JUDGMENT A.K. Goel, C.J. and Ujjal Bhuyan, J. 1. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 18-06-2010 passed in W.P. (C). No. 1445/2009 setting aside the dismissal of the respondent/writ petitioner and directing his reinstatement in service with all service benefits. However, the issue relating to payment of back wages was left to the discretion of the disciplinary authority but the learned Single Judge directed refund of the amount of Rs. 1,09,344/- seized from the possession of the petitioner with interest @ 6% per annum. The Union of India and the concerned authorities of General Reserve Engineering Force (GREF), who were respondents in W.P. (C). No. 1445 of 2009, are in appeal against the aforesaid judgment and order. 2. The facts of the case as projected by the respondent/writ petitioner in the writ petition may be briefly noted. 3. Writ petitioner was appointed as Superintendent, Buildings and Roads Grade-II in GREF on 21-04-1987. While serving at Mizoram, he was placed under suspension by order dated 27-07-1992 issued by the appellant No. 3 under Rule 10(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 1965 Rules) for alleged misuse of Govt. property/stores and accumulation of Rs. 1,09,344/- by unfair means. The said suspension order was, however, subsequently revoked by order dated 14-11-1994. 4. A criminal case was also registered against the petitioner, being Serchip P.S. Case No. 9/94 under Section 408, IPC. However, the said case ended by way of filing of final report dated 14-11-1994 in the Court of Addl. District Magistrate (J), Aizawl, wherein it was stated that the case was investigated but there was insufficient evidence. The final report was accepted by the Magistrate. 5. In the meanwhile, when the petitioner was under suspension, the Director General of Police (Border Roads) issued order dated 30-09-1994 initiating disciplinary action against the petitioner under provisions of the Army Act, 1950 and the Army Rules, 1954 by way of hearing of charges/summary of evidence. In the summary of evidence, the allegation against the petitioner relating to selling of goods from Government stores to civilians could not be substantiated. The proceedings initiated under the Army Act could not be concluded as it had become time barred. 6. The appellants thereafter switched over from the Army Act and decided to proceed under 1965 Rules. In the summary of evidence, the allegation against the petitioner relating to selling of goods from Government stores to civilians could not be substantiated. The proceedings initiated under the Army Act could not be concluded as it had become time barred. 6. The appellants thereafter switched over from the Army Act and decided to proceed under 1965 Rules. A charge memo was issued to the petitioner by the Commander (respondent No. 3) on 23-12-1995 levelling 3 charges against the petitioner, the gist of which is that he was found in illegal possession of Rs. 1,09,344/- on 10-06-1992, which was disproportionate to his own source of income and that while functioning as Supervisor, he had misappropriated Government stores. The third charge was that the petitioner amassed money by gambling. 7. Petitioner submitted his written statement in defence denying the charges levelled against him. An inquiry was conducted and on conclusion of the same, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding that the first two charges were proved. 8. Petitioner submitted detailed representation against the inquiry report. The disciplinary authority i.e. appellant No. 3 by order dated 24-11-1997 held that the departmental case against the petitioner was established in so far charge Nos. 1 & 2 were concerned and, therefore, imposed the major penalty of dismissal from service. 9. Petitioner preferred statutory appeal before the appellate authority against the award of penalty imposed on him. However, the appellate authority vide order dated 22-01-1998 upheld the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority and rejected the appeal of the petitioner. 10. Initially, the petitioner had moved the Madras High Court challenging his dismissal from service. His writ petition was dismissed by a Single Bench of the said High Court where after he filed writ appeal. A Division Bench of Madras High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and gave opportunity to the petitioner to approach the appropriate High Court. Thereafter, W.P. (C). No. 1445/2009 was filed by the petitioner before this Court challenging the order of dismissal as well as the order of the appellate authority. 11. The respondents (appellants herein) resisted the writ petition by filing counter affidavit. It was submitted that possession of unaccounted money was strongly suggestive of corruption. The charges framed against the petitioner were established and after following the due procedure, penalty of dismissal from service was imposed on the petitioner. 11. The respondents (appellants herein) resisted the writ petition by filing counter affidavit. It was submitted that possession of unaccounted money was strongly suggestive of corruption. The charges framed against the petitioner were established and after following the due procedure, penalty of dismissal from service was imposed on the petitioner. It was further stated that as the case had become time barred for trial under the Army Act, 1950, the authority therefore decided to initiate proceedings under 1965 Rules, which are applicable to the members of GREF. There was no irregularity or illegality in switching over from the Army Act to the 1965 Rules. 12. Learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order interfered with the penalty imposed on the petitioner on two grounds. Firstly, it was held that switching over from the Army Act to the 1965 Rules was not justified. Secondly, learned Single Judge also held that the charges against the petitioner were not independently proved in the disciplinary proceeding and that the charges could not be said to have been proved on the basis of materials collected in the Court of inquiry held under the Army Act and in the preliminary inquiry conducted prior to the issuance of the charge-sheet. Learned Single Judge also held that the appellate order did not reflect due application of mind by the appellate authority. The order of the disciplinary authority as well as of the appellate authority were accordingly set aside. Consequently, petitioner was directed to be reinstated in service and the money seized from the petitioner was directed to be returned back to him with interest @ 6% per annum. However, as indicated earlier, payment of back-wages was left to the discretion of the authority. 13. Aggrieved, the respondents in the writ petition are in appeal questioning the correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. This Court by order dated 22-07-2011 passed in MC 2074/2011 had stayed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 14. We have heard Mr. N. Barah, learned CGC appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. P.K. Deka, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioner. 15. Learned CGC submits that learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with the penalty imposed on the petitioner by the disciplinary authority as the same was imposed following the due procedure. 14. We have heard Mr. N. Barah, learned CGC appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. P.K. Deka, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioner. 15. Learned CGC submits that learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with the penalty imposed on the petitioner by the disciplinary authority as the same was imposed following the due procedure. It is contended that the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the disciplinary proceeding stood vitiated because of switching over from the Army Act to the 1965 Rules does not reflect the correct legal position and requires interference by the appellate Court. It is submitted that the proceeding under the Army Act had to be abandoned as the same had become barred and, therefore, the departmental proceeding was initiated under 1965 Rules. He also submits that there were enough materials before the inquiry officer to hold that the charges against the petitioner were proved as the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding is not to be equated with that of a criminal trial. He, therefore, prays for setting aside of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner, on the other hand, supporting the judgment of the learned Single Judge on both the counts, submits that the appellants had initiated proceeding under Army Act but finding the proceeding time barred, they shifted over and took recourse to proceeding under the 1965 Rules, which was not permissible. In support of his aforesaid submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 31-01-2008 passed in W.P. (C). No. 743/1983, Pratap Singh v. Director General, Border Roads Organization, which was also considered by the learned Single Judge. He also supports the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the charges against the petitioner could not be said to have been proved in the departmental proceeding. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal. 17. The submissions made have been considered. 18. As has been noticed above, one of the grounds of interference by the learned Single Judge in the order of dismissal is that the appellants had switched over from proceeding under the Army Act to proceeding under the 1965 Rules, which vitiated the penalty imposed. While reaching the above conclusion, learned Single Judge recorded the sequence of events as under: 17. While reaching the above conclusion, learned Single Judge recorded the sequence of events as under: 17. In order to answer the first question raised by the petitioner regarding switched over of the proceeding from Army Act to CCS (CCA) Rules, it may be noted that admittedly the vigilance team had seized a sum of Rs. 1,09,344/- on 12.06.92 from the petitioner after conducting the Court of inquiry under the Army Act and the Rules and accordingly put him under suspension with effect from 27.07.92 by the order of DGBR on the basis of Court of inquiry and the disciplinary action under the Army Act was directed to be issued but subsequently the trial under the Army Act 1950 was ruled out being time barred and the disciplinary proceeding was thereafter initiated under CCS (CCA) Rules. Now the question that requires for consideration as to whether the initiation of disciplinary action under the Army Act can be switched over under the CCS (CCA) Rules when the disciplinary action under the Army Act was ruled out because of time barred.______. 