘fraudulently’ may be defined to imply an intent to deceive in such a manner as to expose any person to loss, or risk of loss. The term ‘fraudulently’ may be defined to imply an intent to deceive in such a manner as to expose any person to loss, or risk of loss. The term ‘dishonestly’ implies deliberate intention to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss and when such an intention is proved and is coupled with cheating and the delivery of property, the offence is punishable under Section 420 I.P.C., in which the word ‘fraudulently’ finds no place. A, for example may by a false representation induce B to advance him a sum of money, in such circumstances that A is aware that he is exposing B to considerable risk of loss, but without the intention of causing wrongful loss; A would be acting fraudulently, and if he intended to cause wrongful loss, would be acting dishonestly. In the former case, he would be punishable under Section 417 I.P.C., and in the latter under Section 420 I.P.C., 50. It is apparent from the above context that to constitute an offence of cheating under Section 420 I.P.C., a guilty state of mind is very much essential. In other words, it could be state that mens rea is an essential ingredient. 51. This Court also likes to place it on record that the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so. The intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime. This legal principle has been more explained in the following two leading cases: (i) Reg v. Tolson ( 23 Q.B.D. 164 ; 58 L.J.M.C. 97 ), and (ii) Reg. v. Prince ( L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154 : 4 L.J.M.C. 122 ). 52. Goddardl. J. in Brend v. Wood (1946) 62 T.L.R. 462 has lamented that ‘It is of utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a Court should always bear in mind, that unless a statute either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, the Court should not find a man guilty unless he has a guilty mind.’ 53. With regard to an offence under Section 420 I.P.C., His Lordship the Hon’ble Mr. With regard to an offence under Section 420 I.P.C., His Lordship the Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha while speaking on behalf of the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in V.Y. Jose and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another, (2009) 1 SCC (Cr) 996 : (2009) 2 MLJ (Crl) 711 has observed as follows: “For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code can be said to have been made out.” 54. Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned senior counsel appearing for Ms. AL. Ganthimathi, learned counsel, who is on record for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1083 of 2012 has also adverted to that while registering the case in Crime No. 879 of 2011, under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 147 and 506(i) I.P.C. , the Inspector of Police, Pollachi East Police Station might not have any reason to suspect that the petitioners would have committed any cognizable offences as afore stated on the face of the complaint itself. 55. While advancing his argument, the learned senior counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the Order of the learned Principal District Judge of Coimbatore, dated 10.3.2010 and made in the interlocutory application in I.A. No. 324 of 2010 in A.S. No. 55 of 2008. In paragraph No. 13 of the said Order, the learned Principal District Judge has quoted the decision of this Court in Bank of India, rep. by its Branch Manager Gobichettxpalayam v. N.Natarajan and Another, (2007) 5 MLJ 1206 . In paragraph No. 13 of the said Order, the learned Principal District Judge has quoted the decision of this Court in Bank of India, rep. by its Branch Manager Gobichettxpalayam v. N.Natarajan and Another, (2007) 5 MLJ 1206 . In this case, it has been held that “SARFAESI ACT is a self contained code enacted for a special purpose and therefore once a notice is issued under Section 13(2), it has to proceed in the same way as contemplated under the Act and any aggrieved person against the measures taken by the bank under Section 13(4) has to approach the DRT first and the DRAT later and he cannot maintain a civil suit for the measures taken by the bank under Section 13(4) of Act. Therefore, it is to be held that suit is also specifically excluded from the purview of civil Court for the action taken or to be taken by the bank under Section 13(4) of the Act.” 56. The learned Principal District Judge has also made reference, in the same paragraph to the decision of the Apex Court in Transcore v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 712 : (2008) 1 SCC 125 : 2006 (5) CTC 753 : (2007) 1 MLJ 1929 , wherein it is held that “Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act given an overriding effect to that Act will all other laws and of such other laws are inconsistent with the SARFAESI Act. The Supreme Court further observed that the very object of Section 13 of SARFAESI Act is recovery by non-adjudicatory process and it is for this reason that Section 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act proceeds on the basis that security interest needs to be enforced expeditiously without the intervention of the Court/Tribunal. The SARFAESI Act states that enforcement would take place by non-adjudicatory process and the Act