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2012 DIGILAW 1237 (GAU)

Binod Rai v. State of Meghalaya

2012-10-30

T.VAIPHEI

body2012
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 22.11.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shillong in Sessions Case No. 9 of 2001 convicting the appellant under Section 326 IPC, sentencing him to undergo 2 (two) years of imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment thereof, to undergo another two months of imprisonment. The case of the prosecution is that on 23.4.2001 between 7 and 7.30 PM, the accused/appellant assaulted the injured, namely, Bibhisan Rai, ("the victim" for short) with an iron rod with the result that the victim sustained grievous injury. The Laban Police duly registered a case being Laban P.S. Case No. 29(5)2001 under Section 325 IPC over the assault and, in the course of investigation, they found a prima facie case against the appellant under Section 325 and 307 IPC and charge-sheeted him accordingly. The learned Sessions Judge ultimately withdrew the case from the file of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge when the incumbent retired from service and took up the case by himself. By the time the learned Sessions Judge withdrew the case, a charge under Section 307 IPC had already been framed against the appellant. In the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses, examined the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and also examined the defence witnesses produced by the appellant. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Sessions Judge by the impugned judgement and order found the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 326 IPC and convicted and sentenced him in the manner indicated earlier. Aggrieved by this, this appeal is now preferred by the appellant. 2. Assailing the impugned judgment of conviction, Ms. A. Paul, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that there was no independent witness to bring home the charge against the appellant, and the learned Sessions Judge has wrongly convicted the appellant merely on the basis of the evidence of interested witnesses such as the victim as well as his minor son (seven years old at that time), who was examined as PW 14. She maintains that the learned Sessions Judge has completely overlooked the contradictory evidence given by the victim (PW 1) and PW 14, and in the absence of corroboration of the version of the victim from independent witnesses, the conviction of the appellant is highly unwarranted, and is not sustainable in law. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the alleged weapon of assault was not even seized from the appellant but was seized from none other than the victim himself and, that too, only after about 19 days of the incident nor was the same positively identified by the appellant or PW 14 who were not sure about whether it was a wooden stick or an iron rod: the learned Sessions Judge thus completely erred in law in convicting the appellant on such vague evidence. According to the learned counsel, the prosecution is unable to show the exact date on which the FIR was lodged on 23.4.2001 (the date of incident) or 1.5.2001 as indicated in the FIR i.e. Paper Mark E or on 2.5.2001 as per the FIR at Exhibit 9, thereby raising the possibility that there was inordinate and unexplained delay of about 7 days in lodging the FIR. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that in view of such unexplained delay, serious doubt is created in the case of the prosecution: the appellant is thus, at any rate, entitled to acquittal on benefit of doubt. 3. The learned counsel also points out the following discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution, namely, the evidence of PW 1 and PW 14 who claimed that he was assaulted on his head from behind and the evidence of the Medical Officer (PW 7) treating the appellant who deposed that the victim sustained lacerated wound on the frontal area of the scalp and of the contradictory nature of the findings of the learned Sessions Judge. Finally, the learned counsel submits that the prosecution has also failed to prove any intention or knowledge on the part of the appellant to cause death thereby exhibiting the absence of mens rea. She, therefore, strenuously urges this Court to annul the impugned judgment of conviction on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and acquit the appellant accordingly. On the other hand, Mr. She, therefore, strenuously urges this Court to annul the impugned judgment of conviction on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and acquit the appellant accordingly. On the other hand, Mr. M.F. Qureshi, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, defends the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and submits that the doubts sought to be projected by the learned counsel for the appellant are not substantial enough to entitle the appellant the benefit of doubt. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgement of conviction, on the evidence adduced by the prosecution, is not assailable, and is not liable to be interfered with. 4. Since the learned Sessions Judge relied on the statements of the victim (PW 1) and his minor-daughter (PW 14) to convict the appellant, I propose to examine first their statements and thereafter the statements of the other ocular witnesses, namely, PW 2 and 3. PW 1, in his statement, deposed that on 23.4.2001 after he was attending his duty, he returned home accompanied by his son, Jitendra Kr. Rai, aged about 7 years, who had earlier come to his office, and after stopping at Rilbong but while reaching near his house, the appellant, who happened to be his neighbour, came from behind and started picking quarrel with him by complaining the nullah water originated from his house flowing into his (appellant's) compound and asking him to block it. At that time, it was already 7/7.30 P.M. and, so, he told him that as it was already night, he would see the next day and would