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2012 DIGILAW 1217 (MAD)

Kaarmukhilan(alias) Periyasaame v. Chandra Vadivu

2012-03-07

G.RAJASURIA

body2012
Judgment 1. This appeal is focussed by the plaintiff in the suit, as against the judgement and decree dated 12.3.2010 passed by the Principal District Court, Villupuram, in O.S.No.88 of 2007, which was one for specific performance of an agreement to sell. 2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. A summation and summarisation of the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this appeal would run thus: (i) The appellant herein, as plaintiff, filed the suit for specific performance based on the agreement to sell dated 16.4.2007, which emerged between the plaintiff on the one side and the defendants on the other side, whereby, the latter agreed to sell in favour of former the suit property for a total sale consideration of Rs.7,75,000/- and a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- was paid as advance by the plaintiff to the defendants. Subsequently, another sum of Rs.2,00,000/- also was paid by the plaintiff to D1 and D2. Since the defendants 3 to 5 were not co-operative, the suit was filed, after issuance of pre-suit notice, with the following prayer: "to direct the defendants to execute the sale deed and register the same: a. In case of default of the defendants to execute the sale deed, the Honourable Court may be pleased to execute and register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants; b. to direct the defendants to put the plaintiff into the possession of the suit properties without any obstructions through Court; c. direct the defendants to pay the costs of the suit;" (extracted as such) (ii) Defendants 1 and 2 virtually agreed to the claim of the plaintiff. However, D3 to D5 filed the written statement resisting the suit, challenging and impugning the genuineness of the very agreement to sell mainly on the ground that on blank papers D1 and D2 obtained their signatures and thereafter, purely for the purpose of defrauding their interest, the suit was caused to be filed by the plaintiff as against all the defendants. (iii) The trial Court framed the issues. (iv) During trial, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2 and Exs.A1 to A11 were marked. On the defendants' side the second defendant examined himself as D.W.1 along with D.W.2 and marked Exs.B1 and B2. (iii) The trial Court framed the issues. (iv) During trial, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2 and Exs.A1 to A11 were marked. On the defendants' side the second defendant examined himself as D.W.1 along with D.W.2 and marked Exs.B1 and B2. (v) Ultimately, the trial Curt dismissed the suit. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgement and decree, the plaintiff preferred this appeal on various grounds. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, by placing reliance on the grounds of appeal, would develop his arguements, the pith and marrow of them would run thus: (i) The trail Court misunderstood the scope of the suit and also the depositions on the side of the plaintiff and simply dismissed the suit upholding for gospel truth the case of D3 to D5. (ii) D3 to D5 in their written statement candidly and categorically, without any demur, admitted their signatures in Ex.A1-the suit agreement to sell dated 16.4.2007; however, the trial Court simply expected that the plaintiff should have taken the assistance of handwriting expert to prove the signatures of D3 to D5 in Ex.A1. (iii) Undue importance was given to the previous litigation initiated by D1 and D2 by filing O.S.No.168 of 2005, which resulted in an untenable ex parte judgment and decree. (iv) The lower Court found erroneously that non-inclusion of Vanithadevi, i.e. the daughter of D1, was fatal to the case notwithstanding that Vanithadevi herself, even in the previous litigation had not entered appearance and in this suit also she did not get herself impleaded and made any objection. (v) The lower Court failed to take note of the fact that without any laches on the part of the plaintiff as a genuine purchaser, he filed the suit shortly after the expiry of four months period from the date of emergence of the suit agreement to sell dated 16.4.2007. (vi) The plaintiff after parting with the huge sum of Rs.4 lakhs cannot simply keep quiet and hence, he, with all earnestness filed the suit, to show his readiness and willingness for getting the sale executed in his favour by depositing the remaining part of the sale consideration also. (vii) Initially the advance amount of Rs.2,00,000/-was paid, which was received by all the defendants. (vii) Initially the advance amount of Rs.2,00,000/-was paid, which was received by all the defendants. However, on the very next day itself, defendants 1 and 2 approached the plaintiff and expressed their requirement for additional sum so as to pay tax as well as to discharge certain pro note loans; whereupon the plaintiff, who had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, parted with another sum of Rs.2,00,000/-, and simply because in Ex.A2-the endorsement dated 17.4.2007, only D1 and D2 signed and not others, it cannot be taken that others have not signified their consent for selling the suit property. