JUDGMENT Arun Chandra Upadhyay, J. 1. Accused-appellant has filed this appeal, under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (in short, "NIA Act'), against the order, dated 13.09.2011, passed by the learned Special Judge, NIA, Assam, Guwahati, in Misc. Bail Application No. 24/2011, in connection with Special NIA Case No. 1/2010, under Sections 16/17/18/20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (in short, 'UA(P) Act'), arising out of Noonmati Police Station Case No. 159/2010 registered under Section 120(B)/121/121(A)/122 of IPC, read with Section 10/13 of UA(P) Act, whereby the prayer of the accused-appellant, Oinam Moniton Singha, to allow him to go, on bait, was rejected. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The appellant was arrested, on 8.9.2010, in connection with the afore-noted case and he has been in jail custody for nearly two years. On earlier occasion, the appellant had filed a bail application, which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 2/2010. However, by order, dated 07.10.2010, the said bail application was rejected by the learned Special Judge, NIA. Against the said order, dated 7.10.2010, the appellant preferred an appeal before this Court, which came to be registered as Crl. Appeal No. 162/2010. The appeal was rejected by this Court by order, dated 08.11.2010. 2. On 14.02.2011, the National Investigating Agency submitted its charge-sheet in NIA Case No. 1/2010. All necessary papers and relevant documents, relied upon by the prosecution, were supplied to the accused on 07.03.2011. Thereafter, the appellant filed a fresh application before the learned Special Judge, NIA, which came to be registered as Bail Application No. 24/2011. However, by order, dated 13.09.2011, the learned Special Judge, NIA, rejected the said bail application and it is against this order of denial of bail that the appellant has preferred the present Appeal. 3. It may also be indicated herein that during the pendency of the present appeal, the NIA has further submitted, in the month of February, 2012, a supplementary charge-sheet in the aforesaid case. 4. 3. It may also be indicated herein that during the pendency of the present appeal, the NIA has further submitted, in the month of February, 2012, a supplementary charge-sheet in the aforesaid case. 4. The facts, as disclosed during investigation of the case and as projected by the prosecution, may be stated as follows:- (i) The case, which has led to filing of the present appeal, is registered against the members of a proscribed terrorist outfit, namely, United Liberation front (hereinafter referred as 'UNLF'), involved in criminal conspiracy to wage war against India by indulging in fund raising and heinous terrorist acts threatening the unity, integrity, security and sovereignty of India by striking terror by causing death and injury to people, loss, damage and destruction of property, both private and public. (ii) The UNLF is declared as a terrorist organization in terms of the Schedule to the UA(P) Act 1967 as amended by Act 35 of 2008. (iii) The UNLF, as a terrorist organization, is involved, in Manipur, in several violent incidents of maiming, murder, kidnapping, weapon-snatching, extortion and so on. During the course of investigation, details of 149 violent incidents, committed by UNLF, were obtained from the lawful retrieval of e-mail communications of the accused persons. Moreover, further FIRs, relating to 29 cases of the 149 incidents mentioned above, have been obtained, which have established that the members of UNLF have been indulging in terrorist acts in pursuance of UNLFs stated objective of fighting the Indian State. (iv) The UNLF, as a terrorist organization, collects funds for its terrorist activities from public functionaries, Governments servants working in various departments including, but not limited to, Public Works Department. Flood Control Department, Food Corporation of India, etc. The UNLF forces them to part with a percentage of food grains as well as government money by threatening to kill them and thus, indulges in extortion. UNLF also overawes, by means of criminal force and show of criminal force, such as, throwing of grenades at public servants and their residential premises. UNLF indulges in causing death and injuries to persons. Thus, UNLF indulges in extortion of money from the government servants by putting them under threat of death. (v) UNLF prepares budgets listing various sources of revenue. Generally, the sources of funds are extortion from Central Govt. developments funds, FCI, Food and Civil Supply Department and Flood Control Department of Manipur. UNLF indulges in causing death and injuries to persons. Thus, UNLF indulges in extortion of money from the government servants by putting them under threat of death. (v) UNLF prepares budgets listing various sources of revenue. Generally, the sources of funds are extortion from Central Govt. developments funds, FCI, Food and Civil Supply Department and Flood Control Department of Manipur. UNLF is involved in extortion of funds from the transporters, operating in Manipur, by threatening to bum down the buses and harming the operators physically thereby leading to disruption of supply and services. UNLF has also been involved in collecting 5% of the rice, which is meant to be sold to poor people on highly subsidized rate in Manipur. (vi) UNLF has been involved in procuring highly sophisticated weapons to wage war against India. Materials exist on record to show that UNLF has been trying to purchase, and has actually purchased, sophisticated weapons including, but not limited to, AFC 47 Rifles, M16 Rifles and so on from foreign countries. UNLF has raised armed cadres, in the state of Manipur as well as in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, in tune with that of the Indian army. The UNLF cadres are equipped with highly sophisticated weapons procured from foreign countries. (vii) Towards the execution of such conspiracy, as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the top echelons of UNLF, in order to conveniently carry out their activities, selected Guwahati city as their operational base, because the city provided reasonable anonymity and security to the cadres of UNLF. The funds, thus, raised through extortions, in Manipur, were brought to Guwahati through human couriers and, then, sent to countries like the Republic of Nepal, the People's Republic of Bangladesh, and the Republic of Union of Myanmar and so on for the UNLF cadres and their agents based therein and, in pursuance of the said conspiracy, the accused persons, including the present appellant, extensively used internet connection, mobile phones and, in some cases, satellite phones too. (viii) In the present case, sufficient oral and documentary materials exist including, but not limited to, lawfully retrieved e-mails, call detail analysis and documents pertaining to different bank transactions of the said proscribed terrorist outfit. CFSL reports about the material objects, seized from the accused persons, provide incontrovertible evidence to substantiate the criminal conspiracy of the UNLF as aforementioned. (viii) In the present case, sufficient oral and documentary materials exist including, but not limited to, lawfully retrieved e-mails, call detail analysis and documents pertaining to different bank transactions of the said proscribed terrorist outfit. CFSL reports about the material objects, seized from the accused persons, provide incontrovertible evidence to substantiate the criminal conspiracy of the UNLF as aforementioned. The material objects seized, especially, the Indian currency seized from the aforementioned accused persons have been found to be illegally collected towards the proceeds for the ongoing conspiracy of waging war against the country. (ix) In pursuance of the said conspiracy, materials have been brought on record from the lawful retrieval of the e-mails, which reveal (a) Inter-linkages amongst the accused persons (b) A detailed account of the budget proposals and extortions made at the behest of UNLF (c) Visit to China to procure arms (d) Violence committed, and directed to be committed, by UNLF (e) Efforts made to release the arrested accused persons. (f) Details of the bank accounts in India and abroad (g) Conversion of Indian currency into US dollars (h) Names and photographs of arrested accused persons in combat uniforms and weapons, and (i) Details of immovable and movable assets raised from the proceeds of the funds collected through extortion. 5. The accusations against the appellant are contained in paragraph 17.29 of the charge-sheet, which are as follows- (i) The appellant, in the garb of a member of student organization, namely, North-East Manipuri Students Union (NEMSU), which was being run and funded by UNLF, had received funds, extorted by UNLF, to carry out activities, such as, disruption of supply to the community and blockade of NH-39 thereby threatening the unity, integrity and sovereignty of India; (ii) The appellant's name has been discussed in the e-mails exchanged between Moirangthem Joy Singh @ Joyjao @ Nongyai @ Nilachandra (A-18) and Raj Kumar Meghan @ Sanayaima (A-19). (iii) The appellant, in association with Ningombam Dilip Singh @ Ibochou @ Mani (A-16), in particular, and with other co-conspirator arrested, in general, received funds to carry out the anti-national activities by threatening the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the country. 6. (iii) The appellant, in association with Ningombam Dilip Singh @ Ibochou @ Mani (A-16), in particular, and with other co-conspirator arrested, in general, received funds to carry out the anti-national activities by threatening the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the country. 6. In order to substantiate the aforesaid allegations, apart from other materials, the NIA has also relied upon statements of the following witnesses namely:- P.W. 2-S.I. Someshwar Dutta, Noonmati P.S. P.W. 21-Akshay Kumar Das, Landlord of appellant P.W. 22-Chandra Kakoti, tenant of PW 21 and P.W. 23 - Hari Prasad Karmakar, tenant of PW 21. 7. Someshwar Dutta (PW 2), who was a Sub-Inspector of Noonmati P.S., at the relevant point of time, stated that a team, led by S.I. Jyoti Mili of Dispur Police Station, raided, on 08.09.2010, the house of PW 21, wherein the appellant resided, as tenant, and seized several articles including laptop, SIM cards, handycam, etc., by Dispur PS GDE No. 430, dated 08.09.2010 (D-29). 