JUDGMENT Mihir Kumar Jha, J. – Heard counsel for the parties. 2. In this writ application the petitioner has assailed the order of his detention dated 10.11.2011 (Annexure-2) passed by the District Magistrate (D.M.), Rohtas at Sasaram in exercise of his power under section 12 of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) as also the confirmatory order dated 4.1.2002 (Annexure-6) passed under Section 21 of the Act by the State Government whereby and whereunder his detention is to continue till a period of twelve months i.e. upto 9.11.2012. 3. The facts of this case lie in a very narrow compass. An order of detention was passed against the petitioner by the D.M., Rohtas on 10.11.2011, as contained in Annexure 2, which was based on a proposal submitted by the Superintendent of Police (S.P.), Rohtas in his letter dated 16.10.2011. The said detention order alongwith the grounds for his detention of the petitioner having been served on him in the Central Jail, Sasaram on 10.11.2011 he had filed his representation to the State Government on 14.11.2011 with a copy thereof to the D.M., Rohtas and the S.P., Rohtas. The State Government having received the representation of the petitioner on 17.11.2011 had sent the same for comments of the D.M., Rohtas on the same day, whereafter the comments were sent by the D.M. Rohtas on 26.11.2011 and the representation of the petitioner was rejected by an order dated 3.12.2011. The matter relating to detention of the petitioner was also placed before the Advisory Board, which had concurred with the order of detention of the petitioner and the State Government had accordingly issued the order confirming such detention of the petitioner for a period of one year (upto 9.11.2012) by its order dated 4.1.2012. 4. It is to be also noted that the petitioner had moved earlier this Court against the same impugned orders of detention dated 10.11.2011 and its confirmatory order dated 4.1.2012 in Cr. W.J.C. No. 14 of 2012 which was dismissed by an order dated 7.2.2012 (Annexure-1) on the ground that as the petitioner was in judicial custody in connection with Rohtas P.S. Case No. 163 of 2010 pursuant to an order of judicial remand, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued by quashing the impugned orders of his preventive detention. W.J.C. No. 14 of 2012 which was dismissed by an order dated 7.2.2012 (Annexure-1) on the ground that as the petitioner was in judicial custody in connection with Rohtas P.S. Case No. 163 of 2010 pursuant to an order of judicial remand, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued by quashing the impugned orders of his preventive detention. The Division Bench, however, had given liberty to challenge the same orders of his detention again as and when he was released from the judicial custody. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that subsequently he was granted bail in Rohtas P.S. Case No. 163 of 2010 by this Court by an order dated 5.4.2012 in Cr. Misc. No. 14383/2012 (Annexure-7), whereafter the present application has been filed for quashing of the same detention order dated 10.11.2011 (Annexure-2) passed by the D.M., Rohtas as also the consequential order of confirmation dated 4.1.2012 (Annexure-6) passed by the State Government whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been directed to remain in detention till 9.11.2012. The same division bench which had earlier dismissed the writ application of the petitioner on 7.2.2012, in view of subsequent development of grant of bail to the petitioner by this Court on 5.4.2012 and the liberty given in the order dated 7.2.2012 had entertained this writ application filed on 10.5.2012 and by an order dated 11.5.2012 had also directed the respondents to file their counter affidavits whereafter three counter affidavits, the first one by the State Government, the second one by the D.M., Rohtas and the last one by S.P., Rohtas have been filed. 6. Mr. Onkar Nath, learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the impugned order of detention has raised infact only one ground, namely, that there was inordinate and unexplained delay in disposal of the representation filed by the petitioner after service of the order of detention on him. In this regard he has submitted that when the order of detention was passed and served on the petitioner on 10.11.2011 and grounds for detention also were served on him on 10.11.2011 itself, the State Government had taken a period of 21 days in rejecting the representation of the petitioner. In this regard he has submitted that when the order of detention was passed and served on the petitioner on 10.11.2011 and grounds for detention also were served on him on 10.11.2011 itself, the State Government had taken a period of 21 days in rejecting the representation of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that in view of the three counter affidavits filed by the respondents it becomes clear that even when the representation was filed by the petitioner on 14.11.2011 to the State Government and the State Government had asked the D.M., Rohtas to submit comments on the representation of the petitioner by an order dated 17.11.2011 but the D.M., Rohtas had consumed a period of nine days in only submitting his comments on 26.11.2011 and thereafter also a period of one more week was consumed by the State Government in disposing of the representation of the petitioner on 3.12.2011 which would amount to unexplained delay in disposal of the representation and thus would also vitiate the order of the detention. In this regard he has placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul khader vs. Union of India & ors., reported in (1991)1 SCC 476 and also on a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ummu Sabeena vs. the State of Kerala & ors., reported in (2011)10 SCC 781 . 