Judgment : Both these writ petitions preferred by the same employer/management can be disposed of by a common judgment as they arose out of identical fact situation. The petitioner is a private limited company having its registered office at Chennai. It is engaged in the business of manufacture, supply, installation, erection, testing and commissioning of electric lifts. It acquired a part of these business activities from West and Crompton Engineering Limited, with whom initially the 2nd respondent – workman, was employed. The 2nd respondent-workman was employed as a fitter. In January, 2011, it was reported against the 2nd respondent that he had taken away an inverter belonging to the petitioner company and kept it at his home. It was also further reported against the 2nd respondent – workman that he along with another workman (who is the 2nd respondent in the connected writ petition), claimed overtime wages for 60 hours for completing certain works and a bill in that regard has been raised in the name of a subcontractor who has been paid accordingly a sum of Rs.13,200/- by the petitioner company. It is alleged that these two workmen collected the said money from the subcontractor in turn. Thus, they played fraud on the company. It was further alleged that the workmen had allowed the contractor to sell away certain properties of the petitioner company as scrap, thus realizing a sum of Rs.4,500/- and later on both the workmen have participated in a party hosted by the said contractor. Thus, it is alleged that the workmen have enabled an outside agency to sell away properties of the petitioner company without its knowledge or sanction and the workmen did not choose to inform the petitioner company about the whole transaction. It is stated that both the workmen were questioned by the Assistant Branch Manager with regard to their misdeeds on 23.1.2001 and promptly the workmen admitted the irregularities indulged in by them by addressing a letter jointly. It is also alleged that both the workmen have addressed two letters separately on the same day viz., 23.1.2001 admitting their guilt and prayed to be excused for their lapses. However, it is further stated that both the workmen have submitted individual letters of resignation on 24.1.2001. It is also alleged that both the workmen have addressed two letters separately on the same day viz., 23.1.2001 admitting their guilt and prayed to be excused for their lapses. However, it is further stated that both the workmen have submitted individual letters of resignation on 24.1.2001. It is specifically stated by the deponent in paragraph 4(h) of the affidavit filed in support of this writ petition that he has instantaneously accepted orally both the resignations and issued two letters on 24.1.2001, the copies of which are filed as Annexures P-6 and P-7 respectively, the receipt of which has been acknowledged by the workmen concerned. Both the workmen had been relieved from the work on that day itself. However, both the workmen addressed a letter each on 30.01.2001 alleging that the letter of resignation dated 24.01.2001 was obtained under duress and threat by the Assistant Branch Manager. The workmen have also issued two separate telegrams on 2.2.2001 and they followed them up with two separate legal notices. The workmen have sought to withdraw the resignation letters offered by them on 24.1.2001. With a view to finalise the acceptance of resignation and also relieving both the workmen, a letter dated 27.1.2001 was addressed by the writ petitioner company from its Head Office at Chennai. Thereafter, the workmen have invoked the provision available under Section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and respectively raised the industrial dispute concerned. It is stated that upon receipt of notice from the Labour Court, Guntur, the petitioner company entered appearance through a counsel who filed his Vakalat on behalf of the petitioner company, but unfortunately on account of his further nonappearance in the matter, the writ petitioner company was set ex parte by an order dated 12.10.2001 by the Labour Court and thereafter the evidence of the workmen was recorded and an ex parte award was passed on 13.11.2001. The said award was published in terms of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act on 28.6.2002. The petitioner approached the Labour Court by filing IA No. 53 of 2002 in ID No. 130 of 2001 for setting aside the ex parte award. That application was dismissed. The said award was published in terms of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act on 28.6.2002. The petitioner approached the Labour Court by filing IA No. 53 of 2002 in ID No. 130 of 2001 for setting aside the ex parte award. That application was dismissed. Challenging the said order, the petitioner company filed WP No. 5811 of 2003 which was dismissed and when appealed against in WA No. 1374 of 2003, that appeal was also dismissed by a Division Bench of this court on 18.8.2003. Thereafter, the present writ petitions came to be instituted on 23.10.2003 mounting a challenge to the awards dated 13.11.2001 passed by the Labour Court. Heard Sri C.R. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner-company and Sri M.Pitchaiah, learned counsel for the workmen. It is contended by Sri C.R. Sridharan, that the letters addressed by the workmen on 23.1.2001 clearly bring out the misdemeanor committed by the respondents – workmen and hence the question of coercion or duress being applied on them the next day would not arise even remotely. The workmen, in these cases, have suppressed these crucial facts and approached the Labour Court with unclean hands. Therefore, the award passed by the Labour Court is vitiated. It is further contended that when once a resignation is tendered by the workmen which has been accepted, there is no question of termination of services effected by the employer and consequently it will not amount to retrenchment. When once acceptance of resignation offered by the workmen does not amount to retrenchment, invocation of the provision contained under Section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would not arise and hence the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the industrial dispute raised by the workman on his own. It is further contended that acceptance of resignation need not be communicated in writing at all times. It can be oral as well and that is what had happened in the instant case. It is also further contended that the respective workmen have approached the Labour Court with unclean hands by suppressing the most vital facts leading to their voluntarily tendering their resignations and acceptance of such resignations and hence even for that reason the award passed by the Labour Court is unsustainable. It is also further contended that the respective workmen have approached the Labour Court with unclean hands by suppressing the most vital facts leading to their voluntarily tendering their resignations and acceptance of such resignations and hence even for that reason the award passed by the Labour Court is unsustainable. In paragraph (2) of the award, the Labour Court has clearly recorded that though the writ petitioner herein has entered appearance through a Counsel, they have not chosen to file their counter and thereafter remained ex parte. The respective workmen got examined themselves and got marked Exs.W1 to W11. Upon consideration of the entire material, the Labour Court has returned a finding of fact that the resignation letters said to have been submitted by the workmen concerned have been withdrawn before they were accepted by the Management and hence preventing the workmen from attending to duties from 24.01.2001 is not legal and valid. On that premises, workmen were directed to be reinstated and ordered to be paid full backwages and with continuity of service benefit. Sri C.R. Sridharan, learned counsel for the petitioner – Management would urge that the petitioner company has not terminated the employment of the 2nd respondent – workman and it is the 