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2012 DIGILAW 1258 (ALL)

GOPAL DASS v. BAL KISHAN DASS

2012-05-25

ASHOK BHUSHAN, PRAKASH KRISHNA

body2012
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—On a reference having been made by a learned Single Judge, who entertained doubts about the correctness of an earlier decision of the Court in Sheo Prakash Chandra Mehta v. IIIrd ADJ, 2008(3) ARC 841 , to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for consideration of the following question by a Full Bench, the office in pursuance of the order passed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice has placed the matter before us, for its adjudication : “Whether the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 applies to a case where under the agreement, tenant voluntarily vacates the tenanted accommodation for demolition and new construction and after demolition and new construction, new constructed premises is let out to the tenant.” 2. The relevant facts in this regard may be noticed in brief. The facts are few and not much in dispute. 3. It is an accepted position before us that Gopal Das (hereinafter referred to as tenant) was a tenant of an old shop belonging to Bal Krishan (hereinafter described as landlord. These two parties on 17th September, 1998 entered into a compromise, outside the Court. The tenant agreed to vacate the then existing shop which was under his possession and the landlord agreed to let out him a front shop in the market, which was then under construction, after the completion of the construction. 4. It is common case of the parties that the landlord in pursuance of the above compromise in the month of December, 1998 did deliver the possession of the newly constructed shop which was occupied by the tenant. 5. There was absolutely no dispute between the parties for a period of about ten years. 6. The dispute arose when the tenant failed to pay the rent regularly. The landlord gave a notice dated 12.1.2009 demanding the arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy. Ultimately, the SCC Suit No. 34 of 2009 was filed by the landlord for recovery of arrears of rent, damages and eviction alleging that the tenancy has been terminated by serving a notice dated 12.1.2009 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as the tenant failed to pay the rent. It was further pleaded that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to tenanted shop as it is a new construction. It was further pleaded that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to tenanted shop as it is a new construction. The construction was raised after getting the map sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority on 20.2.1996 and it was let out for the first time to the defendant tenant on 23.1.1999. Section 2(2) of the Act grants exemption to “new construction” for a period of ten years (now it has been increased to forty years). 7. In defence, the tenant raised various pleas with which we are presently not concerned except the one that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the given facts are applicable. He, in substance, pleaded that he being an old tenant, the old tenancy continues and the disputed shop would be governed by the Act No. 13 of 1972, in view of Section 24(2) thereof. 8. The trial Court framed two issues and one of them was whether the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable or not. The case of the defendant tenant was that notwithstanding the fact that the new construction was raised as alleged by the landlord even then the shop in question shall be governed by the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in view of the compromise referred to above entered into between the parties. In substance, the contention of the tenant was that the old tenancy continues even though the old shop was demolished and he has been shifted to a newly constructed shop. 9. The said plea has been negatived by the trial judge and it has been held by him under issue No. 3 that there is no continuance of the old tenancy and in view of the fact, which is no longer in dispute between the parties, the shop/super structure let out to the defendant tenant is a new construction within the meaning of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 therefore the building will enjoy the exemption (holiday) for a period of ten years. The suit having been decreed by the judgment and decree dated 28.2.2011, the above revision has been preferred by the defendant tenant, and the matter came up for admission before a learned Single Judge. 10. The suit having been decreed by the judgment and decree dated 28.2.2011, the above revision has been preferred by the defendant tenant, and the matter came up for admission before a learned Single Judge. 10. Reliance was placed on the judgment given in the case of Shri Prakash Chandra Mehta (supra) by the tenant in support of his plea that the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would be applicable to a “new construction” notwithstanding; the old tenancy continued. Per contra, it was argued on behalf of the landlord that in view of Section 2(2) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the building in question is a building exempted from the operation of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Neither the provisions to Section 24(2) nor the principles underlying therein would be attracted on the plain language of Section 2(2) of the Act. 11. After noticing the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, as indicated herein above, reference was made by the learned Single Judge for decision of the question already reproduced above, to a larger bench. That is how the matter is before us. 12. Sri Madho Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant submits that there has been no termination of old tenancy at any