7. Per contra, Mr. S.D. Sanjay, AAG12, appearing on behalf of the State, has submitted that there was no such inordinate delay in disposal of the representation of the petitioner which would vitiate the impugned order of detention. In this regard he, on the basis of three affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, has submitted that the representation filed by the petitioner on 14.11.2011 was forwarded by the Superintendent, Sasaram Jail which had reached the State Government in the Home Department on 16.11.2011, whereafter the Deputy Secretary to the State Government in the Home Department vide his letter dated 17.11.2011 had sought comment on the representation of the petitioner from the D.M., Rohtas and the said letter of the Home Department was received by the D.M. Rohtas on 18.11.2011. He has further submitted that the D.M. Rohtas in fact having received an advance copy of the representation of the petitioner from jail had already acted on such representation filed by the petitioner addressed to the State Government by seeking a report from the S.P., Rohtas vide his letter dated 17.11.2011 directing him to submit his comments with the relevant information relating to involvement of the petitioner in different criminal cases with reference to the investigation report/ case diaries. 8. According to the learned AAG12 the D.M., Rohtas thereafter also did not leave the matter unattended, inasmuch as he on receipt of the letter of Home Department dated 18.11.2011 had again sent a fax message to S.P., Rohtas on 18.11.2011 for submitting the desired report which was followed by his telephonic reminders to S.P., Rohtas as also his written reminders dated 23.11.2011 and 24.11.2011 because the D.M., Rohtas in the meantime had also received two reminders from the State Government for sending his comments on the representation of the petitioner. He has also submitted that when on 25.11.2011 a detailed report from the S.P., Rohtas was received in the office of the D.M., Rohtas and on the next day i.e. 26.11.2011 the D.M., Rohtas had sent his comments to the State Government which was received in the Home Department on 28.11.2011, whereafter the representation of the petitioner had been examined at different level in the Home (special) department of the State Government in between 28.11.2011 to 1.12.2011. According to him the Home Secretary had placed the whole matter before the Chief Minister on 1.12.2011 and the representation of the petitioner was rejected and thus disposed of by the Chief Minister on 2.12.2011 and the consequential communication thereafter was made to the petitioner on 3.12.2011. On the basis of these facts he has submitted that there is no inordinate much less unexplained delay in disposal of the representation of the petitioner which would vitiate the order of detention of the petitioner. Mr. Sanjay in this regard has also placed reliance on the same Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) and additionally he has also referred to a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of D.M. Nagaraja vs. Govt. of Karnataka & ors., reported in (2011)10 SCC 215 . 9. Mr. Sanjay in this regard has also placed reliance on the same Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) and additionally he has also referred to a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of D.M. Nagaraja vs. Govt. of Karnataka & ors., reported in (2011)10 SCC 215 . 9. In order to appreciate the issue relating to inordinate delay in disposal of the representation of a detenu under Preventive Detention Laws, the first and foremost consideration is to be given to the mandate under Article 22, Sub-Clause (5) of the Constitution of India which reads as follows:- “22(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” 10. The mandate flowing from Article 22 of the Constitution of India, which is part of fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen, has a sanguine object and is necessarily referable to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of law as also protection of life and personal liberty. The two rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India being affirmative rights, Article 22 thereof only provides one of the mode of protection of such right and therefore, if the mandate under the Constitution is itself very clear that a person detained under any law of preventive detention has to be communicated and furnished the grounds of his detention as soon as after his detention with an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, it goes without saying that every authority or Officer while dealing with the representation has to act with utmost expedition. The life of such detention order itself being of one year, the personal liberty of a citizen cannot be curtailed by way of causing unexplained delay in disposal of the representation specially when after such representation is rejected by the State Government the detenu has a right of seeking judicial review against such order of detention in a Court of Law. Thus, there can be no two opinion as with regard to settled position in law that the representation filed by a person detained under any Preventive Detention Law has to be disposed of with utmost expedition. 11. Considering this very aspect of the matter the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) had held as follows:- “12.………there should not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal.” 12. The said view of the Constitution Bench has been reiterated by the apex Court in the case of Rajammal v. State of T.N., reported in (1999)1 SCC 417 , wherein in absence of explanation for delay of five days in disposal of the representation by the Minister it was held that unexplained such delay had vitiated the further detention of the detenu. Similarly, the Apex Court in another case of Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaikh v. District Magistrate, Ahmedabad, reported in (1996)3 SCC 194 , had held that the time consumed in internal movement of file of four days was sufficient to vitiate the order of detention, inasmuch as the representation filed by the detenu on 21.9.1995 had got disposed of only on 19.10.1995. 