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would pray for setting aside the judgement and decree of the trial Court and for decreeing the suit for specific performance. 6. The learned counsel for the original D1 and D2 would have no objection for decreeing the suit for specific performance. 7. Whereas, in a bid to torpedo and pulverise the arguements as put forth and set forth on the side of the appellant/plaintiff, the learned counsel for D2 to D5 would advance his arguements, the gist and kernal of them would run thus: (a) The trial Court appropriately and appositely and that too, legally analysed the evidence and justly arrived at the conclusion that the defendants 1 and 2, purely for the purpose of defrauding the interest of D3 to D5, created such document Ex.A1, a make believe agreement to sell and there is no truth in it. (b) Even as per the plaintiff's case, the matter is viewed, it is clear that the very next day to the alleged agreement to sell, D1 and D2 alone allegedly received a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- from the plaintiff, who did not take care to see that the signatures of D3 to D5 were obtained in Ex.A2-the endorsement and that would speak volumes that D3 to D5 were not parties to the agreement to sell at all. (c) The earlier litigation instituted by D1 and D2, by filing O.S.No.168 of 2005 ended in ex-parte decree. While so, defendants 1 and 2 were not justified in entering into such agreement to sell with the plaintiff. (c) The earlier litigation instituted by D1 and D2, by filing O.S.No.168 of 2005 ended in ex-parte decree. While so, defendants 1 and 2 were not justified in entering into such agreement to sell with the plaintiff. (d) The trial Court in fact out of oversight observed as though the plaintiff should have taken the assistance of a handwriting expert in proving the disputed signatures of D3 to D5 in Ex.A1, but in fact, the lower Court has seen the reality and held that the defendants 1 and 2 had a volte face and turned turtle in giving a go-bye to the earlier litigation and ex-parte decree and had chosen to hoodwink the defendants 3 to 5 and the trial Court also correctly held that non-adding of Vanithadevi as one of the parties to the lis was fatal to the case. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the defendants 3 to 5 would pray for the dismissal of the appeal. 8. The points for consideration are as under: (i) Whether the trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit on the ground of non-adding of Vanithadevi as one of the defendants in the lis? (ii) Whether the trial Court was justified in giving importance to the previous litigation in O.S.No.168 of 2005, which ended in an ex-parte decree, and also the fact of non obtention of signatures of D3 to D5 in Ex.A2-the endorsement? Whether the trial court was wrong in disbelieving Ex.A1 despite D3 to D5 having admitted their signatures in it? (iii) Whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract? (iv) Whether the plaintiff suffered from any personal bar under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act in seeking specific performance of Ex.A1? (v) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the judgement and decree of the trial Court? 9. All these points are taken together for discussion, as they are interwoven and interlinked, interconnected and entwined with one another. 10. At the out set itself it is just and necessary to point out that the trial Court erroneously held as though the defendants 3 to 5 disputed their very signatures in Ex.A1. In fact, in the written statement itself D3 to D5 did not dispute their signatures in Ex.A1 An excerpt from it would run thus: 11. 10. At the out set itself it is just and necessary to point out that the trial Court erroneously held as though the defendants 3 to 5 disputed their very signatures in Ex.A1. In fact, in the written statement itself D3 to D5 did not dispute their signatures in Ex.A1 An excerpt from it would run thus: 11. What D3 to D5 would contend was that their signatures were obtained in blank papers, which were converted into the agreement to sell. In such a case, the trial Court was not justified in observing that the plaintiff failed to get the assistance of a handwriting expert in proving the signatures of D3 to D5 in Ex.A1. What I could understand from such finding of the trial Court, is that it was labouring under the misconception that D3 to D5 did not even admit their signatures in Ex.A1. 12. The lower Court dilated much unnecessarily on the issue relating to non-obtention of permission by the plaintiff, from the authority concerned, as a Government servant, as per the Government Servants Conduct Rules relating to Ex.A1, forgetting for a moment that Ex.A1 is only an agreement to sell and not a sale deed. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would explain and expound that the plaintiff happened to be only an Insurance official and not bound to inform his higher ups relating to Ex.A1, which is an agreement to sell. In fact, PW.1(plaintiff) categorically stated in his deposition that he was not bound to obtain such prior permission. 