have a talk about the matter. PW 1 further deposed that all of a sudden, the appellant took out an iron pipe concealed by him, and as the appellant was about to proceed to his house, he gave a blow on his (victim's) head and, as a result, he fell down and that he gave a strong blow on his (victim's) right knee and repeated the blow on his right knee when he had already fallen on the ground. According to him, he got fracture on the right knee but he struggled to protect himself and by his left hand, he managed to grab the iron rod from the appellant, and as he was lying down on the ground, he grabbed the rod while the appellant trampled upon his left hand by his feet The appellant then asked his son to call somebody to help him as he was afraid that the appellant would kill him. Soon thereafter, a young boy named Arinath Rai and Ramanand Rai (PW 3) and many others arrived at the scene and found him profusely bleeding from his hand. On seeing these people, the appellant fled away. In my opinion, the statements of PW 1 does not suffer from any infirmity, and is truthful and consistent throughout and has clearly identified the appellant, who happened to be his neighbour and who assaulted him with iron rod. In fact, the statement of PW 1 alone can form the basis of conviction of the appellant The injuries sustained by him in that assault were amply proved by the medical evidence as will be shown hereafter. 5. Coming now to the statement of PW 3, who is the brother of the victim and is living with him in the same compound and who claims to be an ocular witness and reached the scene of the crime after he was informed by PW 14, he deposed that he saw the appellant assaulting the victim with an iron rod. On critical examination of the statements of PW 3, I am of the opinion that this witness is not a truthful witness, and was never present at the scene of the crime as revealed by the evidence of PW 14, who in his evidence, disclosed that his uncle Rambabu Ray, who is none other than PW 3, was not at home but his son Har Kumar Ray was there and his age was 23/24 years now. Therefore, the evidence of this witness is best discarded. Be that as it may, the weakness of the evidence of this witness cannot destroy the other evidence of other prosecution witnesses if they are otherwise trustworthy, and have a ring of truth. After all, it is not permissible in law to draw adverse inference because of alleged contradictions between the statements of one prosecution witness vis--vis statements of other witnesses. After all, it is not permissible in law to draw adverse inference because of alleged contradictions between the statements of one prosecution witness vis--vis statements of other witnesses. It is not open to the Court to completely demolish the evidence of one witness by referring to the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses. Witness can only be contradicted in terms of Section 145, Evidence Act by his own previous statement and not with the statement of any other witness.-See Chaudhuri Ramjibhai Narasangbhai Vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 11 SCC 184. PW 2 deposed that in the evening of 23.4.2001, while he was taking tuition at home, he heard a noise outside and on corning out, he saw people gathered there and the victim carried to his house, which is located near the place of occurrence. According to him, he saw the victim bleeding from his head and leg and holding material Ext 1, and by the time he arrived at the site, many people were there to help the victim, and his service was not required. He also saw the victim holding M/Ext. 1 in his hand. He further testified that by 7.30/8 PM, he along with PW 3 took the victim by his bike to the Civil Hospital. Shillong, left him there and reported the matter in writing to the Police Booth of the Civil Hospital. He further deposed that on the next day of the occurrence i.e. 24.4.2002, he along with PW 3 went to Rilbong Beat House to lodge an FIR (Ext. 9), which was written by him. 6. Coming now to the statement of PW 14, the minor-son of the victim and who is said to have accompanied the victim at the time of the occurrence, it is his testimony that on the day of the incident, after his school was over, he went to the office of his father (victim), and at around 6 PM, they came out from the office and went to Kavir Ashram at Rilbong, Shillong and thereafter they went to the neighbouring shop to have some eatables and had chocolate and that after sometime, they started towards their home and on the way, his father went to the roadside to answer to nature's call. He further deposed that as they started for home on the upper hill side and had proceeded for about 14/15 steps, another resident of Maxwelton Compound named Binod (whom he identified as the appellant in Court) approached them and started talking to his father about some water from the house of his father flowing towards his house. He was at that time about 2/3 feet behind them. He further testified that after the conversation, his father turned away from the appellant and began to proceed ahead and that when he had moved a couple of steps when the appellant brought an iron rod which he was hiding on his back, jumped forward and assaulted his father with the iron rod from behind. His father fell down then and there while the appellant continued to assault him with the rod. His father then asked him to call for help from the compound. Near their house was the house of his uncle, Rambabu Roy, but he was not there and so his son Hari Kumar Ray aged about 23/24 years old proceeded to the place of occurrence while he continued to seek the help of some more neighbours whereafter he returned to the place of occurrence. He further deposed that everybody tried to interfere for separating the appellant from his father, and in the meantime, the appellant managed to free himself and fled to the house of a person known as Balam in the neighbourhood. He also claimed that his father was in the meantime smeared with blood, was taken by the people