19. After referring to the above and the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Pratap Singh (supra), learned Single Judge held as under: 19. In the instant case admittedly the Court of inquiry was held under the Army Act and the petitioner was alleged to have been confessed to the Investigating Officer in presence of an independent witness on 18.06.92 that he accumulated the money by selling government stores to civilians and the said confessional statement was used as a part of disciplinary proceedings initiated under CCS (CCA) Rules, though the independent witness Lt. Col R.K. Guha in whose presence the confessional statement alleged to have been made was not a witness before the inquiry officer and therefore it can be safely held that the entire disciplinary proceeding is vitiated since the matter was switched over from the purview of Army Act to CCS (CCA) Rules and accordingly answered in positive and against the respondents. 20. We are unable to accept the above view of the learned Single Judge as the Army Act and the 1965 Rules operate in different fields and do not overlap. This position has been made clear by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Sunil Kr. Sarkar, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 414 . We are unable to accept the above view of the learned Single Judge as the Army Act and the 1965 Rules operate in different fields and do not overlap. This position has been made clear by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Sunil Kr. Sarkar, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 414 . Para-11 of the said judgment may be gainfully quoted: 11. Before concluding we must point out that during the course of arguments, a doubt was raised as to the maintainability of the concurrent proceedings initiated against the respondent by the authorities. The respondent in this case has been punished for the same misconduct both under the Army Act as also under the Central Rules. Hence, a question arises whether this would tantamount to "double jeopardy" and is in violation of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. Having considered the arguments addressed in this behalf, we are of the opinion that so far as the concurrent proceedings initiated by the Organisation against the respondent both under the Army Act and the Central Rules are concerned, they are unexceptionable. These two proceedings operate in two different fields though the crime or the misconduct might arise out of the same act. The Court-martial proceedings deal with the penal aspect of the misconduct while the proceedings under the Central Rules deal with the disciplinary aspect of the misconduct. The two proceedings do not overlap. As a matter of fact, Notification No. SRO-329 dated 23-9-1960 issued under the Central Rules and under sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 4 of the Army Act makes this position clear. By this notification, the punishments that could be meted out under the Central Rules have been taken out of the purview of the Court-martial proceedings under the Army Act. We further find support for this view of ours in the judgment of this Court in R. Viswan v. Union of India. 21. In the case of Pratap Singh (supra) a Court of inquiry was held and a common inquiry was conducted against the petitioner, Shri Pratap Singh and another person. In the inquiry, charges were held proved against the said petitioner following which, he was dismissed from service. 21. In the case of Pratap Singh (supra) a Court of inquiry was held and a common inquiry was conducted against the petitioner, Shri Pratap Singh and another person. In the inquiry, charges were held proved against the said petitioner following which, he was dismissed from service. The Delhi High Court noted that the other person Shri Ganga Ram Sharma against whom charges were similar and common inquiry was held, was also dismissed from service along with the petitioner. He had filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, which was allowed by a Single Bench of that Court. The punishment was set aside on the ground that after taking recourse to proceeding under the Army Act and the Rules, he could not have been charged under the 1965 Rules. 22. The appeal filed against the said judgment was dismissed for default. Since no steps were taken for restoration of the appeal, the judgment in the case of Shri Ganga Ram Sharma became final. Since it was a common inquiry levelling the same charges against Shri Pratap Singh as well as Shri Ganga Ram Sharma and the punishment imposed on Shri Ganga Ram Sharma having been quashed, the Delhi High Court did not deem it fit and proper to take a different view in the matter. Accordingly, the writ petition of Shri Pratap Singh was allowed and his dismissal order was set aside. 23. Admittedly, the facts in the present case as adverted to above are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the case of Shri Pratap Singh, which was decided by Delhi High Court. Moreover, in view of the clear enunciation of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are unable to accept the view of the learned Single Judge that switching over from the Army Act to the 1965 Rules vitiated the departmental proceeding, To that extent, the decision of the learned Single Judge stands interfered with. 24. Coming now to the other aspect, namely, that there were no materials before the inquiry officer to hold that charges against the petitioner stood proved, let us first notice the charges framed against the petitioner, which are as under: Article-I That the said Shri S. Rengarajan, Supdt. 