JUDGMENT : Dev Darshan Sud, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the Himachal Road Transport Corporation (H.R.T.C. in short) against the award passed by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Solan. The claim was instituted by claimant-Ms. Anjali, who was aged about ten years on the date of accident as pleaded. She was a student of 3rd Class in Central School Subathu. On 30.10.2008 at around 4 p.m. when she and her relatives were alighting from bus No. HP-14-5308 belonging to the appellant herein, another bus No. HP-14-5319 going towards Kalka was stationed there. The conductor and driver of the bus from which the petitioner was alighting, allowed the conductor of the other bus to climb on the roof of bus and push down a tyre throwing all caution to the winds which resulted in injuries to the claimant crippling her for the rest of life reducing her to a vegetable existence. The Tribunal notes that the claimant was treated at Regional Hospital, Solan, PGI Chandigarh and Command Hospital Western Command, Chandi Mandir, where she underwent considerable long periods of hospitalization. 2. The accident has been proved in the manner in which it has occurred. The nature of the injuries has also been proved so much so PW5 Dr. Saurav Dass of Command Hospital Western Command, states that the petitioner was unable to move her limbs and he classified the injuries 100% crippling. In other words, the claimant has been reduced to a vegetative state. The learned Tribunal, on the evidence on record granted compensation to the extent of Rs. 11,10,000/- and interest at the rate of 12% per annum. It is this award which has now challenged. 3. The first submission made by learned counsel appearing for the H.R.T.C. is that no liability could be fastened on the appellant for the reason that the injuries could not be attributed to the use of a motor vehicle. He submits that even if it is accepted as proved that the tyre was being unloaded from the roof of the bus, it does not constitute an act involving the use of a motor vehicle, which is fundamental and required to be established before compensation is awarded. I am unable to accept this submission that the use of the motor vehicle can be confined only to the driving of the vehicle. I am unable to accept this submission that the use of the motor vehicle can be confined only to the driving of the vehicle. That would be a pedantic interpretation unwarranted by the social intent of the legislation. 4. This Court in Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others v. Om Prakash and others, 1992 ACJ 40 has held that when a bomb lying hidden in the roadways bus exploded when the bus had covered a short distance causing injuries to some and proving fatal to other passengers would be an accident which had occurred during the course of the use of motor vehicle. 5. In Motor and General Finance (India) Ltd. v. Mary Mony and others, 1991 ACJ 101 , a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala holds: "13. The Act does not create a new right or even a new remedy but has simply changed the forum and the process for adjudicating claims for compensation arising from accidents by the use of motor vehicles. Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act merely deal with the change of forum and the process by the Claims Tribunal substituting the civil court and its process. On a reading of sections 110 to 110-F of the Act, it is plain and clear that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals when constituted would substitute the civil courts in the matter of adjudicating the question of compensation arising out of accidents due to use of motor vehicles. As we said earlier, section 110 (1) of the Act postulates accidents "arising out of the use of motor vehicles". Though the fundamental principle on which the liability is fastened can be traced to the law of Torts, many of the crucial aspects of that liability have been now made statutory by the Act. Even then the principles of law of Torts are relevant in the quantification of damages. We feel the word use in section 110 (1) of the Act has been used in a wider sense. It covers all engagements of the motor vehicle, including driving, parking, keeping stationary, repairing, leaving unattended on the road or for any other purposes. In the case when a vehicle is being driven and is stopped or parked for being repaired, it cannot be said that the vehicle is not being used. (See General Manager, Karnataka State Road Trans. Corpn. It covers all engagements of the motor vehicle, including driving, parking, keeping stationary, repairing, leaving unattended on the road or for any other purposes. In the case when a vehicle is being driven and is stopped or parked for being repaired, it cannot be said that the vehicle is not being used. (See General Manager, Karnataka State Road Trans. Corpn. v. S. Satalingappa, 1979 ACJ 452 (Karnataka) and V.G. Sumant v. Shailendra Kumar, 1980 ACJ 248 (MP). (Emphasis supplied) 6. To similar effect is the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Rabari Bharmabai Kana v. Sava Karsan and others, 1994 ACJ 1105 , the court holds: "5 Mr. Nagarkar appearing for Mr. Shelat for the respondent Corporation has frankly brought to the notice of this court the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, 1991 ACJ 777 (SC), in which the decision in General Manager, Karnataka State Road Trans. Corpn. v. S. Satalingappa, 1979 ACJ 452 (Karnataka), has also been considered by the Supreme Court and, after considering several other judgments of different High Courts and of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has held that the word use in the expression use of a motor vehicle has a wider connotation and covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary. It is further held that use of a vehicle does not cease when it has been rendered immobile on account of breakdown or mechanical defect or accident. In the case on hand before me, though the tyre was punctured, admittedly some passengers were sitting in the bus and when the driver started engine with a view to supply water to the radiator, the bus started getting movement and because of that the conductor, who was holding the spare wheel on the carrier of the bus lost the balance and consequently the grip of the spare wheel which slipped from his hands and went rolling about 20 ft. distance and fell on the claimants leg who was sitting under a tree and crushed it. Thus, there is no doubt whatsoever that the claimant received injuries in the vehicular accident which took pace because of the negligence not only of the driver of the bus but also of the conductor. distance and fell on the claimants leg who was sitting under a tree and crushed it. Thus, there is no doubt whatsoever that the claimant received injuries in the vehicular accident which took pace because of the negligence not only of the driver of the bus but also of the conductor. If the driver of the bus had not started the engine, then the bus would not have made any motion and he would not have been required to apply brakes for stopping it. It was only because the driver applied the brakes that the conductor who was on the carrier of the bus with the spare wheel holding in his hands lost his balance and ultimately the grip over the spare wheel which rolled down to the place where the appellant-claimant was sitting under a tree. Therefore, this was only due to negligent act on the part of both the driver and the conductor of the bus that the accident took place resulting in vicarious liability of the opponent No. 3, Corporation. Therefore, this being a vehicular accident, all the three respondents are held jointly and severally responsible for the same." 7. It is well settled principle in awarding compensation that where an injury is of such a nature which cripples a person for the rest of his life, compensation awarded should be to the extent where the return from the corpus is sufficient to meet the needs of the injured not only for an attendant but for medication and other expenses. 8. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and another, 2011 ACJ 1 , the Supreme Court while considering this aspect in detail, holds: "7. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60 per cent permanent disability of the right hand and 80 per cent permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140 per cent (that is 80 per cent plus 60 per cent). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentage of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100 per cent. 8. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45 per cent as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45 percent loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may, however, note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case of course, Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 2010 ACJ 2867 (SC) and Yadava Kumar v. Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2010 ACJ 2713 (SC). 9. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so, the extent of such permanent disability. This means that Tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement; (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 13. We may now summarise the principles discussed above: (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity. (ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability). To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability). (iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different person, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors." 9. This principle was later on reiterated in Govind Yadav v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 2012 ACJ 28 , holding: "10. The personal sufferings of the survivors and disabled persons are manifold. Some time they can be measured in terms of money but most of the times it is not possible to do so. If an individual is permanently disabled in an accident, the cost of his medical treatment and care is likely to be very high. In cases involving total or partial disablement, the term `compensation' used in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, `the Act') would include not only the expenses incurred for immediate treatment, but also the amount likely to be incurred for future medical treatment/care necessary for a particular injury or disability caused by an accident. A very large number of people involved in motor accidents are pedestrians, children, women and illiterate persons. Majority of them cannot, due to sheer ignorance, poverty and other disabilities, engage competent lawyers for proving negligence of the wrongdoer in adequate measure. The insurance companies with whom the vehicles involved in the accident are insured usually have battery of lawyers on their panel. They contest the claim petitions by raising all possible technical objections for ensuring that their clients are either completely absolved or their liabilities minimized. This results in prolonging the proceedings before the Tribunal. Sometimes the delay and litigation expenses' make the award passed by the Tribunal and even by the High Court (in appeal) meaningless. They contest the claim petitions by raising all possible technical objections for ensuring that their clients are either completely absolved or their liabilities minimized. This results in prolonging the proceedings before the Tribunal. Sometimes the delay and litigation expenses' make the award passed by the Tribunal and even by the High Court (in appeal) meaningless. It is, therefore, imperative that the officers, who preside over the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal adopt a proactive approach and ensure that the claims filed under Sections 166 of the Act are disposed of with required urgency and compensation is awarded to the victims of the accident and/or their legal representatives in adequate measure. The amount of compensation in such cases should invariably include pecuniary and non pecuniary damages. In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Private Limited (1995) 1 SCC 551 , this Court while dealing with a case involving claim of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ward v. James (1965) 1 All ER 563, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 12 (Page 446) and observed: "(9) Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life." In the same case, the Court further observed: "(12) In its very nature whenever a tribunal or a court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guesswork, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards." 10. This is the settled law. But what I find from the evidence is that proper assistance has not been afforded to the Tribunal to assess these facts. The question always would remain as to how long this young life can remain in a vegetative state constantly requiring an attendant for every need. So long the mother is alive, she would look after the child but after her, the claimants life would become one big question mark. 11. Second contention urged is with respect to the quantum of damages awarded. It would be very difficult to assess the actual loss of a young child, who has been crippled for the rest of her life and rendered to a vegetative state. It is also impossible to say as to whether the sum awarded would be sufficient and she may not require any medical treatment in future. What I find is that the Tribunal has been frugal in awarding compensation. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Master Shirish Batra v. M.S. Pal Transport Company and others, 2005 (1) Shim. L.C. 98, the learned Tribunal fixes the bench mark for awarding compensation. What I find is that the Tribunal has been frugal in awarding compensation. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Master Shirish Batra v. M.S. Pal Transport Company and others, 2005 (1) Shim. L.C. 98, the learned Tribunal fixes the bench mark for awarding compensation. In these circumstances, I cannot persuade myself to hold that in the circumstances the learned Tribunal has not correctly applied the law but lack of evidence stops my hands from awarding anything more. There is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed. CMP (M) No. 1456 of 2011 12. This application has been filed on behalf of the claimant seeking condonation of delay of 257 days in instituting the present appeal against the judgment and award of the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The reason for delay in instituting the appeal is that the petitioner was handicapped in instituting the present appeal for the reason that she is totally crippled and incapacitated and her mother is constantly devoted to looking after her. This is reason enough in law to condone the delay which is accordingly condoned. This application is accordingly allowed. 13. I need not go into the facts of the case as they are well established. The award has been challenged basically on the ground that the amount of quantum of compensation which has been awarded is on the lower side. The appellant herein said that a multiplier of 20 should and ought to have been used instead of 16. This is the only point urged before me. 14. Looking to the facts of the case and the evidence on record, even no rough estimate of the future medical treatment or the expenditure to be incurred on the attendants has been brought on the record. This appeal is accordingly disposed of.