8. Ws. 21, 22 and 23, who are the landlord and co-tenants of the appellant, have stated, in their statements, under Section 161 Cr.P.C., that, on 20.08.2010, in the late evening, the police raided the rented house of the appellant and made enquiries from the appellant during which the appellant allegedly confessed that he is an active member of banned organization UNLF of Manipur and holding a post in the organization. ARGUMENTS 9. It has been submitted, on behalf of the appellant, that the NIA has relied upon the statement of PW 40, PW 44 and PW 54 to link the appellant with the activities of the UNLF falsely alleging therein that the appellant is an active member of UNLF, though the allegation that the appellant is an active member of UNLF is based on conjectures and surmises and not on evidence. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the NIA, having realized that there is total lack of evidence to implicate the appellant with the UNLF, forced P.W. 105, Sri Lourembam Surendar Singh, President of AMSU, to give statement against the appellant 11. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the NIA, having realized that there is total lack of evidence to implicate the appellant with the UNLF, forced P.W. 105, Sri Lourembam Surendar Singh, President of AMSU, to give statement against the appellant 11. It has been pointed out, on behalf of the appellant, that the NIA has stated that AAMSU is the frontal organization of UNLF and, therefore, PW 105, being its President, ought to have also been made an accused or an approver on the basis of the aforesaid statement made by him that AAMSU was receiving money from UNLF, but PW 1 has been left out in order to use him against the present appellant. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has disputed the allegation of attributing certain electronic communications to the appellant pointing out the discrepancy in the seizure of laptop. 13. It has been submitted, on behalf of the appellant, that there is no material on record to suggest that appellant, directly or indirectly, raised or collected funds for any activity of the UNLF. On the contrary, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the NIA has falsely alleged that the appellant, being the President of NEMSO, was the recipient of funds from the UNLF. Therefore, even assuming that the e-mails indicating financial transactions between the UNLF and the appellant are true, these do not relate to funds collected or raised by the appellant or provided by him to any person for the commission of any terrorist act. 14. Referring to the decision of this Court, in the case of co-accused S. Rakesh Singh (Crl App No. 146/2011), learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that mere entry, in the statement of account of UNLF, by itself, cannot be held to be an adequate evidence on which conviction of the appellant can be based. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that NIA has miserably failed to establish that the appellant is an active member of UNLF in order to implicate and convict the appellant under Section 20 of the UA(P) Act. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that Smti. M. Longdhoni Devi and S. Rakesh Singh, who were similarly held as active members of UNLF, have already been extended the privilege of regular bail by this Court. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that Smti. M. Longdhoni Devi and S. Rakesh Singh, who were similarly held as active members of UNLF, have already been extended the privilege of regular bail by this Court. 15. In reply to the submissions, made on behalf of the appellant, learned Standing counsel, NIA, submits that UNLF is a declared terrorist organization in terms of the Schedule of the UA(P) Act and the appellant is an active member of the said organization. It has been submitted, on behalf of the NIA, that the investigation reveals that United National Liberation Front, (hereinafter called the UNLF), is involved in criminal conspiracy to wage war against India by indulging in fund raising and heinous terrorist acts, threatening the unity, integrity, security and sovereignty of India by striking terror, causing, thus, death, injury, loss, damage and destruction of properties. 16. It has been pointed out, on behalf of the NIA, that the UNLF, as a terrorist organization, is involved in several violent incidents of maiming, murder, kidnapping, weapon snatching, extortion and so on in Manipur. During the course of investigation of the instant case, details of 149 violent incidents, as committed by UNLF, were obtained from the lawful retrieval of the e-mail communications of the accused persons and, further, FIRs, relating to 29 cases of the 149 incidents mentioned hereinbefore, have been obtained, which establish that the members of UNLF have been indulging in terrorist acts in pursuance of UNLFs stated objectives of fighting the Indian State. The statement of PW 44 and D-21 as well as D-65 corroborate the facts so indicated. 17. By referring to the documents and papers relied upon by the prosecution, it has been submitted, on behalf of the NIA, that the UNLF, as a terrorist organization, collects funds for its terrorist activities from public functionaries, Government servants of various departments including, but not limited to, Public Work Department, Flood Control Department and Food Corporation of India. The UNLF forces them to part with a percentage of food grains as well as government money by treatment to kill and, thus, indulges in extortion. UNLF also overawes, by means of criminal force and show of criminal force, such as, throwing of grenades at public servants and their residential premises. UNLF indulges in causing death and injuries to several persons. UNLF also overawes, by means of criminal force and show of criminal force, such as, throwing of grenades at public servants and their residential premises. UNLF indulges in causing death and injuries to several persons. UNLF has as armed wing named as Manipur People's Army (MPA) and as per the evidence collected so far, this armed wing of UNLF has killed hundreds of people and injured many more. UNLF is also involved in extortion of money from the government servants by putting them under the threat of death. 18. Referring to the statements of P.W. 34, 39, 41, 56, 57 and the documents in E. 64 (2 and 3), E. 72 (2 to 18), learned standing counsel, NIA, has submitted that the UNLF, for carrying out their activities, prepared yearly budget raising various sources of revenue and the sources of funds included extortion from Central Govt. departments, State Govt. departments, businessmen and professionals so as to help UNLF procure highly sophisticated weapons to wage war against the Govt. and to terrorize the people. 19. Referring to the above materials, it has been submitted, on behalf of the NIA, that UNLF purchased AK 47, M16 rifles, etc, from foreign countries. Over and above, it also raised armed cadres in the state of Manipur as well as in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in tune with that of the Indian army. The UNLF cadres are equipped with highly sophisticated weapons procured from foreign countries. Such facts stand well established from the Document E-13(3), e-mails and the statements of PW 44 and 45. 20. It has been contended, on behalf of NIA, that the above activities of UNLF has established as to how, over the years, systematic extortion of funds from different Central and State govt. schemes were carried out and used for terrorist activities. 21. Referring to the above documents, learned counsel for the NIA has also pointed out that investigation has established as to how UNLF has been raising arms; the manner in which the UNLF distributed weapons for terrorist acts to its cadres recruited for the purpose and for waging war against the nation. 21. Referring to the above documents, learned counsel for the NIA has also pointed out that investigation has established as to how UNLF has been raising arms; the manner in which the UNLF distributed weapons for terrorist acts to its cadres recruited for the purpose and for waging war against the nation. Referring to the statements of PWs 2, 22, 23 together with D-28, D-29, learned standing counsel, NIA, contended that the materials so found show that the appellant is an active member of the terrorist organization, UNLF, in the garb of students' organization like NEMSO and AAMSU to run the activities of the UNLF and the appellant is, thus, an integral part of the conspiracy hatched by the UNLF to wage war against the State and to commit terrorist acts. 22. The NIA has alleged that the appellant, at the behest of UNLF and with close proximity of UNLF top echelons, fully committed to render his services for the outfit and his services were being utilized by the outfit as mouthpiece to garner and mobilize mass support through media outlets and systemic campaigning using the platform of frontal organizations, such as, AMSU (All Manipuri Students Union) and NEMSO (North East Manipuri Student Organization) working over ground as white collar gentlemen. 23. It has been pointed out, on behalf of the NIA, that during investigation, it came to light that the appellant acted as perpetrator in mobilizing support and induction of innocent (Meitei) community for UNLF outfit in persuasion of various vicious plans organizing meetings, at secret places, with top leaders of the outfit. 24. With reference to the ground taken in para (ii), it is submitted that in April 2010, a stretch of NH-39 (NH 39 starts from Numuligarh, Assam runs through Dimapur-Kohima-Imphal and ends at Moreh), which connects Dimapur with Imphal, was blocked by Naga Groups, resulting in restriction of goods transportation to Imphal via Dimapur. Initially this economic blockade continued for 68 days. The UNLF, with their aim and object of secession of Manipur from India, utilized the situation by creating an anti-India atmosphere, in Manipur, by convincing the general public of Manipuri people that the Indian Union has had been neglecting the needs and necessities of the Manipuri people. Initially this economic blockade continued for 68 days. The UNLF, with their aim and object of secession of Manipur from India, utilized the situation by creating an anti-India atmosphere, in Manipur, by convincing the general public of Manipuri people that the Indian Union has had been neglecting the needs and necessities of the Manipuri people. The UNLF, in order to provoke the anti Naga as well as anti India sentiments, in the minds of general public of Manipur, started its campaign through its Frontal Organizations, such as, AMSU and NEMSU. 