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2012 DIGILAW 1215 (GAU)

Hemendra Narayan Datta v. J. K. Sinha

2012-10-17

SUBHASIS TALAPATRA

body2012
JUDGMENT Subhasis Talapatra, J. 1. The records of the Ex. P. No. 01/2004 along with CM. Appl. No. 233/2011 have been placed before this Court in compliance to the order dated 13.12.2011 as passed in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011. By the order dated 13.122011 as passed in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 14/2011, the Cont. Cas. (C) No. 14/2011 has been tagged with Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011. Similarly, by the order dated 13.12.2011 as passed in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 17/2011, the Cont. Cas. (C) No. 17/2011 also has been tagged with Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011. After perusal of the records, it appeared that violation of the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 as passed by the learned Single Judge in Ex. R No. 01/2004, which was confirmed by the Full Bench of this Court by the judgment and order dated 19.08.2010 as passed in W.A. No. 81/2007 and W.A. No. 88/2007, has been alleged in the Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011, Cont. Cas. (C) No. 14/2011 and Cont. Cas. (C) No. 17/2011 by different sets of the petitioners. All these matters therefore would be required to proceed analogously. The order therefore would be made in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011. However, the counsel representing the petitioners would have the equal opportunity of representing their respective cases. By these petitions filed under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners herein urged for drawing up proceeding for contempt of Court against the respondents for violating the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 as passed in Ex. R No. 01/2004, which has been affirmed by the Full Bench of this Court, alleging further that the violation is wilful and deliberate and as such this Court shall uphold the authority of this Court and majesty of law. 2. The respondents were directed by the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 as under: 19. In view of the above, this writ petition is allowed with the direction to the State respondents either to deliver vacant possession of the land which was de-requisitioned by the aforesaid notification dated 26.2.1977 within two months from today. 2. The respondents were directed by the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 as under: 19. In view of the above, this writ petition is allowed with the direction to the State respondents either to deliver vacant possession of the land which was de-requisitioned by the aforesaid notification dated 26.2.1977 within two months from today. Till then, they will pay requisition compensation all throughout to the parties involved including the petitioner, if the de-requisitioned land is not handed over within the stipulated period, the respondents shall initiate the necessary process towards acquiring the land with payment of appropriate acquisition compensation to the petitioner and others. This shall be done in two months after expiry of the aforesaid stipulated period of two months. Thus, the entire exercise shall be carried out within four months from today of which the later two months will be dependent on the result of the exercise to be carried out by the State respondents in the previous two months. 20. If the aforesaid direction is not complied with within the stipulated period of time, the officers responsible for compliance of the same will be liable for contempt of Court proceeding. It is hoped that such necessity will not arise. However, in case such necessity arises, the matter will be viewed seriously. After all, the orders of this Court cannot be flouted in the manner and method in which the respondents have all along done ever since the judgment dated 2.6.1988 was delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in the first round of litigation. The respondents till date have successfully thwarted the implementation of the successive orders of this Court on untenable pleas. Such infraction on the part of the respondents cannot be tolerated any more. However, the respondents are given the last chance to implement the orders of this Court within the aforesaid stipulated period failing which, the law will take it own course with all its vigour. Apart that, in para 22 of the said judgment and order, another observation has been made, which is reproduced for reference: 22. However, the respondents are given the last chance to implement the orders of this Court within the aforesaid stipulated period failing which, the law will take it own course with all its vigour. Apart that, in para 22 of the said judgment and order, another observation has been made, which is reproduced for reference: 22. Before parting with the case records, it is made clear mat it will be open for the State respondents to realize the amount which might be involved towards implementation of the orders of this Court coupled with the order passed in this proceeding from the Air Port authority, if the same is found to be recoverable from them. 3. For purpose of reference, it is relevant to refer to the direction contained in the judgment and order dated 02.06.1988 passed by the Division Bench of this Court while disposing the writ petition, being Civil Rule No. 258/1980 which was filed for a direction to deliver the possession of the derequisitioned land in terms of the Gazette notification dated 26.02.1997 read with the corrigendum dated 03.08.1979. From the above orders it appears that the letters etc. which were written by the functionaries of the State Government are not denied by the respondents in their counter-affidavit. It is absolutely clear that tout of 3 drones and odd area of land requisitioned by the respondents under the provision of the Tripura State Security Order only an area of 1 drone and odd land was acquired and for which compensation was paid to the petitioners and the remaining area is still with the respondents for which the respondents have neither paid compensation as required under the aforesaid order nor have delivered possession to the petitioners after de- requisitioned. In fact, the District Magistrate and Collector wanted to utilise the land for some other purpose such as construction of college building, stadium etc. Therefore, this Court expressed inability to accept the contention of the respondents that the requisitioned land are in possession of under raiyats of the petitioners or that a part of the land was sold. As the land was in possession of the respondents, under law they are bound to pay compensation to the petitioners from the date of requisition till the land is acquired by paying compensation according to law or hand over the possession of the land after derequisitioning it. As the land was in possession of the respondents, under law they are bound to pay compensation to the petitioners from the date of requisition till the land is acquired by paying compensation according to law or hand over the possession of the land after derequisitioning it. It appears further that the respondents in Civil Rule No. 258/1980 had resorted to the plea that the requisitioned land are in possession of under raiyats of the writ petitioners but the said plea was categorically rejected by the said judgment and order dated 26.02.1977. 