JUDGMENT : S. K. Gangele, J.:- This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 13-8-2004, Annexure-P/1. By the aforesaid order the petitioner has been ordered to be taxed in accordance with the Entry No. 55 of Part-Ill of Schedule-II of Madhya Pradesh Commercial Tax Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1994'). 2. The petitioner is a Government of India Undertaking and a Corporate Company. It is manufacturing fertilizer i.e. Urea at Vijaypur, District Guna (M.P). For the aforesaid purpose, the petitioner uses raw material i.e. natural gas. The petitioner used to purchase the aforesaid gas by way of pipeline. According to the petitioner, it is liable to pay sales tax of natural gas at the rate of 8% in accordance with the residuary entry. However, vide order dated 13-8-2004, the Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Madhya Pradesh has held that a tax shall be levied on the petitioner on purchase of natural gas at the rate of 2% in accordance with the Entry Mo. 55 of Part-Ill of Schedule-II of the Act of 1994. The aforesaid entry reads as under :- SCHEDULE -II [See section 9(1)] (Effective from 5-3-2000) _______________________________________ _____SI. No._________Description of goods________Rate of tax (%) (1)___________________(2)___________________(3)_________ PART-III X X X X X X X X X 55. All types of gases such as oxygen, hydrogen, etc ____________________ 3. The respondents in the return have pleaded that the petitioner has been using natural gas in manufacturing of Urea and because the petitioner consumed in manufacturing the gas at Vijaypur, District Guna, hence, it has to pay tax in accordance with the section 9(2)(b)(i) of M. P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994 and the rate of tax has been fixed as per entry in the Schedule. It is further submitted that the petitioner has been purchasing natural gas from GAIL, Vijaypur, Guna. Earlier in the Schedule II Part VII, there was no specific entry of natural gas therefore rate of tax was payable under the residuary entry but from 1-1-2000, Schedule II Part III amended by Entry No. 56 of all kinds of gases and rate of tax has been fixed 12%. 4. Earlier in the Schedule II Part VII, there was no specific entry of natural gas therefore rate of tax was payable under the residuary entry but from 1-1-2000, Schedule II Part III amended by Entry No. 56 of all kinds of gases and rate of tax has been fixed 12%. 4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the petitioner is not liable to be taxed in accordance with the Entry No. 55 of Part-Ill of Schedule-II of the Act of 1994 because in the aforesaid entry it has been mentioned that "all types of gases such as oxygen, hydrogen, etc," and interpreting the aforesaid entry the principle of ejusdem generis would be applicable. He further submitted that the petitioner is liable to be taxed under residuary entry. Learned Senior Counsel in alternative has submitted that the petitioner is not liable to pay any tax because the natural gas or liquefied natural gas is a central subject covered by Entry 53 of List I and the State is not competent legislative under the Entry No. 55 of Part-III of Schedule-II of the Act of 1994. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel relied on the following judgments :- i) 1978 MPLJ120, Sukhu Ram Tamrakar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & ors.; ii) AIR 1989 SC 1019 , M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd., vs. Union of India and another and iii) AIR 2004 SC 2647 , Association of Natural Gas and others vs. Union of India and others. 5. Contrary to this, learned Deputy Advocate General has contended that the petitioner is liable to pay tax in accordance with Entry No. 55 of Part-Ill of Schedule-II of the Act of 1994. 6. The Department reduced the tax of natural gas to 6% w.e.f. 1-12-1987 to 31-3-1994 and thereafter it was fixed at the rate of 8% in accordance with the residuary entry. The petitioner had been paying the tax at the rate of 8%. According to the petitioner, the Entry No. 55 of Part-Ill of Schedule-II of the Act of 1994 does not cover natural gas, hence, it is liable to pay tax in accordance with the residuary entry, which is 8%. 7. The question is whether the Entry No. 55 of Part-Ill of Schedule-II of the Act of 1994 covers the natural gas or not. The aforesaid entry is as under :- "55. 7. The question is whether the Entry No. 55 of Part-Ill of Schedule-II of the Act of 1994 covers the natural gas or not. The aforesaid entry is as under :- "55. All types of gases such as oxygen, hydrogen etc." 8. The respondents in their return have submitted that the word 'Hydrogen' and 'Oxygen' has been incorporated in the Schedule due to the judgment passed by the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Industrial Gas vs. Commissioner Commercial Tax, decided on 6-12-1996, holding that Oxygen is a chemical and cannot be taxed like gases. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd., vs. Union of India and another, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1019 has held as under in regard to expression of ejusdem generis :- "7. The expression ejusdem generis - 'of the same kind or nature' - signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. If a list or string or family of genus-describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping - up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words. In 'Statutory Interpretation' Rupert Cross says : "......The draftsman must be taken to have inserted the general words in case something which ought to have been included among the specifically enumerated items had been omitted......"(page 116) The principle underlying this approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found, ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favoured. This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found, ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favoured. As a learned author puts it: "..............if a class can be found, but the specific words exhaust the class, then rejection of the rule may be favoured because its adoption would make the general words unnecessary; if however, the specific words do not exhaust the class, then adoption of the rule may be favoured because its rejection would make the specific words unnecessary." (See : Construction of Statutes by E. A. Driedger p. 95 quoted by Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction pages 829 and 830). Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction observed : "For the ejusdem generis principles to apply there must be a sufficient indication of a category that can properly be described as a class or genus, even though not specified as such in the enactment. Furthermore the genus must be narrower than the words it is said to regulate. The nature of the genus is gathered by implication from the express words which suggest it......." (p. 830) "It is necessary to be able to formulate the genus; for if it cannot be formulated, it does not exist. 