24. Coming now to the other aspect, namely, that there were no materials before the inquiry officer to hold that charges against the petitioner stood proved, let us first notice the charges framed against the petitioner, which are as under: Article-I That the said Shri S. Rengarajan, Supdt. B/R Gde II, GS-166217Y, while functioning as Super Incharge in various Detts and also worked in office of the erstwhile 73 RCC from June, 1990 to May, 1992, found in illegal possession of Rs. 1,09,344/- (Rupees one lack nine thousand three hundred forty four only) on 10 Jun, 1992 which is disproportionate to his known source of income. Thus, he failed to maintain absolute integrity and violated Rule 3(1)(i) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article-II That during the period from Aug, 1991 to May, 1992, while functioning as Supervisor Incharge for execution of permanent works between Km 28 to Km 60 on Thenzawl-Bunghmun Road, the said Shri S. Rengarajan Supdt. B/R Gde. II misappropriated the Government stores by faulty construction/fictitious booking i.e. construction of lesser dimension than those shown in the work diaries. Thus, he did not maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and violated Rule 3(1)(i) and (ii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article-III That during the aforesaid period while functioning as Supdt. B/R Gde. II in various Detts, the said Shri S. Rengarajan Supdt B/R Gde. II amassed money by gambling. Thus, he committed an act unbecoming of a Government servant and violated Rule 3(1)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. 25. The Inquiry Officer in his inquiry report dated 04-10-1997 after analysing and assessing the evidence, held that charges 1 & 2 against the petitioner stood proved whereas charge No. 3 was not proved. Since the disciplinary authority did not question the finding of the Inquiry Officer on charge No. 3, we, therefore limit our consideration to charge Nos. 1 & 2 only. The analysis and assessment of evidence in respect of the two charges by the Inquiry Officer is as under: (a) Charge No. I (i) There is no dispute that an amount of Rs. 1,09,344/- was seized from the possession of Shri S. Rengarajan, CO (PW 2) Major P.K. Mehta as well as CO himself have establish to the same. The analysis and assessment of evidence in respect of the two charges by the Inquiry Officer is as under: (a) Charge No. I (i) There is no dispute that an amount of Rs. 1,09,344/- was seized from the possession of Shri S. Rengarajan, CO (PW 2) Major P.K. Mehta as well as CO himself have establish to the same. (ii) From the details of Pay and Allowances received by CO during the period May 90 to May 92, the amount seized is far in excess and the plea of the prosecution has been that the same was earned through illegal means like selling of Govt. stores etc. The CO who had given the confessional statement on 18 June 92 six days after the seizure, admitted that therein to have indulged in selling Govt. stores and thus the part of this amount was accumulated. However, subsequently he has refuted and disowned the same statement. (iii) Notwithstanding above it can not be overlooked that the confessional statement (which forms part of the deposition of (PW 2 Major P.K. Mehta) was given after six days of the incident in presence of the witness i.e. Capt. P.K. Mehta (now Major) and was recorded by another officer. (iv) The CO has cross examined Major P.K. Mehta on this account during the inquiry and there is nothing to establish that his earlier confessional statement was given under any threat pressure, persuasion or coercion. (v) It is well established that the conduct and the action of a govt. servant should be transparent and any accumulation of wealth beyond known sources of income is to be satisfactorily accounted for falling which it is to be construed that the same has been earned through dubious or illegal means. (vi) The plea of the CO that he had accumulated this amount from his earlier service after passing Diploma and as well as Rs. 30,000/- loan from his friends might be correct but does not appear so in the present context especially when his conduct and actions were under probe apart form the fact that various better safe mode of transmission like Bank Draft, Mail Transfer etc. were available rather than carrying huge amount while proceeding on leave. 30,000/- loan from his friends might be correct but does not appear so in the present context especially when his conduct and actions were under probe apart form the fact that various better safe mode of transmission like Bank Draft, Mail Transfer etc. were available rather than carrying huge amount while proceeding on leave. (vii) It is well known that despite free food and clothing given in GREF as a Super one has to spend some amount every month towards his food, drinks, personal clothing and on recreation. From the details of pay and allowances, if FRMO compulsory subscription like GPF etc. and the amount spent for above is deducted, a meagre amount can only be saved. (viii) The circumstances of seizure coupled with the circumstantial and direct evidence, statement available on record and adduced during the inquiry needle of suspection is definitely raised towards the charged officer that the amount might have been earned through illegal means and not satisfactory accounted for. (b) Charge II: (i) In his confessional statement given on 18 June, 1992, the CO has admitted to have sold Govt. stores like Cement, diesel, explosives etc. During preliminary inquiry Shri Abdul Roy of Thenzaml village had stated that he had purchased 30 bags of Cement from Shri