Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 1235 (GAU)

Ravindra Shetty v. Narayan Ghosh

2012-10-30

T.VAIPHEI

body2012
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This batch of criminal petitions under Section 482 Cr PC involving a common question of law were taken up for joint hearing and are now being disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, I will first decide Criminal Petition No. 66(SH) of 2011 and thereafter apply my decision thereon, so far as possible, to the facts of the remaining criminal petitions. The petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 66(SH) of 2011 is currently serving as Chief Manager of Vijaya Bank at Hanumantha Nagar Branch, Bangalore, and was at the relevant time posted at the Shillong Branch of the Bank in the same capacity. Sometime in the month of September, 2011, the respondent filed a complaint petition against the petitioner and three other persons before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong, inter alia, alleging that:- (a) Vijaya Bank, which is arraigned as the accused No. 1 in the criminal complaint, launched the Jeevan Nidhi Deposit Scheme whereby an authorized Jeevan Nidhi agent collects money from a person, who wishes to deposit at his doorstep. (b) An individual can choose a deposit period of 12 or 39 or 63 months, with a daily deposit, as low as Rs. 1/. (c) The petitioner No. 1, the Bank and the accused No. 2 (the current Chief Manager of the Shillong Branch of the Bank) engaged the accused No. 4 (Nilay Kumar Shyam) as its authorized agent for the Scheme for doorstep collection of the deposits from the customers who availed of the Scheme for depositing the same with the Bank. (d) In the month of October, 2009, the accused No. 4 approached the complainant/ respondent and apprised him of the Scheme and persuaded the respondent to open an account under the Scheme. (e) The respondent agreed to open the account and accordingly opened the same with the Bank, for which, on 1.11.2009, he was made to sign on the account opening form and opted for a daily deposit of Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred) only per day vide Account No. 85010221 1000386. (f) As required by the Scheme, after 1st November, 2009, the respondent started paying a sum of Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred) only per day to the accused No. 4, who has been authorized to collect the Same as their agent. A total of Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred) only per day vide Account No. 85010221 1000386. (f) As required by the Scheme, after 1st November, 2009, the respondent started paying a sum of Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred) only per day to the accused No. 4, who has been authorized to collect the Same as their agent. A total of Rs. 1,82,500/- (Rupees one lakh eighty-two thousand and five hundred) only @ Rs. 500/- per day for 365 days i.e. for the period up to 31.10.2010 was thus paid by the respondent to the accused No. 4. (g) On 23.2.2011, when his deposit got matured, the respondent went to the Bank and requested the accused No. 3 to allow him to withdraw his entire deposit of Rs. 1,82,500/- with the interest accrued thereon. The Bank later on vide their letter dated 12.7.2011 intimated the respondent that only a sum of Rs. 12,500/- (Rupees twelve thousand and five hundred) had been deposited with them as on 30.6.2011, and that he was permitted to withdraw this amount subject to submission of indemnity bond, etc. (h) The case of the respondent as contended in the criminal complaint petition is that though he deposited a sum of Rs. 1,82,500/- being the deposits for 365 days @ Rs. 500/- per day, the petitioner together with the accused No. 1, 3 and 4 colluded and conspired to cheat him and have thus cheated him and deprived him of his money to the tune of Rs. 1,70,000/- (Rupees one lakh and seventy thousand) only, which is punishable under Section 120-B/406/409/417/418/419/ 420 IPC. 2. The learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shillong thereafter registered the complaint petition as C.R. Case No. 1247 of 2011, took cognizance of the offences under Section 120-B/406/409/417/418/419/420 IPC and issued summons to the petitioner for his appearance before her. According to the petitioner, the summons did not bear the date on which he was to appear in Court or the date on which the same was issued: it contained only the signature of the presiding officer of the Court. According to the petitioner, the summons did not bear the date on which he was to appear in Court or the date on which the same was issued: it contained only the signature of the presiding officer of the Court. It is the case of the petitioner that the Shillong Branch of the Bank had appointed the accused No. 4 as the collector for the scheme called Jeevan Nidhi Deposit, but he failed to deposit the money so collected by him with the Bank and that it was only when the account of the complainant/ respondent ("respondent" hereafter) got matured and a claim was made to the Bank for withdrawal that the Bank came to know that the accused No. 4 had been cheating the respondent. Several complaints were also apparently filed thereafter by other