JUDGMENT A.N. JINDAL, J. This petition has arisen out of the order dated 3rd February, 2010 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kurukshetra, declining the application of the plaintiff for leading the following additional evidence, which the petitioner/plaintiff wanted to summon from the Punjab National Bank Shahabad Markanda. (a) register of issuing the cheque nos. from 808851 to 808900, 808901 to 808950 issued on 3.2.1996, 8085001 to 805050 issued on 22.8.2005; 176101-176150 issued on 6.4.1995; 176151-176200; 228070-228090; 801400-801500; Cheque Nos. 228065 to 228085; 805030 to 805050; 808856 to 808870; 176140 to 176150; 208070 to 208090 issued to M/s Markanda Sugar Traders, Current A/c no. 2533, M/s Saraswati Sugar Co. 2579 and M/s S.S. Enterprises Current A/c no. 2534 and the register by which the abovesaid cheque books were received by the parties. (b) Requisition/authorization slip on the basis of which Shri Mohan Lal received the cheque book containing cheque nos. 805001-805050 on 22.8.1995 and cheque nos. 808901-808950, 808851-808900; both on 3.2.1996 with original signature slip; (c ) cheque return register for the year 1994-95, 1995-96; (d) Original cheques alongwith vouchers bearing nos. 805001-805050, 808851-808900, 808901-808950, encashed between the period 1995-98 specially cheque nos. 805038, 805039 and 805040 with statement of accounts register; (e) Record relating to dishonour of cheque nos. 808860 and 808863 in the month of February/March, 1996; 805043, 805040, 805041 on 9.2.1996; cheque no. 176130 on 30.1.1996 and cheque no. 801450 on 15.2.1996 issued by Sushil Kumar alias Ashok Kumar. The plaintiff also wanted to examine the concerned official of the Co-operative Bank Shahabad with the following record:- “ii. Concerned official of Co-operative Bank Shahabad (M) with original record of cheque dishonour register, cheque collection register of the period April, 1995 to December, 1996 with total record of cheques given in the account of Shahabad Sugar Mill for encashment and which subsequently dishonoured especially the record of cheque nos. 808862, 808861, 808863, 808856 to 808859 for the account of Saraswati Sugar Company and cheque nos. 805046, 805047, 805040, 804041, 805043 from account of Markanda Sugar Traders handed over to Co-operative Bank between the period March 1996 to April 1996 and register where said cheques were found to be mentioned.” He also wanted to examine the following court record:- “iii. Concerned copyist of record room, learned District and Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra for proving the certified copies of statements and exhibits attached with the present application. iv. Concerned copyist of record room, learned District and Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra for proving the certified copies of statements and exhibits attached with the present application. iv. Civil Ahlmad of the court of Shri S.S.Singh Dahiya, the then Addl. District Judge (FTC), Kurukshetra alongwith case file Saraswati Sugar Traders Vs. Shahabad Sugar Mills etc. from where certified copies have been obtained.” It is urged that earlier the petitioner had no knowledge about documents, including issuance of cheques and it was not also in his knowledge that Madan Lal had received the cheque book on behalf of Sushil Kumar-defendant No.2. Therefore, evidence is sought to be produced to expose the clear picture, which is essential for just disposal of the case. No prejudice would be caused to the defendants, therefore, it would be expedient in the interest of justice allow the petitioner to produce the aforesaid documents by way of additional evidence. The respondents, in their reply, have admitted that the aforesaid documents came to light when the case was pending for cross-examination of DW4-Sushil Kumar but it was submitted that the petitioner had also moved an application for summoning the witness in rebuttal and the said application was accepted, but in revision, this Court had set aside the order and it was observed that it was a case of additional evidence on issue No.1 and not case of rebuttal evidence. However, it was contended that the present application for leading additional evidence would have no relevancy to the controversy in issue and is not necessary for deciding the real question involved in the present case and the present suit has been filed just to delay the payment. It was further submitted that allowing such application would amount to refilling the lacuna and re-opening of the case. Consequently, prayed for dismissal of the application. The trial court, declined the prayer of the petitioner for leading additional evidence. Before I set down to discuss the legal position, I need to mention the factual back ground of the case in the manner that a suit for declaration with consequential relief of mandatory injunction involving huge amount of `4,76,824/- was filed by the plaintiff on 31.7.1996 against the defendants seeking declaration that he was entitled to recover interest from the defendants on delayed payment with consequential relief of rendition of accounts and issues were framed on 2.6.1997. The plaintiff closed the evidence through his counsel on 5.2.2002. When the case was fixed for the evidence of the defendants on 29.4.2002, the suit was dismissed under Order 9 Rule 8 CPC. However, the same was restored on 10.10.2002 and the case was adjourned to 18.11.2002 for evidence of the defendants. On 18.11.2002, the defendants moved an