25. UNLF gave its Frontal Organizations, especially, AMSU and NEMSO, a twofold task on the issue of NH 39 blockade; first, for conducting Public Meetings, Demonstrations, Protest March, etc., and second, for disruptive and violent activities. 26. It has been pointed out, on behalf of the NIA, that the UNLF wanted to block the starting stretch of NH 39 (i.e. from Numuligarh, Assam, to Dimapur), so that the supply of goods to the State of Nagaland from Assam side is stopped. For this purpose, they activated their Frontal Organizations, Students Unions and NGOs. This is evident from the documents lawfully recovered from e-mail accounts of R.K. Meghen (A 19) and Nongyai (A 18) based on their disclosure statements. In one such e-mail, Chairman of the UNLF, Meghen (A 19), clearly writes to the organizational Secretary, Nongyai (A 18), that: When we have decided that no truck should run in NH 39, then how come some drivers are running their truck. Tell AAMSU (All Assam Manipuri Students' Union) to bum down 1 or 2 trucks so that no one dares to run the truck that side and the incident of Ardonmust get and effective media coverage. In response to this letter Nongyai (A 18) writes that I will tell AAMSU to burn down 1 or 2 truck of non-Manipuri's of Assam side of NH 39. Copy of the email E-98 will show the above. Copy of the email E-98 would support the above fact. (Emphasis is supplied) 27. It has been pointed out by the prosecution that subsequently, trucks were burnt on NH 39 during the aforesaid period in due compliance of the above directions. ROLE OF THE APPELLANT (a) Membership of UNLF, a terrorist organization 28. Copy of the email E-98 would support the above fact. (Emphasis is supplied) 27. It has been pointed out by the prosecution that subsequently, trucks were burnt on NH 39 during the aforesaid period in due compliance of the above directions. ROLE OF THE APPELLANT (a) Membership of UNLF, a terrorist organization 28. Facts, as prima facie revealed from the prosecution case, by producing the statement of the witnesses, the documents [E. 13(3)] and the lawful retrieval of e-mails recovered, coupled with the statement of P.W. 44 and 45, support that UNLF was collecting funds by resorting to various extortion activities and such funds were collected not only from private individuals, but also from transporters, businessmen, Central and State Govt. Departments. By producing the documents [E. 64 (2 and 3] and E. 72 (2 to 18), the lawful retrieval of e-mails, NIA has prima facie shown the visits of its cadres to China to procure arms and violent activities carried out by UNLF. The scrutiny of e-mails, prima facie, provides materials to substantiate that UNLF waging war against the Nation. 29. That the above activities prima-facie establish as to how UNLF has, over the years, systematically extorted funds from different central and State government sponsored schemes and used them for terrorist activities. It is also seen as to how in order to procure arms and ammunitions from the neighboring countries, UNLF had established contacts with foreign agents. It would further transpire as to how UNLF, as a part of its ongoing conspiracy, had struck deal with foreign agents to provide information on India's missile technologies. Apparently, the investigation has depicted as to how UNLF had raised funds, distributed the "proceeds of terrorism" amongst its cadres, recruited and trained its manpower in the State of Manipur and outside for waging war against the country. As revealed by the prosecution, the activities of UNLF, pertaining to the aforementioned activities, have become a major challenge to the sovereignty and security of India. 30. In any view of the matter, the fact that UNLF is a scheduled terrorist organization has not been disputed before us. This relieves the Court from making a threadbare inquiry into the activities of the UNLF, because commission of terrorist activities, in an organized manner, is a condition precedent for declaring an organization as a terrorist organization as envisaged by the provisions of Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act. 31. This relieves the Court from making a threadbare inquiry into the activities of the UNLF, because commission of terrorist activities, in an organized manner, is a condition precedent for declaring an organization as a terrorist organization as envisaged by the provisions of Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act. 31. Coming to the statement of witnesses, we find that the statement of PW 105, Sri Lourembam Surendar Singh, prima facie, shows that the appellant used to muster funds from UNLF. The statement, in brief, reads as follows: On being asked, I say knew that Man item was linked with ULNLF and has been receiving money from UNLF for student activities, but as we had no other fixed source of funding for Union's activities, we had no other choice except ignoring this fact. Maniton requested me more than once to organize protest to counter economic blockade on NH-39 which was done by NSCN (IM). Initially I refused but as he was fully funding this, I presented a memorandum for Prime Minister of India through Dy Commissioner of Cacher District after organizing a peace rally. Later on I came to know that this instruction was given to him by UNLF. In September 2010, he was arrested by Assam Police and subsequently by NIA as a member of UNLF. I have produced photocopy of the abovementioned memorandum and relevant budgets submitted to Moniton for sanction, to NIA. 32. Though it has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the statement of PW 105 has been obtained in a mala fide manner and that he could not have been possibly cited as a witness, the fact remains a fact that, as on today, there exists, on record, a statement of a person, cited as witness, who has stated that the appellant used to receive funds from UNLF and it was under the instructions of UNLF that activities, like economic blockade, were carried out. 33. The appellant, by his act of inviting and ensuring support for economic blockade, under the instructions of UNLF, committed acts in order to counter the constitutional scheme of governance in India and, until shown otherwise, the appellant's acts, in the manner as have been done to further the activities of UNLF, threaten the very sovereignty and integrity of India 34. The appellant, by his act of inviting and ensuring support for economic blockade, under the instructions of UNLF, committed acts in order to counter the constitutional scheme of governance in India and, until shown otherwise, the appellant's acts, in the manner as have been done to further the activities of UNLF, threaten the very sovereignty and integrity of India 34. It has also been argued by the teamed counsel for the appellant, as pointed out above, that the there are no materials to justify that the appellant was an active member of UNLF. 35. The question of active membership, as argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant, also arose in the case of Anup Bhuyan, Criminal Appeal No. 889 of 2007, but the ratio of the said case, decided by the Supreme Court, may not be applicable to the present set of facts, because the case of Anup Bhuyan (supra) dealt with membership of a terrorist organization under Section 3(5) of the TADA Act, wherein the term 'membership' was not defined; whereas the term 'membership' has been defined in the present UA(P) Act. The appellant, having alleged to have committed an offence under the UA(P) Act, the term membership must be understood in the light of the definition of 'member' as provided under Section 38 of the UA(P) Act. 36. Section 38 of the UA(P) Act provides the following definition; (1) A person, who associates himself, or professes to be associated, with a terrorist organisation with intention to further its activities, commits an offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation: Provided that this sub-section shall not apply where the person charged is able to prove- (a) that the organisation was not declared as a terrorist organisation at the time when he became a member or began to profess to be a member, and (b) that he has not taken part in the activities of the organisation at any time during its inclusion in the Schedule as a terrorist organisation. (2) A person, who commits the offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation under sub-section (1), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or with fine, or with both. 37. Section 3(5) of the TADA Act simply provided punishment for being member of a terrorist organization or a terrorist gang. The definition, under TADA Act, thus, necessitated judicial interpretation of the term 'member'. 37. Section 3(5) of the TADA Act simply provided punishment for being member of a terrorist organization or a terrorist gang. The definition, under TADA Act, thus, necessitated judicial interpretation of the term 'member'. So far as membership of a terrorist organisation, under the UA(P) Act is concerned, Section 38, now, provides that if a person associates himself, or professes to be associated, with a terrorist organisation with intention to further its activities, he becomes a 'member' of the terrorist organisation. The discerning feature lies in the terms associates himself, or professes to be associated. Section 38, on a bare reading, conceives two different categories of persons, who can be termed as members. Firstly, those, who associate themselves with such an organization and, secondly, those, who profess to be associated with such an organization. 38. Thus, even a person, who is an ideologue of a terrorist organisation and distributes literatures and pamphlets to publicise the activities of such an organization with intention to further the activities of such an organization, can be termed as a member. It is not conceivable that, in order to attract the label of member, under Section 38, a person shall be actually involved in carrying out terrorist activities. 39. Naturally, therefore, if a person, such as, the present appellant, associated himself in the activities of a terrorist organization, such as, the UNLF, with the intention to future its cause with the help of its frontal organization, such as, AMSU, indulged in economic blockade in terms of e-mail, which is mentioned above, cannot, but be described, under Section 38 of the UA(P) Act, as a member of a terrorist organization. 