customers of the Bank. This prompted the Bank to conduct internal inquiry whereupon it was discovered that the accused had misappropriated most of the collections made by him instead of depositing the same with the Bank. Under instruction from the management of the Bank, an FIR to this effect has been lodged by the present Chief Manager of the Bank (the accused No. 3 in the complaint petition), the successor-in-office of the petitioner, on 14.3.2011 with Shillong Sadar Police Station, which accordingly registered the case as Shillong Sadar P.S. Case No, 35(3) of 2011 under Sections 403/409/420 IPC and arrested the accused No. 4, who is now in custody. Aggrieved by the impugned order of the learned Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences alleged against: him by the respondent, this criminal petition is now filed by the petitioner for quashing the proceedings. 3. Both Mr. K. Paul, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. P. Nongri with Mr. N. Mozika, the learned counsel for the respondent, were heard at length. 3. Both Mr. K. Paul, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. P. Nongri with Mr. N. Mozika, the learned counsel for the respondent, were heard at length. Unfolding his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there is no allegation whatsoever against the petitioner in the complaint petition to show that he had illegally induced the respondent to part with some valuable security, which is the sine qua non for proving the offence of cheating nor is there any allegation made against him that the money was ever entrusted by the respondent with the Bank so as to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust: the monies were collected by accused No. 4 but were never deposited with the Bank. Even if the entire allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety also, argues the learned counsel, the allegations made by the respondent do not prima facie constitute any offence against the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, the learned Magistrate has failed to apply his mind to the facts of the case and has in the process exceeded his jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the offences and issued the process: this is an abuse of process of Court. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order is unsustainable in law, and is liable to be quashed. On the other hand, Mr. N. Mozika, the learned counsel for the respondent, supports the impugned order and submits that the learned Magistrate has properly exercised his jurisdiction in issuing process against the petitioner. It is the contention of the learned counsel that the accused No. 4 was appointed and engaged to collect the daily deposits from the respondent with his knowledge, and has the duty to oversee and monitor his (accused No. 4) day to day performance to safeguard the money of the depositors: he is thus equally liable for the crimes charged against the accused No. 4. He submits that the material available so far constitutes sufficient grounds for proceeding against the petitioner, and the criminal petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. Section 482 Cr PC envisages three circumstances under which inherent jurisdiction may be exercised by the High Court, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under Cr PC (ii) to prevent abuse of process of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure ends of justice. 4. Section 482 Cr PC envisages three circumstances under which inherent jurisdiction may be exercised by the High Court, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under Cr PC (ii) to prevent abuse of process of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure ends of justice. It is by now well-settled from a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that although the power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 is very wide, it is not unbridled: it has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for which alone Courts exist. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Sup (1) SCC 335, the Apex Court gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr PC can be exercised to prevent abuse of process of the court or to secure the ends of justice:- (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out of a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the code or the Act concerned, provisiong efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 5. To appreciate the controversy, it may be appropriate to refer to the salient features of the "Jeevan Nidhi Deposit". The scheme is open to individuals, sole proprietory concern or partnership firm, Clubs and Associations and a guardian on behalf of a minor. Clause 7.1.e. says that every month, the Jeevan Nidhi Deposit ("the Scheme" for short) collector should hand over the monthly cards to the Bank and obtain an equal number of cards for the purpose of collection during the subsequent months; that at the end of the month, branch should ensure that the monthly confirmation cards are received from the Scheme collector with the depositors' signatures, confirming the correctness of their balances. Clause 7.1.f. requires the Bank branches to maintain a separate stock register for the monthly collection cards received from the Head Office. Clause 7.1.g. then requires the Branches to record the daily collections in the monthly collection register everyday from the daily collection sheet and the totals of the monthly collections should be posted subsequently to the respective account of the various depositors; that the daily collections received from the collecting agent should be accounted under deposit collection account and that at the end of the month, this account should be debited with the total amount of the monthly collections and credited to the depositor's individual Scheme accounts. 