first to his house and thence to the Civil Hospital by Roshan (PW 2) by his motorbike. He identified Material Ext. 1 as the rod with which the appellant assaulted his father. Though this witness was put to extensive and gruelling cross-examination, his testimony remained unshaken throughout. As to the competency of a child witness to testify, no question was ever raised by the counsel for the appellant on this issue: he never questioned at the time of trial the intellectual capacity of PW 14 to understand the question or give rational answer thereto. In fact on going through his cross-examination, I cannot but notice that the counsel for the appellant was all along questioning him on the assumption that PW 14 is competent to give rational answers to the questions posed by him. In fact on going through his cross-examination, I cannot but notice that the counsel for the appellant was all along questioning him on the assumption that PW 14 is competent to give rational answers to the questions posed by him. The law is now well-settled that the evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se, but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. The legal position is best summed up in the words of the Apex Court in Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak Vs. State of Gujarat, (2004) 1 SCC 64 in the following manner. 6. Pivotal submission of the appellant is regarding acceptability of PW 11's evidence. The age of the witness during examination was taken to be about 10 years. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "Evidence Act") does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease - whether of mind, any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. This position was concisely stated by Brewer, J. in Wheeler v. United States. The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se, but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. (See Surayanarayana Vs. State of Karnataka.). 7. After carefully perusing the evidence of PW 14, the version given by him with respect to the manner in which his father was assaulted, of the subject matter of the complaint made by the appellant i.e. some water from their house flowing into his house, of the weapon used and the number of times he hit his father with this weapon, is quite natural and credible and do not suffer from any inconsistency or embellishment or exaggeration. He has clearly identified the appellant as the assailant of his father: he gave graphic description of the entire incident, and his presence on the spot cannot be doubted. There is no reason to doubt his evidence. That apart, his testimony fully corroborated the evidence of his father (PW 1) in material particulars, as he, whose presence at the scene of the crime throughout cannot be doubted at all, is the ocular witness to the crime committed by the appellant upon his father. True, PW 14 is the son of the victim. But then, there is no requirement in law that such evidence of a relative cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground of relationship. Merely because a witness is related to the victim, he cannot be said to be an interested witness, and his testimony cannot be rejected on that ground alone. If any authority is necessary in this behalf, I may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in State of A.P. Vs. S. Rayappa, (2006) 4 SCC 512 . The relevant portions are found at paragraphs 6 and 7 of the report, which are in the following terms: 6.......By now it is a well-established principle of law that testimony of a witness otherwise inspiring confidence cannot be discarded on the ground that he being a relation of the deceased is an interested witness. A close relative who is a very natural witness cannot be termed as an interested witness. The term interested postulates that the person concerned must have some direct interest in seeing the accused being convicted somehow or the other either because of animosity or some other reasons. 7. On the contrary it has now become almost a fashion that the public is reluctant to appear and depose the Court especially in criminal case because of varied reasons. Criminal cases are kept dragging for years to come and the witnesses are harassed a lot. They are being threatened, intimidated and at the top of all they are subjected to lengthy cross-examination. In such a situation, the only natural witness available to the prosecution would be the relative witness. The relative witness is not necessarily an interested witness. On the other hand, being a close relation to the deceased they will try to prosecute the real culprit by stating the truth. In such a situation, the only natural witness available to the prosecution would be the relative witness. The relative witness is not necessarily an interested witness. On the other hand, being a close relation to the deceased they will try to prosecute the real culprit by stating the truth. There is no reason as to why a close relative will implicate and depose falsely against somebody and screen the real culprit to escape unpunished. The only requirement is that the testimony of the relative witness should be examined cautiously. The High Court has brushed aside the testimony of PW 1 and PW 2 on the sole ground that they are interested witnesses being relatives of the deceased. 8. The next question to be determined is as to what credibility can be attached to the evidence of PW 1, who is the injured. The issue once again came for consideration before the Apex Court recently in Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 . This is what the Apex Court said: (SCC, pp. 271-72 and pp. 28-30) 28. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness." [Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar, Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P., Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra, Bhag Singh v. State of Punjab, Mohar v. State of U.P. (SCC p. 606b-c), Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan, Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of U.P. and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra. 29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under : 28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. 