2nd respondent – workmen who on their own resigned to their service and thus they terminated the contract of employment and the relationship of Master and Servant. The 2nd respondent – workmen are guilty of suppressing the fact that they have admitted the misconduct committed by them. In support of these pleas, learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to Annexures P1 to P8 of the paper book filed in this writ petition. Annexure P1 is a letter dated 23.01.2001 addressed jointly by M.Balkishen and P.Ravisankar Rao, the two workmen in these two cases. This letter was addressed to Sri V.Gopalan, Assistant Branch Manager, Vijayawada Branch of the petitioner company. This letter merely talks of three incidents that took place in the previous year and the details of those incidents were given. Dealing with the Emergency Light Inverter all that Mr.Balkishen stated was this : “A.Ramanjaneyulu told me tot take the inverter from Hotel Manorama’s site to my house. After getting some information from other people you came to my house on 22.1.2001 at 8.30 PM. Dealing with the Emergency Light Inverter all that Mr.Balkishen stated was this : “A.Ramanjaneyulu told me tot take the inverter from Hotel Manorama’s site to my house. After getting some information from other people you came to my house on 22.1.2001 at 8.30 PM. On 23.1.2001 I was not allotted any work and then you questioned me and I accepted that the Inverter is in my house. We both went by auto to my house and we collected the inverter and brought it to office and handed over to you personally on 23.1.2001.” Similarly, P.Ravisankar Rao also mentioned about A.Ramanjaneyulu instructing him with regard to the inverter and the Assistant Branch Manager questioning about the same and Sri P.Ravisankar Rao also proceeding to his home by an auto to bring the inverter back and then handing it over to the Assistant Branch Manager on 23.01.2001. Dealing with the 2nd item – Sub-Contractor Bill, both the workmen claimed overtime for 60 hours for completing the work and that the bill was raised on sub-contractor’s name and the company has paid money to the sub-contractor who in turn paid the money and that the bill was sanctioned/approved for payment by Mr.Ramanjaneylulu and Mr.Thomas. Dealing with the 3rd item relating to Sale of scrap, both the workmen stated that Mr.Ramanjaneylu has instructed Mr.Kameswar Rao and both these workmen to take the material (i.e., extra filler weight) from Hotel Manorama site to office by mode of rickshaw and some other material from office was also put in the same rickshaw and sold as scrap for Rs.4,500/-. What followed thereafter is this: “The same day party was given to 4 fitters by Mr.Ramanjaneyulu. The party expenditure to the maximum extent was Rs.500/-. The balance money was taken by Mr.Ramanjaneyulu.” Both the workmen thereafter stated that this was done by them unknowingly and they were sorry for doing such things and in future or with any new manager, they will not do such things again. Then this typewritten letter concluded as under: “Regards, M.BALKISHEN, Roll No. 20379 – All matters are accepted. Sd/- M.Balkishen, 23.1.2001 P.Ravisankar Rao, Roll No. K-5030 – All matters are accepted. Sd/- P.Ravisankar Rao, 23.1.2001” (emphasis is mine) In my considered opinion, this letter dated 23.1.2001 does not talk of any admission of misconduct committed by the workmen concerned. Then this typewritten letter concluded as under: “Regards, M.BALKISHEN, Roll No. 20379 – All matters are accepted. Sd/- M.Balkishen, 23.1.2001 P.Ravisankar Rao, Roll No. K-5030 – All matters are accepted. Sd/- P.Ravisankar Rao, 23.1.2001” (emphasis is mine) In my considered opinion, this letter dated 23.1.2001 does not talk of any admission of misconduct committed by the workmen concerned. Firstly, both the workmen have stated that Mr.Ramanjaneyulu instructed them to take the inverter and also passed the overtime bill for payment and it is Sri Ramanjaneyulu who has sold away the scrap for Rs.4,500/- and thereafter hosted a party for four fitters including the two workmen here. Hence, the contents of this letter are more of a narration of certain events that took place prior to 23.01.2001. There was no whisper whatsoever, in these writ petitions, as to the status of Mr.Ramanjaneyulu vis-à-vis the petitioner company. If he is a responsible employee or Manager of the petitioner company (as could be made out from this letter) and if that person has authorized the two workmen to take the inverters to their respective homes and also passed the overtime bill for payment and also indulged in sale of scrap, it is not the workmen who can be held guilty of any misconduct, but it is the said Ramanjaneyulu. There was no explanation as to the conduct and role played by or action taken against Mr.Ramanjaneyulu and Mr.Thomas or Mr.Kameswara Rao whose names were also mentioned in this letter dated 23.1.2001. Further, at the ending portion of this letter, against the names of both the workmen what has been typewritten was “all matters are accepted”. It is not in dispute that this letter was typewritten on the company’s letterhead. If the two workmen have addressed this letter entirely on their own volition on 23.1.2001 without any prompting from the Assistant Branch Manager, as is contended by Sri C.R. Sridharan, learned counsel for the petitioner, there would not be any occasion or necessity for them to conclude with the remark “all matters are accepted”. Therefore, this letter dated 23.1.2001 far from accepting any misdemeanor committed by the two workmen makes it amply clear that it is Mr.Ramanjaneyulu who is the man behind the three incidents and not the two workmen concerned. Therefore, this letter dated 23.1.2001 far from accepting any misdemeanor committed by the two workmen makes it amply clear that it is Mr.Ramanjaneyulu who is the man behind the three incidents and not the two workmen concerned. Further the remarks “all matters are accepted” leaves a doubt in my mind as to whether this letter is entirely prepared by the workmen on their own or it was prepared first and brought for their signatures later on. Further, if it is a joint letter prepared by the workmen on their own, there would not be narration of the same events by each of them twice all over. Strangely, the letter bears the date 23.1.2001. The said date was repeatedly mentioned in the letter. But, nowhere is it noted as “Today”. Thus, all these circumstances leave sufficient room for doubting the authenticity and authorship of the said letter. Annexure P-2 is a letter addressed on 23.1.2001 by P.Ravisankar Rao, the 2nd respondent – workman. This letter was addressed in Telugu. I had the advantage of studying it carefully. The heading of this letter reads as under: “………….. ” When translated it reads as: “the instances that occurred during the time of Sri Ramanjaneyulu”. The same three instances noted supra have been repeated in this letter. This letter was also addressed on the letterhead of the petitioner company. Annexure P-3 is the letter dated 23.1.2001 addressed by M.Balkishen in Hindi. It also narrates of the instances that have taken place during Mr.Ramanjaneyulu’s time. English translated copies of these two letters have been placed as Annexures P-4 and P-5. If the workmen concerned have already addressed individually a letter each on 23.1.2001 narrating the three instances, one fails to understand as to why another letter in English language is addressed by them jointly (Ex.P1) on the same day. This also throws a genuine doubt about the authenticity and authorship of the letter dated 23.1.2001 jointly signed by both the workmen, Annexure P-1. As was already noticed supra, the contents of these communications dated 23.1.2001, even without doubting their veracity and authenticity, would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the two workmen have admitted of any guilt of theirs vis-à-vis the three instances which were narrated in those letters. As was already noticed supra, the contents of these communications dated 23.1.2001, even