13. Thus in the backdrop of the aforesaid well settled position in law if this Court analyzes the materials on record, it would be found that even before the State Government had received the copy of the representation of the petitioner dated 14.11.2011, the D.M. Rohtas on his own had already sent a copy of the representation of the petitioner received by him from jail to S.P., Rohtas seeking his comments on the representation. It has been also admitted in the counter affidavit of the S.P. Rohtas that such communication of the D.M., Rohtas dated 17.11.2011 was received in his office on 19.11.2011 and yet he had submitted his comments to the D.M., Rohtas on 25.11.2011. The explanation given by the S.P., Rohtas for consuming a period of six days in his affidavit to say the least is wholly unsatisfactory and infact reflects both callousness and negligence on his part. The explanation given by the S.P., Rohtas for consuming a period of six days in his affidavit to say the least is wholly unsatisfactory and infact reflects both callousness and negligence on his part. The S.P., Rohtas infact has not even explained as with regard to a fax message or telephonic and written reminders were sent to him by the D.M., Rohtas as has been clearly asserted by the D.M., Rohtas in his separate counter affidavit in the following words:- “5. That the Superintendent, Sasaram Jail vide his letter no. 2683 dated 14.11.2011 forwarded the representation filed by the petitioner to the State Government which reached on 16.11.2011. Thereafter, vide letter no. 8339 dated 17.11.2011 under the signature of Deputy Secretary of the State Government comment was sought on the representation of the petitioner from the deponent and this letter was received by Fax by the Deponent on 18.11.2011. 6. That the Deponent even before receiving the letter from the State Government for his comment vide his letter Memo No. 2804 dated 17.11.2011 had already called for a report from the Superintendent of Police, Rohtas with regard to the involvement of the petitioner in different criminal cases with reference to their investigation reports/ case diaries. 7. That on 18.11.2011 a Fax was also sent to the S.P., Rohtas. Thereafter, telephonic reminder was also sent to the S.P. for sending his comment. Reminder was sent on 23.11.2011 and also on 24.11.2011. During this period the Deponent received reminders from the State Government for sending his comments on the representation of the petitioner.” 14. The State Governments affidavit on this aspect infact is also very clear wherein it has been claimed that after the representation of the petitioner dated 14.11.2011 was received in the Home Department on 16.11.2011 the D.M., Rohtas by letter dated 17.11.2011 was directed to furnish his comments and when the same was not received reminders were also given by the State Government to the D.M., Rohtas on 23.11.2011 and 25.11.2011 as would be evident from paragraph 8 of the affidavit of the State Government which reads as follows:- “8. That it is necessary to state that the District Magistrate, Sasaram was asked to furnish his comment on the petitioners representation vide Home (Police) Department letter no. 8339 dated 17.11.2011. That it is necessary to state that the District Magistrate, Sasaram was asked to furnish his comment on the petitioners representation vide Home (Police) Department letter no. 8339 dated 17.11.2011. It is humbly being stated that reminders have also issued vide letter No. 8482 dated 23.11.2011 and letter No. 8572 dated 25.11.2011.” 15. In the light of the aforesaid stand taken by the State Government and the D.M., Rohtas in their respective counter affidavits when this Court has examined the counter affidavit of S.P., Rohtas it is found that the S.P., Rohtas has given no cogent explanation for delaying the matter from 18.11.2011 to 25.11.2011. Firstly the affidavit of the S.P., Rohtas is curiously silent about the fax message sent by the office of the D.M., Rohtas on 18.11.2011 which was in continuation to the earlier letter of the D.M., Rohtas dated 17.11.2011. The affidavit of the S.P., Rohtas also does not say a word as with regard to telephonic reminders followed by written reminders sent by the office of the D.M., Rohtas on 23.11.2011 and 24.11.2011. The only explanation of S.P., Rohtas that he was busy otherwise in his official duty as explained by him in paragraphs 5 to 9 would also hardly explain the delay in submission of his comments to the D.M., Rohtas. In this regard it would be also useful to quote the explanation of the S.P., Rohtas in paragraphs no. 5 to 9 which reads as follows:- “5. That the Deponent states that on 20.11.2011 the Deponent proceeded to Banjari and Rohtas along with the District Magistrate, Divisional Forest Officer and the C.R.P.F. to manage security affairs as a program of Chief Minister, Bihar was to be convened there and as such proper security arrangement was needed to be supervised. 6. That the Deponent further states that on 21.11.2011 the Deponent proceeded to Nauhatta in Chutia P.S. area covering dense forest villages, namely, Parchha, Nawadi, Khurd, Nawadi Kala, Khurmabad, Belduria in an operation against extremists. 7. That on 22.11.2011 the Deponent was engaged in dealing with the problem of police personnel and had to visit Sasaram Camp office and also visited terrorist infected areas of Kargahar and adjoining boarder area of Kaimur district. 8. 7. That on 22.11.2011 the Deponent was engaged in dealing with the problem of police personnel and had to visit Sasaram Camp office and also visited terrorist infected areas of Kargahar and adjoining boarder area of Kaimur district. 8. That on 23.11.2011 also the Deponent was engaged with a prefixed program with D.I.G, Sahabad Range and to tackle a law and order problem personally which had arisen due to the burning of a vehicle of police in course of keeping of idol of Goddes Durga on government land. 9. That on 24.11.2011 the Deponent had to visit Suryapura P.S. and Indrapuri P.S. for the purpose of interrogation of hardcore naxalites.” 