JUDGMENT Ujjal Bhuyan, J. 1. Both the appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment. The background facts may be briefly noted. 2. The respondent as the plaintiff filed Eviction Suit No. 1 of 2009 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl seeking a decree for eviction of the defendant (appellant herein) from the land and building under land Settlement Certificate (LSC) No. 110 of 1976. Case of the plaintiff is that defendant had sold his land and building covered by LSC No. 110 of 1976 measuring about 0.12 bigha located at Ramhlun South, Aizawl to the plaintiff on 23.7.2007 for a consideration of Rs. 15,00,000/-. Defendant submitted before the Revenue authorities a form prescribed by the Revenue Department for mutation and transfer of ownership of land. Accordingly, the Revenue authorities mutated the said land in favour of the plaintiff on 24.7.2007. A Deed of Undertaking and Sale was also executed by the defendant on 24.7.2007. It was, however, stated therein that the plaintiff would be allowed to re-transfer the ownership of the land to the defendant on payment of Rs. 15,00,000/- alongwith interest at the rate of 10% per month by the defendant to the plaintiff within a period of 5 months. 3. Defendant did not pay Rs. 15,00,000/- alongwith the interest to the plaintiff within the stipulated period of 5 (five) months. Defendant also failed to vacate the land and building. 4. Plaintiff served notice on the defendant on 21.2.2008 to vacate the suit premises within 30 (thirty) days. When the defendant failed to vacate the land and building, plaintiff served another notice on the defendant on 20.6.2008, which also went unresponded. 5. Defendant failed to pay rent for occupying the building. Claiming that plaintiff is the absolute owner of the land and building covered by LSC No. 110 of 1976 and that he has the right to occupy and possess the said land and building, plaintiff filed Eviction Suit No. 1/2009 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl and sought for eviction of the defendant from the suit land and building. 6. Though served, defendant did not contest the suit. 7. Learned Trial Court framed the following 2 (two) issues for determination - 1) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style? and 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed? If so, to what extent? 8. 6. Though served, defendant did not contest the suit. 7. Learned Trial Court framed the following 2 (two) issues for determination - 1) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style? and 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed? If so, to what extent? 8. Plaintiff examined 4 (four) witnesses, including herself and exhibited 6 (six) documents. 9. Learned Trial Court vide the Judgment and Decree dated 21.12.2010 decreed Eviction Suit No. 1 of 2009 by holding the plaintiff to be the owner of the suit land and building. Defendant was directed to vacate the suit land and building and to handover vacant possession of the property to the plaintiff within 60 (sixty) days. 10. Thereafter, plaintiff filed Execution Case No. 12 of 2011 for execution of the decree dated 21.12.2010 passed in Eviction Suit No. 1 of 2009. In the execution case, learned Sr. Civil Judge-2, Aizawl passed an order on 7.7.2011 directing the police to handover clear vacant pos session of the suit land and property to the decree holder. The Officer-in-Charge, Bawngkawn Police Station was further directed to arrest the judgment debtor if there was any obstruction in handing over possession to the decree holder. Learned counsel for the decree holder was also directed to keep vigil and to submit compliance report. Further order was passed by the executing Court on 29.7.2011 to remove moveable properties which were inside the suit building. 11. The appellant entered appearance in the execution proceeding and filed written objection. Appellant contended that there was no sale of the suit land and property. Therefore, the judgment delivered in the eviction suit was void. Appellant had also deposited Rs. 15,00,000/- before the executing Court as the amount due to the decree-holder. Objection was filed by the decree-holder declining to accept the said amount. 12. Ultimately, the executing Court passed order dated 30.8.2011 directing execution of the decree and for submission of compliance report. Judgment debtor i.e. the appellant was directed to take back Rs. 15,00,000/- earlier deposited in the Court. 13. Aggrieved, the defendant/judgment debtor is in appeal before this Court. RFA No. 34 of 2011 is against the judgment and decree passed in the eviction suit whereas RFA No. 25 of 2011 arises out of the execution proceeding. 14. Heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Sr. counsel for the appellant/defendant and Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned Sr. 13. Aggrieved, the defendant/judgment debtor is in appeal before this Court. RFA No. 34 of 2011 is against the judgment and decree passed in the eviction suit whereas RFA No. 25 of 2011 arises out of the execution proceeding. 14. Heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Sr. counsel for the appellant/defendant and Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned Sr. counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that no sale in the eye of law had taken place relating to the land and building covered by LSC No. 110 of 1976. He submits that the form prescribed by the State Revenue authorities and executed on 23.7.2007, which the plaintiff claims to be a Sale Deed, was not a statutory form and was not in accordance with law. It was neither registered nor any stamp duty was paid thereon. Regarding the Deed of Undertaking and Sale signed by both the plaintiff and the defendant on 24.7.2007, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the same also cannot be treated as a Sale Deed. It was registered on 1.7.2008 which is beyond the statutory period of registration and also not accompanied by any stamp duty. He submits that plaintiff played fraud on the defendant by taking advantage of distress condition. In such circumstances, learned Trial Court was not justified in decreeing the suit by directing eviction of the defendant. Consequently, the order passed by the executing Court is also not sustainable in law. In fact, the executing Court by passing various orders had clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. He, therefore, prays for setting aside of the Judgment and Decree dated 21.12.2010 passed in Eviction Suit No. 1 of 2009 and also for setting aside of the Order dated 30.8.2011 passed in Execution Case No. 12 of 2011. In support of his submissions, learned Sr. counsel for the appellant has referred to and relied upon the following decisions:- (1) 1995 Supp (3) SCC 249; State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Brundaban Sharma & Anr., (2) (1997) 1 SCC 734 ; State of U.P. Vs. Amar Singh & Ors. (3) (2003) 4 SCC 161 ; Bondar Singh & Ors. Vs. Nihal Singh & Ors. (4) (2010) 8 SCC 383 ; Meghmala & Ors. Vs. G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors. (5) (2012) 1 SCC 476 ; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Brundaban Sharma & Anr., (2) (1997) 1 SCC 734 ; State of U.P. Vs. Amar Singh & Ors. (3) (2003) 4 SCC 161 ; Bondar Singh & Ors. Vs. Nihal Singh & Ors. (4) (2010) 8 SCC 383 ; Meghmala & Ors. Vs. G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors. (5) (2012) 1 SCC 476 ; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Ramesh Gandhi (6) (2012) 1 SCC 656 ; Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) through Director Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. 16. Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff on the other hand strongly supports the impugned judgment and decree of eviction and the orders of the executing Court. He submits that the Sale Deed dated 24.7.2007 had a buy-back clause inasmuch as if defendant paid a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- with interest at the rate of 10% per month within 5 (five) months to the plaintiff, he could regain the ownership of the property. Having failed to pay the said amount to reclaim the property, the same stood vested on the plaintiff. Thus, she became the absolute owner of the property. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the 2 (two) appeals. In support of his submissions, learned Sr. counsel for the respondent referred to and relied upon the following decisions:- (1) (2003) 2 SCC 355 ; B.L. Sreedhar & Ors. Vs. K.M. Munireddy (Dead) & Ors. (2) (2006) 7 SCC 756 ; Jai Narain Parasrampuria (Dead) & Ors. Vs. Pushpa Devi Saraf & Ors. 17. The submissions made have been considered. 18. The land in question measures 0.12 bigha with a building standing thereon. It is covered by LSC No. 110 of 1976 which was in the name of the defendant/appellant. On 23.7.2007, defendant signed a 'Sale Deed' in a form prescribed by the State Revenue authorities selling the above land and building to the plaintiff for Rs. 15,00,000/-. Though, there were 2 (two) witnesses, the said 'Sale Deed' was neither registered with the registering authorities nor accompanied by payment of any stamp duty. On the next day, that is, on 24.7.2007, a Deed of Undertaking and Sale was executed by the defendant and the plaintiff. As per the said deed, the defendant 'sold' his land under LSC No. 110 of 1976 to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/-. It was, however, mentioned therein that if the defendant paid Rs. On the next day, that is, on 24.7.2007, a Deed of Undertaking and Sale was executed by the defendant and the plaintiff. As per the said deed, the defendant 'sold' his land under LSC No. 110 of 1976 to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/-. It was, however, mentioned therein that if the defendant paid Rs. 15,00,000/- with interest at the rate of 10% per month to the plaintiff within 5 (five) months, the said land would be re-transferred to him. But if he failed to pay the said amount, plaintiff would be free to deal with the said land in any manner. It appears that the said Deed of Undertaking and Sale was signed/registered by the District Registrar, Aizawl on 1.7.2008 i.e. almost one year after execution. However, no stamp duty was paid. It is also an admitted fact that the possession of the suit property was not handed over to the plaintiff. It remained under the possession of the defendant. 19. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines "Sale". As per the said definition, "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, can be made only by a registered instrument. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. On the other hand, a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. 20. Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 deals with documents of which registration is compulsory. As per Section 17(1)(b), other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property shall be registered. Thus, a Sale Deed of land having valuation of more than one hundred rupees is mandatorily required to be registered. As per Section 23, such registration is required to be done within four months from the date of its execution. Thus, a Sale Deed of land having valuation of more than one hundred rupees is mandatorily required to be registered. As per Section 23, such registration is required to be done within four months from the date of its execution. In exceptional cases, the Registrar may accept such documents for registration beyond the period of four months but not exceeding four months as provided in Section 25. Therefore, even if the extended period under Section 25 is taken into consideration, a document covered by Section 17(1)(b) has to be presented for registration within eight months (at the maximum) from the date of its execution. 