application for admission and denial of the documents. However, the said application was got dismissed by the defendants as not pressed on 13.8.2004 and the case was adjourned again for the evidence of the defendants, which was closed on 14.12.2004. Thereafter, the plaintiff were given four effective opportunities for rebuttal evidence, but on 22.4.2005, both the counsel submitted that the parties are making endeavour to amicably settle the matter in which they failed and the case was again fixed for rebuttal evidence and arguments for 4.1.2006, when the petitioner moved an application for rebuttal evidence, which was allowed. However, civil revision preferred against that order was disposed of on 14.7.2009, wherein this court passed the following order:- “However, a perusal of the application filed by the plaintiff would reveal that by way of the same, the plaintiff did not want to lead any evidence in rebuttal on issues No.2 and 3, instead, it wanted to examine more evidence on issue No.1 regarding which it had already examined and closed its evidence in affirmative. Such type of evidence, which the plaintiff wanted to lead by way of his application dated 21.10.2005 did not at all concern with issues No.2 and 3 regarding which the defendants had already led their evidence in affirmative and closed it. It is apparent that the plaintiff worded its application dated 21.10.2005 in such a way as if it wanted permission to summon the concerned official from the bank along with the record by way of rebuttal evidence on issues No.2 and 3. It is apparent that the plaintiff worded its application dated 21.10.2005 in such a way as if it wanted permission to summon the concerned official from the bank along with the record by way of rebuttal evidence on issues No.2 and 3. As the evidence which the plaintiff wanted to lead by way of evidence in rebuttal pertained to issue No.1 only, onus of which was upon the plaintiff and it had already examined his evidence in affirmative, the only remedy available to the plaintiff was of applying to the trial Court for leading additional evidence, if permitted, but instead of doing so, it filed the application dated 21.10.2005 by mentioning in para 3 therein, though wrongly, that it wanted to summon and examine the concerned official of the bank along with record in rebuttal evidence on issues No.2 and Having indication from the aforesaid order, the petitioner moved an application for additional evidence for examining the aforesaid documents. The application for leading additional evidence appears to have been declined particularly for the following three reasons:- (1) The application suffers from delay and latches; and (2) No diligence was exercised by the petitioner which may justify grant of permission to lead additional evidence and the application having been filed at the fag end of the case was not maintainable. (3) The additional evidence sought to be produced was not relevant to the controversy; No doubt, as regards the first question, the case has been pending since 1996 and the application for additional evidence was filed on 21.10.2005, but the whole of the delay cannot be said to be attributable to the petitioner. Actually the suit was filed on 31.7.1996; the issues in this case were framed on 2.7.1996 and the plaintiff, as usual, closed his evidence in the month of February, 2002 and the case was adjourned for defendants' evidence on 18.11.2002. On 18.11.2002, the defendants while leading evidence, moved an application on that date for admission and denial of some documents which remained pending for two years and was dismissed as not pressed on 13.8.2004. Then the parties took one year for making an endeavour for amicable settlement. On 18.11.2002, the defendants while leading evidence, moved an application on that date for admission and denial of some documents which remained pending for two years and was dismissed as not pressed on 13.8.2004. Then the parties took one year for making an endeavour for amicable settlement. When they failed in their efforts, an application was filed for rebuttal evidence, which was allowed on that very date i.e. 4.1.2006, however, the defendants challenged the said order in this Court by way of revision petition, which took three years to decide and ultimately it was disposed on 14.7.2009, whereby the court while allowing the petition observed that the petitioner could file an application for additional evidence. Thereafter, he filed an application for additional evidence without delay on 23.9.2009 . In such circumstances, the petitioner cannot be held responsible for whole of the delay which was purely attributable either to the defendant/respondents or due to spending of time in legal process. In this case, the petitioner wants to produce on record some documents relating to the sale tax office which proves the admission of the defendants qua the claim of the plaintiff. In any case, if the documentary evidence sought to be produced by way of additional evidence which may be material and relevant for just decision of the case and enable the court to pronounce the judgment then such evidence cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. In the case of Aggarwal Cotton Waste Co. versus Shree Singhal Spinners Pvt. Ltd. 2004 (2) L.J.R. 375, the plaintiffs filed an application for additional evidence to prove sales tax form submitted on behalf of the defendant qua the claim of the plaintiff. In that situation, this court observed as under:- “If the