4. The said judgment and order containing the directions as reproduced attained finality, there being no challenge. When the aforesaid direction was complied with, the petitioners in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011 had to approach this Court once again by filing another writ petition, being Civil Rule No. 47/1989. The learned Single Judge, taking note of the relevant materials into account of the aforesaid judgment and order of the Division Bench, allowed the writ petition by the judgment and order dated 02.02.1996 with the direction as follows: In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the respondents No. 1 and 2 are directed to pay compensation to the petitioner for his share of the de-requisitioned land as determined under the Tripura State Security order 1358 T.W. for the land de-requisitioned under the order dated 25th Feb, 77 of the Govt. of Tripura, Revenue Department under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the said Tripura State Security Order 1358 T.W. for the period it was requisitioned and even thereafter until possession of the derequisitioned land is delivered to the petitioner less the amount already paid to the petitioner by way of provisional requisition compensation. of Tripura, Revenue Department under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the said Tripura State Security Order 1358 T.W. for the period it was requisitioned and even thereafter until possession of the derequisitioned land is delivered to the petitioner less the amount already paid to the petitioner by way of provisional requisition compensation. The respondents are also directed to make sincere efforts to deliver possession of the derequisitioned land mentioned in the said order dated 26th February, 1977 of the Government of Tripura to the petitioner and Shri Bani Bhusan Sen or their heirs within six months from today and in the event, the respondents No. 1 and 2 deliver possession of the said land to the petitioner, they will cease to be liable for compensation for the de-requisitioned land with effect from the date of delivery of possession of the land to the petitioner and such delivery of possession of the de- requisitioned land to the petitioner will be without prejudice to the rights of other persons including under raiyats, if any, who will be entitled to enforce their rights against the petitioner by due process of law. Considering, however, the entire facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. (Emphasis added) 5. It is to be noted that this Court by the said judgment and order dated 02.02.1996 has in no uncertain terms categorically observed that such delivery of possession of the de-requisitioned land to the petitioners will be without prejudice to the right of the other persons including the under raiyats, if any, who will be entitled to enforce their rights against the petitioner by due process of law. Therefore, irrespective of the right that has been created on the de-requisitioned land by the petitioners or by any other means that would not stand in the way of handing over the possession of the land. Against the said judgment and order dated 02.02.1996 as referred, the respondents preferred writ appeals, being Writ Appeal No. 28/1996 and Writ Appeal No. 33/1996, but the said writ appeals were dismissed by the common judgment and order dated 14.06.2002. The said judgment and order affirmed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench has also referred to the earlier judgment of the Division Bench dated 02.06.1988 in Civil Rule No. 258/1980. The said judgment and order affirmed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench has also referred to the earlier judgment of the Division Bench dated 02.06.1988 in Civil Rule No. 258/1980. During the pendency of the writ appeals, the Division Bench by the order dated 19.12.2001 called for survey of the land to be made by the authority. In the order the specific areas with regard to which, such survey had to be made were indicated. Pursuant thereto a report of the survey was placed on record and on perusal of the report the Division Bench directed the concerned officials to be present in the Court. Considering the report and the other materials and also hearing the officials present, the Division Bench declined to accept the report. It was contended by the respondents that the judgment and order dated 02.02.1996 passed by this Court in Civil Rule No. 47/1989 is incapable of being executed inasmuch as no portion of the de-requisitioned land is in possession of 'the authority'. The Division Bench found that the same was the precise plea raised by the respondents in the earlier round of litigation. The Division Bench also held that the inability of the State to execute and implement the directions made in Civil Rule No. 47/1989 would hardly make the said directions legally fragile and infirm. The validity of the directions contained in the said judgment cannot be judged by the yardstick of the ability of the State to com-ply with the same. While dismissing the appeal along with the connected appeal, by the judgment and order dated 14.06.2002, the Division Bench made the following observations: 9. The sole ground of challenge projected by the appellants in the instant cases appears to be that the Judgment and order dated 2.2.96 passed by this Court in Civil Rule No. 47 of 89 is incapable of execution inasmuch as it is the case of the appellants that no portion of the de-requisitioned land is in possession of the authority. This is the precise question that was raised in the earlier round of litigation. This is the precise question that was raised in the earlier round of litigation. Learned counsel for the appellants, in addition to the contentions already advanced in the earlier round of litigation to the effect that the writ petitioner was himself responsible for transferring some of the land to different purchasers, has contended that to begin with the State never get the possession of the land which was requisitioned in the year 1950. On the aforesaid basis, it is sought to be contended, on behalf of the appellants, that though the de-requisition notification clearly mentions that the area mentioned therein is to be de-requisitioned and possession thereof is to be handed over to the owners, in fact, there is no such land available with the authority. We find the submissions advanced both perplexing and startling. However, as the said question has already been gone into in the earlier round of litigation, i.e. in Civil Rule No. 258/80, we do not consider it necessary on our part to once again enter into the aforesaid controversy and to record any finding thereof. The aforesaid contentions advanced have been answered earlier by this Court in the judgment and order dated 2.6.88 on an elaborate consideration of the communications, orders and notifications issued by the State authority on the basis of which this Court has already held that the land in dispute is within the boundaries and is encircled by the fencing by the Khowai Airport. That apart, the inability of the State to execute and implement the directions issued by this Court in Civil Rule No. 47/99 would hardly make the said directions legally fragile and infirm. The validity of the directions contained in the said judgment cannot be judged by the yardstick of the ability of the State to comply with the same. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeals. Consequently, both the appeals shall stand dismissed. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not consider it appropriate to burden the State with any costs. 6. The respondents having not been satisfied with the said judgment and order, preferred SLP(C) No. 4255/2003, but the Apex Court dismissed the said petition for special leave by the order dated 24.02.2003. Thus, the direction reached its finality and the respondents had no option to deviate from compliance of the said direction. 