29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under : 28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tube well. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident. 29. In State of U.P. Vs. Kishan Chand a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the Courts below. 30. The law on the point can be summarised to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is a consequence of the fact that injury to the witness is an in-built guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. 9. Thus, the deposition of the witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. 9. In my considered opinion, the evidence of PW 1 and PW 14 either independently or jointly are sufficient to hold that it is none but the appellant who attacked and assaulted PW 1 on the night of 23.4.2001 in the presence of PW 14. Coming now to the statement of PW 3, who is the brother of the victim and is living with him in the same compound and who claims to be an ocular witness and reached the scene of the crime after he was informed by PW 14, he deposed that saw the appellant assaulting the victim with an iron rod. On critical examination of the statements of PW 3, I am of the opinion that this witness is not a truthful witness, and was never present at the scene of the crime as revealed by the evidence of PW 14, who in his evidence, disclosed that his uncle Rambabu Ray, who is none other than PW 3, was not at home but his son Hari Kumar Ray was there and his age was 23/24 years now. Therefore, the evidence of this witness is best discarded. Be that as it may, the weakness of the evidence of this witness cannot destroy the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses if they are otherwise trustworthy, and have a ring of truth. After all, it is not permissible in law to draw adverse inference because of alleged contradictions between the statements of one prosecution witness vis--vis statements of other witnesses. It is not open to the Court to completely demolish the evidence of one witness by referring to the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses. Witness can only be contradicted in terms of Section 145, Evidence Act by his own previous statement and not with the statement of any other witness.- See Chaudhuri Ramjibhai Narasangbhai Vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 11 SCC 184. 10. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the injuries inflicted by the appellant on PW 1 are grievous in nature. Section 320 IPC defines "grievous hurt" as follows : S. 320. The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous": First-Emasculation. Secondly-Permanent privation of the sight of either eye. State of Gujarat, (2011) 11 SCC 184. 10. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the injuries inflicted by the appellant on PW 1 are grievous in nature. Section 320 IPC defines "grievous hurt" as follows : S. 320. The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous": First-Emasculation. Secondly-Permanent privation of the sight of either eye. Thirdly-Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear. Fourthly-Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly-Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. Sixthly-Permanent disfiguration of the head or race. Seventhly.-Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. Eighthly.-Any hurt which endangers life or which, causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow ordinary pursuits. 11. The victim was admittedly taken first to Civil Hospital, Shillong which gave him the first medical treatment. PW 6, who was posted at Civil Hospital, Shillong when the victim was admitted there, deposed that he had given treatment to the victim, and it was a case of assault and that the injury sustained by the victim were lacerated wound on the frontal scalp measuring 11/2 abrasion on the right elbow, pain and tenderness on the right knee with restriction of movement. He further testified that as per his treatment, he suspected fracture on the right knee. There is no cross-examination of this witness by the defence. Dr. O. Lamare, a General Surgeon Civil Hospital, Shillong with a qualification of MS in General Surgery who treated him at the Civil Hospital, Shillong, was also examined as PW 10. It is his testimony that he, on examination, found that there were swelling of the right knee and wound in the scalp in the frontal region and that as he could not immediately ascertain the full nature of the injury, he advised X-Ray of the skull and right knee of the victim, but before he could examine him again after the X-Ray report, he (the victim) had already left the Hospital. However, from his examination, he found the victim with external injuries on the scalp and a swelling of the right knee, which indicated, particularly, lacerated injury in the scalp raising the possibility of an assault. However, from his examination, he found the victim with external injuries on the scalp and a swelling of the right knee, which indicated, particularly, lacerated injury in the scalp raising the possibility of an assault. The requisition given by him for the purpose of getting the X-Ray examination done on the right knee and the scalp of the victim, was exhibited by him as Ext. 2. The X-Ray report was also exhibited by him as Ext. 2/2, which appeared to have indicated that the victim had suffered from fracture in the bone of the right leg. PW 13 is the Surgeon in ENT serving at Nazareth Hospital. According to him, he found head injuries on the victim with 4 stitches on the scalp. In his opinion, the injuries suffered by him were grievous injuries. In the cross-examination, he admitted that the type of injuries sustained by the victim had the possibility of leaving permanent disfiguration. The discharge summary of the victim from Nazareth Hospital was