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2012 DIGILAW 1214 (AP)

K. Neelavathamma v. State

2012-12-05

R.KANTHA RAO

body2012
JUDGMENT This appeal is filed against the judgment dated 16.9.2005 passed by the Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, Nellore in CC No. 6 of 2000. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. Smt. K. Neelavathamma, Mandal Parishad Development Officer, Raichoti (MPDO, Raichoti) was tried by the learned Special Judge for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short "the Act") on the allegation of demanding and accepting money of Rs.600/- from PW-1 as illegal gratification for the purpose of doing official favour viz., attesting a cheque for an amount of Rs.50,000/- belonging to PW-1. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove the said charge, examined PWs. 1 to 7, marked Exs.P-1 to P-22 and MOs.1 to 10. The appellant did not examine any witness on her behalf, but marked Exs.D-1 to D-4. 5. The learned trial Court at the conclusion of the trial, found the appellant, MPDO guilty for the aforesaid charges and convicted and sentenced her to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months under first count and also convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year under second count. The substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. Challenging the said order of conviction, Smt. Neelavathamma, the then MPDO, Raichoti preferred the present appeal. 6. Shortly stated, the facts of the case, as per the prosecution are the following: PW-1-Syed Mastan Valli, resident of Raichoti executed a drainage canal work in Nayab Saheb Street under IV phase Janmabhumi Programme in the year 1999. In respect of the said work, a cheque for an amount of Rs.50,000/- had to be issued to him. According to the prosecution, PW-1 approached the appellant, who was the MPDO for issuance of the cheque on 12.2.1999. It is said that the appellant informed him that the cheque was prepared and he had to pay an amount of Rs.1,000/- for attestation of the cheque by her. It is the version of the prosecution that for encashment of the said cheque, the attestation of MPDO was necessary. Subsequently, it is said that she reduced the bribe amount to Rs.600/- and asked PW-1 to pay the said amount on 13.2.1999 either at her office or at the house. It is the version of the prosecution that for encashment of the said cheque, the attestation of MPDO was necessary. Subsequently, it is said that she reduced the bribe amount to Rs.600/- and asked PW-1 to pay the said amount on 13.2.1999 either at her office or at the house. PW-1, who was unwilling to pay the bribe amount approached the DSP, ACB, Tirupathi (PW-7) and lodged a report with him. 7. On the strength of his report, a case in Crime No.1/ACB-TCD/1999 under Sections 7 and 11 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered, and thereafter, a trap was laid by PW-7 with his team consisting of mediators on 13.2.1999. During the course of which, according to the prosecution, the appellant received an amount of Rs.600/- from PW-1 as bribe at her house and kept the same in her vanity bag. On receiving the pre-arranged signal from PW-1, the raiding party rushed into the house of the appellant, conducted chemical test on the fingers of her both hands which yielded positive result. Then, the DSP, ACB got recovered the amount of Rs.600/- from the Vanity Bag of the appellant. The prosecution version is that on being asked by the DSP, ACB about the tainted amount, the appellant herself picked up amount from the Vanity Bag and produced the same before the DSP, ACB. 8. The defence version is that the appellant worked at Rayachoti area for a period of 20 to 22 years, her posting as MPDO, Rayachoti was not to the liking of the President, Mandal Praja Parishad, Rayachoti, when she went to Rayachoti to take charge as MPDO on 28.12.1998, her chambers was locked, she had sent up a report to the authorities and thereafter, the lock was opened facilitating her to occupy the chambers. 9. According to the appellant, the President, Mandal Praja Parishad, who developed some hostile attitude towards her planted PW-1 and got her involved in a false charge of graft. 9. According to the appellant, the President, Mandal Praja Parishad, who developed some hostile attitude towards her planted PW-1 and got her involved in a false charge of graft. Her version is that she never demanded or accepted the bribe from PW-1, on the date of trap two unknown persons entered into her house, offered her money, when she refused, they thrusted forcibly the money into her hands for which she refused, then the said two persons kept the money in her vanity bag lying on the tea-poy and went away, subsequently, the raiding party rushed in and recovered the money from her vanity bag. 10. PW-1 did not support the prosecution version. He stated before the trial Court in his evidence that on 12.2.1999, he approached the appellant and asked her to issue the cheque, she told him to come on the next day as she was in an angry mood for not preparing the cheque on 12.2.1999, on the advise of some persons that if the report was given to ACB he would get the cheque immediately, he approached the DSP, ACB and signed on the statement prepared by him and also brought an amount of Rs.600/- on 13.2.1999 at 9.00 a.m., as directed by the DSP, ACB. 11. This witness specifically stated in his evidence that the appellant did not