6. The respondents having not been satisfied with the said judgment and order, preferred SLP(C) No. 4255/2003, but the Apex Court dismissed the said petition for special leave by the order dated 24.02.2003. Thus, the direction reached its finality and the respondents had no option to deviate from compliance of the said direction. When the direction of this Court was not complied with even after repeated persuasions by the petitioner, he had no option left but to file the writ petition being EX. P. No. 01/2004 for implementation of the judgment and order, 7. The respondents, in their counter-affidavit, have once again taken the stand that the land was not traceable. According to the respondents since the petitioner did not submit the necessary particulars of the land, the respondents could not execute the directions of this Court. It has been stated that if the petitioner wants to enforce the judgment of this Court, he must submit full particulars of the land in respect of which the petitioner wants recovery of possession. Certain statements have also been made regarding the liability of the Airport Authority to comply with the directions. This Court by order dated 27.08.2004 provided for furnishing a report by the Settlement Officer towards identification of location of the derequisitioned land. Pursuant to the said order, the Settlement Officer had furnished report taking altogether a different perspective into consideration that what has prevailing all throughout. As per the said report, the recorded area is much more than the actual area. According to the report, the Revenue Department had de-requisitioned 11.37 acres of land to be handed over to the parties, but the actual area of the de-requisitioned land in sheet/on ground is 7.42 acres. As per the report, the shortage of 3.87 acres in area has been due to recording of access area on the face of old Chitha Khatian. The Settlement Officer in his report has lastly recorded that the parties were invited to come up with proposal towards proper solution of the matter, but no such proposal/suggestion was received by him. 8. In the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 as passed by this Court in Ex. P. No. 01/2004, it has been further observed: 10. The question, which arises for consideration is, whether the successive directions of this Court can be diluted in the above manner. 8. In the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 as passed by this Court in Ex. P. No. 01/2004, it has been further observed: 10. The question, which arises for consideration is, whether the successive directions of this Court can be diluted in the above manner. The report furnished by the Settlement Officer cannot be accepted for more than one reasons. The reflection made in the report that excess area was shown in de-requisitioning of the land, was never the ground urged in any of the earlier proceedings. After the notification of the Government itself on 26.2.1977, with subsequent corrigendum dated 3.8.1979 de-requisitioning the area of land about which mention has been made in the earlier proceedings, it does not lie on the mouth of the Government to say that excess area was shown de-requisitioned. In the earlier round of litigations, the defence of the respondents was that the lands are in occupation of the under raiyats. On the other hand, in the order issued by the authorities that the derequisitioned land was in occupation of the respondents themselves. The judgment and order passed in the Writ appeal has been noted above. 11. In the report furnished by the surveyor in the proceeding in Civil Rule No. 47/1989, it was clearly indicated that the land was located. By Annexure-VI letter dated 31.5.1991 (annexed to the counter objection to the aforesaid report, it was indicated that 2.52 acres of land falls outside the Air Port fencing boundary, which had been recorded as settled land of some persons. Further, the Government of Tripura by its letter dated 10.07.1991 issued under the signature of the Collector asked the Air Port authority to fix up a suitable date for handing over possession of the land in question to the parties involved. The petitioner has annexed the relevant documents in his objection to the report furnished by the Settlement Officer pursuant to the order dated 27.8.2004, which clearly indicate that the land in question was identifiable at the relevant point of time. The petitioner has also produced the relevant maps towards, identification of the land. 9. Even in the said proceeding for execution of the judgment and order dated 02.06.1988, the respondents resorted to the plea that the land was not identifiable and consequently the order of the Court was not executable. On the basis of such stand also this Court in the said Ex. 9. Even in the said proceeding for execution of the judgment and order dated 02.06.1988, the respondents resorted to the plea that the land was not identifiable and consequently the order of the Court was not executable. On the basis of such stand also this Court in the said Ex. P. No. 01/2004 has directed as quoted above. 10. Against the said judgment and order dated 24.08.2007, the respondents filed two appeals, being W.A. No. 81/2007 and W.A. No. 88/2007. By the judgment and order dated 19.08.2010, the Full Bench of this Court directed as under: 49. In the light of the above discussion, we find no merit in this set of appeals requiring interference with the impugned judgment and order. Accordingly, these appeals fail. We order that the directions given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order, be carried out and the entire process be completed within a period of six months from the date of this order. No cost. 11. In the said judgment and order, the Full Bench of this Court had observed that the learned Single Judge considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case refused to accept the report of the Settlement Officer and taking note of the successive directions refused to accept the plea that there was no land to be handed over to the present respondents and correctly directed by its order dated 24.08.2007 to deliver vacant possession of the de-requisitioned land as per notification dated 26.02.1977 within two months from the date of the order and pay the requisite compensation all throughout or in the alternative initiate necessary process towards acquiring the land and pay 'appropriate compensation for acquisition to the petitioners and others. The entire process was directed to be completed within four months from the date of the order. It was also observed that in view of the ratio as laid by the Apex Court in The Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, as reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5577, if the State respondent is not in a position to handover the land, the writ petitioners are entitled to receive the compensation. 12. Against the said judgment and order dated 19.08.2010 as passed in W.A. No. 81/2007 and W.A. No. 88/2007, the respondents filed a petition for special leave with an application for condonation of delay, being LA. Nos. 1- 2/2011. In the said LA. Nos. 12. Against the said judgment and order dated 19.08.2010 as passed in W.A. No. 81/2007 and W.A. No. 88/2007, the respondents filed a petition for special leave with an application for condonation of delay, being LA. Nos. 1- 2/2011. In the said LA. Nos. 1-2, the Supreme Court by the order dated 11.04.2011 has observed as under: The respondents were deprived of their land in May, 1950 when the Chief Commissioner requisitioned the same by exercising power under Section 7(1) of the Tripura State Security Order, 1358 (T.E.). Civil Rule No. 258 of 1980 filed by the respondents and some others for de-requisition of the land and payment of compensation was disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court by directing the petitioners to pay compensation to respondents till the acquisition of land or till the issue of de-requisition notification. Due to non-compliance of the aforesaid order, the respondents again approached the High Court. Civil Rule No. 47 of 1989 was disposed of by the learned Single Judge by directing petitioners to pay compensation and also make sincere efforts to deliver possession of the de-requisitioned land. Writ appeal filed by the petitioners and the Airport Authority of India Ltd. were dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 14.06.2002 and the special leave petition filed by them was dismissed by this Court on 24.02.2003. Notwithstanding the three orders of the High Court dismissal of the special leave petition by this Court, petitioners did not deliver possession of the property to respondents. Therefore, they were constrained to file Execution Petition No. 01 of 2004, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge on 28.04.2007. The petitioners challenged the order of the learned Single Judge in Writ Appeal No. 81 of 2007. The Airport Authority of India Ltd. filed Writ Appeal No. 88 of 2007. The Division Bench of the High Court referred the matter to the Larger Bench. After considering the factual matrix of the case and arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the Full Bench held that there was no valid ground or justification for not restoring land to the respondents. In our view, there is no merit in the petitioners' challenge to the order of the learned Single Judge and the impugned judgment. After considering the factual matrix of the case and arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the Full Bench held that there was no valid ground or justification for not restoring land to the respondents. In our view, there is no merit in the petitioners' challenge to the order of the learned Single Judge and the impugned judgment. The detailed reason recorded by the learned Single Judge for directing delivery of possession of the remaining land to the respondents, which has been approved by the Full Bench of the High Court does not suffer from any legal infirmity requiring interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. The special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed. 13. Thereafter, the petitioner issued a notice on the respondents on 16.04.2011 for delivery of possession of 11.37 acres of land from the vacant airstrip at Khowai in compliance with the judgment and order as passed in Ex. P. No. 01/2004, which was affirmed in W.A. No. 81/2007 and W.A. No. 88/2007 and against which the SLP as filed by the State has also been dismissed on 11.04.2011. In the said notice, the relevant directions as passed by this Court have been reproduced and it was demanded that six months by then had expired and the Supreme Court had not given any extension of time for implementation beyond the six months as was expiring on 18.02.2011. Thus the contempt has already been done. However, the petitioner expected that immediately but not beyond seven days in any rate the possession of the de-requisitioned land as per the direction of the High Court be handed over to them, but no response whatsoever was made available to the petitioners. Ultimately this petition for drawing up the contempt proceeding for violating the orders has been filed. 14. In response to the notice of this Court, the respondents appeared and filed the counter-affidavit, wherein they have reiterated their stand and in para-21 the following statements have been made: 21. After service of the petition upon the respondents, after intensive enquiry till now, for the first time, it has come to the light that the petitioners by different registered Sale Deeds sold land from the requisitioned land to different persons/purchasers/vendees (hereinafter referred to as 'vendees'). After service of the petition upon the respondents, after intensive enquiry till now, for the first time, it has come to the light that the petitioners by different registered Sale Deeds sold land from the requisitioned land to different persons/purchasers/vendees (hereinafter referred to as 'vendees'). The particulars of the said registered Sale-Deeds, which came to the light till now, are stated below-- Sale Deed No. 1-669 dated 20.02.1987, No. Nil Dated 8.1.1969, No. Nil dated 10.03.1999, No. Nil dated 3.10.1988, No. Nil dated 7.9.1974, No. 1-378 dated 5.9.1955, No. 1-378 dated 3.2.1976, No. Nil dated 20.04.2006, No. Nil dated 26.3.1998, No. Nil dated 26.4.1984, No. Nil dated 28.5.2007, No. Nil dated 26.12.1967, No. Nil dated 20.03.1998, No. Nil dated. 30.01.1968, No. Nil dated 16.02.1994, No. Nil dated 15.03.1969, No. Nil dated 5.4.1969, No. Nil dated 23.02.1971, No. Nil dated 12.1.1968, No. Nil dated 2.5.1970. 15. It has been also asserted that the land map prepared during Maharaja's regime is known as "chitta map". After accession of Tripura to Union of India during first settlement operation another land map was prepared. If these two land maps are superimposed on one another then it shall be clear that the chitta plots Nos. during Maharaja's time had been renumbered by the first settlement operation and the lands as relevant here were derequisitioned. It has been further held that after passing of the judgment dated 24.08.2007 in Ex. P. No. 01/2004 and the final order in SLP(Civil) No. 1696-1697/2011 dated 11.04.2011 by the Supreme Court, the respondents are straining much not to implement the order passed in the aforesaid execution case. The de-requisitioned land has been demarcated with the help of the old map and after demarcation, the de-requisitioned land was found under possession/occupation of as many as 25 possessors/occupiers. A comparative statement in respect of the derequisitioned land at Khowai Airport, Mouja-Ganki has been annexed to that counter-affidavit at Annexure-15 series. It has been further referred in the inquiry report submitted by the SDM, Khowai, West Tripura that to cause delivery of vacant possession of the occupied land within a period of fifteen days, the occupants were served notices on 20.05.2011 to vacate the land in question from the date of receipt of those notice and again notices were sent lastly on 27.10.2011 for the same purpose. It has been also contended that the State Government did not take delivery of possession of the de-requisitioned land from the predecessor of the petitioners. It has been further submitted that after receipt of the show-cause notice from the respondents, the occupiers had moved the High Court by filing a batch of writ petitions. Since all the aforesaid writ petitions are pending in this Court and due to the aforesaid reasons the respondents are not in a position to hand over the vacant possession of the land to the petitioners in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011 and urged for some time to implement the order passed in EX. P. No. 01/2004. However, they had deposited Rs. 20,000/- through the Bank Draft drawn on 01.11.2011. The respondents also issued letter to the Airport Authority to deposit the balance amount of the derequisitioned land to the respondent No. 2. It has been further contended that the petitioners had executed the registered sale deeds (Annexure- 16 series) in favour of different vendees in respect of the derequisitioned land in dispute. By dint of those registered sale deeds, the vendees became the owners of the land and the petitioners ceased to be the owners of such land. The Cant, caste) No. 07 of 2011 petitioners intentionally and deliberately suppressed the said incidence of sale and relevant documents i.e. registered sale deeds (Annexure-16 series) and thereby committed fraud on the Court. Non-production, non-disclosure and even non-mentioning of the aforesaid registered sale deeds at any time before the High Court and Supreme Court are tantamount to fraud on the Courts. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants like the petitioners. By stating so the respondents further submitted that the petitioners have recklessly abused the process of the Court and by suppression have obtained the above referred judgments and orders from the High Court and the Supreme Court and as such the petition for drawing up the contempt proceeding shall be shot down at the threshold. Apart that, the following defence has been resorted to by the respondents: 29. "Fraud" as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Apart that, the following defence has been resorted to by the respondents: 29. "Fraud" as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. 30. "Fraud" vitiates even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. "Fraud" in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. 31. xxxx xxxx xxxxx 32. Fraud arises out of the aforesaid deliberate active role of the petitioners about fact, which they knew/know to be untrue yet they succeeded in misleading the Hon'ble Courts by making them believe it to be true. The petitioners made representations of fact with the knowledge that they were false and thus acted fraudulently. "Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation had/has been made: (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether, it be true or false. 