without doubting their veracity and authenticity, would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the two workmen have admitted of any guilt of theirs vis-à-vis the three instances which were narrated in those letters. Therefore, the contention canvassed by Sri C.R. Sridharan that not referring to the contents of these letters (Ex.P1 to P5) in the claim statement filed before the Labour Court by the workmen amounts to suppression of material facts, is without any merit. If the two workmen have admitted any guilt instead of narrating the true facts behind the three instances which have come for adverse notice of the petitioner company, it would have been a different matter. They prayed to be excused, because, they meekly followed the instructions issued by Mr.Ramanjaneyulu. Therefore, I have no hesitation to reject the contention that the two respondents – workmen have suppressed some substantial material facts when they lodged their claim statement before the Labour Court and therefore the reliefs ought to have been denied to them by the Labour Court is an unsustainable contention. AnnexuresP-6 and P-7 are the two letters of resignation tendered by the two workmen on 24.1.2001. (Incidentally, they are not the two letters issued by the Assistant Branch Manager, as was claimed by him in para 4(h) of the affidavit). They are identically worded, excepting that Balkishen stated that he was serving the company for 19 years having joined the company in 1982 whereas Ravisankar Rao stated that he was serving the company for 10 years having joined the company in the year 1991. The case of the workmen was that they have addressed a detailed letter to the General Manager (South) of the petitioner company at Madras on 30.1.2001. A copy of this letter was placed at Annexure P-8 in the paper book. It bears the company dated stamp indicating that it was received at Chennai on 1st February, 2001. In this letter, Sri P.Ravisankar Rao in categoric terms averred that Mr.Gopal, Assistant Branch Manager, Vijayawada, pressurised him to sign one more typed letter which was already kept ready by that time. The contents of the letter was not known to him and he (Mr.Gopal) only told that it is an apology letter. In this letter, Sri P.Ravisankar Rao in categoric terms averred that Mr.Gopal, Assistant Branch Manager, Vijayawada, pressurised him to sign one more typed letter which was already kept ready by that time. The contents of the letter was not known to him and he (Mr.Gopal) only told that it is an apology letter. It is further specifically alleged in the said letter that he was further threatened that a police case on false allegations would be lodged if he does not sign the letter. Therefore, under duress and threat, the signature was obtained. It further proceeds, that the Assistant Branch Manager has also asked both the workmen to come to Madras so that he can talk to the higher ups so that he will not initiate any action with regard to the inverter. After reaching Madras office, a letter dated 24.1.2001 was served that the resignation letter was forwarded to the Head Office and that he will not be allowed to attend the office. The workmen therefore requested the General Manager to look into this episode of obtaining forceful resignation with a view to send them away from the service of the company. At Annexure P-9, copy of the telegram sent up by the workmen on 1.2.2001 has been placed. This telegram issued by the workmen reiterated that the resignations have been forcefully obtained by the Assistant Branch Manager on 24.1.2001 and that they are not interested in resigning their services and most importantly it is stated therein that they are withdrawing the same. Annexure P-11 is the legal notice sent up on behalf of the two workmen to the company. This legal notice specifically adverted to the letter dated 27.1.2001 sent up from Chennai. The letter dated 27.1.2001 has been exhibited before the Labour Court by the workmen as Ex.W4 and the related registered post envelope sent up by the petitioner has been got marked as Ex.W5. This letter dated Jan 27, 2001, was signed by A.Sankarakrishnan, the Managing Director of the petitioner company. The contents of the letter are required to be quoted herein, as the same have a vital bearing upon the controversy at issue and they read as: “Dear Sir, We refer to your letter of resignation dated 24.01.2001 and the letter of acceptance of even date, issued by our Asst. Branch Manager – Vijayawada. The contents of the letter are required to be quoted herein, as the same have a vital bearing upon the controversy at issue and they read as: “Dear Sir, We refer to your letter of resignation dated 24.01.2001 and the letter of acceptance of even date, issued by our Asst. Branch Manager – Vijayawada. Please be informed that your resignation has been accepted and you have been relieved from the services of our Company with effect from 24.01.2001. Kindly contact our Finance Department for final settlement of your accounts. We thank you for the services rendered to our Company. We wish you all success in your future endeavours. Yours faithfully, For KONE ELEVATOR INDIA LIMITED, Sd/- (A.SANKARAKRISHNAN) Managing Director” (emphasis is brought out by me) Ex.W5 is the envelope through which Ex.W4 dated January 27, 2001 was dispatched and it bears the postal receipt issued by Ambattur Post Office at Chennai. It is evident from this postal receipt that the Post Office collected Rs.19/- for this registered letter and it was booked on 22.02.2001 at 13:42:34 Hours. The cover was weighing 20 gms and addressed to Vijayawada, Pin : 52001. It is baffling to note that a communication signed by the Managing Director of a company on 27.1.2001 took such a long time of more than three weeks to be put into transmission by the petitioner company. No explanation was forthcoming as to why the letter dated 27.1.2001 was not put into transmission to the two workmen respectively till 22.2.2001 by the petitioner company. In the absence of any such meaningful explanation, the Labour Court had reason to believe that this letter may have been deliberately put the date 27.1.2001 and it may not have been actually signed on that day. This inference is not an unreasonable one, for, a comunication signed by a Managing Director of the Company could not have failed to be put into transmission with necessary promptitude, given the efficiency of a company of the repute as that of the petitioner and also in view of the significance of the communication itself. It is obvious that the date 27.1.2001 has been `chosen’ because the Assistant Branch Manager, Vijayawada, has ordered both the workmen to reach Chennai, the Head Office of the petitioner company on 27.1.2001. Undoubtedly, this letter talks of accepting the resignation tendered by both the workmen. It is obvious that the date 27.1.2001 has been `chosen’ because the Assistant Branch Manager, Vijayawada, has ordered both the workmen to reach Chennai, the Head Office of the petitioner company on 27.1.2001. Undoubtedly, this letter talks of accepting the resignation tendered by both the workmen. But, it is most important to notice that this letter suggests that it is the Assistant Branch Manager, Vijayawada, who has not only accepted the resignations offered by the two workmen, but also issued them the letter of acceptance on 24.1.2001. The crucial expressions in the letter are : “…… the letter of acceptance of even date, issued by our Asst. Branch Manager – Vijayawada…..” The so called letters of acceptance said to have been issued by the Assistant Branch Manager on 24.1.2001 have not been placed on record by the petitioner even now. In the absence of any such letter of acceptance, it is quite probable that the workmen may have been asked to assemble at Chennai on 27.1.2001 to sort out their role behind the three unpleasant instances. If the letter of resignation dated 24.1.2001 tendered by the workmen were accepted truly by the Assistant Branch Manager on the same day, there would not have been any further necessity for another