removes all fetters on the rights of the secured creditors.” The Apex Court has also observed that “The very suit filed by the first respondent is not maintainable and liable to be rejected in view of the specific bar contained in Section 34 of SARFAESI Act.” 57. In this connection, Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned senior-counsel has submitted that the complainant (second respondent) had made all possible efforts to deter the proceedings, initiated by the banking authorities under SARFAESI Act to bring his property for sale for his failure of. In this connection, Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned senior-counsel has submitted that the complainant (second respondent) had made all possible efforts to deter the proceedings, initiated by the banking authorities under SARFAESI Act to bring his property for sale for his failure of. the repayment of debts and since all his efforts were ended in futile, he had resorted the method of turning the spear as against the petitioners, who happened to purchase the property viz. P.R.M. Complex in the auction, which was conducted on 10.3.2010 by way of filing the present criminal case, which is devoid of any merits and is liable to be quashed. 58. On verification of records, this Court is able to find that the’ complainant (second respondent) Mr.Mohan Kumar has filed an application in S.A. No. 25 of 2010 under Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore with a prayer to declare the publication dated 8.2.2010 made by the State Bank of India as invalid, void ab initio, not binding upon the complainant or his property and. also to set aside the auction dated 10.3.2010. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, in its Order dated 20.4.2010, has observed in paragraph No. 3(11)(ii) as follows: “For availing the financial assistance, the principal borrower and the applicant/the guarantor executed necessary documents in favour of R1 on 10.9.2003 and as per the terms of deed of guarantee, the applicant had agreed to repay the entire amount with interest and cost in the event of default of the principal borrower. Further, the R1 has submitted elaborately about the terms of Clauses 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14 of the deed of guarantee. The R/B further submits that the applicant and principal borrower deposited the title deeds of the scheduled property with R1 on 9.9.2003 and the same was confirmed by a letter evidencing deposit of title deeds dated 10.9.2003.” 59. It is also revealed from the above said Order that after following the legal formalities under SARFAESI Act, the property was brought for sale and hence it appears that there is no irregularity in the proceedings of the State Bank of India against the principal borrower as well as the complainant for which the petitioners could not be blamed as if they had conspired with the principal borrower and other banking officials to cheat the complainant with fraudulent and dishonest intention for the purpose of wrecking vengeance. 60. 60. It is also revealed from para V(i) of the Order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal in S.A. No. 25 of 2010, dated 20.4.2010, under the caption of question No. 1 that (i) The complainant has joined the loan transaction as guarantor and mortgagor for the term loan availed by the principal borrower, (ii) He had executed necessary documents for availing the financial assistance and agreed to repay the loan as per the terms of the sanction, (iii) The applicant and the principal borrower had given their properties as collateral security and created unregistered equitable mortgage by way of deposit of title deeds for the due repayment of the loan on 9.9.2003 and confirmed the same on 10.9.2003, and (iv) The liability of the complainant in availing the financial assistance and in repayment is joint, several and co-extensive to the principal borrower (first accused) in the event of default by the principal borrower. 61. The learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, while dismissing the application in S.A. No. 25 of 2010, has found that the applicant (complainant) has not demonstrated any violation of provision of law with material proof and hence the application is misconceived and devoid of merits. 62. Similarly, the suit filed by the complainant in O.S. No. 65 of 2006, on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Pollachi, seeking the relief of declaration, declaring his liability as guarantor for the principal borrower C.V.Jayaprakash to the suit property stands discharged and for permanent injunction against the State Bank of India and its authorized officer was also dismissed on the following grounds: (i) There is no denial of the character of the guarantor by the plaintiff (complainant) herein as seen from various communication addressed by him,. (ii) There is also no fraudulent act of secured creditors i.e. the defendants 1 and 2 is made out in this case, (iii) The claim of the defendants 1 and 2 cannot be stated as absurd and untenable, and (iv) There is no cause of action to file the suit in this Court of Subordinate Court, Pollachi as the jurisdiction of this Court is barred under Section 34 of SARFAESI Act. 63. The appeal preferred by the complainant (second respondent) in A.S. No. 55 of 2008, on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Coimbatore was also dismissed on 29.7.2011 after confirming the judgment of the Subordinate Court, Pollachi. 