plaintiffs are not allowed to produce the additional evidence, in my opinion, this will amount to miscarriage of justice inasmuch as in that eventuality, the plaintiffs would be required to produce additional evidence in the appeal that may be filed before the appellate Court. In that situation, this court observed as under:- “If the plaintiffs are not allowed to produce the additional evidence, in my opinion, this will amount to miscarriage of justice inasmuch as in that eventuality, the plaintiffs would be required to produce additional evidence in the appeal that may be filed before the appellate Court. In my opinion, the production of additional evidence would advance the cause of justice especially when it is the document of the defendant-firm itself which is sought to be produced by way of additional evidence.” In this case also, the plaintiff wants to produce the documents relating to the purchase of the sugar by Madan Lal an agent of defendant No.2 and the issuance of cheque by the defendants. Similarly, in the case of Surinder Kapoor Versus Gurdev Singh 2009 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 595, this court observed that suffice it to point out that the Court shall offer all opportunities to bring the best possible evidence in the perception of the respective properties. If there was a delay in moving the Court at the appropriate time for examination of witness, it would always be compensated in terms of costs or the Court itself should exercise sufficient vigil not to adjourn the case indefinitely but bind the party by short adjournments and conclude the trial at the earliest. In Kashmir Kaur versus Bachan Kaur 2002 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 133, this court taking a very liberal view, permitted the plaintiff to lead additional evidence, while observing as under:- “The procedure prescribed for recording evidence, as envisaged in Order 18, is based upon common sense. Insofar as plaintiff is concerned, while examining his evidence in affirmative, he has no idea as to by which evidence, the defendant is to rebut his evidence, whereas the defendant, while leading his evidence, knows exactly what evidence has been led by the plaintiff and by which evidence he has to rebut the same. The defendant is, thus, permitted to lead evidence with regard to whole case which right has been given to the plaintiff by way of rebuttal, i.e. , he too can address on the entire case. The whole case mentioned in various rules of Order 18 does include, in its sweep, the issues, onus whereof is upon the plaintiff. At this stage, it may be relevant to mention that this is law of pleadings as well. The whole case mentioned in various rules of Order 18 does include, in its sweep, the issues, onus whereof is upon the plaintiff. At this stage, it may be relevant to mention that this is law of pleadings as well. When the plaintiff files a suit, defendants know what exactly has been disclosed therein. He is, thus, given a right to file written statement wherein he may not only answer the pleadings made in the plaint but may also press into service additional pleas which can entail dismissal of the suit. The plaintiff is then given a right to file replication and the same is not confined only to additional pleas taken in the written statement. The plaintiff has also right to file reply to the written statement as a whole.” In the instant case also, the plaintiff ordinarily would not know about the document as disclosed by Sushil Kumar, while appearing as DW.4 in the witness box to be in possession of the Punjab National Bank and Madan Lal and what amount of sugar was received by Madan Lal, the man of the defendant, who used to receive the sugar under his signatures. Therefore, occasion arose to plaintiff to move the application. The Apex Court has also elaborated the view regarding permission to lead additional evidence in the case of Amrit Lal Kapoor and another Versus Kusum Lata Kapoor and others 2010 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 135, wherein the court held as under:- “There is considerable merit in the submission made by Mr. Agrawala. Shri Ashwani Kumar Kapoor is an attesting witness to the Will which the defendants-appellants herein have set up in their defence. Non-examination of the said witness would, therefore, seriously affect their case. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the witness could not be produced not because of any deliberate neglect or inaction on the part of the appellants herein but on account of the refusal of casual and station leave prayed for by him. Non-examination of the said witness would, therefore, seriously affect their case. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the witness could not be produced not because of any deliberate neglect or inaction on the part of the appellants herein but on account of the refusal of casual and station leave prayed for by him. In the circumstances, interest of justice would be substantially served if a final opportunity is given to the appellants to produce the witness.” Thus, in view of the aforesaid fact, the court cannot decline the application for seeking additional evidence on the ground that it is too late to be accepted unless there was any intentional delay or design to install the early disposal of the suit, which does not appears in the present case. The plaintiff by delaying his own case for recovery was not to be benefitted by it. The Apex Court in case K.K. Velusamy vs. N. Palanisamy, 2011 (3) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 83, while considering the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17-A read with Section 151 of the Code, discussed as to under what conditions, the additional evidence could be permitted, observed as under :- “16. We may add a word of caution. The power under section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. But where the application is found to be bona fide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does so, it should ensure that the process does not become a protracting tactic. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly the court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly if the application is found to be mischievous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly the court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly if the application is found to be mischievous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs. If the application is allowed and the evidence is permitted and ultimately the court finds that evidence was not genuine or relevant and did not warrant the reopening of the case recalling the witnesses, it can be made a ground for awarding exemplary costs apart from ordering prosecution if it involves fabrication of evidence. If the party had an opportunity to produce such evidence earlier but did not do so or if the evidence already led is clear and unambiguous, or if it comes to the conclusion that the object of the application is merely to protract the proceedings, the court should reject the application. If the evidence sought to be produced is an electronic record, the court may also listen to the recording before granting or rejecting the application.” It is a case where the plaintiff could not know about the document sought to be produced even despite due diligence. He has set up an acceptable plea that he only came to know about the documents from the cross-examination of DW.4 Sushil Kumar and during his cross-examination which the defendants had denied earlier. The petitioner could not anticipate that he could get the clue about evidence sought to be produced through DW.4 Sushil Kumar and it was only during his cross examination, the plaintiff came to know that much of the sugar was picked up by the defendant Sushil Kumar (proprietor of the defendant firm) through Madan Lal. The documents show the transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant Sushil Kumar or through his agent, which is certainly material and relevant for just disposal of the suit and only after proving the payment and transactions on the basis of the aforesaid documents, the plaintiff could claim rendition of accounts and interest on the delayed payment. The documents show the transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant Sushil Kumar or through his agent, which is certainly material and relevant for just disposal of the suit and only after proving the payment and transactions on the basis of the aforesaid documents, the plaintiff could claim rendition of accounts and interest on the delayed payment. As such, observations made by the trial court appear to be not correct where it was observed that these documents did not relate to the controversy in question, particularly in the light of the fact that the High Court has observed that the documents are relevant but it declined on the ground that the same could not be permitted in rebuttal and the plaintiff should have applied for leading additional evidence. It is also pertinent to mention here that the plaintiff on coming to know about such evidence led the same evidence in other cases i.e. Shahabad Sugar Mills Vs. Markanda and Shahabad Sugar Mills Vs. Saraswati Traders. Had these not been relevant to the controversy then the court should not have allowed these documents to be produced in other cases also. Since the plaintiff came to know late that Madan Lal had received the cheque on behalf of Sushil Kumar and he has been receiving the sugar and making the transaction on behalf of defendants, Sushil Kumar, the occasion to move the application for additional evidence arose. The trial court appears to have moved by just emotions while declining the application on the ground of delay as the cause of justice cannot be sacrificed merely on the ground of delay but the court should have focussed mainly on the real justice to be imparted to the parties, particularly when the delay is not purely attributable to the petitioner. As such, the impugned order needs interference. Resultantly, I allow this petition, set aside the impugned order and permit the petitioner to lead additional evidence, subject to payment of 10,000/- as costs. However, it is directed that the plaintiff/petitioner would conclude his entire evidence within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. As such, the impugned order needs interference. Resultantly, I allow this petition, set aside the impugned order and permit the petitioner to lead additional evidence, subject to payment of 10,000/- as costs. However, it is directed that the plaintiff/petitioner would conclude his entire evidence within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is further made clear that the defendants would be at liberty to lead any evidence in rebuttal to the aforesaid evidence and conclude their evidence within two months from the date the plaintiff concludes his evidence and the trial court would conclude the trial within eight months positively.