14. Paradoxically, the said fact also was adverted to by the trial Judge, but instead of expecting the defendants to cite the relevant provisions of law, or Rule, compelling the plaintiff to seek permission before entering into Ex.A1, the trial Court simply doubted the genuineness of Ex.A1. 15. I recollect the maxim 'In jure non remota causa, sed proxima, spectatur' – In law, the proximate, and not the remote, cause is regarded. 16. Giving weightage to unconnected and remote pleas taken by the defendants 3 to 5 relating to the non-obtention of permission by the plaintiff from his administrative authority before entering into Ex.A1, the trial Court doubted the genuineness of Ex.A1, which in my opinion was not the proper approach adopted by the lower Court. 16. Giving weightage to unconnected and remote pleas taken by the defendants 3 to 5 relating to the non-obtention of permission by the plaintiff from his administrative authority before entering into Ex.A1, the trial Court doubted the genuineness of Ex.A1, which in my opinion was not the proper approach adopted by the lower Court. The trial Court also went tangent in its view that the income-tax returns were not produced by the plaintiff, which once again in my opinion was a wrong approach on the part of the lower Court. 17. The alleged non-obtention of permission from the higher authority and the non production of income tax returns by the plaintiff are not at all germane for deciding the main controversy involved in this case and it is quite obvious. The concept 'burden of proof' was not properly applied by the lower Court. 18. The defendants 3 to 5 candidly and categorically admitted their signatures in all the pages of Ex.A1. They did not produce even any teeny-weeny evidence to create some doubt about Ex.A1, even after, the plaintiff having examined one of the attesting witnesses to it, namely, Ramesh-P.W.2 on his side. The deposition of P.W.2 would proclaim and evince that Ex.A1 is a genuine document; whereas, the deposition of “LANGUAGE” D.W.2 turned out to be only his ipse dixit. 19. The trial Court in its judgement commented much upon the act of D2's wife Genaselvi having signed as one of the attesting witnesses, without putting the first letter of her husband's name as her initial, but only the first letter of her father's name. 20. There is no hard and fast Rule that a lady should change her initial after marriage. The trial Court imputed bad motive on the part of the plaintiff and D1 and D2 that deliberately they caused Gunaselvi to put such an initial before her name to create an impression as though she was not in any way related to the parties to the agreement. Such an approach on the part of the trial Court, to say the least, is perverse. 21. D3 to D5 are near relatives, who even by phantasmagorical thoughts cannot be assumed that they were not aware of the fact that Gunaselvi happened to be the wife of D2. Such an approach on the part of the trial Court, to say the least, is perverse. 21. D3 to D5 are near relatives, who even by phantasmagorical thoughts cannot be assumed that they were not aware of the fact that Gunaselvi happened to be the wife of D2. In such a case, the trial Court, for the purpose of rejecting the prayer for specific performance of the plaintiff, went on citing one reason after another as stated supra in an unjustifiable and unacceptable manner. 22. The trial Court also commented upon the fact that neither the plaintiff nor D1 or D2 produced any evidence to show that the additional sum of Rs.2,00,000/-, as evidenced by Ex.A2, was utilised for paying tax as well as discharging pro-note debts. Once the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that Ex.A1 is a genuine document and not a concocted document, as alleged by D3 to D5, the question of the plaintiff or D1 and D2 going on adducing surplus evidence, so as to torpedo the untenable pleas of the defendants, would not arise. 23. On behalf of D3 to D5, only D4 was examined as D.W.2 and defendants 3 to 5 have shunned the witness box and the burden of proof was on them to establish and prove, as to what prompted them to sign Ex.A1. 24. My discussion supra would highlight that as against the direct and clinching evidence on the defendants side, D3 to D5 have not shown any probabilities in their favour. 25. The excerpt extracted supra from the written statement of D3 to D5 would show that the defendants 3 to 5 admitted categorically that there were pro-note debts, which have to be discharged out of the sale proceeds of the suit property and that the remaining sale proceeds have to be shared equally. In such a case, their prevarigative stands that neither the plaintiff nor defendants 1 and 2 proved that there were pro-note debts to be discharged jointly by the defendants is a far fetched one, in addition to it being quite antithetical to D3 to D5's own written statement, a portion of which extracted supra. 26. The defendants D3 to D5 even went to the extent of alleging as though they were not at all aware of the negotiations, which took place before emergence of Ex.A1. 