16. From the aforesaid stand taken by it becomes clear that not only that the S.P., Rohtas had treated the matter relating to personal liberty and preventive detention of the petitioner too lightly in a casual manner but had also failed to give any detail as with regard to the action taken by him for sending his comments to the D.M., Rohtas. In paragraph 4 of his affidavit all that has been said by him is that on receipt of the letter of the D.M., Rohtas dated 17.11.2011 he had sought relevant reports from the concerned persons so that his comment could be forwarded to the D.M, Rohtas. There is no explanation whatsoever as to when, on which date and from whom S. P. Rohtas had sought such comment on the representation of the petitioner. Yet again when in paragraph 10 of his affidavit he has maintained the same vagueness by claiming that when he had received information from the concerned Police Officer he had sent his comments to D.M., Rohtas on 25.11.2011. In fact it is not clear from the counter affidavit filed by S.P Rohtas as to from whom such comments were received by his, inasmuch as his comments dated 25.11.2011 by way of Annexure “B” to his counter affidavit sent to D.M. Rohtas does not even remotely refer to any of such information much less any detail thereof received by him from his subordinate officers. 17. 17. It is true that a Superintendent of Police being the district head of the police has got many key and important assignments but can there be any more important assignment than furnishing materials to the District Magistrate as with regard to personal liberty of a citizen who had been detained under the Act? The approach of the S.P., Rohtas, therefore, in being busy with all and sundry works either by way of his associated in official visits of the Chief Minister or attending crime meetings etc. cannot absolve him from his primary duty of submitting his comments on the representation of the petitioner to the D.M. Rohtas, specially when the impugned order of detention dated 10.11.2011 itself refers to the report of the S.P., Rohtas contained in his letter no. 6292 dated 16.10.2011 as the basis for detaining the petitioner under section 12(2) of the Act. Thus, if it was the report of the S.P. Rohtas dated 16.10.2011 on whose perusal the D.M. Rohtas had exercised his power under section 12 of the Act, it was all the more necessary for the S.P., Rohtas to be vigilant and submit his comment immediately after receipt of the letter of the D.M., Rohtas dated 17.11.2011. That having been not done and there being no plausible much less acceptable explanation of the S.P., Rohtas this Court would find no difficulty in holding that there was inordinate and unexplained delay of six days in submission of the comment by the S.P, Rohtas to the D.M., Rohtas. 18. What is really and in fact equally shocking for this Court to note that even when the State Government had kept on asking and reminding the D.M., Rohtas for submitting comments on the representation of the petitioner as would be also apparent from the letter of the Home Department dated 17.11.2011, 23.11.2011 and 25.11.2011, Annexures “D” and “E” to the counter affidavit of the State Government, and the D.M. Rohtas in turn also reminding the S.P., Rohtas by his fax message dated 18.11.2011 followed by his telephonic and the two written reminders dated 23.11.2011 and 24.11.2011, none of them had made any difference to the S.P., Rohtas who in his counter affidavit as quoted above has only claimed that in between 20.11.2011 to 24.11.2011 he was busy in his other official duties. True it is that there is only one Superintendent of Police in a District who has to look after all the assignments but he cannot disown his responsibility towards a citizen who has been detained under the Preventive Detention Law on the basis of his report and cannot adopt dilatory tactics by refusing to send his comments, obstructing the District Magistrate and the State Government in the expeditious disposal of the representation of the detenu. There will be infact no place for callousness and redtapism in any governmental action much less in the case of preventive detention. 19. Learned Counsel for the State has however, explained that after receipt of the comments of the S.P., Rohtas by the D.M. Rohtas, there was absolutely no delay in disposal of the representation of the petitioner by the State Government, inasmuch as when on 26.11.2011, such comments were sent by the D.M., Rohtas to Home Department and was received on 28.11.2011, immediate expeditious steps were taken in the Home Department on 28.11.2011 itself and the file had reached the Home Secretary on 28.11.2011, whereafter the Home Secretary had submitted the file to the Chief Minister and on 01.12.2011 and the Chief Minister had passed necessary order by rejecting the representation of the petitioner on 2.12.2011 which was also communicated to the petitioner on 3.12.2011. Learned AAG 12 has also explained that 26th and 27th November being Saturday and Sunday the action by the Home Department on 28.11.2011 in processing the representation for its being placed before the Home Commissioner and the file being sent by the Home Commissioner on 01.12.2011 would itself speak of utmost expedition in disposal of the representation of the petitioner. Such submission of the learned AAG-12, however, is not at all supported from paragraph 10 of the affidavit of the State Government which reads as follows: “10. That it is worthwhile to mention here that the aforesaid representation has been thoroughly examined by the State Government at different levels on 28.11.2011 Home Secretary, on 1.12.2011 and approved by the Hon’ble Chief Minister on 2.12.2011 who have pleased to reject the representation of the petitioner on 2.12.2011 and communicated to the petitioner vide Home (Police) Department Memo No. 8798 dated 3.12.2011 (Annexure 5 of the writ petition). Thus, it is crystal clear that the representation of the petitioner has been considered promptly and without any undue delay.” 20. Thus, it is crystal clear that the representation of the petitioner has been considered promptly and without any undue delay.” 