'Unless you can find a category', said Farwell LJ, 'there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine'." (p. 831) In 55. Magnhild (Owners) vs. Mclntyre Bros, and Co., (1920) 3 KB 321 Me Cardie, J. said : "So far as I can see the only test seems to be whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. Magnhild (Owners) vs. Mclntyre Bros, and Co., (1920) 3 KB 321 Me Cardie, J. said : "So far as I can see the only test seems to be whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. By this I understand that the specified things must possess some common and dominant feature." In Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar vs. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCR 732 : ( AIR 1970 SC 540 ) the Court said : ".......This rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words, in view of the other rules of interpretation, that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous....." (p.740) (of SCR): (at p. 545 of AIR) In U. P. S. E. Board vs. Hari Shanker, AIR 1979 SC 65 it was observed : "..........The true scope of the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be "applied with caution and not pushed too far"....." (p. 73) 8. The preceding words in the statutory provision which, under this particular rule of construction, control and limit the meaning of the subsequent words must represent a genus or a family which admits of a number of species or members. If there is only one species it cannot supply the idea of a genus." In the present case the expressions 'bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, waterproofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing' which precede the expression 'or any other process' contemplate processes which impart a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise. 'Any other process' in the section must share one or the other of these incidents. The expression "any other process" is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture in its extended meaning and the expression "unprocessed" in the exempting notification draws its meaning from that context. 'Any other process' in the section must share one or the other of these incidents. The expression "any other process" is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture in its extended meaning and the expression "unprocessed" in the exempting notification draws its meaning from that context. The principle of construction considered appropriate by the Tribunal in this case appears to us to be unsupportable in the context in which the expression "or any other process" has to be understood." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has mentioned its earlier judgment passed in the case of The U. P. State Electricity Board and another vs. Hari Shanker Jain and others, reported in AIR 1979 SC 65 , wherein it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed the Farwell LJ, where the learned Judge has observed that "it is necessary to be able to formulate the genus; for if it cannot be formulated it does not exist. 'Unless you can find a category, there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine'." 10. In the present case, the petitioner tried to draw distinction to the fact that the natural gas, all types of gases mentioned in the entry be construed, if the gases are of same nature as Oxygen and Hydrogen. In our opinion, this is not the intention of the statute. The Oxygen and Hydrogen has specifically been mentioned in view of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Industrial Gas (supra) that the Oxygen is a chemical and cannot be taxed like gases. In order to remove the aforesaid ambiguity the Oxygen and Hydrogen have specifically been mentioned in the entry. In our opinion all types of gases would cover the natural gas also because the petitioner has been using the natural gas for commercial purpose. The purpose of entry is to tax gases which are being used for commercial purpose. The petitioner himself has mentioned that the natural gas is the type of petroleum product and it occurs in association with crude oil. It contains carbon dioxide and heavier hydrocarbons and it found near accumulations of oil. 11. The purpose of entry is to tax gases which are being used for commercial purpose. The petitioner himself has mentioned that the natural gas is the type of petroleum product and it occurs in association with crude oil. It contains carbon dioxide and heavier hydrocarbons and it found near accumulations of oil. 11. It is carnal principle of law that in interpreting the taxing statute the strict meaning has to be given to the later. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat vs. Shri Kantilal Trikamlal, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1935 has held as under :- "In a taxing statute one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. The frames of the Estate Duty Act desired by a deeming provisions regarding 'disposition' to cover extinguishments of debts and all other rights at the expense of and made by the deceased in favour of the beneficiary. The substantive definition of 'property' in section 2(15) is not exhaustive but only exclusive and the supplementary operation of Explanation 2 takes in what is not conventionally regarded as 'disposition'." (Para 20) 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also in the case of Mathuram Agrawal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (7999) 8 SCC 667, has held as under :- "The intention of the legislature in a taxation statute is to be gathered from the language of the provisions particularly where the language is plain and unambiguous. In a taxing Act it is not possible to assume any intention or governing purpose of the statute more than what is stated in the plain language. It is not the economic results sought to be obtained by making the provision which is relevant in interpreting a fiscal statute. Equally impermissible is an interpretation which does not follow from the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. Words cannot be added to or substituted so as to give a meaning to the statute which will serve the spirit and intention of the legislature. The statute should clearly and unambiguously convey the three components of the tax law i.e. the subject of the tax, the person who is liable to pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid. The statute should clearly and unambiguously convey the three components of the tax law i.e. the subject of the tax, the person who is liable to pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid. If there is any ambiguity regarding any of these ingredients in a taxation statute then there is no tax in law. Then it is for the legislature to do the needful in the matter." (Para 12) 13. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, there is no illegality or irregularity in the order Annexure-P/1. The arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the State Government is not competent to legislate on natural gas because it is a central subject covered by Entry 53 of List I could not be accepted by this Court because in this petition vires of the entry has not been challenged and for the aforesaid purpose the petitioner has to challenge the vires of the entry for which this Bench has no jurisdiction. 14. Consequently, we do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.