64. Mr. 63. The appeal preferred by the complainant (second respondent) in A.S. No. 55 of 2008, on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Coimbatore was also dismissed on 29.7.2011 after confirming the judgment of the Subordinate Court, Pollachi. 64. Mr. N.R. Elango, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. C.T. Murugappan, learned counsel, who is on record for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1076 of 2012, while advancing his arguments, has made reference to the appeal filed by the complainant (second respondent) Mr. Mohan Kumar before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Chennai in R.A. (SA) No. 483 of 2010 and submitted that even in this appeal also the complainant had not made any specific allegations about the petitioners and that he did not say anything in the grounds of appeal that he was prevented by the petitioners from participating in the auction, which was held on 10 3.2010, by way of public notice. He has also added that the first information report is nothing, but clear abuse of process of law. 65. Mr. AR. L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. M.L. Palanimuthu, learned counsel, who is on record for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1084 of 2012 has submitted that both the trial Court as well as the appellate Court have clearly found that the civil Court’s jurisdiction has been barred under Section 34 of SARFAESI Act and that the dismissal of the suit in O.S. No. 65 of 2006 as well as the appeal in A. S. No. 55 of 2008 would clearly indicate that the complainant (second respondent) has no case in his favour and that the present case in crime No. 879 of 2011, which has been registered by the first respondent Police based on the complaint of the complainant is vexatious and liable to be quashed. 66. He has also canvassed that the petitioners are the bona fide purchasers of the property in the auction conducted by the secured creditor viz. State Bank of India on 10.3.2010 and in consequent thereof, the possession was also delivered to the purchasers viz. 66. He has also canvassed that the petitioners are the bona fide purchasers of the property in the auction conducted by the secured creditor viz. State Bank of India on 10.3.2010 and in consequent thereof, the possession was also delivered to the purchasers viz. the petitioners and subsequently the sale certificate was also issued and registered at the Sub-Registrar’s Office, Pollachi and therefore, the registration of the case as against the petitioners herein would express the frustration of the complainant (second respondent) on account of his failure in all his efforts to set the sale aside. 67. Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. M.L. Palanimuthu, learned counsel, who is on record for the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 1084 of 2012, has also argued on the concept of powers of this Court to be exercised under Section 482 Cr.P.C, to interfere with the powers of a police officer to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 68. Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel, while advancing his arguments, has taken this Court through the averments of the affidavit filed by the complainant (second respondent) in respect of his interlocutory application in I.A. No. 324 of 2010, which was filed in the appeal in A.S. No. 55 of 2008 before the learned Principal District Judge, Coimbatore. The complainant in his affidavit has stated as follows: “The first respondent without adhering the terms and conditions and even without the margin money of Rs. 45 lakhs disbursed Rs. 59 lakhs to the third respondent. Both the respondents 1 and 2 having colluded with each other misled the appellant in order entangle his property.” 69. In this regard, Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel, has adverted to that even in his affidavit filed in I.A. No. 324 of 2010, which was filed in appeal in A.S. No. 55 of 2008 on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Coimbatore, the complainant had never stated that the petitioners herein had conspired with the banking officials and the principal borrower to defraud or to cheat him, nor had he even stated about the publication of notice in newspaper dated 1.3.2010. 70. 70. He has also added that for the first time that too while lodging the criminal complaint with the first respondent Police, the complainant had come forward with such allegations as against the petitioners, which were left unsupported with any legal proof. 71. Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel, has also made reference to Sections 17 and 18 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 relating to the rights of the complainant to appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter as well to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. He would submit further that presumably the securitization appeal under Section 18 of SARFAESI Act in R.A. (SA) No. 483 of 2010 filed by the complainant on the file of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai is pending. When the outcome of the appeal is awaited, it is not fair on the part of the complainant to lodge the complaint against the petitioners, who are bona fide purchasers of the property, which was offered as security for the loan availed by the principal borrower and guaranteed by the complainant. 