JUDGMENT : Dev Darshan Sud, J. (oral) This appeal has been preferred by the Himachal Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the HRTC) against the judgment and award of the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (I), Kangra at Dharamshala awarding a sum of 3,03,000/- plus interest and costs for the death of Billa @ Sanjay, son of the claimants. It is undisputed before me that at the time of the accident, he was 16 years old and was studying in 10th class. The accident occurred on 15.9.1992 and this petition was instituted in the year 2010. 2. Two points have been urged by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that (a) the petition is barred by limitation because the provision of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) governed the case and limitation of six months from the date when the accident took place in which event the claimants should have approached the Tribunal within the period prescribed by law; (b) in case the first submission is not accepted, in that event, the compensation awarded is not in accordance with law and is excessive. 3. On the first point, the Supreme Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd and others, 1991 ACJ 1060 holds: "7. It is true that the appellant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but can this be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired. The answer is in the negative. The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. So far the period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed by the new Act, subject to two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy. This principle has been followed by this court in many cases and by way of illustration we would like to mention New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, 1976 ACJ 128 (SC). The husband of the respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966. A period of two years was available to the respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of damages. In March, 1967 the Claims Tribunal under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was constituted, barring the jurisdiction of the civil court and prescribing 60 days as the period of limitation. The respondent filed the application in July, 1967. It was held that not having filed a suit before March, 1967 the only remedy of the respondent was by way of an application before the Tribunal. So far the period of limitation was concerned, it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action. In view of the change of the law it was held that the application could be filed within a reasonable time after the constitution of the Tribunal; and, that the time of about four months taken by the respondent in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution, could be held to be either reasonable time or the delay of about two months could be condoned under the proviso to section 110-A (3). 13. In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was same six months, which expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act. It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by 22.7.1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act. In this background the appellants further default has to be considered. If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant has actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force, but after a period of one year, the position could be different. Having actually initiated the proceeding when the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away. The present case is different. The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as sufficient cause also relates to the time after the repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because of cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. Sufficient cause as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from cause of action for the claim itself. The question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law. We accordingly, hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs." (at pp.1062-1065) However, to put the controversy at rest, the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma and another 2003 ACJ 1999 holds: "4. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs." (at pp.1062-1065) However, to put the controversy at rest, the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma and another 2003 ACJ 1999 holds: "4. The only contention, which has been strenuously urged by the counsel for the appellant, is that the accident had taken place on 18.2.1989 and the claim petition was filed on 2.11.1995; when the claim was barred under the old Act, the same could not have been revived under the new Act. It is his contention that on this score alone the claim petition should have been dismissed. To answer this contention it would be useful to have a quick survey of changes that have taken place in the Act. The old Act of 1939 has been repealed and since then there is a sea of changes in the Act. In the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) sub-section (3) of section 110-A provided: "110-A. (3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time." 5. The 1939 Act was repealed w.e.f. 1.7.1989. The period of limitation prescribed in the new Act is provided under sub-section (3) of the section 166. It reads: "166. (3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time." 6. The only difference that has been brought about in between the old Act and the new Act is that the Tribunal may entertain an application after the expiry of period of six months but not later than twelve months. 7. In the instant case, at the time, when the respondents had filed claim petition on 2.11.1995, the situation was completely different. Sub-section (3) of section 166 of the Act had been omitted by Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994. 7. In the instant case, at the time, when the respondents had filed claim petition on 2.11.1995, the situation was completely different. Sub-section (3) of section 166 of the Act had been omitted by Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The result of the section 53 of Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, is that there is no limitation prescribed for filing claim petitions before the Tribunal in respect of any accident w.e.f. 14.11.1994. . 