20. In the opinion of this Court, 28th of November 2011 being a Monday if the file had already been processed upto the Home Secretary on the same dealy, there was no reason for the matter remaining unattended by him on 29th and 30th of November which were admittedly working days. There is in fact no explanation with regard to any action taken on 29th and 30th November, 2011 and therefore, this Court would find that when the State Government had sent its reminder on 25.11.2011 to the D.M. Rohtas asking the latter to submit his comments expeditiously failing which the detenu could get the benefit of delay in disposal of his representation, it was more of a mere lip service because there is no plausible explanation even in the counter affidavit filed by the State Government as with regard to any action taken on the representation of the petitioner on 29th and 30th November, 2011. 21. Faced with this situation learned AAG-12 had tried to wriggle out by taking a plea that since the representation filed by the petitioner on 14.11.2011 was within 12 days of the period of detention permissible under section 12 of the Act and thus the State Government had no obligation whatsoever to consider the same till it had received confirmation of the State Government and since the confirmation by the State Government had been made only on 21.11.2011, the period in between 14.11.2011 to 21.11.2011 cannot be treated as delay for the purposes of disposal of representation. In this regard he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of D.M. Nagaraja (supra). 22. In the considered opinion of this Court the reliance placed by learned AAG-12 on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of D.M.Nagaraja (supra) is also wholly misplaced. The concept of confirmation of an order or detention of the detenu in the context of disposal of representation as explained in the Constitution bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) has to be understood in the context of the Act. Section 12 of the Act which reads as follows:- "12. The concept of confirmation of an order or detention of the detenu in the context of disposal of representation as explained in the Constitution bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) has to be understood in the context of the Act. Section 12 of the Act which reads as follows:- "12. Power to make order detaining certain persons-(1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements can not be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-section; Provided that the period specified in an order make by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that if is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall forthwith report, the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government; Provided that where under section 17 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words "twelve days", the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted." 23. From a perusal of Section 12 of the Act it becomes clear the District Magistrate is authorised to pass an order of detention and its life is ordinarily for a period of 12 days within which period it has to receive approval of the State Government. The detenu thus has a right to file his representation immediately after service of the grounds of his detention which also in any event has to be served on him within a period of five days from the date of his detention as is also clear from Section 17 of the Act which reads as follows:- “17. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to person affected by the order.- (1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose.” 24. The period of five days given for communicating the grounds of detention by the District Magistrate to the detenu has also not to be deducted by the State Government while giving approval of such order of detention passed by the District Magistrate under section 12 of the Act, inasmuch as Section 12, sub-section (1) read with Section 12, sub-section (3) of the Act would leave nothing for speculation that after the detention order is passed by the District Magistrate under section 12(1) of the Act the fact relating to detention of the person concerned has to be brought into the notice of the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and the detention order so passed by the District Magistrate under section 12 of the Act can remain in force only for 12 days unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government. 25. 25. As a matter of fact when Section 17 of the Act lays down that the grounds of order of detention has to be disclosed to the person detained under the Act normally within a period of five days and there is also a mandate for affording the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate to the State Government, there would be no difficulty for this Court in holding that the confirmation of detention order under section 21 of the Act after opinion of the Advisory Board is not the same thing as that of the approval of detention order by the State Government in terms of section 12(3) of the Act. This position in law infact is also clear from the provisions of Sections 19 and 21 of the Act which reads as follows :- "19. Reference to Advisory Board- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every case where as detention order has been made under this Act, the Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 18, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by the District Magistrate mentioned in sub-section(2) of section 12 also the report by such officer under sub-section(3) of the section. 20.