demand any bribe at any point of time, on 13.2.1999 he went to the chambers of the appellant and asked her about the cheque, she told him that the cheque was made ready, it was with the Senior Assistant and to take the cheque from him. It is also the evidence of PW-1 that the appellant told him to inform the Senior Assistant to bring the cheque to her, so that she can put the sign on the back side of the cheque, on that' went to the Senior Assistant and told him that the appellant was asking him to bring, the cheque. Then according to PW-1, the Senior Assistant gave a cheque to him and c obtained his signature in the counterfoil. PW-1 further stated in his evidence that the appellant asked him to put his signature on the reverse side of the cheque and he signed accordingly and then the appellant also put her signature on the reverse of the cheque. 12. PW-1 further stated in his evidence that the appellant asked him to put his signature on the reverse side of the cheque and he signed accordingly and then the appellant also put her signature on the reverse of the cheque. 12. This witness further stated that he came out and informed the DSP, ACB that the appellant did not accept the money and she put her signature on the cheque. On that according to him, the DSP, ACB insisted that he should tender the amount of Rs.600/- to the appellant at her house. Subsequently he says, with the assistance of two persons working in the Mandal Praja Parishad Office, he located the house of the appellant and approached her, when he offered the money she stated to him that she would not accept the money then he came out of the house. According to PW-1, two persons, who were waiting outside the house, asked him as to whether the appellant accepted the money and he told him that the appellant did not accept the money, then the two persons took the money stating that they would handover the same to the appellant and went inside the house and tried to give the money to the appellant. When the appellant refused to accept the money they thrusted the money into the purse of the appellant, thereafter, he gave pre-arranged signal to the DSP, ACB and others, and then the raiding party rushed into the house of the appellant. 13. Thus, PW-1 in his evidence apart from stating that the appellant never demanded nor accepted the money from him explained the circumstances under which he gave the report and obliged the directions of the DSP, ACB. The learned trial Court however, convicted the appellant basing on the evidence relating to recovery of an amount of Rs.600/- from the vanity bag of the appellant and the evidence relating to the chemical test which was found to be positive. The learned trial Court relied on the evidence of PWs.2 and 3, the mediators, PW-4 the Woman Constable and PW-5 a Senior Assistant in MPDO Office on the aspects of the factum of recovery of the tainted amount and the chemical test conducted proving to be positive. 14. The learned trial Court relied on the evidence of PWs.2 and 3, the mediators, PW-4 the Woman Constable and PW-5 a Senior Assistant in MPDO Office on the aspects of the factum of recovery of the tainted amount and the chemical test conducted proving to be positive. 14. PW-1 admitted in the cross-examination before the trial Court that one K. Khadar Basha was the President of MPDO, Rayachoti at relevant time and he used to approach him now and then. He also admitted that there were disputes between the Congress MLA, Rayachoti and Ex.M.P., Kadapa. He further admitted that the President, Mandal Praja Parishad, Rayachoti belongs to the opposite faction of Congress MLA, Rayachoti. He also stated in his evidence that he had gone through a news item published to the effect that the followers of the President, Mandal Praja Parishad, Rayachoti locked the chambers of the appellant, who was posted as MPDO and did not allow her into the office. 15. PW-2, the mediator also admitted in the cross-examination that he came to know from a news item that the Office of the MPDO was locked by some persons when the appellant came to Rayachoti to take charge as MPDO on 28.12.1998. He also admitted in the cross-examination that to his knowledge there were no complaints against the appellant and the appellant had been working for 20 to 22 years in Rayachoti area. 16. Similarly, PW-5, the Senior Assistant working in the Office of MPDO also admitted in the cross-examination that there was news item published in daily newspaper that the chambers of the MPDO was locked when the appellant came to take charge as MPDO on 28.12.2012. He also admitted that the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Kadapa came to Rayachoti to make an enquiry in that regard. He further admitted that he and the staff members gave a statement to the effect that the chambers of he MPDO was locked on 28.12.1998, who came to assume charge. The said statement is marked as Ex.D3. This witness also admitted in the cross-examination that the appellant had sent a report against him to the higher officials stating about his involvement in the locking of the chambers of MPDO. He also admitted that on her report he was transferred. Subsequently, admittedly this witness was transferred from Rayachoti to some other place. The Xerox copy of the proceedings are EX.D4. 17. He also admitted that on her report he was transferred. Subsequently, admittedly this witness was transferred from Rayachoti to some other place. The Xerox copy of the proceedings are EX.D4. 17. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that absolutely there is no evidence showing that the appellant either demanded or accepted the bribe, the trial Court taking an erroneous view of the matter convicted the appellant merely relying on the evidence relating to recovery of the tainted amount from the vanity bag of the appellant and the chemical test yielding positive result and the course adopted by the trial Court is unsustainable in law. 18. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for ACB would contend that even though PW-1 did not support the prosecution version, the trial Court is justified in drawing presumption under Section 20(1) of the Act on being satisfied about the proof regarding the recovery of tainted amount from the vanity bag of the appellant and the chemical test yielding positive result. According to the learned Standing Counsel for ACB, since the appellant failed to rebut the presumption drawn against her by the trial Court, the trial Court is perfectly justified in recording conviction against her. 19. Before arriving at a finding as to whether the trial Court is correct in finding the appellant guilty for the charges of graft, it is essential to peruse the authorities relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. (1) In C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala, (2009) 3 SCC 779 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "Mere recovery of tainted money by itself is not enough, in absence of evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe." 20. As to the mode of rebutting the presumption by the accused, the Supreme Court explained that the accused can rebut the charge either through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or by adducing reliable\evidence. According to the Supreme Court, the burden of proof on accused under Section 20 is not the same as the burden placed on prosecution to prove case beyond reasonable doubt. 21. According to the Supreme Court, the burden of proof on accused under Section 20 is not the same as the burden placed on prosecution to prove case beyond reasonable doubt. 21. For laying down the aforesaid ratio the Supreme Court followed earlier decision in Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 4 SCC 725 and M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 . In Suraj Mal's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. According to the Supreme Court, the mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. 22. In M. Narsinga Rao's case (supra), the Supreme Court held as follows: "12. The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted "as motive or reward" for doing or forbearing to do any official act. So the word 'gratification' need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the Court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be forfeited by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like 'gratification or any valuable thing'. If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word 'gratification' must be treated in. the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it." 23. Further, in Banars; Dass v. State of Haryana, 2010 (1) ALD (Crl.) 924 (SC) = AIR 2010 SC 1589 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "It is a settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the conviction of an accused cannot be founded on toe basis of inference. Further, in Banars; Dass v. State of Haryana, 2010 (1) ALD (Crl.) 924 (SC) = AIR 2010 SC 1589 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "It is a settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the conviction of an accused cannot be founded on toe basis of inference. The offence should be proved against the accused beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or even by circumstantial evidence if each link of the chain of events is established pointing towards the guilt of the accused. To constitute the offence under Section 161 IPC it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that there was demand of money and the same was voluntarily accepted by the accused. Similarly, in terms of Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, the demand and acceptance of the money for doing a favour in discharge of its official duties is sine qua non to the conviction of the accused." 24. From the legal position above noted, it is essential to prove the charge of bribery that there is a demand made by the accused and thereafter there was J. voluntarily acceptance of the bribe knowing it to be a bribe. Unless these two requirements are satisfied, the accused cannot be convicted for a graft charge on mere proof of the recovery of tainted money from the possession of the accused or on the ground that the chemical test conducted on him yielded positive result. It is true that when the prosecution succeeds in proving the acceptance of tainted amount, it is obligatory on the part of the Court to draw the legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act, to the effect that unless the contrary is proved the accused accepted or obtained that gratification as a motive or reward, such as is mentioned in Section 7 of the Act for rendering official favour. The presumption, however, is rebutable presumption and the accused can displace the presumption either by leading positive evidence or by showing the circumstances in his favour from the material available on record, such as, from the established facts or from the answers elicited from the prosecution witnesses in the course of cross-examination. The standard of proof required for displacing the presumption is not that of the standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt but is that of the preponderance of probability. The standard of proof required for displacing the presumption is not that of the standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt but is that of the preponderance of probability. It is enough on the part of the accused to show the circumstances which probabilise the defence version. 