72. On the other hand, Mr. A. Ramesh, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr.V.Vijayakumar, learned counsel, who is on record for the second respondent (complainant) has submitted that as contemplated under Section 156(ii) Cr.P.C, no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under the Section to investigate. 73. He has also submitted that the investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered and hence no Court is empowered to interfere with the investigation of a police officer in respect of a cognizable offence. 74. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the decision in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, AIR (32) 1945 PC 18. 74. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the decision in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, AIR (32) 1945 PC 18. In this case, the Privy Council has held that: “Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India there is a statutory right on the part of the police under Sections 154 and 156 to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 561(A).(the present Section is 482 Cr.P.C.,). The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always of course subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 Cr.P.C, to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In the case of a cognizable offence, the Court’s functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then and, therefore, the High Court can interfere under Section 561(A) (the present Section is 482 Cr.P.C.,) only when a charge has been preferred and not before. As the police have under Sections 154 and 156 , a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence without requiring the sanction of the Court to quash the police investigation on the ground that it would be an abuse of the powers of the Court would be to act on treacherous grounds : (‘16) 3 AIR 1916 PC 64 , Rel. on.” 75. on.” 75. In paragraph No. 22 of the above cited decision, the Privy Council based on Section 561(A) (the present Section is 482 Cr.P.C.,) and after placing reliance upon decision (‘38) 25 AIR 1938 Mad 129 has also observed as follows: “No doubt if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation and if they do so the High Court may interfere under Section 561(A).” 76. Mr. A. Ramesh, learned senior counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the averments of the first information report and submitted that at Page No. 3 of the first information report ten lines from top the complainant (second respondent) has disclosed the offences committed by the accused persons, which includes the petitioners and that the question of quashing the criminal proceedings would not at all arise in this case. 77. To fortify his contention, he has also placed reliance upon a decision in State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak, AIR 1963 SC 447 : (1963) 1 MLJ (Crl) 575. In this case, the observation made by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed (supra) has been made reference by the three Judges Bench of the Apex Court. 78. Besides this, he has also placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention: 1. M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita and Others JT (2002) 3 SC 89 , 2. Lakhwant Singh v. Jasbir Singh and Others (2009) 2 SCC (Cr) 873 : 3. Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal and Others AIR 1992 SC 1379 : (1992) SCC (Cr) 636 : 4. Ravindra Kumar Madhanlal Goenka and Another v. Rugmini Ram Raghav Spinners Pvt. Ltd. AIR 2009 SC 2383 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 1011 : (2009) 3 MLJ (Crl) 97 , 5. M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh and Another AIR 2001 SC 3014 : (2002) SCC (Cr) 19 : (2002) 1 MLJ (Crl) 134 , 6. T. Vengama Naidu v. T. Dora Swamy Naidy and Others (2008) 2 SCC (Cr) 231 : (2008) 1 MLJ (Crl) 133 79. M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh and Another AIR 2001 SC 3014 : (2002) SCC (Cr) 19 : (2002) 1 MLJ (Crl) 134 , 6. T. Vengama Naidu v. T. Dora Swamy Naidy and Others (2008) 2 SCC (Cr) 231 : (2008) 1 MLJ (Crl) 133 79. In the first case i.e. M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita and Others (supra), on the basis of an allegations made by the petitioner, an FIR was registered being No. 3 of 1997, and that FIR made some allegations against the respondent of commission of offence under Section 420 /120B, IPC, in relation to certain allotment of land in Delhi. While the matter was under investigation, the respondent having invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in Crl. W.P. No. 969 of 1999, the division bench of Delhi High Court on a detailed examination of the entire materials including the statement recorded in course of investigation quashed the FIR on a conclusion that the allegations in the FIR do not constitute an offence. 80. The Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court while disposing the special leave petition in S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6895 of 2001 has observed as follows: “The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction and the parameters prescribed in a catena of decisions where a Court could be justified in quashing the FIR. At this stage, the High Court would be entitled to only examine the allegations made in the FIR and would not be entitled to appreciate by way of shifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But by no means, the Court would be justified in quashing an FIR by appreciating and shifting the materials collected during the investigation.” 