33. No judgment of a Court, can be allowed to stand when it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. 34. Fraud vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity. 35. 'Fraud' is an extrinsic, collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. It avoids all judicial act, ecclesiastical and temporal. 36. xxxx xxxx xxxx 37. The petitioners obtained the above referred judgments and orders from this Hon'ble High Court and Supreme Court by manifest fraud. 38. Fraud practised on the Court is always ground for vacating the judgment, as where the Court is deceived or misled as to material circumstances, or its process is abused, resulting in the rendition of a judgment which would not have been given if the whole conduct of the case had been fair. 39. Section 44 of the Evidence Act enables a party otherwise bound by a previous adjudication to show that it was not final or binding because it is vitiated by fraud. 39. Section 44 of the Evidence Act enables a party otherwise bound by a previous adjudication to show that it was not final or binding because it is vitiated by fraud. The provision therefore gives jurisdiction and authority to a Court to consider and decide the question whether a prior adjudication is vitiated by fraud. 40. xxxx xxxx xxxx 41. It is most humbly and respectfully submitted that the Court could and must rip up the whole matter for determining whether there had been fraud in the procurement of the above referred judgments and Orders. 42. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or order or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment/order/decree-by the first Court or by the highest Court-has to be treated as a nullity by every Court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court even in collateral proceedings. 43. That being the settled proposition of law the judgments and orders obtained by the petitioners from this Hon'ble High Court and Supreme Court has to be treated as nullity and non est in the eye of the law and should be declared as nullity and non est in the eye of the law. 16. Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011 has categorically submitted that the land as de-requisitioned by the order dated 26.07.2012 as available in Annexure-6 is as under: Government of Tripura Revenue Department. No. F.37(212)-Rev/68 Dated, Agartala, the 26th February, 1977 ORDER In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 8 of the Tripura State Security Order 1358 T.E. (order No. 9 of 1358 T.E.) and all other powers enabling him in this behalf the Governor is pleased to order that the land measuring 1(one) drone, 12(twelve) kanis, 8(eight) gandas, 2(two) karas, 1(one) kranta and 2-1/2 (two & half) dhurs as detailed below requisitioned under order No. 988/FWD/147(a) dated 22nd February, 1950 be released from requisition and possession of the said land be given to the owners (1) Shri Hemendra Narayan Dutta, son of Late Harendra Narayan Dutta and (2) Shri Bani Bhusan Sen, son of Late Mahendra Ch. Sen of Khowai Town. SCHEDULE OF THE LAND DE-REQUISITIONED. Land bearing old survey plot Nos. Sen of Khowai Town. SCHEDULE OF THE LAND DE-REQUISITIONED. Land bearing old survey plot Nos. 293p, 299p, 292, 516p and 554 comprising an area of 1 drone, 12 kanis, 8 gandas, 2 karas, 1 kranta and 2-1/2 dhurs fallen under present survey plot Nos. 1403 of mouja Ganki under Khowai Sub-Division of West Tripura District. R.M. DE Under Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura. The so called sale deeds do not pertain to those de-requisitioned land. As such the contention of exercising fraud on the Court is absolutely without basis. In this context he referred to one of the sale deeds appearing at Annexure-16 which was executed by one of the petitioners and apart that there was no relation with the derequisitioned land vis-a-vis the land demised in those sale deeds. Having reference to the affidavit-in-reply as filed by the respondents on 28.11.2011, the petitioner has made the following statements: The plea that the land in question is in possession of others, under raiyats, purchasers, is totally a false plea. The story of possession by under raiyats or purchasers is a falsehood in fact, and prohibited in law. Factually the Respondent cannot say that the land is in possession of anyone except the Airport authority. Such a statement goes contrary to the contention of various documents emanating from the Government Offices including the document at Annexure-22 of the C.R. 258/80, by which the Asst. Survey Officer on 10.11.1978 very articulately informed the SDM Khowai that the tract of the de-requisitioned land falls within the barbed wire fencing erected by the Civil Aviation Department of the Central Government and as such the possession could not be delivered without informing the Civil Aviation Department. That apart other documents in the form of interdepartmental communications which were considered by the Hon'ble Court in deciding the C.R. 258/2010 give a clear picture that the de-requisitioned land is well within the airfield area 'and if the Civil Aviation Department does not maintain the Airfield and the Government of Tripura is interested to utilize the land for construction of Stadium, market etc. (the findings of the Hon'ble Court in the judgment in C.R. 258/80, at paragraph 5 may be conveniently referred to). Those documents mentioned in the CR 258/80 has never been doubted or contradicted. (the findings of the Hon'ble Court in the judgment in C.R. 258/80, at paragraph 5 may be conveniently referred to). Those documents mentioned in the CR 258/80 has never been doubted or contradicted. The plea now taken defying the earlier facts proved, speaks sufficiently of the "Wilful disobedience" of the directions of this Hon'ble Court by the Respondents. 17. Apart that, it has been categorically asserted that the de-requisitioned 'and as has been in possession of others was repeatedly taken in all the previous proceedings viz. Civil Rule No. 258/80, Civil Rule No. 47/89, W.A. No. 33/91, Ex. P. No. 01/04 and even in the SLP 1696-1697 of 2011. On all occasions, the plea has been rejected. Therefore, there is no foundation in the allegation of fraud against the petitioners. In para-3, the following averments have been succinctly made: 3. That on the face of records it is the Respondents who have played fraud on the Court by making the following statements and misleading the proceeding by placing documents totally irrelevant. (a) The names of the occupants are given in khatians enclosed (beginning at Page-31) the names are different from the names furnished earlier in C.R. 47/89 and C.M. 455/93. (b) In the earlier proceedings names of 17 occupants of the derequisitioned land was furnished, while now the Respondents have furnished new names and they are 26 in number. (c) The Requisitioned area (including the acquisitioned part) according to the State, comprised in 4 plots namely 293, 299, 292, 571, 572, 516 and 554 (vide Annex-1 Page 28 of the counter-affidavit). These plots in the cadastral survey was brought under one plot namely 1403 and in the Revisional Survey as 2185 (vide map at the end of the counter-affidavit). It is also on recorded admission that the entire land including the de-requisitioned land was recorded in Revenue records in the name of Civil Aviation. If the 26 Khatians enclosed in the counter affidavit (from page 31) are minutely looked into and the corresponding sale deeds are examined it would be clearly found that: (i) Total land in occupation of the 26 khatian holders is 21.31 acre, while de-requisitioned land is only 11.37 acre. (ii) None of the Plot Nos. mentioned in the sale deeds (from page-443) is 1403 or 2185. It thus clearly indicates that the occupants are somewhere beyond the periphery of the Airport Plot 1403. (ii) None of the Plot Nos. mentioned in the sale deeds (from page-443) is 1403 or 2185. It thus clearly indicates that the occupants are somewhere beyond the periphery of the Airport Plot 1403. (d) The Khowai Airport was operational till sometime after the 1971 war. It was operating upto the end of March 1972, If so how can outsiders come to occupy the land marked as de-requisitioned but remained under active possession of Civil Aviation. (e) The sale deeds would show that the sales occurred in most cases in sixties. If so how could land from within the operational Airport be sold. (f) Khatians annexed show that the status of the occupants are 'raiyati'. When the admitted position is that the entire land including the de-requisitioned part was recorded in the name of Civil Aviation, how could the Mutation Officer grant Raiyati title to the purchasers? 