round of discussions to take place at Chennai subsequently with regard to those three instances and at any rate, the workmen would have hesitated to assemble at Chennai, at the instance of the same Assistant Branch Manager who had already accepted their resignations. Further, my opinion in this regard gains ground from the fact that the writ petitioner company has not disputed the fact that both the workmen had been asked to assemble at the Head Office of the petitioner company at Chennai on 27.1.2001 and the Assistant Branch Manager was also present at that time. In the absence of the acceptance letter, the petitioner company is therefore aware that the workmen are perfectly at liberty to withdraw the offer of resignation made by them. That was in fact the case set up by the workmen before the Labour Court that till they received the letter dated 27.1.2001 signed by the Managing Director, the resignations obtained by the Assistant Branch Manager from the two workmen remained unaccepted. That was in fact the case set up by the workmen before the Labour Court that till they received the letter dated 27.1.2001 signed by the Managing Director, the resignations obtained by the Assistant Branch Manager from the two workmen remained unaccepted. The material brought on record in the Labour Court in the form of Ex.W5, the postal envelope clearly disclosed that the letter of acceptance of resignation has been dispatched only on 22.2.2001 from Chennai, and most significantly much prior thereto both the workmen have withdrawn their offers of resignations. Realising the possible difficulty arising from out of non-acceptance of the resignation letters of the two workmen prior to their withdrawing the same, the concept of oral acceptance was introduced and further the acceptance letter is deliberately dated 27.1.2001. In this context, the 1st written communication sent up by the two workmen to the General Manager (South) was received by the company at Madras on 1st February, 2011 itself. It is with a view to beat the clock, Ex.W4 letter has been ascribed the date 27.1.2001 so that the petitioner company cannot be faulted for accepting a resignation letter after it was withdrawn. But, this communication significantly spelt out that the Assistant Branch Manager has dispatched on the same day (i.e., 24.01.2001) the acceptance letters. These letters of acceptance of Assistant Branch Manager have not seen the light of the day so far. This letter dated 27.01.2001, thus, in so many words, belies the oral acceptance of resignations by Assistant Branch Manager on the same day, a theory propounded now for the first time. Further, going by the fact that the Assistant Branch Manager has taken the trouble of visiting the residence of the workmen (Sri Balkishen) and also the next day travel in an auto to retrieve an inverter and then demanded an explanation from the workmen and secured their resignations as well, it is he, more than any one else, would have realized the importance of accepting the resignations by the competent authority. Hence, it is less probable that he would have accepted those resignations orally rather than in writing. Further, there is no material on record which discloses the competence of an Assistant Manager to accept the resignations offered by workmen. That, in my opinion, an Assistant Manager would not have been vested with such power or disciplinary control over the workmen. Hence, it is less probable that he would have accepted those resignations orally rather than in writing. Further, there is no material on record which discloses the competence of an Assistant Manager to accept the resignations offered by workmen. That, in my opinion, an Assistant Manager would not have been vested with such power or disciplinary control over the workmen. It is not spelt out that, in the hierarchy of the company, an Assistant Manager occupies a fairly high position. Most crucially, the terms and conditions of the contract of service or the standing orders of the petitioner company have not been placed before this court for one to understand the terms and conditions subject to which a right accrues to an employee to resign from service abruptly. While I can concede, in principle, that a contract of employment can be terminated by either side, but, however, a resignation from service can become effective only upon its acceptance. No employee can have the freedom and liberty to resign from service and simultaneously stay away from service even before the resignation offered by him is accepted. There can be any number of operational difficulties and unfavourable circumstances that can be brought about, if there is no requirement of acceptance of resignations involved. Take for instance, the case of the petitioner company itself. It undertakes installation works of electric lifts at its customers premises. It also manufactures electric lifts which can be customised for the special requirements or needs of its customers. For instance, multi-storied apartment complexes, multi-storied hotel industries, commercial complexes and Multi-specialty hospital complexes require electric lifts of different dimensions and with different requirements and specifications. Some of the lift cars are required to open their doors on either side, while the conventional lift car has one set of doors fixed on only one side. Carrying capacity may also be varying to suit the needs of the clients. Imagine a situation where a project may be half way through the installation process and there can be a strict time schedule within which the equipment will be required to be installed, tested and tried completely thereat and any failure to stick to the strict time schedule can result in serious ramifications including the exposure for possible damages and or loss of goodwill. Therefore, resignation of an employee working at a project site is essentially required to be accepted and before any such acceptance is conveyed, the employee cannot stay away from duty and any such action is mostly impermissible. Resignations tendered by the employees imminently require their acceptance by the competent authority, for the resignation to become effective. That would help in making the required substitute arrangement. This apart, a condition regulating the contract of service can legitimately specify that when a disciplinary proceeding is pending, an employee may not be permitted to resign from his service. Such measures are adopted for good reason. I, therefore, have no hesitation to subscribe to the view that the resignations said to have been tendered by the two workmen have not been accepted before the workmen have withdrawn the same. When once the workmen have withdrawn their resignations, there is no way the resignations would be subsisting, for them to be acted upon or accepted later on by the petitioner company. In the absence of any other letter, other than the one said to have been signed by the Managing Director on 27.1.2001, it is reasonable to conclude that the resignations offered by the workmen remained unaccepted till they are withdrawn and consequently the action of the Assistant Branch Manager preventing the two workmen from rendering services with effect from 24.1.2001 amounts to wrongful termination of their services and hence the order of reinstatement passed by the lower court is a perfect consequence that has followed. Learned counsel Sri C.R. Sridharan, has placed reliance upon a number of judgments in support of his case. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Company Limited v. State of UP and Ors (1990) 4 SCC 27 ) and contended that when once an employee voluntarily resigns and the same has been accepted by the petitioner, such an act falls within the first exclusion clause to the definition of the term `retrenchment’ and hence the Labour Court went wrong in entertaining the dispute. It is most important to notice the principle set out by the Supreme Court in the above case in the following words: “4. It is most important to notice the principle set out by the Supreme Court in the above case in the following words: “4. The first question which we must consider is whether in the backdrop of facts stated earlier it can be said that the services of the employee were terminated by way of 'retrenchment' as understood by Section 2(s) and, if yes, whether the employer was required to comply with the provisions of Section 6N of the State Act. It becomes clear on a plain reading of the definition of the term 'retrenchment' that it comprises of two parts; the first part is the inclusive part which defines retrenchment whereas the second part is in the nature of an exception and excludes two types of cases from the scope and ambit of the said definition. Under the first part termination of an employee's service by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than by way of punishment inflicted as a disciplinary measure, amounts to retrenchment. Under the second part cases of (i) voluntary retirement, and (ii) retirement on superannuation are excluded from purview of the first part of the definition. Termination of service can be brought about in diverse ways by an employer but every termination is not retrenchment, as for example, termination of service by way of punishment for proved misconduct. The earlier. In order to counter the employee's contention that he was retrenched from service on the employer having communicated the acceptance of his resignation, the employer has placed reliance on the first clause, namely, that the workman had voluntarily retired from service. The letter dated 1st November, 1970 written by the employee to the Manager of the appellant-company expressing his desire to resign his job shows that it was a voluntary act on the part of the employee. This was followed by another letter of 3rd November, 1970 whereby the workman requested the company to depute someone to take charge of the Bradma office so that he gets acquainted with the work to ensure a smooth take over. It was on this request of the employee that 1970 with effect from 16th November, 1970. From this correspondence it is crystal clear that the employee desired to sever his relations with the appellant-company on account of his family circumstances. But for this request made by the employee there was no reason for the. It was on this request of the employee that 1970 with effect from 16th November, 1970. From this correspondence it is crystal clear that the employee desired to sever his relations with the appellant-company on account of his family circumstances. But for this request made by the employee there was no reason for the. appellant-company to terminate the contract of service on its own. Just as an employer has a right to terminate the service of an employee, an employee too has a right to put an end to the contract of employment by informing his employer of his intention to give up the job. This right is specifically conferred by Clause 21 of the Standing Orders certified under Section 5 of the Industrial, Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; This clause reads as under: Any permanent clerk desirous of leaving the company's service shall give one month's notice in writing to the Manager unless he has a specific agreement providing for a longer or shorter notice. If any permanent clerk leaves the service of the company without giving notice, he shall, be liable to be sued for damages. Similar clause with reduced notice period is also to be found in the certified Standing Orders for operatives. Therefore, one of the ways of terminating the contract of stands snapped. Merely because the employer is expected to accept the employee’s resignation it cannot be said that the employer has brought about an end to the contract of employment so as to bring the case within the first part of the definition of retrenchment. A contract of service can be determined by either party to the contract. If it is determined at the behest of the employer it may amount to retrenchment unless it is by way of punishment for proved misconduct. But if an employee takes the initiative and exercises his right to put an end to the contract of service and the employer merely assents to it, it cannot be said that the employer has terminated the employment. In such cases the employer is merely acceding to the employee's request, may be even reluctantly. Here the employee's role is active while the employer's role is passive and formal. The employer cannot force an Unwilling employee to work for him. In such cases the employer is merely acceding to the employee's request, may be even reluctantly. Here the employee's role is active while the employer's role is passive and formal. The employer cannot force an Unwilling employee to work for him. Under Clause 21 of the certified Standing Orders all that the employee is required to do is to give the employer a notice to quit and on the expiry of the notice period his service would come to an end. A formal acceptance of the employee's desire by the employer cannot mean that it is the employer who is putting an end to the contract of employment. It would be unfair to saddle the employer with the liability to pay compensation even where the service is terminated on the specific request of the employee. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the legislature. We are, therefore, of the opinion that where a contract of service is determined on the employee exercising his right to quit, such termination cannot be said to be at the instance of the employer to fall within the first part of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(s) of the State Act. 6. We may now examine the question from another angle, namely, whether an employee whose resignation has been accepted by the employer falls within the first exclusion clause to the definition of the term 'retrenchment'. There can be no doubt that a resignation must be voluntarily tendered for if it is tendered on account of duress or coercion, it ceases to be a voluntary act of the employee expressing a desire to quit service……..” This judgment is of not much of assistance to the petitioner, for, the plea of the two workmen in the instant case is that the resignation letters were obtained by the Assistant Branch Manager, under duress and coercion and further before the same were accepted, the two workmen have also withdrawn the same. When once the workmen have withdrawn their resignations, before they could be accepted, in the absence of any provision in the contract of service or the Standing Orders of the petitioner company, prohibiting or inhibiting any such withdrawal, the same cannot be accepted after it is withdrawn. When once the workmen have withdrawn their resignations, before they could be accepted, in the absence of any provision in the contract of service or the Standing Orders of the petitioner company, prohibiting or inhibiting any such withdrawal, the same cannot be accepted after it is withdrawn. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited v. Anil and Ors (2007) 1 SCC 610 ), in support of his plea that Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act does not cover every type of dispute between an individual workman and his employer, and it cannot cover any other dispute which does not relate to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service of an individual workman. There is no dispute with regard to the principle that an individual dispute is deemed to be an industrial dispute in terms of Section 2-A, only when such dispute concerns discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination, and other than this class of disputes, Section 2-A cannot be invoked for redressal of any other disputes. In the instant case, the individual dispute of the workmen was that their services have been wrongfully terminated by the petitioner company by way of preventing them from service of the company w.e.f., 24.01.2001 by the Assistant Branch Manager. Hence, the Labour Court is justified in entertaining the dispute raised by the workman. Therefore, this judgment in BHEL case (supra 2) is of not much assistance to the petitioner. Learned counsel has pressed into service the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in North Zone Cultural Centre and Another v. Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar (2003) 5 SCC 455 ). The principle enunciated in North Zone Cultural Centre case (supra 3) can be culled out in paragraphs 10 and 16 of that judgment. “10. ………if actually the appellant had accepted the resignation only on 1.12.1988 then 16. Therefore, it is clear that non-communication of the acceptance does not make the resignation inoperative provided there is in fact an acceptance before the withdrawal.” In the instant case, the claim of the two workmen was that before their resignations were accepted, they have withdrawn the same. The petitioner company could not establish with reference to any credible material on record that those resignations have been accepted before they are withdrawn. The petitioner company could not establish with reference to any credible material on record that those resignations have been accepted before they are withdrawn. Whereas in North Zone Cultural Centre case (supra), as a matter of fact, it is established that the resignation of the employee has been accepted on 18.11.1988 itself and that was communicated on 1.12.1988 and hence the subsequent withdrawal of the resignation was held to be of not much help. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in T.Ravindranv. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore and the Management of Pollachi Cooperative House Construction Society, Pollachi (2002) III LLJ 160 (Madras). In paragraph (4) of the judgment of the Madras High Court, this is what has been found. “………..From his evidence it is seen that the employee gave the letter of resignation voluntarily and it was accepted immediately and the acceptance was communicated to him orally on the same day and the employee also understood it that his (emphasis is supplied) Whereas in the instant case, the two workmen have been urging that the Assistant Branch Manager at Vijayawada has forcefully and under duress obtained letters of resignation from them on 24.1.2001 and before those letters of resignation are accepted, the two workmen have withdrawn. Therefore, the judgment of the Madras High Court in T.Ravindran’scase (supra) is of not much help to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.D. Sharmav. Steel Authority of India Limited and others (2008) 12 SCC 481), in support of his plea that if a party has approached a court with unclean hands without putting forth all the facts before the court, without concealing or suppressing anything, then the relief must be declined at the threshold without considering the matter on merits. It will be important to notice the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the said judgment in the following words: “36.……. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. It will be important to notice the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the said judgment in the following words: “36.……. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. 37. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJ KB 257 : 116 LT 136 in the following words: [I]t has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts-it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it; the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement. (emphasis supplied) In the instant case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate satisfactorily as to what material fact has been suppressed or withheld by the two workmen from the knowledge of the Labour Court. The petitioner has construed the letter dated 23.1.2001 signed by them as some kind of admission of their guilt of a misconduct and urges that not adverting to it amounts to suppression of fact by the workmen. Admission of misconduct, is entirely a different aspect from narrating the facts behind three instances which have come for adverse notice. As was already discussed supra, the letter dated 23.1.2001 merely explained the circumstances and nothing more. Admission of misconduct, is entirely a different aspect from narrating the facts behind three instances which have come for adverse notice. As was already discussed supra, the letter dated 23.1.2001 merely explained the circumstances and nothing more. Further the two workmen have clearly made out that in that letter it is Mr.Ramanjaneyulu who was passed on the necessary instructions to the two workmen concerned with regard to the inverter and the scrap material. Insofar as the overtime bill is concerned, it is stated that it is Mr. Thomas/Ramanjaneyulu who have processed and passed it for payment. So, therefore, if Mr. Ramanjaneyulu is an officer of the petitioner company wielding considerable amounts of authority and influence, his acts cannot become acts of default on the part of the two workmen. Very strangely, the petitioner company has not made a whisper about the role and status of Mr. Ramanjaneyulu anywhere. Obviously, the petitioner felt it inconvenient to deal with that aspect of the matter. Hence, the two workmen cannot be faulted for their conduct in the instant case. At any rate, there was no suppression of any material fact by them. Sri C.R. Sridharan, learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in Talwara Cooperative Credit and Service Society Limited v. Sushil Kumar (2008) 9 SCC 486 )and Ashok KumarSharma v. Oberoi Flight Services (2010) 1 SCC 142 ), in support of his plea that adequate compensation can be paid to the two workmen instead of ordering for their reinstatement. Sri C.R. Sridharan, upon my further inquiry, also suggested that a sum of RS.2.5 lakhs to each of the workmen would be adequate and sufficient amount of compensation. I would prefer to deal with this aspect of the matter a little later on. Sri M. Pitchaiah, learned counsel appearing for the respective workmen would submit that, these two writ petitions are barred by the principles of constructive rejudicata as well as the principle enunciated under Order 2 Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as, the same petitioners have earlier instituted W.P.No.5804 of 2003 and W.A.No.1346 of 2003 which were both dismissed and hence the petitioners are now precluded from challenging the award. Further, the Labour Court has provided a fair and reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to participate and contest the Industrial Dispute raised by the respective workmen, but however, they have not preferred to participate in the enquiry before the Labour Court and hence the petitioner cannot raise any factual dispute at present and seek to rely on them as if they are the admitted or established facts on record. It is also contended by Sri M. Pitchaiah that, it is the petitioners who are guilty of suppression of the material fats, inasmuch as, they have not filed Ex.W9 filed by the workmen before the Labour Court along with this writ petition. Above all, the petitioners have not traversed the pleadings set up by the workmen. When the respective workmen have asserted that the letter dated 23.01.2001 as well as the resignation letters dated 24.01.2001 were obtained by undue influence, it can be contraverted firstly by setting up the true and correct facts and circumstances relating to those two documents and then by producing necessary evidence and further by cross-examining the witness examined by workmen. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the workmen that, evidence which is liable to be led in the course of enquiry need not be pleaded in complete detail. The only facts which are essential and needed to determine the issue alone need be pleaded. In the instant case, the workmen have pleaded all the relevant facts and thereafter, they have also led in the evidence. Based upon a proper and correct appreciation of the same, according to the learned counsel for the workmen, the Labour Court has arrived at a proper and correct conclusion. Error of fact recorded by the Tribunal, however grave it might be, cannot be corrected by this Court. Further, no fraud or misrepresentation has been indulged in by the respective workmen. Hence, the award cannot be set-aside. Sri M. Pitchaiah would submit that with regard to the facts relating to acceptance of the resignation submitted by the two workmen are concerned, divergent pleas were raised by the writ petitioner. It is pointed out that, in ground h of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it is stated that the resignations are accepted instantaneously by the Assistant Branch Manager, but whereas, no such acceptance letters are filed before the Court. Realizing this, oral acceptance theory is introduced. It is pointed out that, in ground h of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it is stated that the resignations are accepted instantaneously by the Assistant Branch Manager, but whereas, no such acceptance letters are filed before the Court. Realizing this, oral acceptance theory is introduced. Hence, the pleas of the writ petitioners deserve no consideration whatsoever. It is further contended by Sri M. Pitchaiah that, whether it is a case of voluntary resignation of services by the workmen or a case of termination of services brought about under duress by the Management is a question of pure fact. Hence, the application moved by the respective workmen under Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is perfectly maintainable. Leaned counsel for the workmen has also pleaded that, the normal rule is, to award full back wages and only in exceptional circumstances and for valid and justifiable reasons, the quantum of back wages can be properly modulated. Learned counsel for the workmen has also placed reliance upon the Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officer’s Association Vs. State of Maharashtra (1990) 2 SCC 715 (para 35), M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt Ltd. Vs. The Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. (1979) 2 SCC 80 ), Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha ( AIR 1980 SC 1896 (1) (paras 143,144), SurenderaKumar Verma Vs. Central Government Industrial Triubnal, New Delhi (1981 (1) LLJ pg 386), Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (2010(1) SCALE pg 613), S.S. Shetty Vs. Bharat Nidhi Ltd. ( AIR 1958 SC 12 ), Chandu Lal Vs. Management of M/s Pan American World Airways Inc. (1985) 2 SCC 727 ). From an analysis of the fact situation, I have arrived at a finding that the joint letter addressed by both the workmen on 23.01.2001 did not inspire much confidence in my mind that it is made out of a free will and volition of the two workmen. Similarly, the identically worded two resignation letters dated 24.01.2001 also did not appear to be voluntary acts of the two workmen. Further, there was no acceptance of such resignations as was pleaded by the petitioners in this case, at any time prior to the letter dated 27.01.2001 signed by the Managing director of the company which was dispatched from Madras only on 22.02.2001. Further, there was no acceptance of such resignations as was pleaded by the petitioners in this case, at any time prior to the letter dated 27.01.2001 signed by the Managing director of the company which was dispatched from Madras only on 22.02.2001. Hence, I doubted the genuineness of the date of this letter. I have also doubted the competence of the Assistant Branch Manager to accept the resignations offered by the two workmen. Further, I agree with the contention that even before accepting the resignations of the workmen, the Assistant Branch manager prevented the two workmen from rendering services. Such an action of the Assistant Branch Manager amounts to termination of the services of workmen and hence the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the two Industrial Disputes. Most importantly, Sri V. Gopalan, S/o Sri T.R. Varadan, Assistant Branch Manager of the petitioners company at Vijayawada swore to an affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.54 of 2002 moved under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC read with Section 151 for setting aside the exparte award. He has alleged that the respondent/workman has stolen some property of the company and has accepted voluntarily the said offence committed by them by giving a letter. But however, nowhere did he say that he has accepted the resignation letter dated 24.01.2001 submitted by the workmen. Dealing with the allegation of improper conduct, the Labour Court by its order passed on 02.01.2003 while dismissing the I.A.No.54 of 2002 in I.D.No.131/2001 has observed in paragraph 3 of its order as under: “3. But however, nowhere did he say that he has accepted the resignation letter dated 24.01.2001 submitted by the workmen. Dealing with the allegation of improper conduct, the Labour Court by its order passed on 02.01.2003 while dismissing the I.A.No.54 of 2002 in I.D.No.131/2001 has observed in paragraph 3 of its order as under: “3. Though it is stated in the affidavit that the respondents of this petition admitted the offence voluntarily and gave a letter to him in his own hand-writing, which cannot be accepted for the reason that no such letter was put forth or filed before the court in proof of the voluntary admission of the offence of theft committed by the respondent of this I.A. In the absence of any such documents before the court, I feel that the allegations made against the respondent in this I.A. cannot also be recorded as genuine………..” W.P.No.5804 of 2003 was filed by the petitioner company challenging the correctness of the order dated 02.01.2003 passed by the Labour Court in I.A.No.54 of 2002 and that writ petition has been dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court along with W.A.No.1346 of 2003, with the following observations: “We are constrained to notice that as on the date of filing of application on 26-6-2002 for setting aside the ex parte award before the Labour Court, the deponent of the affidavit was not even competent to represent the appellant-company. In the affidavit itself, it is stated, “I will also furnish the General Power of Attorney within few days to see the company legal steps at my jurisdiction because I am Assistant Manager of the above company”. The affidavit has been sworn and signed on 26-6-2002, which itself discloses that as on the date of filing of affidavit in the Labour Court, the deponent of the affidavit was not authorized to represent the appellant-company. During the course of hearing of this writ appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant-company made available a copy of power of attorney executed by the Managing Director in favour of the deponent of the affidavit, which is dated 28-6-2002. These facts speak for themselves. The appellant-company never cared to prosecute the matter diligently. The affidavit filed in support of the application seeking to set aside the ex parte award does not inspire any confidence. These facts speak for themselves. The appellant-company never cared to prosecute the matter diligently. The affidavit filed in support of the application seeking to set aside the ex parte award does not inspire any confidence. We do not find any bonafides on the part of the appellant-company.” Therefore, to the extent of the finding recorded by the Labour Court while dealing with the allegation made by the petitioner company against the workman in I.A.No.54 of 2002 has become final and it binds the parties. The petitioner company is therefore precluded from raising any plea to the contra by virtue of principles of resjudicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is worth taking note of the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in PrahladSingh Vs. Col. Sukhdev Singh ( AIR 1987 SC 1145 ). “The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether a trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. …………..In the present case, in the proceeding to set aside an ex-parte order, the Court recorded an express finding that the landlord had agreed to withdraw the suit and receive the rent from