Aligave Mahesh Gurulingappa v. State of Maharashtra
2012-07-04
D.Y.CHANDRACHUD, R.D.DHANUKA
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT:- 1. Learned Counsel for the respondents waive service. By consent, the rule is made returnable forthwith. The petition is taken up for hearing and final disposal, by consent and on the request of learned Counsel. Heard finally by consent of the parties. 2. The petitioner is a highly qualified teacher with M.A., M.Ed., and M.Phil qualifications. The petitioner was appointed as a Shikshan Sevak for the period from 1 July, 2005 until 30 June, 2000 by the management of a D.Ed. College. The management is represented by the Fourth and fifth respondents. Pursuant to the order of appointment dated 1 July, 2005, a proposal for approval was submitted to the Deputy Director of Education, Pune, the second respondent, who granted his approval on 27 February, 2006 to the appointment of the petitioner as a Shikshan Sevak on an aided division of the D.Ed. College for the period from 1 July, 2005 to 30 June, 2008. The petitioner completed a period of three years as a Shikshan Sevak and was appointed on a regular post. A proposal for the grant of regular pay scale was submitted to the second respondent. By an order dated. 19 December, 2008, the second respondent granted approval to the appointment of the petitioner in a regular post and on a pay scale of Rs. 5500-9000 with effect from 1 July, 2008. 3. On 9 August, 2010, an order was passed by the second respondent by which the period during which approval was granted to the petitioner as a Shikshan Sevak initially and subsequently as an Assistant Teacher, has been modified. As a Shikshan Sevak, the approval was initially granted to the petitioner between 1 July, 2005 and 30 June, 2008. The approval has now been restricted to the period between 14 September 2005 and 16 December, 2007; and 1 October, 2008 and 28 June, 2009. Similarly, as an Assistant Teacher, the petitioner was granted approval initially from 1 July, 2008, but by the impugned order, the approval has been granted with effect from 29 August, 2009. For the period which is excluded from the original approval, the petitioner is declared as 'excess'. A direction has been is-sued that the petitioner would not be entitled to his salary for the period where he has now been declared as excess.
For the period which is excluded from the original approval, the petitioner is declared as 'excess'. A direction has been is-sued that the petitioner would not be entitled to his salary for the period where he has now been declared as excess. Consequent upon this, recoveries were initiated against the petitioner and the Court is informed that for about one year an amount of Rs. 17,000/-per month was recovered from his salary. 4. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed in these proceedings on behalf of first, second and third respondents. In the affidavit-in-reply it has been stated that the staffing pattern shows that in the aided division of the D.Ed. College, there was, inter alia, one post of a Principal and four posts of Lecturers/ Assistant Teachers, which were approved. According to the affidavit, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Shikshan Seuak which became vacant due to the promotion of Mr. S.T. Chandane as a Principal. Since the aforesaid person did not have work experience required for the post of Principal, approval was granted to him for the period from 1 June, 2004 to 13 September, 2005 and he was placed in his original post of Lecturer in the D.Ed. College. Hence it has been stated that the petitioner has become excess as a Shikshan Sevakfrom 1 July, 2005 to 13 September, 2005. Subsequently, Mr. S.T. Chandane acquired work experience and approval was granted to him on 14 September 2005. However, he left service. In his vacancy, one Mr. M.V. Palse was appointed as a Principal with effect from 17 January, 2007. Since he too was not duly qualified for the post of Principal, approval was granted to him on an in-charge basis from 17 December, 2007 to 30 September 2008. During this period, it has been stated that the petitioner became excess. Mr. M.V. Palse acquired the qualifications required for the post of Principal and approval was granted with effect from 1 October, 2008. 5. On this basis it has been submitted in the affidavit-in-reply that during the period from 1 July, 2005 to 13 September, 2005 and from 3 of 17 December 2007 to 30 June 2008, the petitioner was rendered as excess in the post of Shikshan Sevak and during the period from 1 July, 2008 to 30 September, 2008, he was excess as a Lecturer/ Assistant Teacher.