81. In the second decision viz. Lakhwant Singh v. Jasbir Singh and Others (supra), the judgment of a learned single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court, allowing the application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, was challenged before the Apex Court. The respondents therein had filed an application praying for quashing the first information report registered against them for alleged commission of theft on 13.7.1999. The statement in the first information report was that while executing the Order in their favour possession of land of the complainant was illegally taken in execution of warrant of possession. 82. The respondents therein had filed an application praying for quashing the first information report registered against them for alleged commission of theft on 13.7.1999. The statement in the first information report was that while executing the Order in their favour possession of land of the complainant was illegally taken in execution of warrant of possession. 82. In this case, a Division Bench of the Apex Court headed by His Lordship the Hon’ble Mr. Justice DR. Arijit Pasayat has quoted the decisions of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : and State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others (supra). In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (supra) case, the Apex Court has also summarised some categories of cases where the inherent power of the High Court can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g., want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 83. The Apex Court has also referred to the illustrative seven categories indicated in State of Haryana and Others v. Ch.Bhajan Lal and Others (supra) case. In this connection, in paragraph No. 9, while speaking on behalf of the Division Bench, His Lordship Hon’ble Mr. Justice DR. Arijit Pasayat has observed that “As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound’ principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.” His Lordship has also observed that “It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.” 84. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.” His Lordship has also observed that “It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.” 84. In Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal and Others (supra), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the High Court’s power to quash the complaint and consequent criminal proceeding should not be exercised where allegations prima facie constituting the offence alleged in the complaint. In paragraph No. 7, it has been held that “7.......This Court has in various decisions examined the scope of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C, and has reiterated the principle that the High Court can’ exercise its inherent jurisdiction of quashing a criminal proceeding only when the allegations made in the complaint do not constitute an offence or that the exercise of the power is necessary either to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. No inflexible guidelines or rigid, formula can be set out and it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case wherein such power should be exercised. When the allegations in the complaint prima facie constitute the offence against any or all of the respondents in the absence of materials on record to show that the continuance of the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the Court or would defeat the ends of justice, the High Court would not be justified in quashing the complaint.” 85. In Ravindra Kumar Madhanlal Goenka and Another v. Rugmini Ram Raghav Spinners Pvt. Ltd. (supra), while penning down the Judgment on behalf of the Division Bench, His Lordship the Hon’ble Dr. Justice M.K. Sharma has held that while entertaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C, materials furnished by defence cannot be looked into and can be entertained only at the time of trial, are prima facie materials available against the petition for quashing the criminal proceedings entertained. 86. Justice M.K. Sharma has held that while entertaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C, materials furnished by defence cannot be looked into and can be entertained only at the time of trial, are prima facie materials available against the petition for quashing the criminal proceedings entertained. 86. In T. Vengama Naidu v. T. Dora Swamy Naidy and Others (supra), the appellant had filed a private complaint against the respondents, which was sent for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C, to the Police whereupon a criminal case was registered as Crime No. 22 of 2002 on 13.1.2002 for the offences punishable under Sections 464, 423, 420 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. In that case, the investigation was not completed and while the investigation was in progress, the respondents filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C, before the High Court for quashing FIR, which was lodged on the basis of the complaint, as well as the investigation. 