ORDER : SANJAY YADAV, J. Quashment of First Information Report leading to registration of Crime No. 20/2009 at Economic Offence Wing Bureau, Bhopal dated 24-7-2009 is being sought vide this petition under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The F.I.R in turn relates to registration of offence punishable under sections 420, 120-B, Indian Penal Code and sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner and four other persons, viz., Mohd. Abid Khan, the then President Betwa Grin Nirman Sahkari Sanstha, Bhopal, R. B. S. Yadav, Recovery Officer & Additional Tahsildar, Co-operative Societies, Bhopal, the then Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhopal and the then Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhopal. The F.I.R is in the following term : 2. The petitioner, President of the Society, viz., Betwa Grih Nirman Sahkari Sanstha, Bhopal since 2006 (21-1-2006) (it is stated that in fresh elections held on 5-12-2012 some other person has been elected as President), challenges the registration of offence on the ground that he has been falsely implicated in the matter and that he has no role to play in respect of the transactions in respect of the land bearing Khasra No. 78/1 admeasuring 54 acres situated at Village Chandanpura, Tahsil Huzur, district Bhopal. It is contended that in respect of land in question an agreement was entered into between Betwa Grih Nirman Sahkari Sanstha, Bhopal through its President Mohd. Abid with one Mohd. Azam Qureshi in respect of land in question on 16-8-1988 for the consideration for Rs.30,000/- per acre and out of total amount of Rs.16,20,000 (30,000 x 54 = 16,20,000) Rs.25,000 was paid as initial payment. The remaining amount was agreed to be paid after necessary permission from the competent authority. It is contended that some controversy arose between Mohd. Azam Qureshi and the Society; wherefor, Society preferred a dispute before the Dy. Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal under section 64 of the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (referred to as Act), forming subject-matter of Case No. E-7/2000. 3. That, Deputy Registrar vide order dated 8-6-2001 answered the dispute in favour of Co-operative Societies and directed Mohd. Azam to execute the sale-deed in favour of Co-operative Society. In an appeal preferred against said order by Mohd. Azam Qureshi the order passed by Deputy Registrar was confirmed by the Joint Registrar vide order dated 9-1-2002. 3. That, Deputy Registrar vide order dated 8-6-2001 answered the dispute in favour of Co-operative Societies and directed Mohd. Azam to execute the sale-deed in favour of Co-operative Society. In an appeal preferred against said order by Mohd. Azam Qureshi the order passed by Deputy Registrar was confirmed by the Joint Registrar vide order dated 9-1-2002. That, in furtherance to these orders, sale-deed was executed by Mohd. Azam Qureshi in favour of Betwa Grih Nirman Sahkari Sanstha, Bhopal on 10th January 2002. It is contended that the order dated 9-1-2002 passed by Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhopal was simultaneously subjected to challenge before the M.P. State Co-operative Tribunal, Bhopal vide Second Appeal No. 58/2002. The Tribunal vide its order dated 24-2-2007 set aside the orders passed by the authorities, viz., Deputy Registrar and the Joint Registrar and remitted the matter to the Court of Deputy Registrar for adjudicating afresh. Whereagainst Writ Petition was filed vide W.P. No. 3597/2007 by the Betwa Grih Nirman Sahkari Sanstha, Bhopal. 4. It is contended that at the time when Second Appeal was decided by the Tribunal on 24-2-2007 the petitioner was elected as President of the Society and having suffered an order, the Society through petitioner decided to challenge the same vide W.P. No. 3597/2007. The petition was dismissed on 5-9-2008 but a liberty was granted to the petitioner Society to move an application for interim relief before Deputy Registrar who was directed to deal with the matter expeditiously. That, Deputy Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bhopal on remand re-adjudicated the matter and while entertaining an application under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 dismissed the dispute raised under section 64 of the Act. There-against Society preferred an appeal before the Joint Registrar by his order dated 13-3-2009 set aside the order passed by the Deputy Registrar and remitted the matter for its adjudication on merit. It is contended that despite of setting aside of the order dated 14-1-2009 passed by Deputy Registrar, few persons, viz., Smt. Mayalal Chandani, Shri Ratanlal Chandani and Shri Nitinlal Chandani were attempting to sell part of the land in question. It is contended that to prevent these persons as well as the legal heirs of Mohd. Azam Qureshi the Society through petitioner filed a Civil Suit No. 120-A/2009 in the Court of VIII Addl. It is contended that to prevent these persons as well as the legal heirs of Mohd. Azam Qureshi the Society through petitioner filed a Civil Suit No. 120-A/2009 in the Court of VIII Addl. District Judge, Bhopal for declaration of title and permanent injunction; wherein, by order dated 16-4-2009 the parties were directed to maintain status quo in respect of property in question. It is contended that the Civil Suit is still pending adjudication. 