10. The ratio laid down in Dhannalals case, 1996 ACJ 1013 (SC), applies with full force to the facts of the present case. When the claim petition was filed sub-section (3) of section 166 had been omitted. Thus, the Claims Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition without taking note of the date on which the accident took place. Faced with this situation, Mr. Kapoor submitted that Dhannalals case does not consider section 6-A of the General Clauses Act and, therefore, needs to be reconsidered. We are unable to accept the submission. Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act undoubtedly provides that the repeal of a provision will not affect the continuance of the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of repeal. However, this is subject to unless a different intention appears. In Dhannalals case the reason for the deletion of sub-section (3) of section 166 has been set out. It is noted that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury caused to heirs and legal representatives of the victim of accidents if the claim petition was rejected only on ground of limitation. Thus the different intention clearly appears and section 6-A of the General Clauses Act would not apply. .. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant, next contended that since no period of limitation has been prescribed by the legislature, Article 137 of the Limitation Act may be invoked, otherwise, according to him, stale claims would be encouraged leading to multiplicity of litigation for non-prescribing the period of limitation. We are unable to countenance with the contention of the appellant for more than one reason. Firstly, such an Act like the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found genuine. Secondly, it is a self-contained Act which prescribes mode of filing the application, procedure to be followed and award to be made. Firstly, such an Act like the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found genuine. Secondly, it is a self-contained Act which prescribes mode of filing the application, procedure to be followed and award to be made. Parliament, in its wisdom, realised the grave injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who suffer bodily injuries/die in accidents, by rejecting their claim petitions at the threshold on the ground of limitation, and purposely deleted sub-section (3) of section 166, which provided the period of limitation for filing the claim petitions and this being the intendment of the legislature to give effective relief to the victims and the families of the motor accidents un-trammeled by the technicalities of the limitation, invoking of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would defeat the intendment of the legislature." (at pp.2000,2001,2003-2004) The submission on the bar of limitation cannot be accepted despite the forceful submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Bangaru and others v. Theeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation 1996 ACJ 430 has held to the contrary. 4. On the question of quantum, the learned Tribunal holds that the deceased was not earning anything and in that event, the dependency was to be taken at Rs. 1500/- per month and multiplier of 16 was applied. It accordingly calculated the loss of dependency at Rs. 2,88,000/-, funeral expenses at Rs. 10,000/- and transportation charges at Rs. 5000/-. Learned counsel submits that this is not the correct method of assessing the dependency as in R.K. Malik and another v. Kiran Pal and others 2009 ACJ 1924 the Supreme Court holds: "6. During the course of trial before the Tribunal, several witnesses were examined in support of the respective claims. The appellants also examined themselves as witnesses. The Tribunal by award dated 6.12.2004 held that the accident had taken place due to negligence of the driver, respondent No. 1 and, therefore, the said respondent along with respondent Nos 2 and 3 were jointly and severally liable to pay compensation. The Tribunal by its common award awarded a sum of Rs. 1,55,000 to the dependants of children between age group of 10 and 15 years and Rs. 1,65,000 between 15 and 18 years. The Tribunal by its common award awarded a sum of Rs. 1,55,000 to the dependants of children between age group of 10 and 15 years and Rs. 1,65,000 between 15 and 18 years. Three of the children, namely Kailash Rathi, Neena Jain and Jatish Sharma were less than 10 years. In case of Kailar Rathi, compensation of Rs. 1,05,000 was awarded and in the cases of Neena Jain and Jatish Sharma, compensation of Rs. 1,30,000 and Rs. 1,31,000 respectively was awarded. Plus additional Rs. 1000 was awarded in the case of Jatish Sharma, as in some other cases, for loss of books. The figures mentioned above include Rs. 5,000 each for funeral and last rites. It awarded interest at the rate of 6 percent for 4 years. As per the Second Schedule to the Act, the balance amount was awarded for loss of dependency that was calculated on notional income of Rs. 15,000 per annum. Rs. 5000 was deducted for personal living expenses. The Tribunal applied multiplier of 15 for children below 15 years and multiplier of 16 for children between 16 and 18 years respectively. . 13. For calculating the pecuniary loss or the loss of dependency, this court has repeatedly held that it is the multiplier method which should be applied. The said method is based upon the principle that the claimant must be paid a capital sum, which would yield sufficient interest to provide material benefits of the same standard and duration as the deceased would have provided for the dependants, if the deceased had lived and earned. The multiplier method is based upon the assessment that the yearly loss of dependency should be equal to interest that could be earned in normal course on the capital sum invested. The capital sum would be the compensation for loss of dependency or the pecuniary loss suffered by the dependants. Needless to say, uniform application of the multiplier method ensures consistency and certainty and prevents different amounts being awarded in different cases. 