point of time and under the compromise, the tenant was provided an alternative accommodation as a make shift arrangement for the time being and after completion of market the shop in dispute was given to him. Submission is that the old tenancy continues and as such the tenant being a statutory tenant is entitled to protect his statutory tenancy by invoking the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Elaborating the argument, he submits that it is evident from the compromise that the building which was in his tenancy earlier was in a dilapidated condition. The proceeding for getting it repaired was pending before the Prescribed Authority. Good sense prevailed upon the landlord and tenant entered into compromise to shorten the litigation. Under Section 21(1) (b) of the Act, it is provided that a landlord may obtain release of a building which is in dilapidated condition for its reconstruction subject to fulfilment of the conditions specified therein. Good sense prevailed upon the landlord and tenant entered into compromise to shorten the litigation. Under Section 21(1) (b) of the Act, it is provided that a landlord may obtain release of a building which is in dilapidated condition for its reconstruction subject to fulfilment of the conditions specified therein. Section 24(2) gives option to the tenant if such a release order is passed, the tenant would be entitled to get the newly constructed building and such tenant would be statutory tenant. The same principle as mentioned in Section 24(2) will also be applicable in a case where there is a compromise. Here the fact is—the parties settled the terms outside the Court and this would not put the tenant in a disadvantageous position. To buttress his argument, aid from Section 89 (c) of CPC was sought for. 13. Refuting the above, Sri K.K. Arora, learned counsel for the landlord, on the other hand, submitted that in view of plain language of Section 2(2) of the Act, there is little scope for the tenant to say anything otherwise. The rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the terms of the compromise. There being no such term that the old tenancy will continue to exist, the old tenancy of the tenant came to end as soon as the super structure was demolished. The tenant cannot be permitted to add any thing further, which is not there in the compromise. The parties are bound by the compromise. To put it differently, the submission of the landlord is that the tenancy of the tenant is a “new tenancy” which came into existence with occupation of the shop in question (new shop). 14. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. What is the true import of the compromise and its effect, if any, on the Section 2(2) of the Act is the crux of the matter. The other question would be whether the provision of Section 24(2) could be imported in the compromise, entered into without intervention of any Rent Authority or Court. 15. A brief survey of the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would be helpful in addressing the issues involved. The other question would be whether the provision of Section 24(2) could be imported in the compromise, entered into without intervention of any Rent Authority or Court. 15. A brief survey of the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would be helpful in addressing the issues involved. The said Act has been enacted in the interest of general public for regulation of letting, rent and eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situate in urban areas and for the matters connected therein. It is divided into seven chapters. It is a self contained code as it contains provisions regarding the regulation of rent, of letting, of eviction, other rights and obligations of landlord and tenant, penalties and procedure and miscellaneous and transitional provisions. As usual, Section 1 thereof provides that the Act extends to whole of the U.P. and it shall apply to every city, as defined in Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, every municipality as defined in the United Provinces Municipalities Act and every notified area constituted under the United Provinces Town Areas Act. Further, the State Government has been empowered in the interest of general public to extend the operation of the Act in any other local area by issuing notification in the Gazette. Its Section 2 contains the provisions granting exemption to certain buildings mentioned therein from the operation of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 provides that except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. The said sub-section was referred by both the counsel for the parties and it would be appropriate to reproduce its material parts for present purpose. 2. The said sub-section was referred by both the counsel for the parties and it would be appropriate to reproduce its material parts for present purpose. 2. Exemption from operation of Act.—(1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to 1[the following, namely] :- 2[(a) any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation 3[or a Cantonment Board] is the landlord; or] (b) any building belonging to or vested in a recognised educational institution, [* * *];4 or 5[(bb) any building belonging to or vested in a public charitable or public religious institution; (bbb) any building belonging to or vested in a waqf including a waqf-alal-aulad;] (c) any building used or intended to be used as a factory within the meaning of the Factories Act, 1948 (Act No. LXIII of 1948) where the plant of such factory is leased out alongwith the building; or (d) any building used or intended to be used for any other industrial purpose (that is to say, for the purpose of manufacture, preservation or processing of any goods) or as a cinema or theatre, where the plant and apparatus installed for such purpose in the building is