26. The defendants D3 to D5 even went to the extent of alleging as though they were not at all aware of the negotiations, which took place before emergence of Ex.A1. It is common knowledge that before entering into an agreement to sell, some of the joint owners would negotiate with the prospective purchaser and thereafter all other joint owners would also join in the execution of the agreement to sell. In such a case, the trail Court simply, by culling out one of the answers given by P.W.1 in his deposition cannot hold that defendants 3 to 5 did not agree for selling the suit property as per Ex.A1. 27. Ex.B1 is the copy of the plaint in O.S.No.168 of 2005 filed by D1 and D2 herein as against D3 to D5 and also one Vanithadevi, seeking the following reliefs: ". to pass a decree and judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and as against the defendants:- 1. Declaring plaintiffs title to the suit 'A' Schedule properties; 2. restraining the defendants, their men servants and agents in any way interfere with the plaintiffs' peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit 'A' schedule properties by means of a permanent injunction; 3. Order the defendants to pay the cost of the suit." (extracted as such) 28. Based on the plaintiffs pleadings therein that the suit property even though was covered by the settlement deed dated 17.8.1977 executed by the husband of the first plaintiff therein, namely, Arumugam @ Palanimuthy, conferring absolute right in favour of his four sons, namely, D2 to D5 herein and also granting life estate in favour of his wife D1-Chandravadivu herein, there was virtually an alleged partition and in that a portion of the suit property was allotted to defendants 1 and 2. 29. In fact there was no partition deed emerged as alleged in the said deed and it turned out to be an ex-parte judgement and decree. 30. A bare perusal of Exs.B1 and B2-the ex-parte judgment and decree passed in O.S.No. 168 of 2005 would display and demonstrate that the said judgement and decree have to be simply ignored, because absolutely there are no reasons found spelt out in the ex parte judgment. 31. 30. A bare perusal of Exs.B1 and B2-the ex-parte judgment and decree passed in O.S.No. 168 of 2005 would display and demonstrate that the said judgement and decree have to be simply ignored, because absolutely there are no reasons found spelt out in the ex parte judgment. 31. At this juncture, my mind is reminiscent and redolent of the following decision of the Honourable Apex Court: "AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 2508 – RAMESH CHAND ARDAWATIYA V. ANIL PANJWANI, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "33. . . . . . . . . . . Even if the suit proceeds ex parte and in the absence of a written statement, unless the applicability of Order VIII, Rule 10 of the CPC is attracted and the Courts acts thereunder, the necessity of proof by the plaintiff of his case to the satisfaction of the Court cannot be dispensed with. In the absence of denial of plaint averments the burden of proof on the plaintiff is not very heavy. A prima facie proof of the relevant facts constituting the cause of action would suffice and the Court would grant the plaintiff such relief as to which he may in law be found entitled. In a case which has proceeded ex parte the Court is not bound to frame issues under Order XIV and deliver the judgment on every issue as required by Order XX, Rule 5. Yet the trial Court would scrutinize the available pleadings and documents, consider the evidence adduced, and would do well to frame the 'points for determination' and proceed to construct the ex-parte judgement dealing with the points at issue one by one. Merely because the defendant is absent the Court shall not admit evidence the admissibility whereof is excluded by law nor permit its decision being influenced by irrelevant or inadmissible evidence." 32. In view of the above, Ex.B1 and B2 should be ignored. Merely because the defendant is absent the Court shall not admit evidence the admissibility whereof is excluded by law nor permit its decision being influenced by irrelevant or inadmissible evidence." 32. In view of the above, Ex.B1 and B2 should be ignored. Over and above that, the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that inasmuch as there was no registered partition and the parties did not agree to adhere to the ex-parte decree, there arose an understanding between defendants 1 to 5 based on the settlement deed Ex.A7,dated 17.8.2007, whereupon alone D1 to D5 wanted to sell the property to the plaintiff and on such understanding Ex.A1 emerged, without adding Vanithadevi the daughter of D1, because she was not one of the settlees under Ex.A7-the settlement deed dated 17.8.2007. 33. I could see considerable force in the said argument, because in the earlier litigation, virtually the defendants therein, including D3 to D5 herein and Vanithadevi remained ex-parte. Now, D3 to D5's argument is that subsequently, they signed Ex.A1 purely for the purpose of enabling D1 and D2 to discharge certain family debts and to pay off taxes. But, such a plea is quite antithetical to their written statement itself wherein they averred that they signed for selling the suit property only and to discharge the said dues and share the remaining sale proceeds. D3 to D5 are male members. D1 is the mother of D3 to D5. This is a singularly singular case in which D3 to D5 would go to the extent of accusing their own mother D1 and their elder brother D2 that they wanted to defraud D3 to D5. If really D1 and D2 retained their alleged portions as contained in the earlier litigation and ex-parte decree and wanted to sell the remaining portion along with D3 to D5, certainly that would lead to suspicion. But in this case, the suit property covers the entire property covered under the settlement deed Ex.A7 dated 17.8.1977. That itself is the indicative of the genuineness of the said agreement to sell, Ex.A1. 