JUDGMENT AND ORDER : A.K. Goswami, J. Heard Mr. S.Dutta, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. B. Padum, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1. 2. By an order passed on 24.8.2012, notice on respondent No.2 was dispensed with. 3. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 29.11.2010 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati in MAC Case No.754/05 directing the appellant to pay compensation amounting to Rs. 2,98,000/- to the claimant and his unmarried sister with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till full satisfaction of the award in respect of death of Niladri Ghosh, elder brother of the claimant, due to a vehicular accident involving vehicle No. AS-01-0508 arising out of rash and negligence driving of the said vehicle. 4. The learned Tribunal came to the finding that at the time of accident, deceased was 35 years of age. The claimant was about 33 years at the time of filing the petition and the sister of the claimant, who was examined as PW 2 and in whose favour also the award was made, was about 31 years at the time of filing of the petition. The learned Tribunal also assessed the annual income of the deceased at Rs. 36,000/- per annum. 5. Mr. Dutta submits that the learned Tribunal was wholly wrong in granting compensation on the basis of the petition filed by the brother of the claimant. According to him, the claimant cannot be held to be a dependent of the deceased and at the most, he would be entitled to the amount under 'no-fault liability' under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short, the Act of 1988. He relies on decisions reported in the cases of (i) Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai & anr, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1690 , (ii) Union of India v. Golendra Muchahari, reported in 2003 (3) GLT 199 and (iii) Manjuri Bera (Smt) v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd and anr, reported in (2007) 10 SCC 643 . 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Padum has also relied on the judgments in Ramanbhai (supra) and Golendra Muchahari (supra) in order to substantiate his argument that a claim petition is maintainable at the instance of the brother of the deceased and that the brother is entitled to compensation in respect of death of his brother in a vehicular accident. 7. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, a brief reference to the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, for short, the Act of 1855, may be appropriate. In the High Courts established in India, the English Common Law which was based on principles of justice, equity and good conscience came to be applied wherever they were called upon to award damages or compensation for civil wrongs committed by the defendants in the suit. An action for a tort had to be begun in the joint life time of the wrong-doer and the person injured. English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, for short, the Act of 1846, was passed for compensating families of persons killed by accidents as a measure of law reforms. Close on the heels of Act of 1846, the Act of 1855 came to be passed on 27.3.1955 in India. Section 1 A of the Act of 1885 deals with an action or suit for damages on account of death occasioned by actionable wrong. 2nd paragraph of the said provision reads as follows: "Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased." 2nd paragraph of Section 2 reads as follows: "Provided that in any such action or suit the executor, administrator or representative of the deceased may insert a claim for, and recover any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by such wrongful act, neglect or default, which sum, when recovered, shall be deemed part of the assets of the estate of the deceased." 8. From the aforesaid, it is seen that claim under Section 1 A of the Act of 1855 can be made only for the benefit of the spouse, parent and child of the deceased and it cannot be made for the benefit of any other relations of the deceased. 9. From the aforesaid, it is seen that claim under Section 1 A of the Act of 1855 can be made only for the benefit of the spouse, parent and child of the deceased and it cannot be made for the benefit of any other relations of the deceased. 9. Section 110-A(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the Act of 1939, reads as follows: "(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 110 may be made- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (aa) by the owner of the property; or (b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondent to the application. 10. The proviso of sub-section 110-A of the Act makes it clear that ordinarily all the legal representatives of the deceased must join the application and where all of them have not been so joined, the application must be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all of them and the legal representatives who have not so joined. 11. The expression "legal representatives" has not been defined either in the Act of 1939 or in the Act of 1988. Section 2 (11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, defines "legal representative" as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who inter-meddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, in terms, does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal. However, a legal representative ordinarily means a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. 12. The above definition, in terms, does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal. However, a legal representative ordinarily means a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. 12. Considering the provisions contained in Section 110-A and 110-B of the Act of 1939, the Supreme Court in Ramanbhai (supra) held that the provisions of Section 110-A and 110-B of the Act 1939 supersedes the provisions of the Act of 1855 relating to making of application and grant of award and distribution of compensation in so far as the Act of 1939 is concerned. 13. The question involved in Ramanbhai (supra) was as to whether a brother of a person who was killed in a motor vehicle accident can claim compensation in a proceeding instituted before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal established under the provisions of the Act of 1939. 