40. In the present case, when there is evidence of even one witness to show that the appellant used to receive funds from the UNLF to carry out activities, as directed by the UNLF, under the colour of student activities, and the statement, coming from one of the office bearers of the frontal organization, in this regard, cannot, at this stage, be questioned. In other words, the statement, which has come from the office bearer of AMSU, has to be assumed as true until shown otherwise. In other words, the statement, which has come from the office bearer of AMSU, has to be assumed as true until shown otherwise. Thus, there being materials to justify that the appellant used to receive funds from UNLF and the funds, so received by the appellant, were spent for furthering the activities of the UNLF, the appellant cannot but be regarded as an active member of the said terrorist organization. 41. The materials, including the retrieved e-mails, collected during investigation, also show, until proved otherwise, that budget was allocated to the members of different organizations, such as, AAMSU and NEMSU, and the appellant, as the President of NEMSU, received huge amount of money to take up such activities as directed by the UNLF from time to time. 42. Thus, an inference, though tentative, can be drawn that the appellant is a member of UNLF, which is an offence punishable under Section 38 of the UA(P) Act, falling under Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act. (b) Conspiracy with UNLF 43. According to the prosecution's case, the top echelons of UNLF, for the fulfillment of conspiracy and in order to conveniently carry out their activities, selected Guwahati city as safe and secure place. The funds, raised in Manipur by extortion, were brought to Guwahati by human couriers and sent to Republic of Nepal, Republic of Bangladesh and Republic of Myanmar for UNLF. The present appellant was arrested, on 08-9-10, from a rented house, at Hastinapur, Narayanpur, House No-3, Dispur. When search was made by the Assam police, many suspicious articles had been seized from the possession of the accused like - (i). One Accer Laptop, (ii). One Spice Mobile Hans Set, (iii). One Aircel SIM card, (iv). Two Nos. of Airtel SIM and one Vodafone SIM, (v). One Maxter 80GB Hard Disk, (vi). One Panasonic Handy Cam, (vii). One Sony Digital Camera, (viii). Two Nos. of CDs (ix). One Battery Charger with Sony Digital Camera Battery etc. This has been stated by PW-21, Sri Akshay Kumar Das, a retired Assistant Engineer, Hastinapur, Narayanpur of Dispur. He is the landlord of the house from where the present appellant was arrested by the Assam Police. The relevant portion of the statement of PW-21 are as follows.- It is fact that on 8 Sept 2010 at late night, local police raided the rented room of in possession of Sh. Moniton Singha of my house. He is the landlord of the house from where the present appellant was arrested by the Assam Police. The relevant portion of the statement of PW-21 are as follows.- It is fact that on 8 Sept 2010 at late night, local police raided the rented room of in possession of Sh. Moniton Singha of my house. During that time myself and other tenant were present at our respective rooms. In front of us police officers made enquiries from Moniton Singha during which he revealed that he is a active member of banned organization UNLF of Monipur and holding the post in the organization. Thereafter police officers requested myself and one tenant namely Chandrajyoti Kakaty to witness the search of room of in possession on Moniton Singha. 44. We may pause here to point out that though the confession, made by the accused-appellant, to the police, in the presence of PW 21, was not admissible in evidence, it was, nonetheless, an important piece of material for further investigation of the case and, consequently, the statement, so made, which provided the lead, could not have been ignored or brushed aside, while considering the bail application by the learned trial Court. 45. The Interim Forensic Report, as mentioned, has volume of data pertaining to UNLF and has been retrieved from the seized electronic items. The Statements of PW-21, 22, and 23, D-28, the Arrest and Inspection Memo and D-29, Seizure list of Recovery, prima facie lend credence to the above. 46. So far as the offence of conspiracy under the UA(P), Act is concerned, the relevant provisions underwent some amendments in the year 2004 and in the year 2008. The changes brought with respect to offence of conspiracy are as follows: CHANGES IN THE OFFENCE RELATING TO CONSPIRACY ETC. TO COMMIT TERRORIST ACT 47. Under the Act of 2004, Section 18 read as under: 18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc.-Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 48. 48. Placing reading of Section 18 of the Act of 2004 makes it clear that not only conspiracy to commit terrorist act is made punishable, but attempting, advocating, abetting, advising, inciting the commission of a terrorist act is also made punishable. It also goes further by adding the term knowledge. Thus, it is not necessary that the person must intend to aid a terrorist act in order to be held liable for an offence under Section 18 of the Act of 2004; it would be sufficient, for the purpose of attracting the penal provisions of Section 18, if the prosecution is able to prove that an accused had the knowledge that his act or omission would facilitate the commission of a terrorist act. 49. Now, Section 18, as it stood in the Act of 2004, has been modified, by the UA(P) Act, 2008, by substituting, in place of the words "incites or knowingly facilitates", the words "incites, directs or knowingly facilitates". This becomes clear, when we read Section 18 as stands amended in the UA(P) Act, 2008. Section 18 is, therefore, reproduced below: 18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc.-Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directs or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 50. A bare reading of Section 18 shows that though punishment, under Section 18, remains unchanged. Section 18 makes not only the person, who conspires or attempts to commit or advocates, abets, advises commission of a terrorist act or of any act preparatory to the commission of the terrorist act, but also when the person concerned incites, directs or knowingly facilitates commission of a terrorist act or any act, preparatory to the commission of terrorist act, meaning thereby that the person would fall within the ambit of Section 18 if he directs an act, which would facilitate not only commission of a terrorist act, but also an act, which is preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act. Thus, the scope of the nature of conspiracy has been widened by including those persons, who direct an act, which may be, otherwise, irrelevant, but is connected to either a terrorist act or an act, which is preparatory to the commission of terrorist act. To put it a little differently, the ambit of Section 18 has been widened and if the materials on record give rise to a reasonable ground to believe that an accused prima facie had the knowledge that his acts or omissions would facilitate a terrorist act, he would be liable for punishment under Section 18. 51. It does not appear necessary for sustaining a charge under Section 18 of the UA(P) Act that there must be direct allegations of committing a terrorist act, rather, if there exist circumstances that an accused committed an act, which was preparatory for the commission of terrorist act, the charge under Section 18 may be sustained. 52. In the present case, the basic allegation against the appellant is that he provided logistic over-ground support to UNLF with intention to further the activities of UNLF. The logistic support pertained to communications. The seizure of Laptop, Mobile Hand Set, SIM cards of different operators, 80GB Hard Disk, Handy Cam, Digital Camera, CDs, Battery Charger, Digital Camera Battery etc, otherwise appear to be items of general nature and no offence, ordinarily, can possibly be made out if a person is found to be possessing these items. However, the seizure of these items, from the possession of appellant, assumes immense significance, because of the information retrieved from these appliances. Exchange of communication is the most indispensable necessity for carrying out terrorist activities and, at the same time, most difficult hurdle for underground activists, since communications made, through electronic media, may be intercepted and subversive plans may get derailed. Thus, it becomes necessary, for underground activist, to exchange communication in a discreet manner and it is for this purpose such organizations have non-descript people, who appear to be naive and beyond suspicion. 53. Now, if the directions of the top brass of the UNLF had not reached the student organizations, of which the appellant was one of the office bearer, by electronic media, the burning of trucks, the economic blockade, the budgeting and all other terrorist activities could also, possibly, have failed. 53. Now, if the directions of the top brass of the UNLF had not reached the student organizations, of which the appellant was one of the office bearer, by electronic media, the burning of trucks, the economic blockade, the budgeting and all other terrorist activities could also, possibly, have failed. The appellant, who happened to be representing a student organization, fitted into the role of a naive character, in providing communication logistics to the UNLF. The materials against the appellant, prima facie, raise an inference that he, by providing logistic support, knowingly facilitated the commission of terrorist acts or acts preparatory to terrorist acts. 54. Even though the learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that there is a discrepancy with regard to the laptop seized from the possession of the appellant and the laptop, which was actually examined by the FSL. It is, in this regard, important to bear in mind that the inquiry, on these aspects, can be undertaken, while considering the charges against the appellant, for, this Court, while sitting as an appellate Court, if records a conclusive finding on the seizure, there is every likelihood of causing prejudice to either side. Hence, it would not be proper to record a finding on such an aspect of the case. 55. Thus, the evidence, gathered during investigation prima-facie reveal the connection of the appellant with the UNLF to provide active over-ground support for carrying out the activities of the UNLF. The materials, which prima facie appear to be true, thus, go to show that the appellant associated himself, or professed to associate himself, with terrorist organization, UNLF, in the garb of student organizations like AMESO and NEMSO and actually furthered the