18. On the other hand, Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing or the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011 and Mr. D.P. Kundu, learned Advocate General, assisted by Mr. N.C. Pal, learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the respondents in Cont. Cas. (C) Nos. 14 and 17 of 2011 with sufficient emphasis submitted that by suppressing incidence of the transfer of the land, which however has been categorically denied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners with reference to the records as produced in the counter-affidavit, the petitioners exercised fraud. Even the petitioners, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel continued to hold did not disclose the name of the persons to whom they had sold out the land which was de-requisitioned showed their unclean and fraudulent faces to subvert the justice. As such the 'fraud' vitiated the judgment and orders as obtained by the petitioners. To buttress their submissions, both Mr. Deb and Mr. Kundu, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that there was no violation to say the least of the wilful disobedience as alleged. Moreover, they submitted that the respondents have taken all possible initiative to comply the direction as evinced from the show-cause notice and issued the Bank Drafts. They contended that the petitioners knowing full well that there is no land to be handed over, exercised fraud on the basis of certain unrelated revenue records and the survey reports for advancing the claim of handing over the de-requisitioned land. They contended that the petitioners knowing full well that there is no land to be handed over, exercised fraud on the basis of certain unrelated revenue records and the survey reports for advancing the claim of handing over the de-requisitioned land. They further contended that there is no pleading in the petition that the violation is deliberate and wilful. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents relied on a decision of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr., as reported in (2011) 7 SCC 639 , where the Apex Court held: 8. It is a settled proposition of law that a party has to plead its case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate the averments made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. 9. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, (1988) 4 SCC 534 , this Court has observed as under: 13. In our opinion, when a point, which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e. a plaint or written statement, the facts and not [the] evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. (emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 4 SCC 387 ; Atul Castings ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, (2001) 5 SCC 133 and Rajasthan Pradesh Vaidya Samity v. Union of India, (2010) 12 SCC 609 . 10. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the Court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, (2001) 5 SCC 133 and Rajasthan Pradesh Vaidya Samity v. Union of India, (2010) 12 SCC 609 . 10. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the Court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the Court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question(s) in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted." Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. 19. It has been further contended that in view of the decision as rendered by the Apex Court in Meghmala & Ors. v. G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors., as reported in (2010) 8 SCC 383 , the Apex Court held as under: 28. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eye of law." Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath). In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, the Court observed without equivocation that "No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. For fraud unravels everything. 29. In A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. GAR Re-Rolling Mills, AIR 1994 SC 2151 and State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 this Court observed that a writ Court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. "Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law." 30. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros., (1992) 1 SCC 534 , it has been held as under: 20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. 31. In United India Insurance Co. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros., (1992) 1 SCC 534 , it has been held as under: 20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. 31. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 581 , this Court observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell together" (fraus et jus nun-quam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. 32. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. (See Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Girdharilal Yadav, State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar, Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Company and Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar.) 33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. [Vide Vimla (Dr.) v. Delhi Admn., Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd., State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, K.D. Sharma v. SAIL and Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir]. 34. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made: (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made: (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the Court. 35. In Kinch v. Walcott, 1929 AC 482, it has been held that: Mere constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient but such a judgment will not be set aside upon mere proof that the judgment was obtained by perjury. Thus, detection/discovery of constructive fraud at a much belated stage may not be sufficient to set aside the judgment procured by perjury. 36. From the above, it is evident that even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be taken away. In such an eventuality the questions of non-executing of the statutory remedies or statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the Court. Every Court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by fraud as the order so obtained is non est. It has been further contended that no contempt proceeding can be drawn up against a person upon whom a direction has been issued by the Court who had not been in position of implementing or executing the same. In paras 39 and 40 of Meghmala (supra), the Apex Court further observed as under: 39. The respondents have never been able to show as under what circumstances they are interested in the suit land because before the Special Court in the first round they failed to show any document that land had ever been transferred by the tenure-holders/owners in favour of the Society or the Society had made any allotment in their favour or they were members of the said Society or they obtained any sanction from the statutory authority to raise the construction. 