According to the State, as two persons cannot work for one post and the petitioner being the junior most, became excess and it was necessary to rectify the earlier approval accorded to the petitioner and to recover the salary paid to him during the period in question. 6. We find merit in the contention of the petitioner that the action of the second respondent is thoroughly arbitrary. The admitted position before the Court is that the services of the petitioner were initially approved as a Shikshan Sevak with effect from 1 July, 2005. After the petitioner successfully completed a period of three years as such, he was appointed as a Lecturer/Assistant Teacher on the regular pay scale and an approval was granted by the second respondent with effect from 1 July, 2008. Both the approvals as a Shikshan Sevak and as a Lecturer in the regular pay scale, were acted upon. The petitioner indisputably worked in the post of Shikshan Sevan initially and subsequently as a Lecturer and has drawn his pay. The approval is now sought to be modified with retrospective effect on the ground that the petitioner is declared as excess as a result of the fact that two persons whom the management had appointed as Principals, did not have the requisite qualifications. That cannot, in our view, furnish any justification to retrospectively cancel the approval, which was granted to the petitioner initially. The impugned order dated 19 August, 2010 was passed even without issuing a notice to show cause or affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. Apart from that, we find no reason or justification to make recoveries from the salary of the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner has worked as a Shikshan Sevak initially and subsequently as a Lecturer. This was on the basis of approvals duly granted at the relevant point of time. In this state of matter, it would be thoroughly arbitrary on the part of the second respondent and the Education Department to make recoveries from the salary of the petitioner. The situation whereby two persons were appointed as Principal, successively by the management, though they did not have work experience for a period of time, cannot be attributed to the petitioner. Teachers cannot be made the victim of such a situation over which they have no control. 7.
The situation whereby two persons were appointed as Principal, successively by the management, though they did not have work experience for a period of time, cannot be attributed to the petitioner. Teachers cannot be made the victim of such a situation over which they have no control. 7. The AGP submits that the fault in the present case cannot be laid exclusively at the door of the Education Department and the management is equally responsible for making appointments to the post of Principal, though the incumbents did not have, at the relevant time, requisite qualifications and the Education Department would have to sort the issue out with the management. A teacher who has duly worked and whose services have been approved, cannot be made to face a consequence of a situation over which he has no control. Moreover, the State cannot be permitted to act arbitrarily by purporting to make recoveries for the period during which the teacher has discharged his duties. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the impugned order dated 9 August, 2010 would have to be set aside and we order accordingly. The recoveries that have been made from the salary of the petitioner, shall be refunded to the of petitioner and no further recoveries shall be made in pursuance of the impugned order. 8. The petitioner has also prayed for the grant of the revised pay scale. The second respondent shall duly consider the request in accordance with law and if the petitioner is otherwise entitled to the benefit of the revised pay scale, necessary orders shall be passed within a period of four weeks from the date on which an authenticated copy of this order is produced before the second respondent. In the event that the petitioner is held to be eligible to the revised pay scale, the difference in emoluments shall be paid over to the petitioner within a period of two months. 9.
In the event that the petitioner is held to be eligible to the revised pay scale, the difference in emoluments shall be paid over to the petitioner within a period of two months. 9. Accordingly, the following order is passed :- (i) The impugned order passed by the second respondent on 9 August, 2010 is quashed and set aside; (ii) The recoveries which have been effected from the salary of the petitioner in pursuance of the impugned order dated 9 August, 2010, shall be restored and a refund shall be issued to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date on which an authenticated copy of this order is produced before the second respondent; (iii) The claim of the petitioner for the payment of the revised pay scale shall be considered in accordance with law by the second respondent and in the event that the petitioner is entitled thereto, necessary orders shall be passed within a period of one month from the date on which an authenticated copy of this order is produced before the second respondent; (iv) In the event that the petitioner is held to be entitled to the revised pay scale, the difference in emoluments, if any, payable to the petitioner, shall be paid over to the petitioner within a period of two months; (v) We clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the action, if any, that can be adopted by the second respondent against the management and we keep open all the rights and contentions of the parties in that regard; (vi) Rule is made absolute in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.