34. It is beyond comprehension, as to how the mother and the elder bother of defendants 3 to 5 would have been ready to part with their own shares in favour of the plaintiff, if they really had the mala fide intention to put D3 to D5 in trouble. 35. 34. It is beyond comprehension, as to how the mother and the elder bother of defendants 3 to 5 would have been ready to part with their own shares in favour of the plaintiff, if they really had the mala fide intention to put D3 to D5 in trouble. 35. A plain wading through Ex.A1 would exemplify and proclaim that the defendants 3 to 5 signed Ex.A1 in English, whereas the learned counsel for D3 to D5 would try to explain and expound that even illiterates now-a-days are signing in English. The dexterity with which the signatures were put and the defence that was taken in the litigation by them would all demonstrate and convey that it is not as though D3 to D5 were so ignorant of their rights and as such, D3 to D5's contention that they signed stamp papers while they were blank, in my considered opinion, is a far fetched plea, which the trial Court should not have accepted. 36. There is nothing to indicate that the plaintiff is a near relative, who colluded with D1 and D2 herein and tried to siphon of the property of D3 to D5. 37. To the risk of repetition and pleonasm, but without being tautalogous, I would like to point out that here D1 and D2 are also parting with their shares and in such a case, it is too a big pill to swallow that D1 and D2 wanted to defraud D3 to D5. Certainly the conduct of D1 and D2 in receiving the additional sum of Rs.2,00,000/- on the very next day of the agreement to sell, over and above the advance amount of Rs.2,00,000/-, is paving the way for adverse comments. The plaintiff could have been diligent enough in insisting D1 and D2 for obtaining the signatures of the other defendants also, because D1 and D2 happened to be the mother and elder brother of D2 to D3. The plaintiff, on the very next day of Ex.A1 parted with another sum of Rs.2,00,000/- in order to show his readiness and willingness to purchase the property. 38. The learned counsel for the defendants 1 and 2 would contend without evidence available on record that his clients shared that additional amount also with D3 to D5, for which, absolutely there is not even any teensy-weensy evidence. 38. The learned counsel for the defendants 1 and 2 would contend without evidence available on record that his clients shared that additional amount also with D3 to D5, for which, absolutely there is not even any teensy-weensy evidence. In my considered opinion, D1 and D2 are bound to share that additional amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) also with D3 to D5. The plaintiff, who parted with Rs.4,00,000/- cannot be left high and dry and that too, when the evidence explicitly show that he had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 39. The agreement to sell emerged on 16.4.2007, stipulating four months' period for performance, whereby the period of performance expired by 16.8.2007. Whereas on 17.8.2007 itself the suit was filed after issuance of pre-suit notice, which bespeaks and betokens the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff, over which, the Court cannot have any speck of doubt. 40. Regarding non adding of Vanithadevi is concerned, there is nothing to indicate that Vanithadevi was one of the settlees under Ex.A7-the settlement deed dated 17.8.1977, as this suit is based on Ex.A7-the settlement deed and Ex.A1-the agreement to sale. If at all Vanithadevi is aggrieved, it is for her to set the law in motion and try to assert her right. As of now, the suit is between the plaintiff and the defendants, who entered into the agreement to sell as per Ex.A1 and in such a case, the lower Court was wrong in assuming and presuming as though non-inclusion of Vanithadevi was fatal to the case. 41. At this juncture, I would like to recollect the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court emerged under Sections 16 read with Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act: (i) 2010(10) SCC 512 [Man Kaur (Dead) By L.Rs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha]; certain excerpts from it would run thus: "40. This contention has no merit. There are two distinct issues. The first issue is the breach by the defendant vendor which gives a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance. The second issue relates to the personal bar to enforcement of a specific performance by persons enumerated in Section 16 of the Act. This contention has no merit. There are two distinct issues. The first