Judgment : The petitioner joined the service of A.P. State Cooperative Bank Limited, the 2nd respondent herein in the year 1975, as a Staff Assistant. Thereafter, he earned number of promotions, and in the year 1999, he was working as Assistant General Manager. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, alleging certain acts of omission and commission. A charge-memo dated 31-07-1999 was issued and on receipt of the same, the petitioner submitted his explanation dated 06-09-1999, denying the charges. Not satisfied with the explanation, the disciplinary authority appointed an Enquiry Officer, and a full-fledged enquiry was conducted. The enquiry officer submitted a report, holding that the charges against the petitioner are proved. Taking the same into account, the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 29-01-2005, imposing the punishment of dismissal of the petitioner from service. Challenging the order of dismissal, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Hyderabad, the 3rd respondent, under Regulation 41 of the Common Cadre Regulations, (for short ‘the Regulations’), framed by the 2nd respondent. The 3rd respondent allowed the appeal through order dated 25-05-2010, setting aside the order of dismissal. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the 2nd respondent filed a revision under Section 77 of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 (for short ‘the Act’), before the 1st respondent. Through orders in memo dated 18-09-2010, the 1st respondent allowed the revision, and the order dated 25-05-2010, passed by the 3rd respondent was set aside. The result is that the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner is restored. The petitioner challenges the memo dated 18-09-2010. The petitioner submits that the revision under Section 77 of the Act is not maintainable, in view of the order passed by the Appellate Authority under the Regulations. He further submits that the process of hearing of the revision was reduced to farcical levels, inasmuch as it took just two days from the date of filing of the revision for the 1st respondent to pass the order, bulldozing all the basic requirements under law. He also submits that no reasons whatever were furnished by the 1st respondent for setting aside the detailed and voluminous order passed by the 3rd respondent. The 2nd respondent filed a detailed counter-affidavit. He also submits that no reasons whatever were furnished by the 1st respondent for setting aside the detailed and voluminous order passed by the 3rd respondent. The 2nd respondent filed a detailed counter-affidavit. It is stated that the charges framed against the petitioner were grave in nature, and still, the 3rd respondent has allowed the appeal, without taking the facts, borne out by record, into consideration. He submits that the Appellate Authority had proceeded with the matter with a bit of speed, on account of the fact that almost a deadline like thing was prescribed by this Court, both for the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent, in the matter of implementation of the order passed by the 3rd respondent. The objection as to the maintainability of the revision is seriously contested, and it is pleaded that the 1st respondent is conferred with the powers of superintendence and revision over any matter, pertaining to a society. Sri G. Vidyasagar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the charges framed against the petitioner are in relation to the discharge of routine functions, as an officer of the Bank, and that the order of dismissal was passed, absolutely without any basis. He contends that the 2nd respondent has framed Regulations, which deal exclusively with the matters pertaining to the employees, and that the petitioner has availed the remedy under the Regulations. Learned counsel submits that the appellate authority has examined the matter, in detail, and demonstrated through threadbare discussion, as to how the charges framed against the petitioner were baseless, and ultimately allowed the appeal. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that once the appeal is filed under the Regulations, the remedy provided for under the Act are not at all available. Taking support from the language employed in Section 61 of the Act, which excludes the service matters from its purview, learned counsel submits that the revision under Section 77 of the Act equally excludes from its purport, the matters, pertaining to the service conditions of the employees of the societies. In support of this proposition, learned counsel has relied upon certain precedents. Another important contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, assuming that the 1st respondent has power to entertain the revision, it is just unthinkable as to how a revision filed on 17-09-2010 is disposed of on the next day. In support of this proposition, learned counsel has relied upon certain precedents. Another important contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, assuming that the 1st respondent has power to entertain the revision, it is just unthinkable as to how a revision filed on 17-09-2010 is disposed of on the next day. He contends that not only the principles of natural justice, but also the specific provisions, pertaining to the hearing and disposal of the revisions; were flouted with impunity. Learned Advocate-General appeared for the respondents. He submits that the petitioner has resorted to several financial irregularities, and in the departmental enquiry, the charges were held proved. He contends that the 3rd respondent has misread the provisions; misinterpreted the record, and has set aside the order of dismissal on totally untenable grounds. He further contends that Section 77 of the Act is comprehensive provision, and a revision under it, is maintainable against any order passed by an authority under the Act. According to the learned Advocate-General, once the 3rd respondent is an authority under the Act, any order passed by him, whether in exercise of power under the Rules framed under the Act, or bye-laws or Regulations, framed by the society; is amenable to the jurisdiction, under Section 77 of the Act. As regards the manner of disposal of revision, learned Advocate-General submits that a semblance of hasty disposal had to be given to the revision, on account of the fact that 20th September, 2010 was fixed, virtually as a deadline by this Court, in a writ petition, filed by the petitioner, for implementation of the order passed by the 3rd respondent. He submits that within the limited time, the 1st respondent has ensured that notice is served upon the petitioner, and that his contentions are taken note of. He too placed reliance upon precedents, in support of the contention, that the revision is maintainable. The 2nd respondent initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and an order of dismissal was passed on 29-01-2005. Aggrieved by that, the petitioner availed the remedy of appeal, under Regulation 41 of the Regulations. A detailed order, running into 48 printed pages, was passed by the 3rd respondent, on 25-05-2010, and the order of dismissal was set aside. The petitioner filed W.P.No.19927 of 2010, with a prayer to direct the 2nd respondent to implement the order passed by the 3rd respondent. A detailed order, running into 48 printed pages, was passed by the 3rd respondent, on 25-05-2010, and the order of dismissal was set aside. The petitioner filed W.P.No.19927 of 2010, with a prayer to direct the 2nd respondent to implement the order passed by the 3rd respondent. In other words, he wanted reinstatement into service, once the order of dismissal was set aside. The 2nd respondent herein represented to the Court, that it is proposing to avail the remedy of revision. A representation was filed by the petitioner before the 1st respondent, urging that the revision may not be entertained, since it would not be maintainable. However, the revision was presented on 17-09-2010, and on the same day, the petitioner was served with a notice to appear on the next day. Ultimately, the impugned order was passed by the 1st respondent. Whatever may be the merits of the matter, the procedure adopted by the 1st respondent, while disposing of the revision, can not at all be approved. It is fundamental that the opposite party in a revision must be given reasonable and adequate time to put forward its contention, be it, as regards maintainability, or on merits. As observed earlier, the revision was presented on 17-09-2010; notice was served upon the petitioner on the same day, and disposal was given on the next day. Even if the representation made by the petitioner before the 1st respondent can be treated as caveat, he ought to have been given time to put forward his contention, particularly when an objection is raised as to the very maintainability. Virtually, no opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioner, and there is a clear violation of the principles of natural justice as well as the procedure, prescribed for hearing and disposal of the revision. In view of this finding, the matter has to go back to the 1st respondent for fresh consideration and disposal. However, strong objection is raised by the petitioner as to the maintainability of the revision under Section 77 of the Act. The basis pleaded for the objection is that the Regulations provide the mechanism for resolution of disputes between the 2nd respondent and its employees, and an order passed by an authority, conferred the jurisdiction under the Regulations; can not at all be the subject-matter of a revision. The basis pleaded for the objection is that the Regulations provide the mechanism for resolution of disputes between the 2nd respondent and its employees, and an order passed by an authority, conferred the jurisdiction under the Regulations; can not at all be the subject-matter of a revision. To appreciate this contention, it becomes necessary to have a glance at the provisions of the Act, dealing with the remedies. Section 61 of the Act provides for reference of disputes, touching the constitution, management and business of the society to the Registrar for adjudication. The manner in which, the dispute must be dealt with on being referred to, is stated in Section 62. However, this mechanism excludes from its purport, any dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of a society. Section 61 of the reads, “Sec. 61 (1): Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society, arises— (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members; or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society; or (c) between the society or its committee, and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent, or past employee or the nominee, heir or legal representative of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; or (d) between the society and any other society, such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision”. (remaining part of the section is omitted since it is not relevant for the purpose of this case) An order passed under Section 62 is appealable under Section 76 of the Act. There is no controversy that the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner could not have been the subject-matter of a reference under Section 61 and adjudication under Section 62, much less, the subject-matter of an appeal under Section 76 of the Act. The 2nd respondent framed the Regulations to govern the service conditions of its employees. There is no controversy that the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner could not have been the subject-matter of a reference under Section 61 and adjudication under Section 62, much less, the subject-matter of an appeal under Section 76 of the Act. The 2nd respondent framed the Regulations to govern the service conditions of its employees. A remedy of appeal is provided under that, to various authorities depending upon the cadre of the delinquent employee. As regards the petitioner, the Appellate Authority is the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. The Rules do not provide for any further remedy on the order passed by an Appellate Authority. The aggrieved party, be it, the society or the employee must be able to prosecute the remedies. Section 77 of the Act provides for the remedy of revision. It reads, “Sec.77: Revision:- (1) The Registrar may of his own motion or on application made to him, call for and examine the record of any officer subordinate to him and the Government may of their own motion or on application made to them, call for and examine the record of the Registrar, in respect of any proceeding not being a proceeding in respect of which an appeal to the Tribunal is provided by sub-section (1) of Section 76 to satisfy himself or themselves as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision passed or order made therein; and if, in any case, it appears to the Registrar or the Government that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, he or they may pass orders accordingly: Provided that every application to the Registrar or the Government for the exercise of the powers under this section shall be preferred within ninety days from the date on which the proceeding, decision or order to which the application relates was communicated to the applicant. (2) No order prejudicial to any person shall be passed under sub-section (1) unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representation. (3) The Registrar or the Government, as the case may be, may suspend the decision or order pending the exercise of his or their power under sub-section (1) in respect thereof. (2) No order