activities of terrorist organization, UNLF. A perusal of the documents, submitted along with the charge sheet, would show that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accusations against the appellant are prima facie true. LIMITATIONS ON GRANTING BAIL FOR OFFENCES, WHICH FALL UNDER CHAPTER IV AND VI OF UA(P) ACT? POSITION OF LAW AS ALREADY LAID BY THIS COURT: 56. What, now, needs to be noted is that this Court has held, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh Vs. LIMITATIONS ON GRANTING BAIL FOR OFFENCES, WHICH FALL UNDER CHAPTER IV AND VI OF UA(P) ACT? POSITION OF LAW AS ALREADY LAID BY THIS COURT: 56. What, now, needs to be noted is that this Court has held, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2010 (4) GLT 1, that Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, when considers a bail application, the consideration is really under Section 437 of the Code, which is, ordinarily, meant for Judicial Magistrates, and the special power, which, otherwise, stands vested in a Sessions Court under Section 439 of the Code, does not apply to a Special Court, though even a Court of Session may be notified as a Special Court by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 11. This apart, this Court has held, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), that besides the limitations, which Section 437(1) imposes on the Magistrate's power to grant bail, in a case, where there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, there is yet another limitation, which is imposed, on the power of the Special Court, by the proviso to Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D of the UA(P) Act. 57. Let us, now, determine as to what limitations the Special Court ran, in the present case, in the matter of granting of bail to the accused-appellant. While considering this aspect, it needs to be noted that the appellant herein is accused of having committed offences under Sections 120(B)/121/121(A)/122 of the IPC, read with Sections 16/17/18/20 of the UA(P) Act. 58. Considering the fact that it is the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, which puts severe restrictions on the Special Court's power to grant bail, it is imperative to take note of what the proviso to Section 43D(5) conveys. 58. Considering the fact that it is the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, which puts severe restrictions on the Special Court's power to grant bail, it is imperative to take note of what the proviso to Section 43D(5) conveys. For the sake of clarity, Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D, which is of utmost importance, is reproduced below: (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. (Emphasis is added) 59. A bare reading of Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D shows that apart from the fact that Sub-Section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail by laying down that if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the A(P) Act, is prima facie true, such an accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. 60. Thus, if the Special Court, on perusal of the case diary, forms an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against an accused person, of the commission of offence or offences, under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI, is prima facie true, it will not remain within the powers of the Court to grant bail in such a case. 61. 61. The above position of law is further made clear by Sub-Section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in sub-Section (5), are 'in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grating of bail'. 62. The logical conclusion would, therefore, be that in a case, investigated by the NIA, when the Special Court forms an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Special Court would have no jurisdiction to grant bail to such an accused except as may be provided by law. In addition thereto, the Special Court shall also not be able to release an accused on bail if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences, under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, is prima facie true. 63. In the backdrop of Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1) of the Code, when one reverts to Section 43D(5), what surfaces is that the proviso to Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D, (which lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no person accused of an offence, punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the NIA Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true), can be treated to be, and can, by legal fiction, be read, as Clause (iii) of Section 437(1) of the Code. CONCEPT OF PROVISO TO SECTION 43D(5) 64. Dealing with the concept of the proviso to Section 43D(5), a Division Bench, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), observed and held as to what the expression prima facie and the expression true, which appear in the proviso to Section 43D(5), convey. The relevant observations, made in this regard, read as under: 63. CONCEPT OF PROVISO TO SECTION 43D(5) 64. Dealing with the concept of the proviso to Section 43D(5), a Division Bench, in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), observed and held as to what the expression prima facie and the expression true, which appear in the proviso to Section 43D(5), convey. The relevant observations, made in this regard, read as under: 63. Before proceeding further, it is also, to our mind, necessary to ascertain as to what the scope of the proviso to Section 43-D(5) is and when would this proviso be attracted. While dealing with this aspect of the appeal, it is necessary to bear in mind that the proviso to Section 43-D(5) states that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is 'prima facie true'. The expression, 'prima facie true' is an expression, which does not, ordinarily, appear in penal statutes. 64. Let us, therefore, ascertain as to what the word 'prima facie' means. The word, prima facie, has been described in the Black's Law Dictionary as: "sufficient to establish fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted". Rebuttable presumption means an inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence. Rebuttable resumption also means prima facie presumption or disputable presumption or conditional presumption. 65. The Concise Dictionary of Collins has defined, prima facie, as an adjective thus: "At first sight; as it seems at first." "And prima facie evidence is an evidence that is sufficient to establish a fact or to raise a presumption of the truth unless controverted." 66. Warton's Law Lexicon defines that a prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be established if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, are believed. 67. Warton's Law Lexicon defines that a prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be established if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, are believed. 67. The Supreme Court, in Marlin Burn Ltd. V.R.N. Banerjee, 1958 SCR 514 at p. 530 ( AIR 1958 SC 79 at p. 85), observed thus:"..........A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case, which can be said to be established if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out, the relevant consideration is whether, on the evidence led, it was possible to arrive at the conclusion, in question, and not whether that was the only conclusion, which could be arrived at on that evidence." 68. The meaning of the word, 'prima facie', given in Marlin Burn Ltd. (supra), has been followed by the Supreme Court, in its later decision, in The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. B. Dasappa, M.T. represented by the Binny Mills Labour Association, reported in (AIR 1960 SCC 1352). 69. From the meaning, attributed to the word, 'prima facie', by various dictionaries, as indicated above, and the observations, made by the Supreme Court, in its decisions, in The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills (supra), what clearly follows is that prima facie is a Latin word, which means, 'At first sight or glance or on its face' and, in common law, it is referred to as 'the first piece of evidence of fact', i.e., considered true unless revoked or contradicted. 70. In the face of the above observations made by the Supreme Court, it may be construed that prima facie case would mean whether the inference drawn is a possible inference or not. 71. The word, 'true', according to Collins Dictionary, means something, which is not false, fictional or illusory, but factual and confirming with reality or exactly in tune. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines True as: "Something, which is in accordance with fact or reality". 72. The word, 'true' has been defined, in World Book Dictionary, as "Agreeing with fact, not false". 73. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines True as: "Something, which is in accordance with fact or reality". 72. The word, 'true' has been defined, in World Book Dictionary, as "Agreeing with fact, not false". 