S. Rengararjan @ Rs. 120/- per bag. Shri Abdul Roy also cross examined by the charged officer during preliminary inquiry. However, the prosecution has failed to produce Shri Abdul Roy during DE. But the fact that he was earlier cross examined by the CO is very much relevant so far as the story of prosecution is concerned. (ii) Shri D.S. Giri (PW 3) in his statement in DE has stated that he had taken 10 bags of Cement from Shri S. Rengarajan, however he denied to have made payment (Q No. 3 to PW 3 in DE refer). This shows that the CO was in the habit of giving Govt. stores free or on payment without any authority. (iii) The board of officers during Preliminary Inquiry had carried out measurements which was done in presence of CO and there was a lot of variation in the quantity booked and quantity based on ground measurements. The very fact that Shri S. Rengarajan was the member of the team and did the measurement establishes that measurement was done in his satisfaction and he had not raised any objection at any stage. The very fact that Shri S. Rengarajan was the member of the team and did the measurement establishes that measurement was done in his satisfaction and he had not raised any objection at any stage. The full copy of the preliminary inquiry was given to Shri S. Rengarajan prior to commencement of the DE. At no stage he had raised objection regarding the quantity shown therein. (iv) The plea of the CO that there is general practice of indulging of overbooking may be correct but that does not give him the authority to resort to overbooking which is a serious irregularity and the person doing so is to be personally blamed. 26. Thus, it is seen that the Inquiry Officer had acted upon the confessional statement of the petitioner made on 18-06-1992 during the course of inquiry conducted under the Army Act, which was subsequently retracted by the petitioner himself by saying that the confessional statement was extracted from him under coercion. Interestingly, the Inquiry Officer partially accepted the contention of the petitioner that he had accumulated the amount in question from his earlier service as well as by taking loan from friends by saying that the plea of the charged official "might be correct". The Inquiry Officer, however, gives his own reasoning by saying that an official like Supervisor has to spend some money towards his food, drinks, personal clothing and nutrition and, therefore, only a meagre amount can be saved. He, therefore, concludes that the amount in question "might have been earned through illegal means and not satisfactorily accounted for". 27. In so far charge No. 2 is concerned, the Inquiry Officer again relied on the preliminary inquiry, where one Abdul Roy was stated to have purchased 30 bags of cement from the petitioner but the said Abdul Roy was not produced during the departmental enquiry. However, the Inquiry Officer took the view that since the said Abdul Roy was earlier cross-examined in the preliminary inquiry that would be very much relevant. Thus, it is seen that the Inquiry Officer based his finding on what transpired in the preliminary inquiry. 28. It is true that in a departmental proceeding, the standard of proof is not to be equated with that of a criminal trial. Thus, it is seen that the Inquiry Officer based his finding on what transpired in the preliminary inquiry. 28. It is true that in a departmental proceeding, the standard of proof is not to be equated with that of a criminal trial. While in criminal proceeding, the charge against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, in the case of a departmental proceeding, it is pre-ponderence of probability. Notwithstanding the above, it cannot be denied that even in a departmental proceeding, the charge against the delinquent must be proved or established as is understood by a reasonable man. Though the strict rules of evidence and the provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable but none-the-less, the Inquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority must base their findings on materials, which were before the disciplinary proceeding. There must be reasonable nexus between the materials produced in course of a departmental proceeding and the findings recorded. Just because a prima facie finding of guilt is recorded against the delinquent in the Court of inquiry or in the preliminary inquiry, the same ifso facto would not entitle the Inquiry Officer as well as the disciplinary authority to draw adverse inference against the delinquent without the charge being proved independently in the departmental proceeding. 29. Therefore, the learned Single Judge is correct in saying that the Court of inquiry held under the Army Act and the evidence recorded therein as well as the evidence collected in the preliminary inquiry cannot be the basis of holding that charge Nos. 1 & 2 against the petitioner stood proved in the disciplinary proceeding. 30. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the decision of the learned Single Judge. However, the direction given for payment of interest @ 6% per annum on the amount seized from the petitioner is considered not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case, which portion of the order is accordingly set aside. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is upheld to the extent indicated above, not on the first ground but on the second ground. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of. However, there will be no order as to cost.