5. On the bedrock of aforesaid facts it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that, there is no cogent material on record as would suggest complicity of the petitioner in the offences registered. It is further contended that despite of offences having been registered on 24-7-2009 the prosecution has not been able to collect any cogent evidence suggesting involvement of the petitioner in the offences. It is urged that merely because the petitioner has been prosecuting the legal remedy available to the society during the tenure of Presidentship the same does not suggest in any manner the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offences. 6. In order to ascertain as to what are the material available with the prosecuting agency to rope in the petitioner, we called upon the respondent on 21-11-2012 to produce the same. We further noticed that despite of issuance of notice to respondent as back as 1-8-2011 no reply was filed, therefore, we directed the investigating officer of the case to remain present along with case diary, as we were informed by learned counsel for respondent that the case diary has been taken back. We also required the Investigating Officer to state on affidavit as to what material has been collected till date against the petitioner. 7. When the matter is taken up today, as directed, the Investigating Officer is present in person along with the case diary. He also filed an affidavit wherein besides narrating the factual aspects, in paragraph 8 of the affidavit states that OTHER LANGUAGE When called upon to substantiate the aforesaid contentions put forth on affidavit the Investigating Officer except placing reliance on communication No. 548 OTHER LANGUAGE 12 by Additional Tahsildar, T.T. Nagar has no other material on record. The said communication as borne therefrom is in response to letter dated 9-10-2012 by the Investigating Officer in respect of making available the relevant documents regarding the land in question. The said communication as borne therefrom is in response to letter dated 9-10-2012 by the Investigating Officer in respect of making available the relevant documents regarding the land in question. The communication stipulates : Thus, on the face of communication it nowhere substantiates the statement made by the Investigating Officer in paragraph 8 of his affidavit. We further called upon the learned counsel for respondent as also the Investigating Officer to show from record any material as would suggest the petitioner's involvement in the matter, no material has been shown to us. 8. We are not oblivious of the proposition as propounded by Supreme Court in the State of Orissa and another vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, (2005) 13 SCC 540 that section 482, Criminal Procedure Code "only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Cr.P.C." that "The Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicuiconcedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself." However, to meet the ends of justice - ex debito justitiae there is no clog in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. 9. In Popular Muthiah vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296 , it is held that : "24. It is also significant to note that whereas inherent power of a court or a tribunal is generally reocgnised, such power has been recognized under the Code of Criminal Procedure only in the High Court and not in any other court. It is also significant to note that whereas inherent power of a court or a tribunal is generally reocgnised, such power has been recognized under the Code of Criminal Procedure only in the High Court and not in any other court. The High Court apart from exercising its revisional or inherent power indisputably may also exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India and in some matters in terms of section 483 thereof. The High Court, therefore, has a prominent place in the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis the court of Session which is also possessed of a revisional power." 28. In certain situations, the court exercises a wider jurisdiction, e.g., it may pass adverse remarks against an investigator or a prosecutor or a judicial officer, although they are not before it. Expunction of such remarks may also be directed by the High Court at a later stage even suo motu or at the instance of the person aggrieved. 29. The High Court while, thus, exercising its revisional or appellate power, may exercise its inherent powers. Inherent power of the High Court can be exercised, it is trite, both in relation to substantive as also procedural matters. 