1. This criminal appeal has been registered on the basis of an application dated 24.2.2012 made by the convict to the Registry of this court through the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Aizawl. Appeal was admitted on 9.3.2012. By a subsequent order dated 8.6.2012, Mr. A.R. Malhotra, a learned counsel of this court was appointed as the amicus curiae. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.1.2010 passed by the Addl. District and Sessions Judge-II, Aizawl in Crl. Trl. No. 1517 2009 convicting the appellant under section 376(1) IPC and the order dated 3.2.2010 sentencing the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years with fine of Rs. 5,000, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 3 months, detention already undergone to be set off. 3. Prosecution case in brief is that one Lalbiakdika had lodged a first information dated 9.08.2008 before the Officer-in-Charge, Kolasib Police Station alleging that his minor daughter Lalnunfeli, aged about 14 years, was subjected to rape by the appellant on two occasions, i.e., on 22.5.2008 and 7.7.2008. The said information was treated as FIR and on the basis of the same, Kolasib P.S. Case No. 77/2008 under section 376(1), IPC was registered. Police investigated the case and in the course of investigation, appellant was irrested. After conclusion of the investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the accused under the aforesaid section. Charge under the aforesaid section was framed on 20.1.2009. 4. To prove its case, prosecution examined as many as 6 witnesses whereas no witness was produced by the defence though statement of the appellant under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ('Cr.PC') was recorded. The defence plea was that of denial. 5. After perusing the evidence adduced and after hearing the learned counsels for both the sides, learned trial judge by the judgment dated 22.1.2010 held that the guilt of the appellant was proved beyond all reasonable doubt and accordingly, convicted him under section 376(1), IPC. Again after hearing both the sides, the learned trial judge by order dated 3.2.2010 sentenced the appellant for the period as indicated above. 6. Aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant in the manner indicated above assailing his conviction and sentence. 7. Heard Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned amicus curiae for the appellant. Also heard Mr. A.K. Rokhum, learned Public Prosecutor, Mizoram. 8. 6. Aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant in the manner indicated above assailing his conviction and sentence. 7. Heard Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned amicus curiae for the appellant. Also heard Mr. A.K. Rokhum, learned Public Prosecutor, Mizoram. 8. Learned amicus curiae fairly submits that on the basis of the evidence on record it would be difficult to dislodge the finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial judge. He, however, contends that the trial was vitiated on three counts which strikes at the root of the trial itself. According to him, no charge was read over to the accused and since he was not confronted with the charge giving him the opportunity either to admit the charge or to contest the same, there was no charge framed against the appellant in the eye of law. Therefore, the trial proceeded without any charge being framed against the accused. His next point is that the statement of the accused under section 313, Cr.PC was recorded in a very perfunctory manner and, therefore, no proper explanation of the accused could be brought out in the course of the said exercise, which has also cast a shadow of doubt over the trial proceeding. He also contends that at the end of recording of evidence from the prosecution side, accused was not called upon to enter his defence and to adduce any evidence in his support. Thus, there was violation of section 233 of the Cr.PC. He submits that the cumulative effect of the aforesaid procedural irregularities would strike at the very foundation of the criminal trial and, therefore, the impugned conviction and sentence should be set aside and quashed. Learned amicus curiae, in support of his submissions, has referred to and relied upon the following judgments : Lal Behari Das and Ors. v. State of Tripura, 1998 (4) GLT 220. Basavaraj R. Patil and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 740 . N. Pishak Singh v. State of Manipur, 2005 (4) GLT 720. Latu Mahto and Another v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), (2008) 8 SCC 395 . Rafiq Ahmad alias Raft v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 8 SCC 300 . 9. Controverting the above submissions of the learned amicus curiae, learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. A.K. Rokhum submits that there is overwhelming evidence to establish the culpability of the appellant. Latu Mahto and Another v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), (2008) 8 SCC 395 . Rafiq Ahmad alias Raft v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 8 SCC 300 . 9. Controverting the above submissions of the learned amicus curiae, learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. A.K. Rokhum submits that there is overwhelming evidence to establish the culpability of the appellant. He submits that the victim though a minor girl was steadfast in her testimony and she was categorical in pinpointing the accused as having committed rape on her on the two occasions. According to him, the defects pointed out by the learned amicus curiae are technical in nature which have not caused prejudice to the appellant and in any case would not make any material difference to the final outcome of the proceeding. He finally submits that the view taken by the learned trial judge is based on the materials on record and, therefore, should not be disturbed. 10. Submissions made have been considered. 11. Before proceeding to the merit of the case, let us first examine the procedural defects as pointed out by the learned amicus curiae. 12. A perusal of the charge at page 5 of the paper book would indicate that the following charge was framed against the appellant —. "that you on or about 25.5.2008 and 7.7.2008 raped Lalruatfeli, 14 years in her house and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 376(1), IPC within the cognizance of this court and hereby direct that you be tried by court on the said charge". Though it is stated that the charge was read over and explained to the accused, his reply as to whether he admitted the charge or claimed to be tried was not recorded. It appears that even the name of the prosecutrix has been wrongly recorded. In the FIR her name has been shown as Lalnunfeli whereas in the charge it has been shown as Lalruatfel. 13. Section 215 of the Cr.PC provides that no error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge and no omission to state the offence or those particulars shall be recorded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact, misled by such error or omission and it has occasioned a failure of justice. 14. 14. The hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq Ahmed (supra) referring to the aforesaid provision, has observed that the purpose of framing a charge is to put the accused at notice regarding the offence for which he is being tried before the court of competent jurisdiction. For want of requisite information of the offence and details thereof, the accused should not suffer prejudice or there should not be failure of justice. 