---------------------- 21. Action upon the report of the Advisory Board- (1) in any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. (2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person concerned to be released for with." 26. (2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person concerned to be released for with." 26. Thus as is clear scheme under the Act, a District Magistrate can detain a person by passing his order at best for a period of 12 days and if such order of detention in the meantime is approved by the State Government, his case has to be referred to by the State Government to the Advisory Board within three weeks of the order of detention so as to enable the Advisory Board to record its opinion on the basis of materials on record including the representation filed by the detenu in next four weeks, whereafter the State Government in the light of the opinion of the Advisory Board has to pass a fresh order for confirmation of detention order which can continue for a maximum period of one year. A simultaneous reading of the provisions of Sections 12, 17, 19 and 21 of the Act infact would make it clear as a day light that filing or disposal of the representation by the State Government is not dependent on the confirmation of the detention order in terms of Section 21 of the Act inasmuch as approval of a detention order in terms of section 12(3) of the Act by State Government is altogether different from the confirmation of the detention order under section 21 of the Act. 27. 27. Once this aspect becomes clear there would be no difficulty in distinguishing the judgment in the case of D.M. Nagaraja (supra) wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the provisions of Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985 and having found that the order of detention was passed on 22.9.2010 and was approved by the State government on 30.9.2010, whereafter the case was sent to the Advisory Board on 8.10.2010 and the Advisory Board on 4.11.2010 had given its opinion in favour of the detaining detenu whereafter confirmatory order was passed for detaining him for a period of 12 months on 16.11.2010, their Lordships had held that the representation of the detenu having been filed on 6.10.2010 i.e. much after approval of the order by the State Government on 30.9.2010 be considered only after confirmatory order was passed by the State Government. Thus the observations made in the case of D.M Nagraja (supra) in paragraph no. 23 has to be clearly understood in the facts of that case as would be apparent from reading of the paragraph no. 22 and 23 thereof which for sake of clarity is quoted herein below:- “Though the learned counsel for the appellant has not raised the objection i.e. delay in disposal of his representation, since that was the only contention before the High Court, we intend to deal with the same. We have already stated that the detention order was passed on 22.09.2010 by the Commissioner of Police, Bangalore City. The said order was approved by the Government on 30.09.2010 and the case was sent to the Advisory Board on 08.10.2010 and the Board sat on 10.11.2010. Confirmation detaining the detenu for a period of 12 months was issued on 16.11.2010. Representation of the detenu through the Central Prison was sent on 06.10.2010 i.e. before passing of the confirmation order by the Government. This Court in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi V. Union of India has clearly held that the authority has no constitutional duty to consider the representation made by the detenu before the order of the confirmation of the detention order. There is no constitutional mandate under clause (5) of Article 22, much less any statutory requirement to consider the representation before confirming the order of detention. There is no constitutional mandate under clause (5) of Article 22, much less any statutory requirement to consider the representation before confirming the order of detention. In other words, the competent authority can consider the representation only after the order of confirmation and as such, the contention raised by the appellant as if there was delay in consideration, is baseless and liable to be rejected.” 28. Moreover, from the aforesaid quoted portion it is also clear that their Lordships had actually placed reliance on the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) and the Constitution Bench in the aforesaid judgment itself had clarified this aspect that there can be two stages for filing of the representation, one by the detenu before the matter is referred to the Advisory Board and the other when the representation is filed after the matter has been referred to the Advisory Board. The constitution bench of Apex Court in that regard having considered the law laid down in the earlier case of Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of W.B., reported in (1970)1 SCC 219 , had held that: “11. It is now beyond the pale of controversy that the constitutional right to make representation under Clause (5) of Article 22 by necessary implication guarantees the constitutional right to a proper consideration of the representation. Secondly, the obligation of the government to afford to the detenu an opportunity to make representation and to consider such representation is distinct from the governments obligation to refer the case of detenu along with the representation to the Advisory Board to enable it to form its opinion and send a report to the government. It is implicit in Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22 that the government while discharging its duty to consider the representation, cannot depend upon the views of the Board on such representation. It has to consider the representation on its own without being influenced by any such view of the Board. The obligation of the government to consider the representation is different from the obligation of the Board to consider the representation at the time of hearing the references. The government considers the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in conformity with the power under the law. The obligation of the government to consider the representation is different from the obligation of the Board to consider the representation at the time of hearing the references. The government considers the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in conformity with the power under the law. The Board on the other hand, considers the representation and the case of detenu to examine whether there is sufficient case for detention. The