25. Now, turning to the facts of the present case, there is evidence on record showing that there were two rival political groups in Rayachoti and that some persons locked the chambers of the appellant on 28.12.1999 when she went there to assume charge. The learned trial Court also recorded a finding that from the evidence of PW2 and the contents of EX.D3, it was established that the office of the appellant was locked by unknown persons on 28.12.1999 when she came to assume charge as MPDO. The evidence of PW-1 clearly shows that when he informed two persons outside the Office of the MPDO that the cheque was not issued to him on 12.2.1999, they advised him to lodge a report before the ACB so that the cheque would be issued at an early date. PW-1 was specific on the aspect that the appellant never demanded bribe from him nor accepted the same, but on the advice of the said two persons, he lodged a report with the DSP, ACB against her. Though the team of DSP, ACB consisted of mediators, there was no accompanying witness in this case at the time when PW-1 allegedly offered bribe amount and the appellant allegedly accepted the same. Therefore, there is no direct evidence showing that the appellant either demanded to pay the bribe or accepted the same from PW-1. Unless the prosecution proves that there is voluntary acceptance of bribe from the appellant, the learned trial Court is not supposed to draw a presumption under Section 20 of the Act against the appellant. In the instant case, according to the evidence of PW-5, the Senior Assistant, the cheque was prepared and it was signed by the appellant also and she directed him to deliver the cheque to PW-1. However, according to the prosecution, when PW-1 approached the appellant at her house for attestation of his signature on the cheque, she demanded and accepted the bribe. PW-1 did not support the said version. According to him, there was no demand or acceptance of bribe by the appellant at any point of time. However, according to the prosecution, when PW-1 approached the appellant at her house for attestation of his signature on the cheque, she demanded and accepted the bribe. PW-1 did not support the said version. According to him, there was no demand or acceptance of bribe by the appellant at any point of time. As there was hostility between two political groups in Rayachoti at relevant time and one group did not want the appellant to assume charge as MPDO, Rayachoti, there was every possibility for involving the appellant in a false charge of graft. This factor has been completely overlooked by the learned trial Court. PW-1, apart from positively asserting that the appellant never demanded bribe from him nor did she accept the same, stated the circumstances leading to lodging his report with the DSP, ACB. The only evidence therefore, remained against the appellant was that an amount of Rs.600/- was recovered from her vanity bag lying on tea-poy at her residence and the chemical test conducted on her fingers yielded positive result. For that, her explanation is that two persons came to her house, forcibly thrusted the money in to her hands, she did not receive it and then they kept the amount in the vanity bag and went outside. The explanation she states, that she offered at the earliest before the DSP, ACB, but the same was not recorded in post-trap panchanama. 26. From the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that even assuming that a presumption under Section 20 of the Act had been raised by the trial Court against the appellant, the appellant could be able to rebut the presumption by raising a probable defence that she was involved in a false charge of graft on account of the political rivalry between two groups. As already said that she need not establish her defence by standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, it seems to me that the defence raised is more probable and the appellant could be able to discharge the presumption drawn against her under Section 20 of the Act by the trial Court by showing the afore-stated circumstances in her favour. The learned trial Court overlooking the said circumstances erroneously convicted the appellant for the charge of bribery. The learned trial Court overlooking the said circumstances erroneously convicted the appellant for the charge of bribery. The conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court are unsustainable in law and are liable to be set aside in the present appeal. 27. Consequently, the conviction and sentence passed by the Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, Nellore in CC No. 6 of 2000 on 16.9.2005 against the appellant are set aside and the appellant is found not guilty of the charges with which she stood charged and accordingly, she is set at liberty. The fine amount, if any, paid by the appellant shall be refunded. The appeal is allowed.