Judgment : N. PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR, J. 1. This Habeas Corpus Petition is filed by the wife of the detenu - Syed Mohammed Imam @ Munir, who has been detained as “Goonda” under Section 2(f) of the Tamil Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982, on the orders of the second respondent, by his proceedings C.P.O./T.C/I.S/D.O.No. 40/2011, dated 28.12.2011. Now, he has been lodged at Central Prison, Tiruchirappalli. 2. Even though several grounds were raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he is pressing a point that the detention order was passed by the detaining authority solely on the basis of a bail order granted in Crime No. 709 of 2010, which was registered for offence under Section 379 of IPC, the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Tiruchirapalli in Cr. M.P.No. 1853 of 2010, dated 30.4.2010, therefore, the detenu, who has already filed bail applications will be released on bail. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said criminal case registered in Crime No. 709 of 2010 is only for an offence under Section 379 IPC and the bail order was granted as the learned Public Prosecutor said no objections in considering the custody of the said accused for more than 39 days, and the said facts are entirely different from the cases pending against the detenu in Crime Nos. 1435 of 2011, 1427 of 2011, 173 of 2011 and 1756 of 2011, where the alleged offences are under Sections 379 IPC, 393 IPC and 392 read with 397 of IPC and 25(1) of Arms Act and 3 of Explosive Substances Act , respectively. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the said bail order having been relied on, the detaining authority has not applied to his mind to the cases pending against the detenu. 3. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the bail order was granted in connection with the said crime, which was registered under Section 379 of IPC and therefore, the detaining authority relied on the said order. 4. We have considered the rival submissions. 5. The bail order granted is not in connection with the case pending against the detenue (4 cases). 4. We have considered the rival submissions. 5. The bail order granted is not in connection with the case pending against the detenue (4 cases). The bail granted in a single case against the said accused in Crime No. 709 of 2010, which was registered for an offence under Section 379 of IPC, is not in any way connected. Further, the learned Public Prosecutor said no objection. The said grant of bail cannot be a reason to grant bail to the detenue in the four cases, when more serious offenes are registered. Hence, the detention order passed by the second respondent is without application of mind. 6. The law, on this aspect, is well settled. In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 4 SCC 260 : (2011) 3 MLJ (Crl) 422 the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held that in the absence of any material particulars in similar cases in which bail has been granted, the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was merely a ruse for issuing the Detention Order. 7. A similar issue came up for consideration before this Court in H.C.P. (MD) No. 979 of 2011, dated 14.12.2011, wherein in Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14, it is held as under: “13. Even though the Detaining Authority had stated, in the grounds of detention, that there is an imminent or a real possibility of the detenu coming out on bail, there is nothing available on record to substantiate such a claim. Unless, there are sufficient and cogent materials for the Detaining Authority to arrive at his conclusion that there is an imminent or a real possibility of the detenu coming out on bail and indulging in activities, which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the conclusion of the Detaining Authority would be a mere ipse dixit and as such, the conclusion arrived at by the Detaining Authority cannot be held to be valid in the eye of law. 14. Further, unless, the similar cases referred to by the Detaining Authority, in the grounds of detention, are comparable with the cases relating to the detenu, in all aspects, it would not be open to the Detaining Authority to arrive at his conclusion that the detenu would be enlarged on bail. 14. Further, unless, the similar cases referred to by the Detaining Authority, in the grounds of detention, are comparable with the cases relating to the detenu, in all aspects, it would not be open to the Detaining Authority to arrive at his conclusion that the detenu would be enlarged on bail. In the present case, it has not been shown that all the relevant materials relating to the similar cases, referred to by the Detaining Authority had been furnished to the detenu, in order to enable him to make an effective representation against the detention order. The failure of the Detaining Authority to furnish all the materials would, no doubt, cause substantial prejudice to the detenu, resulting in the failure on the part of the Detaining Authority in following the mandate, enshrined in Clause (5) of the Article 22 of the Constitution of India.” 8. The same is emphasised by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the decision in Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur, (2012) 2 SCC 176 : wherein in Paragraph Nos. 15 and 16, it is held thus: “15. As has been observed in various cases of similar nature by this Court, the personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the issuance of such an order.” 16. In our view, the detaining authority acted rather casually in the matter in issuing the order of detention and the High Court also appears to have missed the right to liberty as contained in Article 21 of the Constitution and Article 22(2) thereof, as well as the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 9. Applying the above principles stated in the judgments, cited supra, to the facts of the present case, we hold that the Detaining Authority has passed the impugned Detention Order without application of mind, as relevant facts were not taken into consideration. Applying the above principles stated in the judgments, cited supra, to the facts of the present case, we hold that the Detaining Authority has passed the impugned Detention Order without application of mind, as relevant facts were not taken into consideration. As the detenue is detained without trial, as per the order of detention, the law is to be strictly interpreted and no allowance could be given to the Detaining Authority for the lapses committed by him. In such view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the impugned Detention Order cannot be sustained, and therefore, the impugned Detention Order is liable to be quashed. 10. In the result, this Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed and the impugned Detention Order passed by the second respondent, in his proceedings C.P.O/T.C/I.S/D.O. No. 40/2011, dated 28.12.2011, is quashed. The detenu, by name, Syed Mohammed Imam @ Munir S/o. Rafiq Hussian, is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required for detention in connection with any other case.