consideration by the Board is an additional safeguard and not a substitute for consideration of the representation by the government. The right to have the representation considered by the government is safeguarded by Clause (5) of Article 22 and it is independent of the consideration of the detenu’s case and his representation by the Advisory Board under Clause (4) of Article 22 read with section 8(c) of the Act.” 29. The constitution bench thus having held so in the case of K.M Abdullah Kunhi (supra) had also specifically addressed to the cases of representation which were filed before the matter was referred to the Advisory Board and in this regard it was observed as follows: “20. It is necessary to mention that with regard to liberty of citizens the court stands guard over the facts and requirements of law, but court cannot draw presumption against any authority without material. It may be borne in mind that the confirmation of detention does not preclude the government from revoking the order of detention upon considering the representation. Secondly, there may be cases where the government has to consider the representation only after confirmation of detention. Clause (5) of Article 22 suggests that the representation could be received even after confirmation of the order of detention. The words “shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order” in Clause (5) of Article 22 suggest that the obligation of the government is to offer the detenu an opportunity of making a representation against the order, before it is confirmed according to the procedure laid down under section 8 of the Act. But if the detenu does not exercise his right to make representation at that stage, but presents it to the government after the government has confirmed the order of detention, the government still has to consider such representation and release the detenu if the detention is not within the power conferred under the statute. But if the detenu does not exercise his right to make representation at that stage, but presents it to the government after the government has confirmed the order of detention, the government still has to consider such representation and release the detenu if the detention is not within the power conferred under the statute. The confirmation of the order of detention is not conclusive as against the detenu. … … …” (underlining by us for emphasis) 30. It would thus be clear that in the present case when the order of detention was passed on 10.11.2011 by the District Magistrate in exercise of power under section 12(1) of the Act and the petitioner had filed his representation on 14.11.2011 whereafter the State Government had approved the order of detention of the petitioner in terms of section 12(3) of the Act on 21.11.2011 and had rejected the representation of the petitioner on 3.12.2011 much before the case of the petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board on 20.12.2011 and the Government had confirmed the order of detention on 4.1.2012, a plea could not have been raised by the learned counsel for the State that the petitioner had no right for getting his representation disposed of prior to confirmation of the order of his detention passed on 4.1.2012. Not only that the law in this regard in very clear term has been settled by the Constitution Bench in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) also followed by the Apex Court in the case of D.M. Nagaraja (supra) but even otherwise the Government will be estopped by its own conduct, inasmuch as the representation of the petitioner having been filed on 14.11.2011 the State Government itself had called for the comments from the D.M., Rohtas on 17.11.2011 and having sent two reminders on 24.11.2011 and 25.11.2011 for ensuring expeditious disposal of the representation had ultimately disposed of the representation of the petitioner on 3.12.2011, much before confirmation of detention order by the State Government passed on 4.1.2012. 31. By-now it is also well settled that the question of delay in disposal of the representation has to be always examined and viewed by the Courts on the specific facts of a case. 31. By-now it is also well settled that the question of delay in disposal of the representation has to be always examined and viewed by the Courts on the specific facts of a case. The procedure given for protection of personal liberty has to be strictly followed though no time limit has been fixed for consideration of the representation made by a detenu under the Act but in view of the expression “as soon as may be” under section 17 of the Act, nothing is left for speculation that the representation should be very expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency and without any avoidable delay. As noted above, the S.P., Rohtas had time for everything else in the world in between 18.11.2011 to 24.11.2011 before sending his comments to the D.M., Rohtas on 25.11.2011. Thus, even if we ignore the delay of two days caused at the level of the State Government, no plausible explanation is available on record for time consumed in between 18.11.2011 to 24.11.2011, which was caused due to clear negligence, callous inaction and avoidable redtapism on the part of the S.P., Rohtas. 32. The reliance placed by Mr. S.D. Sanjay, learned AAG12, on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sri Ram Sukrya Mhatre vs. R.D. Tyagi & ors., reported in AIR 1994 S.C. 1134 , is also misplaced, inasmuch as in that case the records were produced to show that the representation filed was dealt with utmost expedition. In this case no such records have been produced and the affidavit of the S.P., Rohtas, as noted above, remains curiously silent on this aspect. 