14. The brief facts of Ramanbhai (supra) were to the effect that on account of negligent driving on the part of the driver of a bus belonging to the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, a boy named Bhambhai, aged 14 years, was run over by the bus resulting in his death. Ramanbhai and Dineshbhai, who were brothers of the deceased, filed a petition before the Claims Tribunal claiming compensation for the death of Bhambhai on the ground that they were the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased. The Tribunal directed the Corporation to pay a sum of Rs. 32,000/- as compensation. Appeal preferred by the Corporation before the High Court was dismissed. 15. It was held in Ramanbhai (supra) that brother of a person who died in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the Act of 1939, if he is a legal representative of the deceased. 16. Section 166 (1) of the Act of 1988 is now the corresponding provision to Section 110-A (1) of the Act of 1939 and therefore, the principles laid down in Ramanbhai will be applicable in case of Act of 1988. 17. 16. Section 166 (1) of the Act of 1988 is now the corresponding provision to Section 110-A (1) of the Act of 1939 and therefore, the principles laid down in Ramanbhai will be applicable in case of Act of 1988. 17. In Golendra Muchahari (supra), this Court noted that the brother is not a heir of the brother, when the father is alive under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and that when the father is alive, the brother has no right to claim property of the brother as heir and it was held that the brother not being a heir, the compensation could neither have been awarded in his favour individually nor along with his father. However, taking note of the fact that the father was later on joined as a party, compensation was awarded to the father by considering the dependency of the father. 18. In Manjuri Bera (supra) the question that had fallen for consideration of the Apex Court was as to whether a married daughter can maintain a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Act of 1988 as she was not entitled to any compensation in view of the fact that she was not dependent upon the deceased father. 19. The Calcutta High Court had upheld the judgment of the learned Tribunal dismissing the claim petition holding that though a married daughter can be covered by the expression "legal representative" appearing in Section 166 of the Act, she was not entitled to any compensation unless she was dependent on the deceased. The Apex Court noted that 'no-fault liability' under Section 140 of the Act of 1988 does not cease because there is absence of dependency and held that where a legal representative who is not a dependent files an application for compensation, the quantum cannot be less than the liability referable to Section 140 of the Act. Accordingly, it was held that even if there is no loss of dependency, the claimant, if he or she is a legal representative, will be entitled to compensation, the quantum of which shall not be less than the liability flowing from Section 140 of the Act. 20. Accordingly, it was held that even if there is no loss of dependency, the claimant, if he or she is a legal representative, will be entitled to compensation, the quantum of which shall not be less than the liability flowing from Section 140 of the Act. 20. The position of law as would appear from the aforesaid discussion is that claim in the case of a fatal accident under Section 166 of the Act of 1988 could be made by the legal representatives of the deceased and the right is not restricted to spouse, parent and child. A brother of the deceased may be a legal representative of the deceased in the absence of preferential heirs under the personal law of the parties and, if so, can claim compensation. Even if a legal representative is not dependent on the deceased and there is no loss of dependency, a legal representative would be entitled to 'no-fault liability' under Section 140 of the Act of 1988, which is a statutory liability and which can be considered as part of the estate of the deceased. 21. In the instant case, all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in the claim application. Materials on record disclose that the claimant and PW2, his sister, are the only legal representatives of the deceased elder brother. The learned tribunal recorded a finding that the family of the deceased comprised of the deceased, the claimant and PW2. The impugned judgment shows that the claimant was also earning a sum of Rs. 2,000/- per month. PW2, the sister, appears to have no income and was entirely dependent on her two brothers. It also appears that the two brothers pooled in their resources to run the family. While there cannot be any manner of doubt that PW2 was dependent on the brothers including the deceased brother, it may not be entirely correct to say that the claimant was dependent on the deceased brother. But there is no denying the fact, as noted above, that the three siblings comprised the family and two brothers had run the family with their joint income and thus, both the brothers were mutually dependent on each other. The sister would, otherwise, have been entitled to compensation as awarded by the learned Tribunal. 22. But there is no denying the fact, as noted above, that the three siblings comprised the family and two brothers had run the family with their joint income and thus, both the brothers were mutually dependent on each other. The sister would, otherwise, have been entitled to compensation as awarded by the learned Tribunal. 22. As because the claim petition was filed by the brother, and as he had some income, the learned counsel for the appellant had argued that the claimant would be, at the most, entitled to 'no-fault liability' along with his sister i.e. PW2. 23. In the factual matrix of the case, when there cannot be any dispute that PW2 i.e. the sister, would have been entitled to compensation and as she also is a beneficiary under the impugned judgment, a liberal view has to be taken on the issue of non-joinder because of she being not a party to the proceeding as well as on the issue of she being not the claimant. The brothers and sister were living together and two brothers were mutually dependent on each other in supporting the family which also comprised their unmarried sister, PW2, and when the eldest brother, who admittedly had much more income than the claimant, had died in a vehicular accident due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle, there cannot be any justification to deny the surviving brother and sister compensation. 24. In view of the above, I find no merit in this appeal and accordingly, the same is dismissed.