6. Clause 7.14 of the Scheme deals with confirmation/verification of balance and other precautions. 6. Clause 7.14 of the Scheme deals with confirmation/verification of balance and other precautions. Clause 7.14.a. imposes a duty upon the Branch Manager to verify the entries in the monthly Deposit Card with the register and sign the monthly deposit cards to be returned to the depositor through the concerned Scheme collector. The same sub-clause provides that the depositor has to confirm the correctness of the balance by signing the foil of the monthly deposit card and return it to the branch through the Scheme collector and that the confirmatory signature on the foil of the card has to be carefully verified by the branch officials with the specimen furnished by the depositor. Sub-clause (d) is important, which says that entries in the counterfoil or card retained by the depositor should be verified by the Manager by surprise checks once a fortnight with the foil of the card duly certified by the depositor and that in respect of surprise checks conducted by the Branch Manager, record should be maintained in a separate note-book indicating therein the date of checking, the number of accounts checked and the name of the official who checked the account [in case the Branch Manager himself/herself has not been able to check]. [Underlined for emphasis] 7. I have to extensively refer to the above provisions to examine the contention of the petitioner that it was only when the account of the depositors got matured and claims were put forward to the Bank that it became known to the Bank that the accused No. 4 never deposited all the collections made by him from the subscribers of the Scheme including that of the respondent, and had misappropriated all those collections except Rs. 12,500/-(Rupees twelve thousand and five hundred) only and that on such discovery, an FIR to that effect was lodged by the accused No. 3 with the Shillong Sadar Police Station under instruction from the management of the Bank. 12,500/-(Rupees twelve thousand and five hundred) only and that on such discovery, an FIR to that effect was lodged by the accused No. 3 with the Shillong Sadar Police Station under instruction from the management of the Bank. A comparative reading of the complaint petition, which is at Annexure-1, and the criminal petition will show that there is no dispute that the Scheme was indeed launched by the Bank, that the petitioner was at the relevant time functioning as the Chief Manager of the Bank at the Shillong Branch, that the accused No. 4 was engaged by the Bank as its authorized agent to collect the daily deposits from the respondent, that only a sum of Rs. 12,500/- had been credited to the account of the respondent in connection with the Scheme as against the case of the respondent that a total of Rs. 1,82,500/- was deposited in 365 days. The provisions referred to by me earlier demonstrably indicate that the petitioner could not have feigned ignorance about the failure of the accused No. 4 to deposit his daily collections with the Bank, which happened right under his nose. 8. The first point for consideration in this criminal petition is, whether there is a prima facie case of criminal breach of trust by the petitioner, the accused No. 4 together with the Bank and the accused No. 3. This necessarily leads me to the allegations made against the accused No. 4, who is alleged to have collected the deposits of the respondent under the Scheme for deposit with the Bank. The offence of criminal breach of trust is defined in Section 405 IPC. Section 409 IPC punished criminal breach of trust by a public servant, or by a banker, merchant or agent. An offence of criminal breach of trust necessarily involves the facts of (a) entrustment of property; and (b) a dishonest misappropriation or conversion of the property by the agent to his own use; or (c) dishonest use or disposal of the property in violation of the mandate of the law prescribing the mode in which the entrustment is to be discharged; or (d) dishonest use or disposal of the property in violation of the terms of any legal contract or willfully allowing some other person to do so. The burden of proving dishonest intention is on the prosecution though, however, it is often difficult to get any direct evidence of intention, it may be justifiably inferred from the attending circumstances, the conduct of the accused and a false explanation given by may also be an additional factor against him to be taken into consideration. The question is whether there is prima facie case to show that the