87. The High Court has allowed the petition and the criminal proceedings in the FIR were quashed. Hence, being aggrieved by the impugned Order of the High Court, the complainant had preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 88. While speaking on behalf of the Division Bench, the Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.S. Sirpurkar has held that “It is settled law that an FIR and the consequent investigation cannot be quashed unless there is no offence spelt out from the same. The law in this respect is settled that the said FIR has to be taken on its face value and then it is to be examined as to whether it spells out the offences complained of. There was no question of considering the merits of the allegations contained in the FIR at that stage or testing the veracity of allegations.” 89. Having been made reference to the above cited decisions, Mr.A.Ramesh, learned senior counsel has submitted that the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C, in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule and. that the proviso to Section 482 Cr.P.C, has not conferred any power on the High Court and it only save the inherent power, which the Court possessed before the enactment of the law. that the proviso to Section 482 Cr.P.C, has not conferred any power on the High Court and it only save the inherent power, which the Court possessed before the enactment of the law. He has also submitted that Section 482 Cr.P.C, contemplates three circumstances, under which the inherent jurisdiction might be exercised, namely: (i) to give effect on order of the Court, (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to secure the ends of justice, 90. He has also submitted that ex facie, the first information report discloses the offences under Sections 120(B), 409, 420, 147 and 506(i) of I.P.C. , and therefore, the petition seeking the relief of quashing the criminal proceedings in the case, in Crime No. 879 of 2011 while the investigation is in progress is devoid of any merits and liable to be dismissed. He would submit further that the allegations of the complainant (second respondent) prima facie constitute the offences alleged therein as against the petitioners and hence, the first respondent Police might be allowed to continue the investigation and to lay the final report after the completion of the investigation. 91. This Court has meticulously scrutinized the averments of the complaint as well as the averments of the petition and other materials available on record. 92. Having given careful consideration, this Court is of view that the uncontroverted allegations as made in the first information report prima facie do not establish any offence as against the petitioners. It is admitted facts that the investigation is in progress and under this circumstance the intervention of this Court is sought for by the petitioners to prevent the abuse of process of law and also to secure the ends of justice. This Court is also of view that the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak as the allegations as against the petitioners have become pale into insignificance and therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing the criminal proceedings in the case in Crime No. 879 of 2011 to continue. 93. As observed earlier, this case has squarely come under the second category as envisaged in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (supra) viz., where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. 94. 93. As observed earlier, this case has squarely come under the second category as envisaged in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (supra) viz., where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. 94. As rightly argued by the learned senior counsels Mr. B. Sriramulu, Mr. N.R. Elango and Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, the criminal proceedings as against the petitioners in the present case in Crime No. 879 of 2011 are manifestly attended with mala fide and has been instituted maliciously with an oblique motive for wrecking vengeance on the petitioners for having purchased the property of the complainant (second respondent) in the auction conducted by the secured creditors viz. State Bank of India and it also discloses the complainant’s private and personal grudge as against the petitioners. Since the allegations in the complaint did not constitute a cognizable offence justifying the registration of the case and investigation thereon, the interference of this Court is warranted to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, to prevent the abuse of Court and to secure the ends of justice. 95. Keeping in view of the above facts and having regard to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is inclined to quash the criminal proceedings pertaining to the case in Crime No. 879 of 2011 in respect of the petitioners, who are arrayed as A3, A4, and A5 in the above case. 96. In the result, the petitions in Crl. O.P. Nos. 1083, 1084 and 1076 of 2012 are allowed and the criminal proceedings against the petitioners/A3, A4 and A5 in the case in Crime No. 879 of 2011 pending investigation on the file of the first respondent Police are quashed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. Petition allowed.