exhibited by him as Ext. 7. From the evidence of the aforesaid medical experts, it is seen that the victim had suffered fracture in the bone of his right leg and head injuries on his scalp. PW 13 opined that the injuries suffered by the victim were grievous injuries. He further deposed that the patient was assaulted with an iron rod. There was no denial of these statements in his cross-examination. In my opinion, there were no major contradictions in the statements of the three Medical Officers, who treated and examined the victim. Secondly, their statements fully corroborated the version of the victim, who also deposed that the appellant gave a blow on his head for which he fell down, also gave a strong blow on his right knee and repeated the blow on his right knee when he had already fell down on the ground and that he got fracture on the right knee, but he struggled to protect himself and could grab the iron rod from the appellant. 12. Thus, the evidence discussed above have established beyond any shadow of doubt that the appellant assaulted the victim with an iron rod and inflicted head injuries and fracture on his right knee which had the possibility of leaving permanent disfiguration. 12. Thus, the evidence discussed above have established beyond any shadow of doubt that the appellant assaulted the victim with an iron rod and inflicted head injuries and fracture on his right knee which had the possibility of leaving permanent disfiguration. Fracture of the right knee of the victim combined with the possibility of this permanent disfiguration lead to only one conclusion i.e. grievous hurt was caused to the victim (PW 1). One more contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is concerning the inability of the witnesses to clearly identify the weapon used in the commission of the crime. It is true that PW 1 initially said the "accused took out iron pipe hiding in his person" and gave a blow on his head, etc. However, later on in the examination-in-chief, he used the words "iron rod" by saying that he could grab the "iron rod" from the appellant. PW 14 also identified the weapon used for the assault of this father as iron rod. However, in fairness, it may be pointed out that PW 14, in his cross-examination, admitted that there was a possibility that the weapon used by the appellant might be a wooden stick or an iron rod. In my judgment, this discrepancy cannot stand closer scrutiny in view of the fact the iron rod was seized from the possession of the victim, which was witnessed by PW 2, who in his cross-examination confirmed that he saw with his own eyes the victim holding the iron rod on the day of the incident. PW 4 is the seizure witness, who, in his examination-in-chief, testified that the iron rod (M/Ext. 1) was seized by the police in his presence. The appellant never raised any issue in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses about the use of the iron rod (M/Ext. 1) for assaulting the victim. In my judgment, there is no substantial difference between "iron pipe" and "iron rod" in the layman language, and can mean the same. To borrow from Hon'ble T.S. Thakur, J., a witness who has a momentary view of incident which is over within a few minutes, would not have his testimony rejected only because instead of describing the weapon as iron rod, he described the same to be "iron pipe" or "wooden stick". It is apposite to quote the observations of this Lordship in Gosi Jayarami Reddy Vs. It is apposite to quote the observations of this Lordship in Gosi Jayarami Reddy Vs. State of A.P., (2011) 11 SCC 766 , which, with due respect, accurately laid down the principle for appreciation of evidence in a criminal trial : Courts need to be realistic in their expectation from the witnesses and go by what would be reasonable based on ordinary human conduct with ordinary human frailties of memory or power to register events and their details. A witness who is terrorised by the brutality of the attack cannot be disbelieved in his description of who hit the deceased on what part of the body there is some mix-up or confusion. It is the totality of the evidence on record and its credibility that would eventually determine whether the prosecution has proved the charge against the accused. 13. That apart, it is not the duty of the prosecution witnesses to meet each and every hypothesis raised by the defence. The discrepancies pointed out by the defence are, at the most, minor and trivial in nature, and do not touch upon the core of the prosecution case: even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals.-[See State of Haryana Vs. Tek Singh, (1999) 4 SCC 682 ]. In my judgment, in the instant case, the evidence i.e. oral testimony of the ocular witnesses such as PW 1 and PW 14 as well as medical evidence and other evidence on record clearly have clinchingly established the commission of the crime, the manner in which it was committed, the place where it was committed, the person who committed the crime and the grievous hurt caused by means of a dangerous weapon, namely, iron rod. The appellant is, therefore, guilty of the offence punishable under Section 326 IPC. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly convicted him. Though the sentence of two years of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant by the trial Court is disproportionate to the offence proved against him, I decline to interfere with the sentence inasmuch as no appeal for enhancement of sentence is preferred by the State. The result of the foregoing discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed. Bail-bonds stand cancelled. The result of the foregoing discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed. Bail-bonds stand cancelled. The appellant shall forthwith surrender before the learned Sessions Judge to undergo the remaining period of this sentence, failing which, the trial Court shall take such necessary coercive measures as permissible by law to take him to custody. Transmit the L.C. record without any loss of time. Appeal dismissed.