the tenant. That was a finding which was binding on the landlord at later stages of the proceeding…………………” Dealing with the question of the measure of compensation that should be ordered where the termination is unlawful, it is only appropriate to notice the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in S.S. Shetty Vs. Bharat Nidhi Ltd ( AIR 1958 SC 12 ). “12. The position- as it obtains in the ordinary law of master and servant is quite clear. The master who wrongfully dismisses his servant is bound to pay him such damages as will compensate him for the wrong that he has sustained. They are to be assessed by reference to the amount earned in the service wrongfully terminated and the time likely to elapse before the servant obtains another post for which he is fitted. If the contract expressly provides that it is terminable upon, e.g., a month’s notice, the damages will ordinarily be a month’s wages.................. They are to be assessed by reference to the amount earned in the service wrongfully terminated and the time likely to elapse before the servant obtains another post for which he is fitted. If the contract expressly provides that it is terminable upon, e.g., a month’s notice, the damages will ordinarily be a month’s wages.................. No compensation can be claimed in respect of the injury done to the servant’s feelings by the circumstances of his dismissal, nor in respect of extra difficulty of finding work resulting from those circumstances. A servant who has been wrongfully dismissed must use diligence to seek another employment, and the fact that he has been offered a suitable post may be taken into account in assessing the damages." (Chitty on Contracts, 21st Edition, Vol. (2), p. 559 para. 1040). 13. If the contract of employment is for a specific term, the servant would in that event be entitled to damages the amount of which would be measured prima facie and subject to the rule of mitigation in the salary of which the master had deprived him. (Vide Coller v. Sunday Referee Publishing Co., Ltd. 1940-4 ALL.E.R.234 at p.237(A). The servant would then be entitled to the whole of the salary, benefits, etc., which he would have earned had be continued in the employ of the master for the full term of the contract, subject of course to mitigation of damages by way of seeking alternative employment.” However, in industrial adjudication, the measure of compensation is regulated by awarding back wages. In Shambunath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda (1984 AIR 289),the Supreme Court held, against the Management for its failure to get an issue framed before the Industrial Tribunal with regard to the gainful employment of the workman after his termination and for not adducing necessary evidence indicating the gainful employment of the workman anywhere, that the workman was not required to prove the negative that he is not gainfully employed. Thus, the issue relating to payment of back wages has been made to depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd Vs. Udai Narain Pandey (2006 (1) SCC pg 479), Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation Vs. M.C. Joshi (2007 (9) SCC pg 353). Thus, the issue relating to payment of back wages has been made to depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd Vs. Udai Narain Pandey (2006 (1) SCC pg 479), Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation Vs. M.C. Joshi (2007 (9) SCC pg 353). From the facts and circumstances, as noticed supra, I am convinced that the award of the Labour Court in ordering for payment of back wages is an appropriate award. Even at the time of admission of this writ petition, an interlocutory order was passed by this Court on 27.10.2003 directing interim suspension of the award subject to the condition that the petitioner company deposits 25% of the back wages awarded by the Labour Court within a period of four weeks and the interim suspension of the award is also subject to Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner company carried the matter by way of an appeal in W.A.No.2054 of 2003 and the division bench by its order dated 25.11.2003 has allowed the said appeal. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner company has been very effectively utilizing its superior economic capacity to frustrate and prolong the rights of the individual workmen, without any let up, by indulging in continuous litigation. There was not any meaningful explanation offered anywhere as to the reasons why it has not chosen to contest diligently the industrial dispute raised by the workmen. It has also not placed the entire material for consideration of this Court. But however, when a suggestion has been left, learned counsel for the petitioner had responded that a sum of Rs.2.00 lakhs would be an adequate compensation. Sri P. Ravisankar Rao has gone into the box and deposed that at the relevant point of time, he was drawing wages of Rs.5,600/- whereas Sri Balkishen, the other workmen has rendered much longer length of service that Sri Ravisankar Rao. For the past over 11 years, these workmen have been unjustly kept out of employment. They have not seen the colour of the copper so far. There is no averment made, even casually by the petitioner, that workmen are gainfully employed. The normal rule in such cases is that the order of reinstatement must follow with back wages. For the past over 11 years, these workmen have been unjustly kept out of employment. They have not seen the colour of the copper so far. There is no averment made, even casually by the petitioner, that workmen are gainfully employed. The normal rule in such cases is that the order of reinstatement must follow with back wages. Since the petitioner company has not led in any material as to why it cannot pay full back wages to the workmen concerned and as to the reasons or factors which disentitles the workmen to make any such claim for disallowance of back wages, the following rule enunciated in Hindustan Tin Works Pvt Ltd. Vs. The Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd i.e. payment of full back wages should be applied:- “9. …………. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law’s proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wage except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer……..” I, therefore, have no hesitation to uphold the award passed by the Labour Court which ordered for reinstatement of the workmen with full back wages. However, if the petitioner company is hesitant to reinstate the two workmen back into service, but instead prefers to pay adequate compensation, the compensation should be a reasonable amount of not less than Rs.10.00 lakhs whereas, on behalf of the petitioner company, an unrealistic and unreasonable amount of Rs.2 to 3 lakhs has been suggested as a compensation to be paid. I am not able to subscribe to the view that an amount of compensation of Rs. 2 or 3 lakhs is a reasonable amount. If, perhaps, the petitioner company has offered to pay a compensation in a sum of Rs.10.00 lakhs to each of the workmen, I would have been compelled to consider the said offer seriously. I, therefore, do not accept the suggestion made by Sri C. R. Sridharan to order for payment of compensation of Rs. 2 or 3 lakhs to workmen concerned in lieu of reinstatement and payment of back wage, basing upon the Judgments of Supreme Court in Talwara Cooperative Credit and Service Society Limited v. Sushil Kumar and Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Oberoi Flight Services. For the extraordinary litigative zeal exhibited all through by the petitioner company, thus denying the legitimate benefits to the two workmen for over a decade, I consider that it is only appropriate that this writ petition should be dismissed with costs of Rs.5,000/-payable to each of the two workmen. Fifteen days time is granted for depositing the costs with Registrar (Judicial), who upon such deposit being made by the petitioners would pass on the same to the workmen by transfer or by payment by way of crossed Demand Draft.