ORDER 1. This revision, under Section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, has been preferred against the order dated 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 12-4-2010 passed by Rent Controlling Authority, Bhopal in Case No. 52/RCA/2006, reviewing the earlier order dated 15-2-2010 on the ground that it suffered from patent error of law. 2. The proceeding, under Chapter III-A of the Act, for eviction of the respondent was initiated upon application moved by the petitioner, a widow, under Section 23-A(b) of the Act. 3. The respondent raised an objection, by way of an application under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Stamp Act, 1899 (for short the) to the effect that being an insufficiently stamped Procedure (for brevity instrument of partition, as defined under Section 2(15) of the Stamp Act, the Family Settlement Deed, sought to be tendered in evidence by the petitioner as document of title was admissible only after payment of requisite duty and penalty. In reply, the petitioner, while asserting that subject matter of the deed was an ancestral property, termed the contention as misconceived. After hearing the arguments, the RCA, vide order-dated 15-2-2010, proceeded to reject the objection for the following reasons. (i) In the light of the guideline laid down by this Court in Anand Singhal v. Smt. Ramkotari 2001 (1) MPHT 321 , the deed, being a memorandum of partition, did not require registration. (ii) As per the decision of this Court in Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Gyasira 1983 M. P. W. N. 5, the deed, even if assumed to be compulsorily registerable, was admissible for any collateral purpose. Thereafter, by the order in question, the respondent’s application for review was allowed on the ground that by virtue of Section 2(15)(iii) of the Stamp Act (as substituted by (M.P. Act (8 of 1975)), stamp duty @ 4% on the value of respective share of the petitioner was payable on the deed. 4. Legality and propriety of the impugned order have been challenged primarily on the ground that it is passed in excess of jurisdiction. 4. Legality and propriety of the impugned order have been challenged primarily on the ground that it is passed in excess of jurisdiction. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715 , learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that scope of jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC is circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein and, therefore, review jurisdiction cannot be used as appellate jurisdiction. 5. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has supported the order of review. According to him, no interference under the revisional jurisdiction is called for in view of the following settled principles of law on the subject. (i) The amended definition of instrument of partition was attracted as the document was executed after coming into force of M. P. Act of 8 of 1975 (Rao Mahendrasingh v. Sub-Registrar, AIR 1983 MP 144 ). (ii) Deed of partition, which constituted an instrument of partition requiring stamp, cannot be admitted for any purpose including a collateral purpose (Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand AIR 1946 PC 51). 6. Chapter IIIA of the Act, which was inserted by M. P. Amending Act 27 of 1983 to provide a special machinery for eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlord falling under the special category covered by Section 23-J, is a complete code for the purpose. On a conjoint reading of Section 23-D(2) of the Act and 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, it is evident that the RCA, while holding an enquiry under the Chapter, has to follow the practice and procedure of the Court of Small Causes as prescribed in the CPC. Under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, the Court may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely. (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) For any other sufficient reason. 7. (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) For any other sufficient reason. 7. As explained by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by the Supreme Court in Moran Mar Bassellos Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 , the words any other sufficient reason must mean a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule. Further, there is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction (Parsion Devi case (supra) referred to). 8. Thus, even if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that order-dated 15-2-2010 was erroneous in law; setting at naught the same would be beyond the scope of review jurisdiction. 9. Consequently, the revision stands allowed and the impugned order of review is hereby set aside. However, nothing contained herein shall be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the objection and it shall still be open to the respondent to challenge the legality and propriety of the order dated 15-2-2010 in accordance with law. Petition allowed.