30. In respect of the incidental or supplemental power, evidently, the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction irrespective of the nature of the proceedings. It is not trammelled by procedural restrictions in that : (i) power can be exercised suo motu in the interest of justice. If such a power is not conceded, it may even lead to injustice to an accused. (ii) Such a power can be exercised concurrently with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction and no formal application is required to be filed therefor. (iii) It is, however, beyond any doubt that the power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not unlimited. It can inter alia be exercised where the Code is silent where the power of the court is not treated as exhaustive, or there is a specific provision in the Code; or the statute does not fall within the purview of the Code because it involves application of a special law. It acts ex debito justitiae. It can, thus, do real and substantial justice for which alone it exists." 10. It acts ex debito justitiae. It can, thus, do real and substantial justice for which alone it exists." 10. In Reshma Bano vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2008) 5 SCC 791 it is held that : 6. The parameters where exercise of inherent power under section 482 of the Code can be exercised either on proof of abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice have been highlighted in several cases. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335), it was held that though it will not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined sufficiently channellized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised, certain illustrative cases were indicated. They are as follows : (SCC pp.37879, para 102) (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 11. In M. N. Ojha vs. Alok Kumar Srivastav, AIR 2010 SC 201 it has been held : "15 ..... .... ....... It is well settled and needs no restatement that the saving of inherent power of the High Court in criminal matters is intended to achieve a salutary public purpose "which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. If such power is not conceded, it may even lead to injustice". [See : State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy ( AIR 1977 SC 1489 ). We are conscious that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to "act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases". [See : Kurukshetra University vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229 ]." [Please also see Baijnath Jha vs. Sita Ram ( AIR 2008 SC 2778 )] 12. Thus, in case of a legitimate prosecution exercise of inherent power would be an exception. However, in the case as the present one where despite of the fact that more than three years have elapsed from the date an FIR is registered naming the petitioner as an accomplish for an offence under sections 420, 120-B, Indian Penal Code and sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 no cogent material has been collected by the prosecuting agency to bring home the complicity of the petitioner in respect of alleged offences. To prevent any miscarriage of justice, in absence of reply by respondents, we called upon the Investigating Officer along with the case diary and also directed him to furnish an affidavit indicating therein as to whether in the course of investigation in three years (we are informed that the investigation was initiated even prior to two years from the date of lodging F.I.R), any cogent material has been collected by the prosecution indicating the involvement of petitioner for which he has been prosecuted, the Investigating Officer except giving the details in respect how the prosecution has been launched has only stated (in paragraph 8 of the affidavit) that, the petitioner in collaboration with the Revenue Officials is trying to evade the stamp duty and got the sale-deed executed, this statement of the Investigating Officer is without any cogent material on record, as despite of his being called upon to substantiate the same he is unable to do. It, therefore, leaves no iota of doubt that the Investigating Officer is prolonging the investigation so far as the petitioner is concerned for the reasons best known to him as till now he is not able to fetch any cogent material as would bring home the offence registered against the petitioner. In such a case the non-exercise of inherent jurisdiction conferred by section 482, Criminal Procedure Code would tantamount to travesty of justice. 13. Before parting with the case we incline to record dissatisfaction in respect of discharge of duty by the Investigating Officer. Be that as it may. Since no material is brought on record to substantiate the allegation levelled against the petitioner, we are inclined to quash the F.I.R. against the petitioner. 14. In view whereof, we hereby quash the F.I.R dated 24-7-2009 insofar as it relates to the petitioner for an offence under sections 420, 120-B, Indian Penal Code and sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 15. Petition is allowed to the extent above. No order as to costs.