73. Thus, the expression, 'prima facie true', would mean that the court shall undertake an exercise to determine as to whether the accusations, made against the accused, are inherently improbable and/or wholly unbelievable. Ordinarily, while considering a complaint made against an accused, the court assumes the contents of the complaint to be true and correct and, then, proceed to decide as to whether the allegations, made in the complaint, make out a case of commission of offence by the accused or not. No exercise is required to be undertaken by the court to determine the truthfulness or veracity of the accusations. However, when the word, 'prima facie', is coupled with the word, 'true', it implies that the court has to undertake an exercise of cross-checking the truthfulness of the allegations, made in the complaint, on the basis of the materials on record. If the court finds, on such analysis, that the accusations made are inherently improbable, or wholly unbelievable, it may be difficult to say that a case, which is prima facie true, has been made out. 74. The term 'true' would mean a proposition that the accusation brought against the accused person, on the face of the materials collected during investigation, is not false. The term false again would mean a proposition, the existence of which cannot be a reality. While arriving at a finding whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or false, the Court can only look into the materials collected during investigation; and, on its bare perusal, should come to a finding that the accusation is inherently improbable. However, while so arriving at a finding, the Court does not have the liberty to come to a conclusion, which may virtually amount to an acquittal of the accused. (Emphasis added) 75. In the case of State of Gujrat vs. Gadhvi Rambhai Nathabai, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 111 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the principles governing the granting of bail under the TADA, observed: 8. (Emphasis added) 75. In the case of State of Gujrat vs. Gadhvi Rambhai Nathabai, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 111 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the principles governing the granting of bail under the TADA, observed: 8. It is true that for the purpose of grant of bail, the framers of the Act require the Designated Court to be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accused concerned was not guilty of such offence but this power cannot be exercised for grant of bail in a manner which amounts virtually to an order of acquittal, giving benefit of doubt to the accused person after weighing the evidence collected during the investigation or produced before the court. At that stage the Designated Court is expected to apply its mind as to whether accepting the allegations made on behalf of the prosecution on their face, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused concerned was not guilty of the offence. At that stage the Designated Court is not required to weigh the material collected during the investigation. 76. In short, thus, on a bare reading of the materials, as may have been collected during investigation, if the Special Court finds that the materials, so collected, are sufficient to form, when assumed to be true, an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations, made against the accused, are prima facie true, the Special Court will be disempowered from releasing the accused on bail. At the stage of bail, no minute scrutiny or microscopic dis-Section of the materials, collected during investigation, shall be undertaken by the Special Court. Credibility or otherwise of the materials collected would not be the subject-matter of scrutiny. What, at best, the Special Court can do, and shall do, is to examine if the accusations made, on the basis of the materials collected, are wholly improbable. When the materials are, on examination by the Special Court, are found to be not wholly improbable and the Special Court finds, on assuming such materials to be true, that the accusations, made against an accused, as regards commission of an offence under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, are prima facie true, such materials would be enough to attract the bar imposed by the proviso to Section 43-D(5). 77. 77. To put it a little differently, the Special Court is required to examine the materials, collected during investigation, assuming the same to be true and if, such materials, on such examination and consideration, are found to make out a case against the accused, the Special Court has to determine if there is any such thing in the materials, so collected, which would make the case, which has been made out against the accused, as a wholly improbable case. If the Special Court, on undertaking such an exercise, finds reasonable grounds to infer that the case, which has been made out against the accused, is not wholly improbable, the case would be treated as a case, which is sufficient for the Special Court to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations, made against the accused, are prima facie true. 78. The expression, 'reasonable ground', means something more than prima facie ground, which contemplates a substantially probable case for believing that the accused is guilty of the offence(s) alleged. Under Section 437 CrPC, an accused is not to be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence, which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Under Section 437 CrPC, the burden is on the prosecution to show existence of reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty. Hence, the presumption of innocence, which always runs in favour of the accused, is displaced only on the prosecution showing existence of reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty. (See Union of India vs. Thamissharasi, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 190 , and Union of India vs. Shiv Shankar Kesari, reported in (2007) 7 SCC 798 ). 79. Coupled with the above, the proviso to Section 43-D(5) does not require a positive satisfaction by the court that the case against the accused is true. What is required is a mere formation of opinion by the court on the basis of the materials placed before it. The formation of opinion cannot be irrational or arbitrary. Such formation of opinion cannot be based on surmises and conjectures; but must rest on the materials collected against the accused. What is required is a mere formation of opinion by the court on the basis of the materials placed before it. The formation of opinion cannot be irrational or arbitrary. Such formation of opinion cannot be based on surmises and conjectures; but must rest on the materials collected against the accused. Since the presumption of innocence runs in favour of the accused, it logically follows that if there are, in given circumstances, grounds for believing that the case, against the accused, is true, a case of commission of offence under Chapter IV or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, 1967, can be said to have been made out and when such a case is made out, it would be tantamount to saying that reasonable grounds exist for opining that the accusations are prima facie true. In such a case, the bar, imposed by the proviso to Section 43-D(5) on the court's power to grant bail, gets attracted. 80. We may point out that Section 20(8) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 'the TADA Act') (since repealed), laid down that no person, accused of an offence punishable under the said Act, or any rule made thereunder, shall, if in custody, be released on bail, or on his own bond, unless, amongst others, the court is satisfied, where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence, while on bail. Section 20(9) of the Act made it clear that the limitation on granting of bail, specified in sub-Section (8) of Section 20, is in addition to the restrictions, which the Code of Criminal Procedure, or any other law, in force, imposes. 81. There are no corresponding provisions, in the NIA Act, as were present in Section 20(8) and Section 20(9) of the TADA Act. Notwithstanding, however, the fact that the provisions (as contained in sub-Section (8) and/or sub-Section (9) of Section 20 of the TADA Act) no longer find place in the NIA Act, the fact remains that even under the scheme of the NIA Act, the Special Court, as already discussed above, is a 'Court' other than the High Court and Court of Session. In such circumstances, the limitations, imposed by Clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-Section (1) of Section 437 CrPC, are applicable to the Special Court too. In addition thereto, when a case falls within the ambit of the proviso to Section 43-D(5), there would be an additional bar, on the part of the Special Court, to release an accused on bail, the bar being that the Special Court shall not release the accused on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are 'reasonable grounds' for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. (Emphasis added) 65. Thus, we find that in the facts of the present case, the learned Special Court, having found that the allegations against the appellant were prima facie true, could not have granted bail to the appellant, because of the specific prohibition in matters of granting bail provided under the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act. 66. In view of the findings of the learned Special Court, whether it is open to the High Court, while sitting as appellate Court, to disturb the finding arrived at by the Special Court and, if so, what is the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under the NIA Act is an important question, which, now, needs to be looked into. HIGH COURTS APPELLATE JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 21(4) OF THE NIA ACT VIS--VIS HIGH COURT'S POWER UNDER SECTION 439 OF THE CODE: 67. In the light of the law, laid down in Redaul Hussain Khan & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2009 (3) GLT 855, and Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), let us, now, note the difference between High Court's appellate jurisdiction under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act and the High Court's power under Section 439 of the Code. 68. The scheme of the NIA Act, if analysed carefully, shows that accused has to apply for bail, if he so chooses, to the Special Court and if his prayer for bail is refused by the Special Court, then and then only, the accused may prefer an appeal to the High Court in terms of Section 21(4) against an order refusing to grant bail. In other words, without having applied for bail and the prayer for bail having been disallowed by the Special Court, a person, who is accused of having committed a scheduled offence covered by the scheme of the NIA Act, cannot directly apply for bail to the High Court under Section 439(1) or prefer an appeal under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, against the Special Court's order rejecting his prayer for bail and seeking thereby an order of bail from the High Court Similarly, if the Special Court grants bail, the State may prefer an appeal to the High Court, in terms of Section 21(4), seeking cancellation of such bail. Hence, without applying for bail to the Special Court, an accused, who is arrested, cannot apply for bail to the High Court by taking recourse to Section 439 of the Code. 69. An order refusing or granting bail, in a case under the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act, 1987, too, was an appeallable order under Section 34 thereof. Explaining the parameters of the powers of the High Court, while considering an appeal from an order granting bail and how it differed from an application for bail under Section 439 of the Code, the Supreme Court, in State of Gujarat Vs. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh & Ors., reported in (2003) 8 SCC 50 , observed as under: 10. Sub-Section (4) of Section 34 of POTA provides for an appeal to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. Though the word "appear" is used both in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure and in many other statutes but it has not been defined anywhere. Over a period of time, it has acquired a definite connotation and meaning which is as under: A proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher authority, especially the submission of a lower court's decision to a higher court for review and possible reversal. An appeal, strictly so-called, is one in which the question is, whether the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was right on the material which the court had before it. An appeal is removal of the cause from an inferior to one of superior jurisdiction for the purposes of obtaining a review or retrial. An appeal, strictly so-called, is one in which the question is, whether the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was right on the material which the court had before it. An appeal is removal of the cause from an inferior to one of superior jurisdiction for the purposes of obtaining a review or retrial. An appeal, generally speaking, is a rehearing by a superior court on both law and fact. 11. Broadly speaking, therefore, an appeal is a proceeding taken to rectify an erroneous decision of a court by submitting the question to a higher court, and in view of the express language used in sub-Section (1) of Section 34 of POTA the appeal would lie both on facts and on law. Therefore even an order granting bail can be examined on merits by the High Court without any kind of fetters on its powers and it can come to an independent conclusion whether the accused deserves to be released on bail on the merits of the case. The considerations which are generally relevant in the matter of cancellation of bail under sub-Section (2) of Section 439 of the Code will not come in the way of the High Court in setting aside an order of the Special Court granting bail. It is, therefore, evident that the provisions of POTA are in clear contradistinction with that of the Code of Criminal Procedure where no appeal is provided against an order granting bail. The appeal can lie only against an order of the Special Court and unless there is an order of the Special Court refusing bail, the accused will have no right to file an appeal before the High Court praying for grant of bail to them. Existence of an order of the Special Court is, therefore, a sine qua non for approaching the High Court. 70. Referring to the above observations, made in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra), this Court, in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), held as under: 98. In the light of the observations made above, it becomes clear that an appeal is a proceeding to rectify an erroneous decision of a Court both on facts as well as on law. 70. Referring to the above observations, made in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra), this Court, in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), held as under: 98. In the light of the observations made above, it becomes clear that an appeal is a proceeding to rectify an erroneous decision of a Court both on facts as well as on law. An order, granting or refusing bail, could have been, in the light of the provisions of Section 34(4), examined on merit by the High Court without any other fetters and while considering a question of cancellation of bail the general principles, governing Section 439(2) of the Code, would not come in the way. The Apex Court, in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra), while laying down that the scheme for appeal, under the POTA, is in contradistinction to that of the Code, pointed out that an appeal can lie only against an order of the Special Court and unless there is an order of the Special Court refusing or granting bail, the accused cannot prefer appeal to the High Court seeking bail. What, further, follows from the above discussion is that even a High court could not have invoked its power, under the Section 439, to grant bail to a person, accused of an offence under the POTA. Consequently, in order to obtain release on bail, an accused person, arrested under the POTA, was required to, first, apply for bail to the Special court, where the Special Court was constituted, or to the Court of Session, where the Special Court was not constituted, and, if his application for bail was rejected, then and then only he could have preferred an appeal against the order refusing bail. Similarly, even the State could have preferred an appeal if the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, happened to grant bail to such an accused person in exercise of powers under Section 437 of the Code. 99. Though it was contended, in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra), that TADA had not taken away the High Court's power under Section 439, the Supreme Court, referring to Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), held that there was complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court, under the TADA, to entertain a bail application made under Section 439 and that this view was reiterated in State of Punjab Vs. Kewal Singh, reported in 1990 Supp SCC 147. Kewal Singh, reported in 1990 Supp SCC 147. The Apex Court concluded, at para 14, in Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh (supra), thus: 14. That apart, if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is accepted, it would mean that a person whose bail under POTA has been rejected by the Special Court will have two remedies and he can avail any one of them at his sweet will. He may move a bail application before the High Court under Section 439 CrPC in the original or concurrent jurisdiction, which may be heard by a Single Judge or may prefer an appeal under sub-Section (4) of Section 34 of POTA which would be heard by a Bench of two Judges. To interpret a statutory provision in such a manner that a court can exercise both appellate and original jurisdiction in respect of the same matter will lead to an incongruous situation. The contention is therefore fallacious. 71. We, therefore, in the light of the discussions held by this Court, in Redaul Hussain Khan & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Ors. reported in 2009 (3) GLT 855, agree with the views expressed therein that once the investigation, under the scheme of the NIA Act, is taken over by the NIA, it is the Special Court, which can authorize further detention of an arrested accused. When such an arrested accused applies for bail to the Special Court, the source of power to consider such an application for bail lies in Section 437 and not Section 439 of the Code. Even a High Court cannot invoke its powers, under Section 439, to grant bail if it has been refused by the Special Court nor can the High Court, by resorting to its power under Section 439, cancel bail if bail has been granted to such an accused by the Special Court. If the bail has been refused or granted by the Special Court, the aggrieved party may, however, prefer an appeal, in terms of Section 21(4), to the High Court. Such an appeal has to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and in such an appeal, the merit of the order, granting or refusing bail, can be questioned. (Emphasis added) 72. Such an appeal has to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and in such an appeal, the merit of the order, granting or refusing bail, can be questioned. (Emphasis added) 72. In the case of Redaul Hussain Khan (supra), this Court has, on analyzing the scheme of the NIA Act, concluded, at Para 42, 43 and 44, as follows: 42. On a close reading of Section 16 of the NIA Act, what becomes clear is that notwithstanding the fact that, according to Section 16(3) of the NIA Act, a Special Court, for the purpose of trial of a scheduled offence, has all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence 'as if it were a Court of Session', the Special Court does not become a Court of Session inasmuch as it is only the power of trial of a Court of Session that the Special Court, by virtue of Section 16(3), entitled to exercise. In other words, the expression, 'as if it were a Court of Session', which occur in Section 16(3), really reflects that it is only the procedure for trial of a Sessions case, which a Special Court can follow; but it is, otherwise, not a Court of Session. 43. I may pause here to point out that Section 16(3) of the NIA Act states, "Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Special Court shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session so far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for the trial before a Court of Session." Similar provisions existed in Section 14(3) of TADA. Both the provisions were, thus, pari materia. The Supreme Court had the occasion to interpret Section 14(3) in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra). Both the provisions were, thus, pari materia. The Supreme Court had the occasion to interpret Section 14(3) in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra). Referring to the expression 'as if it were', appearing in Section 3 of the TADA, the Supreme Court pointed out, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), that though the Parliament has vested, by using the words 'as if it were', in the Designated Court, the status of a Court of Session, yet this legal fiction, contained in Section 14(3), must be restricted to the procedure to be followed for trial of an offence under the TADA, i.e., trial must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed, by the Code, in respect of a trial before a Court of Session in so far as it is applicable. The relevant observations, made in this regard, which appear at para 18, read as under: 18. No doubt, the legislature by the use of the words "as if it were" in Section 14(3) of the Act vested a Designated Court with the status of a Court of Session. But, as contended for by Learned Counsel for the State Government, the legal fiction contained therein must be restricted to the procedure to be followed for the trial of an offence under the Act i.e. such trial must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of the trial before a Court of Session, insofar as applicable. 