15. After going through the case record and observing the trend in the criminal trial, this court is of the view that the appellant was all along aware of the charge for which he was being tried. It cannot be said that the defect in the framing of charge had caused prejudice to the appellant by taking him by surprise. The omission in the framing of charge as pointed out by the learned amicus curiae, in my considered opinion, cannot be said to be of such a magnitude as to have vitiated the conviction itself. The appellant was represented by a learned counsel and at no point of time in the trial, the plea of prejudice was raised. 16. Coming to the alleged violation of section 233 of the Cr.PC, for a proper appreciation, the same is quoted hereunder : "233. Entering upon defence. — (1) Where the accused is not acquitted under section 232, he shall be called upon to enter on his defence and adduce any evidence he may have in support thereof. (2) If the accused puts in any written statement, the Judge shall file it with the record. (3) If the accused applies for the issue of any process for compelling the attendance of any witness or the production of any document or thing, the Judge shall issue such process unless he considers, for reasons to be recorded, that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice." 17. A perusal of the aforesaid provision would indicate that once the prosecution had concluded adducing of evidence on the basis of which the trial court could not have recorded an order of acquittal, the trial court would require the accused to enter his defence and adduce any evidence in his support. 18. A perusal of the aforesaid provision would indicate that once the prosecution had concluded adducing of evidence on the basis of which the trial court could not have recorded an order of acquittal, the trial court would require the accused to enter his defence and adduce any evidence in his support. 18. In lal Behari Das (supra), after examining the provisions of section 232 and 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this court observed that an irregularity in not recording a finding under section 232, Cr.PC that it is not a case of no evidence would not vitiate the trial but it is a curable defect. This court had relied upon a judgment of the Karnataka High Court reported in 1993 Crl. LJ 907 wherein it was held that failure on the part of the Judge to call upon the accused person to enter his defence in terms of section 233, Cr.PC would not in all cases vitiate the conviction, if there are materials to indicate that no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the accused. In other words, if on the facts of a particular case, no prejudice is said to have been caused on account of the failure to comply with the procedure as laid down under section 233, Cr.PC, conviction cannot be said to be vitiated. Similar is the view expressed in a subsequent decision of this court in N. Pishak Singh (supra). 19. On a consideration of the relevant materials, including the judgment of the trial court, this court is of the view that failure on the part of the trial court to adhere to the provisions of section 233, Cr.PC did not cause prejudice to the petitioner in putting up his defence. 20. Coming to the recording of statement of the accused under section 313, Cr.PC, this court is of the view that the same was not satisfactory. The hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Laku Mahto (supra) examined the object behind section 313, Cr.PC. The object is to enable the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The said provision is mainly intended to benefit the accused and as a corollary, to benefit the court in reaching a just and fair conclusion. The said provision is in fact an extension of the principles of natural justice which enables the accused to explain his position. 21. The said provision is mainly intended to benefit the accused and as a corollary, to benefit the court in reaching a just and fair conclusion. The said provision is in fact an extension of the principles of natural justice which enables the accused to explain his position. 21. No doubt, the trial judge ought to have been more discerning while recording the statement of the accused under the aforesaid provision. However, in the overall context of the case, such defect though has dented the prosecution case to a certain extent, however, cannot be said to have demolished it altogether. 22. Coming now to the evidence adduced, it is clear that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time when the occurrence took place. In her deposition she has stated her date of birth as 7.3.1994. Her testimony is clear and specific, leaving no room for any ambiguity. She has stated in detail the two incidents of rape committed on her on 22.5.2008 and 7.7.2008, the details of which need not be reproduced. She has stated in clear and unequivocal terms that it was the appellant who committed rape on her on both the two occasions. The cross-examination could not make any impact on her testimony. 23. The law has now crystallized that a conviction under section 376(1), IPC based on the sole uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix would be valid and legal and can be sustained. In this case, as has already been noted above, the prosecutrix was a minor girl of 14 years of age at the time of the incident. In normal circumstances, a minor girl would not falsely implicate a person, that too, a close relative like the appellant, who happened to be the maternal grand uncle of the victim. The evidence of the other witnesses also fully support the testimony of the prosecutrix. 24. In such circumstances, this court finds no good reason to interfere with the conviction of the appellant. In so far the sentence is concerned, the learned trial judge had imposed the minimum of the sentence prescribed, which is 7 years. Though the court may for adequate and special reasons impose a lesser sentence, this court finds no mitigating circumstances to warrant reduction in the sentence imposed. 25. In his representation to the court, the appellant has stated that he is suffering from persistent ill-health and is not getting proper treatment. Though the court may for adequate and special reasons impose a lesser sentence, this court finds no mitigating circumstances to warrant reduction in the sentence imposed. 25. In his representation to the court, the appellant has stated that he is suffering from persistent ill-health and is not getting proper treatment. The medical certificates enclosed suggest that surgery may be required. Considering the above, the jail authorities of Aizawl Central Jail are directed to immediately provide all medical facilities to the appellant and to get him treated at the Civil Hospital, Aizawl. 26. Before parting with the record, this court would like to place on record its appreciation of the assistance rendered by the learned amicus curiae, whose fee is quantified at Rs. 10,000. 27. Appeal stands dismissed, but with the above observation. 28. Copy of this judgment may be forwarded to the Jail Superintendent, Aizawl Central Jail, Aizawl for doing the needful. 29. No costs. _____________