accused No. 4 is the agent of the Bank. 9. As already noticed, he was authorized by the Bank to make daily collection of a sum of Rs. 500/- per day which he was required to deposit with the Bank in accordance with the Scheme, but he deposited with the Bank only a sum of Rs. 12,500/- out of the total deposit made by him to the order of Rs. 1,70,000/- over a period of 365 days, and these amounts appear to have been misappropriated by him. It is not the case of the petitioner that the accused No. 4 is not the agent of the Bank: nor can he deny that he is the agent of the Bank – See Chairman, LIC vs. Rajiv Kumar Bhaskar, (2005) 6 SCC 188 , The allegation made against the petitioner by the respondent is that the Bank vide its letter dated 12.7.2011 intimated the respondent that only a sum of Rs. 12,500/- had been deposited into his account as on 30.6.2011. The Scheme enjoined the petitioner as the Chief Manager of the Bank to verify the entries in the monthly Deposit card with the register and sign the monthly deposit cards to be returned to the depositor through the accused No. 4 and to perform other duties for regular monitoring of the account of the respondent almost on daily/monthly basis to ensure that there was smooth operation of the account, he was apparently not doing anything for performing those duties/ obligations imposed by the Scheme for months and months altogether. No wonder, he claims to know the irregularities committed by the accused No. 1 only when the respondent requested the Bank for withdrawal of his deposits together with the interest accrued thereon after the expiry of 365 days of opening the account. 10. No wonder, he claims to know the irregularities committed by the accused No. 1 only when the respondent requested the Bank for withdrawal of his deposits together with the interest accrued thereon after the expiry of 365 days of opening the account. 10. Whether such omission to perform his duties is due to bona fide mistake or inadvertence or was done intentionally in collusion with the accused No. 4 is yet to be inquired into by the trial court. Or whether the omission on the petitioner in not monitoring the collections of deposit by the accused No. 4 and of his failure to keep monitoring such collections and deposit of the collections in the Bank, which borders on gross negligence of duty, can lead one to come to the conclusion that he was all along abetting the commission of criminal breach of trust by the accused No. 4 are yet to be inquired into by the trial court. At any rate, there is prima facie evidence of the offences punishable U/s. 406/409 read with Section 109 read with Section 107, Clause (3) IPC. In my judgment, therefore, this is not a case in which the uncontroverted allegations of the respondent in the complaint, and the materials available on record so far in support of the complaint do not disclose the commission of the offence punishable under Section 409 read with Section 109 IPC. Consequently, there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the petitioner. 11. Coming now to the second point for consideration, namely, whether there is prima facie case of Sections 419/420 IPC, the offence of cheating requires the following ingredients to be satisfied:- (1) Deception of any person. (2) (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person. (i) To deliver any property to any person. (ii) To consent that any person shall retain any property. (b) Intentionally that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. 12. I have already indicated the ingredients for the offence of criminal breach of trust. 12. I have already indicated the ingredients for the offence of criminal breach of trust. The distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating is that in the case of cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of entrustment, though mere proof of entrustment is sufficient in criminal breach of trust. In other words, for conviction of an offence under Section 420 IPC, it is essential for the prosecution to establish that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise: mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating. In Ram Narayan Popli vs. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 , the Apex Court explained the scope of Section 420 IPC in the following manner:- 366. Section 420 then deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. The offence of cheating is made of two ingredients: deception of any person and fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property. To put it differently, the ingredients of the offence are that the person so deceived delivers to someone a valuable security or property, that the person deceived was induced to do so, that such person acted on such inducement in consequence of his having been deceived by the accused and that the accused acted fraudulently and dishonestly when so inducing the person. To constitute the offence of cheating, it is not necessary that the deception should be by express words, but it may be by conduct or implied in the nature of the transaction itself. (Underlined for emphasis) On reading and re-reading the complaint petition, there is no whisper of statement made by the respondent that