33. As a matter of fact the effect of unexplained delay in disposal of a representation under the Act was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mani Roy @ Maniya vs. the State of Bihar & ors., reported in 2006(2) PLJR 301, wherein this Court had quashed the order of detention after having found that there was unexplained delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu filed on 5.5.2005 which was rejected on 23.5.2005. This Court again in the case of Pintu Singh @ Daroga Singh vs. the State of Bihar & ors., reported in 2003(3) PLJR 218 , while quashing the order of detention under the Act had held the delay in disposal of the representation dated 24.6.2002 by the State Government on 22.8.2002 was wholly unreasonable and lacking any proper explanation. 34. The case of Rama Shankar Yadav vs. the State of Bihar & ors., reported in 2003(3) PLJR 163 on which reliance was placed by learned AAG-12 is altogether distinguishable on facts inasmuch as the representation filed by the petitioner in that case on 18.9.2002 was received in the Home Department on 23.9.2002 and the comments called from the District Magistrate, Gopalganj on 27.9.2002 were also sent with due dispatch by the District Magistrate on 27.9.2002, whereafter the representation was rejected on 9.10.2002. The Division Bench having regard to the aforesaid facts had held that it was not a case where the respondents had sat over the representation and the file containing the representation of the petitioner had kept moving from one office table to another and if any delay occurred it was in course of transit. As noted above, in the present case the delay did not occur in transit rather the S.P., Rohtas happily sat over the matter from 18.11.2011 to 25.11.2011 on the ground that he was busy otherwise in his official duties relating to visit of Chief Minister, and crime meeting etc. which cannot be equated with movement of the file containing the representation of the petitioner. 35. Similarly, the reliance placed on another Division Bench judgment in the case of Satyendra Dikshit vs. The State of Bihar & ors., reported in 2003(3) PLJR 795 , seems to be wholly misplaced, inasmuch as in that case the representation was filed on 23.9.2002 which was received in the Department on 25.9.2002 and when the District Magistrate was asked to send his comments by a letter of the State Government dated 25.9.2002 the comments were sent by the D.M. on 1.10.2002 which was received in the department on 4.10.2002 and ultimately the representation was rejected on 9.10.2002. It has to be noted that though the Division Bench had in that case held that if the District Magistrate thought it proper to seek comments of the Superintendent of Police on the representation filed by the petitioner, this Court could not question the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in this regard but what had made the Division Bench to approve the order of detention and reject the plea of delay in disposal of the representation was that when the District Magistrate had sent the representation of the petitioner for comments to the Superintendent of Police on 26.9.2002 such comments were sent by the S.P. on 29.9.2002. That however is not the position in this case and thus the view taken by the Court in the case of Satyendra Dikshit is clearly distinguishable on facts. 36. Thus, as noted above, it is the facts of each case which will have the bearing on the issue of delay in disposal of the representation as was also held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Golden Yadav @ Ajay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & ors., reported in 2007(2) PLJR 751 wherein their Lordships having relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rajammal vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 685, and an earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Umesh Singh vs. the State of Bihar, reported in 2002(1) PLJR 419 , and after noticing the facts of the case of Golden Yadav (supra) that the representation filed by the petitioner in that case on 31.7.2006 was rejected by the State Government on 17.8.2006, while quashing the order of such detention on the ground of unexplained delay in disposal of the representation had held as follows:- “11. Delay in disposal of the representation goes to the root of the case and it vitiates the detention in view of the mandates of the Act. The representation, if filed, by a detenu must be disposed of with all promptitude and in case certain delays are caused that should be satisfactorily explained.” 37. Delay in disposal of the representation goes to the root of the case and it vitiates the detention in view of the mandates of the Act. The representation, if filed, by a detenu must be disposed of with all promptitude and in case certain delays are caused that should be satisfactorily explained.” 37. To that extent reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on a recent judgment of Apex Court in the case of Ummu Sabeena (supra) seems to be apt and appropriate wherein it was held that such unexplained delay in disposal of the representation voids the continued detention of the detenus and the law in this regard was laid down in the following words:- "Going by the aforesaid precedents, as we must, we hold that the procedural safeguards given for protection of personal liberty must be strictly followed. The history of personal liberty, as is well known, is a history of insistence on procedural safeguards. Following the said principle, we find that delay in these cases is for a much longer period and there is hardly any explanation. We, therefore, have no hesitation in quashing the orders of detention on the ground of delay on the part of the Central Government in disposing of the representation of the detenus." 38. Thus, having given anxious consideration to the facts of this case, we are of the view that the impugned order of detention of the petitioner cannot be sustained only on the ground of unexplained delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu petitioner. 39. In the result, this application is allowed and the impugned order of detention of the petitioner dated 10.11.2011 as also its confirmation by the State Government by an order dated 4.1.2012, as contained in Annexure 6, is hereby quashed and the petitioner is directed to be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in any other case.