JUDGMENT Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.: - The tenants are in revision against orders of the Courts below by which the eviction petition filed by the landlords under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 [for short “the Act”] on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent, impairment of value and utility of the demised premises and subletting has succeeded only on the ground of subletting the demised premises (shop) by petitioner Nos.1 to 3 to petitioner No.4 without the written consent of the landlords. 2. In brief, Parshotam Dass Goenka (respondent No.2) had let out the demised premises to Tirath Ram, father/predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Nos.1 to 3 on a monthly rent of Rs.500/-. After the death of Tirath Ram, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 stepped into his shoes. The eviction petition is filed, inter alia, on the grounds that the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 did not pay the arrears of rent @ Rs.500/- per month w.e.f. 01.01.1995; they have, by their act and conduct, impaired the value and utility of the demised premises and have sublet the demised premises to petitioner No.4, a public limited company, without the consent of the landlords. It was averred that the demised premises was on rent with Tirath Ram for his business from 01.05.1976 apropos a rent note dated 07.05.1976. After the death of Tirath Ram, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 have sublet the demised premises to petitioner No.4. 3. In reply, it was admitted by petitioner Nos.1 to 3 that the demised premises was let out by respondent No.2 to Tirath Ram @ Rs.500/- per month and petitioner Nos.1 to 3 had inherited his tenancy rights after the death of Tirath Ram but they have denied the execution of rent note dated 07.05.1976. It was alleged that petitioner No.4 is a public limited company having its registered office at New Delhi and has no office/branch in the demised premises in question. It was denied that petitioner No.4 is in exclusive possession, use, occupation and control of the demised premises. It was also alleged that petitioner No.1 Jugal Kishore Arora is the sole selling agent of petitioner No.4 for Amritsar since 13.05.1994 as per the agreement of the same day which was arrived at with petitioner No.4 and is carrying on his business as such in the demised premises. 4. It was also alleged that petitioner No.1 Jugal Kishore Arora is the sole selling agent of petitioner No.4 for Amritsar since 13.05.1994 as per the agreement of the same day which was arrived at with petitioner No.4 and is carrying on his business as such in the demised premises. 4. After filing of the replication by the landlord, issues were framed on 15.04.1996. Both the parties led their oral as well as documentary evidence. The learned Rent Controller decided issue No.2 against the landlords and issue Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5 against the tenants and passed the order of eviction on 13.06.2003 basically on the ground of subletting in view of the finding returned on issue No.3. The tenants filed appeal before the learned Appellate Authority which was also dismissed on 02.04.2009. 5. Since the only issue involved in this case is about the subletting as both the Courts below have passed the order of eviction on this ground alone, therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners has confined her submissions on this issue. She has submitted that the learned Courts below have committed a patent error of law in misreading the evidence on record as the question of subletting would arise if it is proved by the landlords that the petitioner No.4, the alleged sub-tenant, is in exclusive possession over the demised premises. 6. It is submitted that petitioner No.4 is a public limited company having its registered office at New Delhi but the possession of the demised premises is with petitioner No.1 Jugal Kishore Arora, who was appointed as sole selling agent of petitioner No.4 vide agreement dated 13.05.1994. It is submitted by leaned counsel for the landlords that this argument has not been accepted by the learned Courts below because the original agreement dated 13.05.1994 has not been produced on record. 7. It was observed that merely by producing a photocopy of the agreement Ex.R4 does not dispense with its proof as the original had never been produced on record. It is further argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that in the income tax return of Jugal Kishore Arora (petitioner No.1), his income has been shown under the head of salary and commission, which clearly proves that he has been getting commission as agent from petitioner No.4. It is further argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that in the income tax return of Jugal Kishore Arora (petitioner No.1), his income has been shown under the head of salary and commission, which clearly proves that he has been getting commission as agent from petitioner No.4. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the head of income is also shown as salary and commission and it is not proved by evidence by the petitioners that Jugal Kishore Arora was getting commission from the petitioner No.4. Learned Courts below have also appreciated that in the letter head of the petitioner No.4, the address of the demised premises has been given which proves that the demised premises is being used as its office. It is also argued by learned counsel for the landlords that as per clause (h) of the agreement Ex.R4 the entire amount of maintenance expenses was borne by the company (petitioner No.4). The agreement dated 13.05.1994 was allegedly executed for a period of 5 years which has expired in the year 1999 but nothing has been brought on record that any other conveyance was executed by the company for extension of the said agreement. The learned Courts below have also relied upon the statement of AW4 Shiv Kumar, who is a Clerk in the department of Sales Tax and has proved the record pertaining to petitioner No.4 which has been assessed to sales tax under the Punjab General Sales Tax with proof that it is situated at Amritsar. It was also stated by him that petitioner No.4 has its office in the demised premises w.e.f. 30.09.1992, much prior to the alleged agreement with Jugal Kishore Arora (petitioner No.1) dated 13.05.1994. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has then argued that even if it is presumed that the petitioner No.4 is in possession of the demised premises but it cannot be said that it is in exclusive possession because two of the petitioners, namely, Jugal Kishore Arora and Gurnam Arora, i.e. petitioner Nos.1 and 3, are the Directors of petitioner No.4. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has then argued that even if it is presumed that the petitioner No.4 is in possession of the demised premises but it cannot be said that it is in exclusive possession because two of the petitioners, namely, Jugal Kishore Arora and Gurnam Arora, i.e. petitioner Nos.1 and 3, are the Directors of petitioner No.4. In this regard, she has relied upon a decision of the Single Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Vishwa Nath and another v. Chaman Lal Khanna and another, AIR 1975 Delhi 117 and a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Madras Bangalore Transport Company (West) v. Inder Singh and others, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1564. 9. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the demised premises was let out to Tirath Ram where he had started his business of “Export House”. After the death of Tirath Ram, the said firm has become non-functional and business under the banner of M/s Satnam Overseas Limited is being carried out in the demised premises which is a limited company having a separate legal entity. In this regard, he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Saran v. Payare Lal and another, 1996(1) R.C.R. (Rent) SC 212 and M/s Speedline Agencies v. M/s T. Stanes & Co. Ltd., [2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3006] : 2010(2) R.C.R. (Rent) SC 229. 10. I have heard both the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance. 11. Since the only issue to be decided by this Court is with regard to the sub-tenancy, therefore, the question arises for consideration is as to “whether the original tenant, who was running a partnership/ proprietorship firm in the demised premises, dies, the said firm had become non-functional and his successors-in-interest forms a limited company in which they are also Directors, continues to run the business in the said demised premises, whether it tantamounts to subletting in favour of the limited company?” 12. As per narration of the aforesaid facts, admittedly, the demised premises was let out to Tirath Ram, predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Nos.1 to 3, wherein he had started his business of “Export House” which was a partnership firm but after the death of Tirath Ram, when his sons stepped into his shoes as tenants, they had started a limited company, namely, M/s Satnam Overseas Limited without the oral/written permission of the landlord. The concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below is that the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 have failed to prove that petitioner No.1 was the sole selling agent of petitioner No.4 and is occupying the demised premises as it has been proved otherwise on the basis of documentary evidence on record that petitioner No.4 is itself in possession of the demised premises of which petitioner Nos.1 to 3 are the Directors. 13. In Vishwa Nath and another’s case (supra), which has been heavily relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, Vishwanath was the tenant who had taken the demised premises in the year 1962 in his own name and in the year 1964, he formed a company in which he had a controlling interest being the Chief Executive and the Managing Director. After formation of the company, which was a private limited company, he continued to be in possession of the demised premises. The Court had found that if an individual takes the premises on rent and then converts his sole proprietorship concern into a private limited company in which he has the controlling interest, he cannot be evicted from the premises because the person who had taken the premises on rent remains in possession though he forms a company and ceases to be the sole proprietorship firm. There is no succession to his possession because he did not part with the possession with anyone else as he had only changed the form of his business. It was also held that occupation by the company is merely that of a licensee and such an occupation is not necessarily exclusive because the tenant has not completely effaced himself and has a controlling interest in the company. 14. In M/s. Madras Bangalore Transport Company (West)’s case (supra), the Madras Bangalore Transport Company, a partnership firm, became the tenant of the disputed premises in July 1962. 