14. For calculating the yearly loss of dependency the starting point is the wages being earned by the deceased, less his personal and living expenses. This provides a basic figure. Thereafter, effect is given to the future prospects of the deceased, inflation and general price rise that erodes value and the purchasing power of money. To the multiplicand so calculated, multiplier is to be applied. This provides a basic figure. Thereafter, effect is given to the future prospects of the deceased, inflation and general price rise that erodes value and the purchasing power of money. To the multiplicand so calculated, multiplier is to be applied. The multiplier is decided and determined on the basis of length of dependency, which must be estimated. This has to be necessarily discounted for contingencies and uncertainties. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this court in the cases of Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav, 1996 ACJ 581 (SC); Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Trans. Corpn. Ltd. v. K.I. Bindu, 2006 ACJ 423 (SC); Tamil Nadu State Trans. Corpn. Ltd. v. S. Rajapriya, 2005 ACJ 1441 (SC); New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie, 2005 ACJ 1131 (SC) and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, 2002 ACJ 1441 (SC). 15. The real problem that arises in the cases of death of children is that they are not earning at the time of the accident. In most of the cases they were still studying and not working. However, under no stretch of imagination it can be said that the parents, who are appellants herein, have not suffered any pecuniary loss. In fact, loss of dependency by its very nature is awarded for prospective or future loss. In this context, Lord Atkinson aptly observed in Taff Vale Rly. Co. v. Jenkins, (1911-13) AII ER 160, as follows: "In the case f death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the childs lifetime. But this will not necessarily bar the parents claim and prospective loss will found a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived." 16. Then, how does one calculate the pecuniary compensation for loss of future earnings and loss of dependency of the parents, grandparents, etc. in the case of non-working student? Under the Second Schedule to the Act in the case of a non-earning person, his income is notionally estimated at Rs. 15,000 per annum. The Second Schedule is applicable to claim petitions filed under section 163-A of the Act. in the case of non-working student? Under the Second Schedule to the Act in the case of a non-earning person, his income is notionally estimated at Rs. 15,000 per annum. The Second Schedule is applicable to claim petitions filed under section 163-A of the Act. The Second Schedule provides for the multiplier to be applied in cases where the age of the victim was less than 15 years and between 15 years but not exceeding 20 years. Even when compensation is payable under section 166 read with section 168 of the Act, deviation from the structured formula as provided in Second Schedule is not ordinarily permissible, except in exceptional cases. (See Arati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India, 2003 ACJ 680 (SC); United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, 2002 ACJ 1441 (SC) and U.P. State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Trilok Chandra 1996 ACJ 831 (SC)) 18. Therefore, keeping in view the Second Schedule to the Act, this Court does not see any reason to differ with the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court insofar as award of pecuniary compensation to the dependants-claimants is concerned. We must point out here that the learned counsel for appellants had argued that the notional sum of Rs. 15,000 should be enhanced and increased as the legislature has not amended the Second Schedule and the same continues to be in existence since it was enacted on 14.11.1994. We are not examining and going into this aspect as the accident had taken place in the present case nearly three years after the enactment of the Second Schedule. The time difference between the date of the enactment and the date of accident is not substantial." (at pp.1926-1928) 5. According to the Second Schedule, the multiplier to be applied is 16. In case of non-earning persons, the annual income has been considered as Rs. 15,000/- per annum. Rs. 5000/- has to be deducted for personal living expenses and therefore, the annual dependency comes out at Rs. 10,000/- per annum. After multiplying it by 16, the just compensation in terms of the award comes out at Rs. 1,60,000/-. Applying the ratio of R.K. Maliks case, an additional sum of Rs. 75,000/- is also awarded and the total compensation comes out at Rs. 2,35,000/-. This appeal is accordingly allowed and a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- is awarded including Rs. After multiplying it by 16, the just compensation in terms of the award comes out at Rs. 1,60,000/-. Applying the ratio of R.K. Maliks case, an additional sum of Rs. 75,000/- is also awarded and the total compensation comes out at Rs. 2,35,000/-. This appeal is accordingly allowed and a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- is awarded including Rs. 10,000/- as funeral expenses and Rs. 5000/- for transportation of the dead body of deceased. The amount shall carry interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of award till its payment. The award is modified accordingly. A direction is issued to calculate the compensation award in terms of what has been determined above. Let the excess amount, if any, be deposited by the HRTC and the amount, falling to the shares of the claimants, be released to them by remitting it to their respective bank accounts within a period of six months from the date of this judgment. 6. An objection has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that 10% interest is excessive rate. Considering the frugal amount of compensation, as awarded, and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the interest of justice, I deem it fit and proper that 10% interest should and ought to be awarded.