the petitioner has fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time the accused No. 4 had apprised him of the benefits and prospects of the Scheme. In this view of the matter, I have no hesitation to say that this is a case where the allegations made in the complaint, taken at their face and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence of cheating or make out a case against the petitioner, Criminal Petition No. 63(SH) of 2011 13. In this view of the matter, I have no hesitation to say that this is a case where the allegations made in the complaint, taken at their face and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence of cheating or make out a case against the petitioner, Criminal Petition No. 63(SH) of 2011 13. In this criminal petition, the same petitioner is challenging the complaint filed against him by another depositor, namely, Shri Narayan Ghosh, who alleged that he also availed of the same Jeevan Nidhi Deposit Scheme by depositing a sum of Rs. 100/- per day with the same agent, namely, Shri Nilay Kumar Shyam (the accused No. 4) for a period of 365 days i.e. from 1.1.2010 to 31.12.2010. According to the respondent, on 16.3.2011, when he approached the Bank for withdrawal of his deposits together with the interest accrued thereon, which came to a total of Rs. 36,500/-, the Bank subsequently wrote to him vide their letter dated 12.7.2011 intimating him that only a sum of Rs. 1,000/- had been deposited with the Bank, and allowing him to withdraw only the said amount of Rs. 1,000/- subject to fulfillment of some conditions. As in the previous case, the respondent charged the petitioner together with the Bank, the former Chief Manager of the Bank and the collector/agent with committing the offences punishable under Sections 120-B/406/409/417/418/420 IPC. In my opinion, my decision in Criminal Petition No. 66(SH) of 2011 is also applicable to this case on all fours. Therefore, there are sufficient grounds for further proceeding against the petitioner under Section 409 read with Section 109 IPC. Criminal Petition No. 64(SR) of 2011 14. This criminal petition, like in the two previous cases, is directed against the complaint lodged by one Shyamlal Banik, the respondent herein, against the petitioner alleging that he also availed of the same Jeevan Nidhi Deposit Scheme by depositing a sum of Rs. 100/- per day with the Bank through their agent, namely, Nilay Kumar Shyam (the accused No. 4) for a period of 365 days. On 23.2.2010, when his deposit got matured, he went to the Bank to withdraw his deposits amounting to Rs. 36,500/- together with the interest accrued thereon, he was later on informed by the Bank through their letter dated 12.7.2011 that only a sum of Rs. On 23.2.2010, when his deposit got matured, he went to the Bank to withdraw his deposits amounting to Rs. 36,500/- together with the interest accrued thereon, he was later on informed by the Bank through their letter dated 12.7.2011 that only a sum of Rs. 2,700/- had been deposited with them as on 30.6.2011 and that he was permitted to withdraw only this amount subject to fulfillment of some conditions. As in the previous two cases, the respondent filed a complaint case against the petitioner, the Bank, the former Chief Manager of the Bank and the accused No. 4 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate/ Shillong for commission of the offences punishable under Sections 120-B/406/409/417/418/419/420 IPC. As in the previous cases, on going through the materials on record and after hearing both the counsel, this case is also squarely covered by my decision in the previous two cases. Consequently, I hold that there is prima facie case against the petitioner under Sections 409/109 IPC. Criminal Petition No. 1 (SID of 2012 15. In this criminal petition, the complaint was lodged against the Bank represented by the Chairman for the commission of the offences under Section 120-B/406/409/417/ 418/419/420 on the basis of the allegations made by the respondent as pleaded in the previous cases. The first point for consideration is, whether Vijaya Bank, which is a body corporate constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (Act V of 1970), having its registered Head Office at 41/2, Trinity Circle, M.G. Road, Bangalore, Karnataka and carrying on banking business, inter alia, at GS. Road, Shillong, East Khasi Hills, Meghalaya can be prosecuted for the offences charged against it. The Bank is being prosecuted through the Chairman and Managing Director (Mr. H.S. Upendra Kamath), who is not separately impleaded as one of the accused. After reviewing the entire body of case-laws in this country and England, the controversy is now set at rest by the Apex Court in the recent decision of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. Vs. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74 . This is what it said:- 63. From the above it becomes clear evident that a corporation is virtually in the same position as any individual and may be convicted of common law as well as statutory offences including those requiring mens rea. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74 . This is what it said:- 63. From the above it becomes clear evident that a corporation is virtually in the same position as any individual and may be convicted of common law as well as statutory offences including those requiring mens rea. The criminal liability of a corporation would arise when an offence is committed in relation to the business of the corporation by a person or body of persons in control of is art airs. In such circumstances, it would be necessary to ascertain that the degree and control of the person or body of persons is so intense that a corporation may be said to think and act through the person or the body of persons. The position of law in this issue in Canada is almost the same. Mens rea is attributed to corporations on the principle of "alter ego" of the company. (Underlined for emphasis) 64. So far as India is concerned, the legal position has been clearly stated by the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement. On a detailed consideration of the entire body of case laws in this country as well as other jurisdictions, it has been observed as follows:- 6. There is no dispute that a company is liable to be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences. Although there are earlier authorities to the effect that corporations cannot commit a crime, the generally accepted modern rule is that except for such crimes as a corporation is held incapable of committing by reason of the fact that they involve personal malicious intent, a corporation may be subject to indictment or other criminal process, although the criminal act is committed through its agents. In the same decision i.e. Standard Chartered Bank case (supra), the Apex Court also rejected the submission that a company could avoid criminal prosecution in cases where custodial sentence is mandatory. Following the decision of the Constitution Bench, it held:- 66. These observations have no manner of doubt that a company/corporation cannot escape liability for a criminal offence merely because the punishment prescribed is that of imprisonment and fine. We are of the considered opinion that in view of the aforesaid judgment of this court, the conclusion reached by the High Court that the respondent could not have necessary mens rea is clearly erroneous. 16. We are of the considered opinion that in view of the aforesaid judgment of this court, the conclusion reached by the High Court that the respondent could not have necessary mens rea is clearly erroneous. 16. In the instant case, however, there is no whisper of statement made by the respondent in his complaint petition as to when, how and in what manner the Bank became involved in the acts complained of. True, the Scheme was made and launched by the Bank, but there has to be specific averment made by the respondent that the Bank was aware of the day to day operation of the Scheme by the accused No. 2 (the petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 66(SH) of 2011) and the accused No. 4, but was also actively involved in the day to day operation of the account by the accused No. 2 and the accused No. 4, In the absence of such averments, it is difficult to fasten criminal liability upon the Bank/petitioner. Under the circumstances, this cannot be a case where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face and accepted in their entirety, prima facie disclose a criminal offence or make out a case against the petitioner/ Bank. 17. The allegations made by the complainant against the petitioner in C.R. No. 1247 of 2011, which are the subject-matter of Criminal Petition No. 2(SH) of 2012 and those in C.R. No. 1248 of 2011, which are the subject-matter of Criminal Petition No. 3(SH) of 2012 are virtually one and the same. In these two criminal petitions also, the petitioner is the Bank in question (the accused No. 1 therein). In my opinion, as the facts are more or less same, and are squarely covered by my decision in Criminal Petition No. 1(SH) of 2012, it is not necessary to burden this judgment with the detailed facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the two criminal petitions. Consequently, no prima facie case of criminal offence is made out against the petitioner in these two criminal petitions. The result of the foregoing discussion is that Criminal Petitions No. 63(SH), 64(SH) and 66(SH) of 2011 are partly allowed. The criminal complaints in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 417/418/420 IPC are hereby quashed. Consequently, no prima facie case of criminal offence is made out against the petitioner in these two criminal petitions. The result of the foregoing discussion is that Criminal Petitions No. 63(SH), 64(SH) and 66(SH) of 2011 are partly allowed. The criminal complaints in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 417/418/420 IPC are hereby quashed. The trial court shall now proceed with the criminal complaints against the petitioner (accused No. 2) with respect to Sections 406/409 read with Section 109 IPC from the stage when the proceedings were stayed by this court. All the stay orders passed in connection therewith stand vacated. Criminal Petition No. 1 (SH), 2(SH) and 3 (SH) of 2012 are allowed, and the complaints in connection therewith in respect of the petitioner/Bank are, accordingly, quashed. Petition allowed.