14. In M/s. Madras Bangalore Transport Company (West)’s case (supra), the Madras Bangalore Transport Company, a partnership firm, became the tenant of the disputed premises in July 1962. There was some dispute between the partners of the company in the year 1967 which was settled by arbitration. The partnership firm was split-up into two firms, namely, the Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (West) and the Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (East). The business of the old firm was also divided between the new firms area-wise. Under the arrangement, each of the new firms was forbidden from carrying on operations in the territory allotted to the other. Although the Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (East) had ceased its functions for practical purposes and the Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (West) could not operate in the territory allotted to the Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (East), therefore, the partners of the Madras- Bangalore Transport Company (West) founded a Limited Company styled as the ‘Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited’ in order to secure the business in the territory which had been allotted to Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (East). It was in the year 1968 that Madras- Bangalore Transport Company (West) was appointed as the agent of ‘Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited’ in the territory of Delhi. The Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited was in turn appointed as an agent of the Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (West) for certain purposes. Both Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (West) and Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited registered themselves under the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act disclosing their offices as located at the disputed premises. The landlord filed the eviction petition on the ground that the demised premises has been let out to Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited by Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (West). The Rent Controller, Delhi allowed the eviction petition which was confirmed by the Appellate Authority and the High Court, but the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the tenant M/s Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (West) observing that the firm had founded a limited company, i.e. M/s Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited with its partners as directors. It was formed to circumvent the ban against the firm from operating in a particular area. The firm was appointed agent of the company and the company as the agent of the firm. The firm (tenant) allowed the company to operate from its tenanted premises along with it. It was formed to circumvent the ban against the firm from operating in a particular area. The firm was appointed agent of the company and the company as the agent of the firm. The firm (tenant) allowed the company to operate from its tenanted premises along with it. Both the company and the firm had their sign-boards at the premises and they were both registered unde the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act as having their offices at the disputed premises. In these circumstances, it was held that the firm had never effaced themselves even after the formation of the private limited company which was though a sperate legal entity but was a creature of the partners of the firm and was the very image of the firm. 15. In my view, both the aforesaid judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case because in both the cases, the firms had formed a private limited company in which the partners have controlling interests, whereas in the present case, the firm “Export House” has admittedly become non-functional after the death of Tirath Ram, the successors-in-interest/petitioner Nos.1 to 3 had formed a limited company (petitioner No.4) who is now in possession of the demised premises. Even if the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 are the Directors of petitioner No.4, which is a limited company, they cannot be said to be in control and power of the said company. On the contrary, in the case of Ram Saran’s case (supra), the tenant had taken a shop (room) in the main bazar of Nalagarh town in the year 1973 @ monthly rent of Rs.140/- where he was carrying on his business in the name of Ashoka Jain Industry. The said tenant had formed a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 and the firm was changed from Ashoka Jain Industry to Mahavir Gram Udyog Samiti. The society was registered on 10.02.1977 comprising the tenant and his family members. The case of the tenant was that neither the business has been changed nor the complexion of the firm because the members of the society are the tenant and his family members. However, it was admitted fact that the Mahavir Gram Udyog Samiti (Society) was in possession. The society was registered on 10.02.1977 comprising the tenant and his family members. The case of the tenant was that neither the business has been changed nor the complexion of the firm because the members of the society are the tenant and his family members. However, it was admitted fact that the Mahavir Gram Udyog Samiti (Society) was in possession. The decision in the case of M/s. Madras Bangalore Transport Company (West)’s case (supra) was also cited in this case but it was held that even if the tenant was controlling the business of the society as President yet it was a case of subletting because the registered society is a separate legal entity then the firm. In M/s Speedline Agencies’s case (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that if the premises is on rent with a company which merges with another company, it would be considered that the tenant company has transferred its tenancy rights to the transferee company and would be a case of subletting. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that since the demised premises was on rent and in possession of the firm “Export House” which was being run by Tirath Ram, which had become non-functional and the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 had formed a private limited company (petitioner No.4) which is now in possession, therefore, it is a case of subletting and hence, the learned Courts below have committed no error in passing the order of eviction. The present revision petition is, thus, found to be without any merit and the same is hereby dismissed. --------------