issue is the breach by the defendant vendor which gives a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance. The second issue relates to the personal bar to enforcement of a specific performance by persons enumerated in Section 16 of the Act. A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct. Let us give an example. Take a case where there is a contract for sale for a consideration of Rs.10 lakhs and earnest money of Rs.1 lakh was paid and the vendor wrongly refuses to execute the sale deed unless the purchaser is ready to pay Rs.15 lakhs. In such a case there is a clear breach by the defendant. But in that case, if the plaintiff did not have the balance Rs.9 lakhs (and the money required for stamp duty and registration) or the capacity to arrange and pay such money, when the contract has to be performed, the plaintiff will not be entitled to specific performance, even if he proves breach by the defendant, as he was not "ready and willing" to perform his obligations." (ii) (2011) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES 429 – J.P.BUILDERS AND ANOTHER V. A.RAMADAS RAO AND ANOTHER would run thus: "27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the Court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. "Readiness and willingness" to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties." 42. It has to be seen as to whether there are any laches on the part of the plaintiff so as to label him or dub him as the one who suffered from personal bar under Section 16 of the Specific Performance Act. Absolutely there is nothing to indicate that the plaintiff suffered from any personal par, as contemplated under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. 43. Discretionary power of the Court as per Sec.20 of the Specific Relief Act in ordering specific performance also should be used in favour of the plaintiff, because there is nothing to proclaim or display that the plaintiff suffers from any disability to seek for specific performance. Merely because in the written statement or during trial, the defendants 3 to 5 contended that the value of the property was more and it was sought to be sold for a song, the specific performance cannot be denied in view of the following decision of this Court. 1995(1) L.W. 716 [K.M.Madhavakrishnan vs. S.R.Swami and another], certain excerpts from it would run thus: "39. Even though the fairness of the price was concluded by the3 earlier Division Bench judgment, Mr.G.Subramaniam contended that the question of grant of equitable relief of specific performance has got to be seriously considered by us. According to him, a paltry sum of Rs.10,011/- was paid by way of advance and that all through the respondents have never moved the trial Court for trial of the suit and they have been only delaying and subsequently, the old lady herself has been fighting the litigation. However, since the decree for specific performance is against deceased Paramayammal and at present against her heirs, if it is granted, it will be grossly inequitable. However, since the decree for specific performance is against deceased Paramayammal and at present against her heirs, if it is granted, it will be grossly inequitable. The respondents have taken possession of the property as early as 19.3.1968 and that they have been enjoying the property. This contention of Mr.G.Subramaniam is also liable to be rejected. Increase in price of properties cannot be a ground for refusing the decree for specific performance. The parties are not responsible for the law's delays. The respondents have denied that they have enjoyed the property. Once the fairness of price is concluded by the earlier Division Bench judgement of this Court, which was later on confirmed by the Apex Court, it is not at all open to the learned Senior counsel for the appellant to raise this contention once over again. Hence, we reject this contention as well." (emphasis supplied) 44. A bare perusal of the above precedent and also explanation (1) to sub-Section (2) of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act would reveal that a mere escalation in value of the land or by projecting that the suit property is of higher value, one cannot try to wriggle out of his liability to execute the sale deed. 45. As such, the above points are decided in favour of the plaintiff and as against the defendants and accordingly, the judgement and decree of the trial Court are set aside and the suit is decreed as prayed for. 46. The remaining part of the sale consideration, so to say, Rs.3.75 lakhs shall be deposited by the plaintiff in the lower Court within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgement and I also make it clear that D1 and D2 are bound to share the additional sum of Rs.2,00,000/-, which they received under Ex.A2, with the other defendants, namely, D3 to D5. It goes without saying that in the amounts to be deposited also D3 to D5 are entitled to their shares equally. The Executing Court shall have the power to enforce the decree in favour of the plaintiff and also enforce the respective inter se rights of the defendants as per this decree. 47. In the result, the appeal stands allowed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.