prejudicial to any person shall be passed under sub-section (1) unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representation. (3) The Registrar or the Government, as the case may be, may suspend the decision or order pending the exercise of his or their power under sub-section (1) in respect thereof. (4) The Registrar or the Government may award costs in proceedings under this section, to be paid either out of the funds of the society or by such party to the application for the revision as the Registrar or the Government may deem fit”. An examination of Section 61, on the one hand, and Section 76 of the Act, on the other hand, discloses that under the former, the disputes between the societies and their employees are totally excluded from the purview, whereas such a stipulation does not exist in Section 77. What are excluded from the purview of Section 77 are, the proceedings, in respect of which, an appeal is provided under Section 76. If this legal position is applied to the facts of the case, it emerges that the petitioner could not have availed the remedy under Section 61 of the Act, because that is specifically excluded, and has rightly approached the appellate authority. The 2nd respondent had filed a revision before the 1st respondent under Section 77 of the Act, because the order in favour of the petitioner was passed by the Registrar, may be, in the capacity of an appellate authority, under the Regulations. Section 77, however, does not maintain any distinction between the orders passed by the Registrar, in exercise of powers as an appellate authority under the Regulations, on the one hand, and other provisions of the Act and Rules, on the other hand. If, in fact, the legislature intended to exclude the orders passed by a Registrar, in his capacity as appellate authority under the Regulations, a stipulation to that effect would have been made, just as was done in Section 61, to exclude the service matters from its purview. In fact Section 77 itself excludes from its purview, the proceedings against which, remedy of appeal is available under Section 76. The inescapable conclusion is that a revision filed by the 2nd respondent under Section 77 of the Act is maintainable. In fact Section 77 itself excludes from its purview, the proceedings against which, remedy of appeal is available under Section 76. The inescapable conclusion is that a revision filed by the 2nd respondent under Section 77 of the Act is maintainable. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in THE GUJARAT STATE CO-OPERATIVE LAND DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD., v. P.R. MANKAD AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1979 SC 1203 ) and this Court in IBRAHIM ALI KHAN v. REGISTAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, GOVERNMENT OF A.P., AND OTHERS (1998 (3) An.W.R. 759). In the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court the question was, as to whether under the provisions of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, it was permissible for an employee of a society to raise the dispute pertaining to his termination, before a Registrar. The Supreme Court took the view that the Registrar was not conferred with the jurisdiction to deal with such matters, and the remedy for the employee was to approach the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Regulations Act, 1946. The provisions of those enactments are totally at variance to those, of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act. Under the A.P. Act, the exclusion of the class of disputes from the purview of Section 61 or 77 is clear and specific. In IBRAHIM ALI KHAN’S case (2 supra), the question was, as to whether an employee of a society, who is placed under suspension by the management, can maintain a revision before the Registrar of the Societies, under Section 77. This Court took into account, the purport of Section 77 of the Act and held that it is only the proceedings issued by a subordinate to the Government or Registrar, as the case may be, that can constitute the subject-matter of a revision, and that a society can not at all be treated as a subordinate to the Registrar or Government. In the instant case, the subject-matter of the revision preferred by the 2nd respondent was an order passed by the 3rd respondent, the Registrar, and it is not in dispute that a Registrar is subordinate to the 1st respondent. Therefore, the ratio underlying the judgments, referred to above, does not cover the facts of this case. Similar view was expressed in ISHWAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ( AIR 2005 SC 773 ). Therefore, the ratio underlying the judgments, referred to above, does not cover the facts of this case. Similar view was expressed in ISHWAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ( AIR 2005 SC 773 ). An employee of a Co-operative Society was compulsorily retired by the management. He challenged the order of compulsory retirement before the Additional Registrar of Cooperative Societies under Section 128 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, which is similar to Section 77 of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act. The Additional Registrar entertained it, and has set aside the order of compulsory retirement. The society, in turn, filed a revision before the Government under that very provision. The Government entertained the revision and held that the revision entertained by the Additional Registrar was not tenable, since the society was not subordinate to him. On the question as to whether a Registrar can entertain a revision against an order passed by a Cooperative Society against its employee, the Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by this Court, in IBRAHIM ALI KHAN’S case (2 supra). As in the present case, in the case before the Supreme Court also, the subject-matter of a revision before the Government was an order passed by a Registrar, in relation to the service conditions of an employee. Therefore, no exception was taken to the action of the State Government in entertaining the revision against an order passed by the Registrar in relation to service matter of an employee of a society. If that principle is applied to the facts of the present case, the objection raised by the petitioner becomes totally untenable. The order impugned in this writ petition, however, deserves to be set aside on other grounds, discussed earlier. Hence, the writ petition is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded to the 1st respondent for fresh consideration and disposal. The 1st respondent shall issue notice of hearing, of not less than fifteen days, to the petitioner, and dispose of the revision, within two months thereafter. The miscellaneous petition filed in this writ petition shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.