21. Under the Indian Stamp (Mizoram Amendment) Act, 1996, in the case of sale of immovable property whose valuation exceeds Rs. 10,00,000/- stamp duty of Rs. 47,500/- plus 10 percent of the value above Rs. 10,00,000/- is required to be paid. 22. Having noticed the legal position as indicated above, let us again examine the 2 (two) crucial documents in question, one dated 23.7.2007 and the other dated 24.7.2007, which have been discussed in the proceeding paragraph 19 in some detail. The document dated 23.7.2007 is admittedly not registered. No stamp duty has been paid thereon. As already stated, possession of the property was also not handed over to the plaintiff. In so far the document dated 24.7.2007 is concerned, though it is shown to have been registered, the registration is clearly beyond the period prescribed under Sections 23 and 25 of the Registration Act, 1908. The Deed was executed on 24.7.2007 and registration was done on 1.7.2008, that is, after almost 1 (one) year. As per the aforesaid provisions, a document for registration can be accepted within 4 (four) months from the date of execution and in exceptional cases, the aforesaid period of 4 (four) months can be extended for a further period of 4 months, that is, for a total of 8 (eight) months. In the present case, it is clearly beyond even the extended period of 8 months. Therefore, the said document dated 24.7.2007 cannot be said to have been validly registered. No stamp duty was also paid alongwith the said document and as already noticed, possession was also not handed over to the plaintiff. 23. In the present case, it is clearly beyond even the extended period of 8 months. Therefore, the said document dated 24.7.2007 cannot be said to have been validly registered. No stamp duty was also paid alongwith the said document and as already noticed, possession was also not handed over to the plaintiff. 23. The plaintiff in her evidence only stated that the Revenue authorities had mutated her name in respect of LSC No. 110 of 1976 on 24.7.2007 i.e., within one day of the presentation of the deed dated 23.7.2007, which only goes to show the total non-application of mind on the part of the Revenue authorities. On the strength of the 2 (two) documents, grant of mutation and failure of the defendant to pay Rs. 15,00,000/- with the stipulated interest as per the buy back clause, plaintiff claimed title over the said land and building. 24. In State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Brundaban Sharma & Anr. (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a non-est order is a void order and it confers no title and its validity can be questioned or invalidity be set up in any proceeding or at any stage. 25. In the case of State of U.P. Vs. Amar Singh & Ors. (supra), Apex Court reiterated the settled law that mutation entries are only for the purpose of enabling the State to collect land revenue from the person in possession but it does not confer any title to the land. The title would be derived from an instrument executed by the owner in favour of an alienee as per the Stamp Act and registered under the Registration Act. 26. In Bondar Singh & Ors. Vs. Nihal Singh & Ors. (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held that under the law a sale deed is required to be properly stamped and registered before it can convey title to the vendee. 27. In Meghmala & Ors. Vs. G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court again stated in clear terms that it is settled legal proposition that an agreement to sell does not create any right, or title in favour of the intending buyer. 28. The legal position, as discussed above, has been aptly summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held as under: 18. 28. The legal position, as discussed above, has been aptly summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held as under: 18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred. 19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under Section 53-A of the TP Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject-matter. 29. In view of the settled legal position as indicated above, deliberation on the aspect of fraud urged by the appellant is considered not necessary. 30. S.L. Sreedhar & Ors. Vs. K.M. Munireddy (Dead) & Ors. relied upon by the respondent is a case which deals with the concept of estoppel. The said decision can be of no assistance to the respondent as the present case is clearly distinguishable on facts. Moreover, when the so called "Sale", is void, there can be no estoppel preventing the aggrieved partly from raising a grievance as to the in-validity of such "Sale". 31. Likewise, Jai Narain Parasrampuria (Dead) Vs. Pushpa Devi Saraf & Ors. relied upon by the respondent was decided on facts which are clearly distinguishable from the present case. Principle of estoppel cannot be invoked in a case like the present one. 32. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the unhesitant view that no sale of the land and building covered by LSC No. 110 of 1976 as understood in law had taken place. Principle of estoppel cannot be invoked in a case like the present one. 32. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the unhesitant view that no sale of the land and building covered by LSC No. 110 of 1976 as understood in law had taken place. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.12.5010 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl in Eviction Suit No. 1 of 2009 is wholly unsustainable in law. The same is accordingly set aside and quashed. Consequently, all the orders passed in Execution Case No. 12 of 2011 by the learned Senior Civil Judge-2, Aizawl would also stand quashed. RFA No. 25 of 2011 and RFA No. 34 of 2011 are accordingly allowed. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.