40. Shri M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the said respondents was repeatedly asked by us to show any document on record linking the said respondents with the suit land. Though, he argued for a long time, raised large number of issues but could not point out a single document which may reflect that the respondents could have any claim on the suit land. Though, he argued for a long time, raised large number of issues but could not point out a single document which may reflect that the respondents could have any claim on the suit land. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the application at their behest was not maintainable. The ratio as has been carved out in Meghmala (supra) as regards the misrepresentation/fraud, suppression of material fact and identification of land is concerned, may be recorded. In this regard, for appreciation, the Special Court in execution proceedings was fully' satisfied regarding the identity of land on the basis of revenue records and came to the conclusion that there was no misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the appellant-applicant. The order of the Special Court dated 11.7.2006 made it clear that all these issues had been agitated in earlier proceedings. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also referred a decision of the Apex Court as rendered in Niaz Mohammad & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., as reported in (1994) 6 SCC 332 . In the said decision, the Apex Court held as under: 9. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') defines "civil contempt" to mean "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court" Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of a Court made in favour of a party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction has been made can move the Court for initiating proceeding for contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of, such order. The Court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged condemner should be punished for not having complied with and carried out the direction of the Court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court. Before a condemner is punished for non-compliance of the direction of a Court, the Court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. The Civil Court while executing a decree against the judgment-debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was wilful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the Court to execute the decree whatever may be consequence thereof. But while examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such condemner is held guilty and punished, the Court has to record a finding that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the Court, the Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the condemner to comply with the order, the Court may not punish the alleged contemner. 10. In the present case, there is no specific direction in the aforesaid judgment of this Court dated 2-6-1988 in the connected writ petition, to pay any particular amount to the instructors. This Court has simply decided the question as to whether they are entitled to the scale of pay which has been given to squad teachers. Having decided that question in favour of the instructors, this Court directed that arrears be paid to the instructors w.e.f. their respective dates of appointments, treating them on a par with the squad teachers. This direction will involve payment of about 28 crores of rupees was neither known to the Court nor to the parries to that proceeding. As such, this Court is now entitled to examine the question as to whether in the special facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondents should be punished for having committed contempt of this Court. This direction will involve payment of about 28 crores of rupees was neither known to the Court nor to the parries to that proceeding. As such, this Court is now entitled to examine the question as to whether in the special facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondents should be punished for having committed contempt of this Court. In the case of Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal this Court said: Nor is a person to be punished for contempt of Court for disobeying an order of Court except when the disobedience is established beyond reasonable doubt, the standard of proof being similar, even if not the same, as in a criminal proceeding. Where the person alleged to be in contempt is able to place before the Court sufficient material to conclude that it is impossible to obey the order, the Court will not be justified in punishing the alleged contemner. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 9, para 53, p. 34, it has been said: Although contempt may be committed in the absence of wilful disobedience on the part of the contemner, committal or sequestration will not be order unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or misconduct. It has been further stated: In circumstances involving misconduct civil contempt bears a twofold character, implying as between the parties to the proceedings merely a right to exercise and a liability to submit to a form of civil execution, but as between the party in default and the State, a penal or disciplinary jurisdiction to be exercised by the Court in the public interest. 11. Taking all facts and circumstances into consideration, we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no wilful disobedience on the part of the respondents in complying with the direction given by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. It cannot be disputed that when the aforesaid direction was given, this Court was not conscious that the direction had created a liability for payment of about 28 crores of rupees, as arrears to the instructors in the Adult and Non-formal Education Scheme under the Education Department in the State of Haryana. Out of that amount about 20 crores of rupees have already been disbursed for different periods to the instructors. Out of that amount about 20 crores of rupees have already been disbursed for different periods to the instructors. In this background, it is not possible to hold that respondents have committed contempt of this Court, for which they ought to be punished by this Court. Accordingly, all the petitions including W.P. (C) Nos. 401 and 784 of 1989 are dismissed. 21. In reply to the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, it has been contended that the identification or availability of the derequisitioned land now cannot be questioned by the respondents in any manner inasmuch as all such questions had fallen for consideration of this Court in the previous proceedings and the finding of the Court had been crystallised and reached its finality. Apart that Mr. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011, stated that so called allegation of fraud absolutely has no basis. This is a mere repetition of their defence as projected in the earlier proceeding under different garb. The garb has been removed and the real face has started gaping to swallow the justice. 22. To buttress the contention, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel has also made an endeavour to rebut the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that there are no pleadings as regards the deliberate violation of the judgment and order as referred. In this regard, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011 referred to paras 4 and 5 of the petition, which provided as under: 4. Now as the picture stands the State Respondent has either to hand over the possession in terms of the notification dated 26.2.1977 or in the alternative to start the acquisition proceeding. But nothing has been done within the stipulated time and compelled by the situation the petitioner files this Contempt petition just following the direction of the Ld. Single Judge at Para 20. 