44. The above impression gets strengthened from the fact that Section 16(1) provides that a Special Court may take cognizance of offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, which, in turn, implies that a Special Court takes cognizance of an offence as a Court of original jurisdiction and does not have the trappings of a Court of Session, which cannot, ordinarily, take, in the light of Section 193 of the Code, cognizance of an offence, unless the case, in terms of Section 209 of the Code, is committed to it, for, Section 193 states that a Court of Session cannot take cognizance of an offence as a Court of original jurisdiction except when the Code or the special law provides otherwise. Thus, a Court of Session could not have taken cognizance of an offence, under the NIA Act, without the case having been committed to it; but, as the NIA Act provides for taking cognizance of an offence by a Court of Session, without the case being committed to it, the Court of Session can take cognizance of offence, under the NIA Act, as the Court of original jurisdiction. Such a deviation is possible even in respect of a specified offence under the Indian Penal Code. For instance, sub-Section (2) of Section 199 of the Code provides that when an offence, falling under Chapter XXI of the IPC, is alleged to have committed against a person, who, at the time of such commission, is the President of India, Vice-President of India, Governor of a State, the Administrator of a Union territory or a minister of the Union or of a State or of a Union territory, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his functions, a Court of Session may take cognizance of such an offence, without the case being committed to it, upon a complaint, in writing, made by the Public Prosecutor. 73. This Court, in Redaul Hussain Khan(supra), also pointed out, at para 65, 66 and 74, as under: 65. It is also well to remember that merely because of the fact that a Court of Session can function as a Special Court if Special Court is not constituted under a special law, it does not follow that the Court of Session, which exercises the powers of the Special Court, would become a Court of Session. In the given scheme of a 'special law', a Court of Session, as already pointed out in A.R. Antulay (supra), may become a Court of original jurisdiction with no trappings of the Court of Session. In such circumstances, merely because of the fact that a Sessions Judge exercises the jurisdiction of a Special Court, the Special Court would not be treated, or would not be deemed, to have become, a Court of Session. In such circumstances, merely because of the fact that a Sessions Judge exercises the jurisdiction of a Special Court, the Special Court would not be treated, or would not be deemed, to have become, a Court of Session. When the Special Court, in the case at hand, falls within the expression, 'a Court other than the High Court or the Court of Session', which appears in Section 437(1), it logically follows that a Special Court would run all the limitations, which are imposed by Section 437 on the powers of a Court, covered by Section 437, in respect of granting of bail. Logically extended, this will mean that, amongst other limitations, as specified by sub-Section (1) of Section 437, a Special Court would not be able to release a person on bail if there appears a reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life except when a case is covered by the proviso to Section 437(1), which says that even such an accused person may be released, if the accused person is a woman or is sick or is infirm or if, for any other special reason, the Special Court considers it just and proper to release such a person. 66. Unlike, therefore, the powers, which a Court of Session enjoys, while considering a bail application, under Section 439, the Special Court runs the limitations, which are imposed by Section 437. Resultantly, therefore, a Special Court cannot enlarge a person on bail except to the extent as provided in Section 437. Apart from the limitations imposed on the powers of a Special Court as are prescribed by Section 437, even the special statute, which creates the Special Court, can impose additional limitations. No wonder, therefore, that the power to grant bail, in the case of NDPS, is much more restricted than what Section 437 provides inasmuch as Section 37 of the NDPS imposes further limitations, on the Special Court, in matters of granting bail and such limitations would apply to a Sessions Judge even if he acts as a Special Court under the NDPS Act, for, while exercising the powers of a Special Court, the Session Judge does not act or function as a Court of Session, but as a Court of ordinary criminal jurisdiction. ****** ******* ******* 74. ****** ******* ******* 74. Having held that the source of power of a Designated Court, under the TADA, to grant bail is traceable to Section 437 inasmuch as the Designated Court falls within the expression 'a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session', the Apex Court further clarified that the Designated Court's power to grant bail is not contained in Section 20(8); rather, Section 20(8) places only limitations on such power in addition to the limitations, which the Code has already imposed, on a Designated Court, by making it a Court within the ambit of Section 437. This was made explicit by Section 20(9), which provided that the limitations on the granting of bail, specified in sub-Section (8), are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in force. 74. Apart from the fact that the conclusions, on the questions of law indicated above, reached in the case of Redaul Hussain Khan(supra), have not been disagreed with by a Division Bench of this Court in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), we are, on a reconsideration of the whole scheme of the NIA Act read with the provisions for bail in the Code, agree with the above propositions of law, governing the powers of the Special Court, as regards the granting of bail, or refusal to grant bail, and hold that the above propositions of law are wholly correct. 75. Thus, the limitations, imposed by the proviso to Section 43D(5), shall, to the extent that it is inconsistent with Section 437, would supersede Section 437 and if it is not inconsistent, then, it would be in addition to the limitations imposed by Section 437. 76. The proviso to Section 43D(5) imposes a limitation in addition to the limitations, which Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, impose on the Court's power to release an accused on bail. Thus, the proviso to Section 43D(5) is an additional restriction on the Court's power to grant bail. 77. We must also point out that when a case is registered and investigated, under the NIA Act, for commission of scheduled offences, the Special Court would be competent to deal with not only the scheduled offences, but also other offences under any law for the time being in force. 77. We must also point out that when a case is registered and investigated, under the NIA Act, for commission of scheduled offences, the Special Court would be competent to deal with not only the scheduled offences, but also other offences under any law for the time being in force. Such a law would obviously include offences under the Indian Penal Code. We have also settled that the power of the Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, to grant bail is covered by, and shall remain confined within, the ambits of Section 437 of the Code and, as an appellate Court, the High Court's power, under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, would be co-extensive with the powers of the Special Court. We have further settled that the ban, imposed on the power of the Court to release an accused, if a case falls within the proviso to Section 43D(5), is, as already mentioned above, in addition to the limitations imposed on the powers of Special Court (same as magisterial courts) by Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1). 78. Our above conclusion that this Court's power, while considering an appeal under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, would be coextensive with the power of the Special Court and that the ban imposed on the power of the Special Court to release an accused on bail, which appears in the proviso to Section 43D(5), if a case falls within the proviso to Section 43D(5), is in addition to the limitations imposed on the powers of Special Court (same as magisterial courts) by Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1), stand upheld by the Supreme Court in its order, dated 25.08.2011, passed, in SLP (Criminal) No. S5063/2010), wherein, while allowing the appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, to with draw his appeal and giving him liberty to apply for bail to the Special Court afresh if there are any change in the circumstances or if fresh facts are placed before the Court, the Supreme Court made it, however, clear thus; We also make it clear that we are not interfering with the order of the High Court. (Emphasis added) 79. (Emphasis added) 79. In view of the law that there exists no extra-ordinary or special powers of the High Court to grant bail, sitting as an appellate Court under Section 21(4) of NIA Act, and since the discussion on facts and relevant law, made hereinbefore, make it clear that circumstances, in the present case, justify, on a prima facie basis, an inference that the appellant associated or professed to associate himself with UNLF, a scheduled terrorist organization under UA(P) Act, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the allegations, levelled against the appellant, that the appellant had committed offences under Chapter IV/VI of the NIA Act, are prima facie true, the Special Court was well within its jurisdiction, in the present case, in not granting bail to the present appellant inasmuch as the learned Special Court stood disempowered by the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act, from allowing the appellant to go on bail. To put it a little differently, the learned Special Court did not commit any illegality in rejecting the present appellant's application for bail and the accused-appellant's rejection of bail by the learned Special Court does not warrant any interference by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 80. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in the appeal. The appeal shall accordingly stand dismissed. 81. However, we make it clear that the views, expressed in this appeal, are limited for the purpose of deciding the appeal preferred by the appellant against the order passed by the learned Special Judge, NIA, refusing to grant bail. Any observation made by us, in this appeal, shall not be binding upon the Court, at the time of trial of the case, which would include consideration of charge/charges against the appellant. With the above observations and directions, this appeal shall stand disposed of.