5. That the Respondents have full knowledge of the orders of both High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court to have affirmed the judgment of the Ld. Single Bench, and they have full knowledge about the consequence that would follow if the Order as stated above is not observed or followed. Yet a Notice to caution was served upon the District Collector on 16.04.2011. But that seems to be ineffective till date. Single Bench, and they have full knowledge about the consequence that would follow if the Order as stated above is not observed or followed. Yet a Notice to caution was served upon the District Collector on 16.04.2011. But that seems to be ineffective till date. The petitioner therefore has been compelled to file this contempt petition. xxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx In the above circumstances it is most respectfully prayed that your Lordships would kindly issue a notice to the respondents asking to show cause as to why the proceeding for contempt of the Hon'ble Courts Order passed on 24.08.2007 in Ex. P.01/04, affirmed by the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Court should not be drawn in terms of the observation made in para 20 of the judgment in Ex. P.01/07, and after hearing and being satisfied punish the respondents for wilful disobedience and delay. Also pass any other order as may be deemed fit to ensure justice. 23. In furtherance of this submission, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel also referred to the direction of this Court in the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 as passed Ex. P. No. 01/20Q4, where it has been categorically observed that the respondents till date have successfully thwarted the implementation of the successive orders of this Court on untenable pleas. Such infraction on the part of the respondents cannot be tolerated any more. However, the respondents are given the last chance to implement the orders of this Court within the aforesaid stipulated period failing which, the law will take its own course with all its vigour. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011 has stated that it has been pleaded that following the direction at para-20 of the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007, this petition for drawing up contempt proceeding has been filed. In para-20, the following observations and directions have been made: 20. If the aforesaid direction is not complied with within the stipulated period of time, the officers responsible for compliance of the same will be liable for contempt of Court proceeding. It is hoped that such necessity will not arise. However, in case such necessity arises, the matter will be viewed seriously. If the aforesaid direction is not complied with within the stipulated period of time, the officers responsible for compliance of the same will be liable for contempt of Court proceeding. It is hoped that such necessity will not arise. However, in case such necessity arises, the matter will be viewed seriously. After all, the orders of this Court cannot be flouted in the matter and method in which the respondents have all along done ever since the judgment dated 2.6.1988 was delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in the first round of litigation. The respondents till date have successfully thwarted the implementation of the successive orders of this Court on untenable pleas. Such infraction on the part of the respondents cannot be tolerated any more. However, the respondents are given the last chance to implement the orders of this Court within the aforesaid stipulated period failing which, the law will take its own course with all its vigour. 24. Therefore, absence of pleadings as the respondents laboured to point out as regards the deliberate act and/or wilful disobedience is without any foundation. Rather, the respondents by filing counter-affidavit had completely failed to show any reason as to why the contempt proceeding should not be initiated against them. Nowhere had they stated that they had made any endeavour to handover the de-requisitioned land, schedule of which has been referred to. Mr. Biswas submitted further that in one hand when the respondents stated that the de-requisitioned land is encircled by the acquired land and that cannot be handed over, on the other hand, they have claimed non-availability and/or non-existence of the land. These are the acts which cannot be condoned by this Court inasmuch as recourses or pleas were repeatedly projected to-frustrate the definite directions of this Court. In support of his contention, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel has referred few decisions of the Apex Court. 25. In M.L. Sachdev v. Union of India & Am., as reported in (1991) 1 SCC 605 , the Apex Court held that Courts constitute an inbuilt mechanism within the framework of the Constitution for purposes of social audit and to ensure compliance of the Rule of law. In enforcing compliance of orders of this Court and in punishing for lapses in the matter of compliance by invoking the power of contempt, this. In enforcing compliance of orders of this Court and in punishing for lapses in the matter of compliance by invoking the power of contempt, this. Court seeks only to ensure that the majesty of this institution may not be lowered and the functional utility of the constitutional edifice may not be rendered ineffective. 26. In Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. & Anr., as reported in (1996) 4 SCC 622 , the Apex Court held that imposition of punishment for contempt would not denude the Court of its power to issue direction to remedy the wrong. 27. In State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society & Ors. as reported in (2003) 2 SCC 412 , the Apex Court held that a parliamentary statute indisputably can create a tribunal and might say that non-compliance with its orders would be punishable by way of imprisonment or fine, which can be in addition to any other mode of recovery. 28. In S.K. Ramaraj v. Special Court, Bombay, as reported in (2003) 7 SCC 175 , the Apex Court held that a person is under a legal obligation to verify the allegations made in the pleadings and if he verifies falsely, he comes under the clutches of law. 29. Relying on S.R. Ramaraj (supra), Mr. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2001, further submitted that the statements made in the counter- affidavit are absolutely false and those were falsely verified by the respondents. As such, by that verification the respondents again committed contempt of this Court and therefore, there cannot be any condonation of their acts for drawing up contempt proceedings. Dr. H.K. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioners in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 14/2011 and Cont. Cas. (C) No. 17/2011 has adopted the submissions of Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner in Cont. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011. 30. This Court on aggregate assessment of all the materials as referred above as well as the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, is prima facie satisfied that the direction of this Court as contained in the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 in Ex. Cas. (C) No. 07/2011. 30. This Court on aggregate assessment of all the materials as referred above as well as the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, is prima facie satisfied that the direction of this Court as contained in the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 in Ex. P. No. 01/2004, which has been affirmed by the Full Bench of this Court by their judgment and order dated 19.08.2010 in W.A. No. 81/2007 and W.A. No. 88/2007 has been deliberately violated and the respondents have demonstrated wilful disobedience to the directions of this Court inasmuch as this Court in para-20 of the judgment and order dated 24.08.2007 had sounded adequate caution pi the consequence that might visit them for non-implementation of the orders of this Court. 31. In view of this, a contempt proceeding under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India be drawn up against the respondents and the respondents would be required to reply the charge as indicated and appear in person on the next date so fixed. List the matter again on 19.12.2012.