leased out alongwith the building : Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply in relation to any shop or other building, situated within the precincts of the cinema or theatre, the tenancy in respect of which has been created separately from the tenancy in respect of the cinema or theatre; or (e) any building used or intended to be used as a place of public entertainment or amusement (including any sports stadium, but not including a cinema or theatre), or any building appurtenant thereto; or (f) any building built and held by 6[* * *] a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Act No. XXI of 1860) or by a co-operative society, company or firm and intended solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers or servants, whether on rent or free of rent or as a guest house, by whatever name called, for the occupation of persons having dealing with it in the ordinary course of business; 7(g) any building, whose monthly rent exceeds two thousand rupees; (h) any building of which a Mission of a foreign country or any international agency is the tenant.] 2(2) 8[Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed] : XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XXX XX XX XX XX XX XX Explanation 1.— (a) ................................................... (b) “construction" includes any new construction in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished; (c) where such substantial addition is made to an existing building that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition. 16. On a reading of Section 2 of the Act which deals with exemption from the operation of the Act, it would show that the exemption from the operation of Act is granted to a building and to the relationship of landlord and tenant. In this regard, reference can be made to a judgment of the Apex Court under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, Parwati Bai v. Radhika, JT 2003 (5) SC 34. It has been held that exemption is not conferred on the relationship of landlord and tenant but on the premises itself making it immune from the operation of the Act. In this case, the Apex Court has noticed its earlier decision given in the case of Bhatia Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. D.C. Patel, 1953 SCR 185 . The relevant paragraphs-4 and 5 of are reproduced below : 4. “Section 3(1) of the Act provides as under : “Section 3. Act not to apply to certain accommodation.—(1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to- (a) accommodation which is the property of the Government [Central Govt. or any State Govt.] (b) accommodation which is the property of a local authority used exclusively for non-residential purposes.” 5. It is well settled by a decision of this Court in Bhatia Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. D.C. Patel, 1953 (4) SCR 185, wherein pari materia provisions contained in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 came up for consideration of this Court. It was held that the exemption is not conferred on the relationship of landlord and tenant but on the premises itself making it immune from the operation of the Act. It was held that the exemption is not conferred on the relationship of landlord and tenant but on the premises itself making it immune from the operation of the Act. In identical facts, as the present case is, the decision of this Court was followed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Radhevlal Somsingh v. Ratansingh Kishansingh, 1977 MPLJ 335 and it was held that the immunity from operation of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is in respect of the premises and not with respect to the parties. If a tenant in municipal premises lets out the premises to another, a suit by the tenant for ejectment of his tenant and arrears of rent would not be governed by the Act as the premises are exempt under Section 3 (1)(b) of Act though the suit is not between the municipality as landlord and against its tenant. We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Radheylal’s case. It is unfortunate that this decision binding in the State of Madhya Pradesh was not taken note of by the Courts below as also by the High Court.” Noticeably, Section 2 of the Act is also similarly worded. Sub-section (1) of Section 2 consists of clauses (a) to (h). All these clauses open with the words “any building...............” Similarly, its sub-section (2) which grants exemption to a building during the period of ten year (now it is forty years) from the date on which the construction completes. The irresistible conclusion which can be drawn is that the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 also grants exemption to the building from the operation of the Act and not to the relationship of landlord and tenant. The exemption is to building specific. There being so, the argument of the tenant that the old tenancy continues is meritless, as soon as the tenanted building falls to earth, the tenancy comes to an end. 17. In Vannattankandy Ibrayi v. Kunhabdulla Hajee, 2001 (1) ARC 325, the Apex Court has examined the matter in depth with regard to a tenanted shop destroyed by accidental fire. The contention of the tenant that he continued to be tenant of the land which was beneath the destroyed shop was repelled by holding that it was the shop which was let out to the tenant. The contention of the tenant that he continued to be tenant of the land which was beneath the destroyed shop was repelled by holding that it was the shop which was let out to the tenant. As soon as the shop is destroyed by accidental fire, the tenant ceases to occupy the said shop. No super structure exists and therefore, relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceases to exist. In this case, the Apex Court has considered a judgment of Lord Denning of England, Woodfall’s Law of Landlord and Tenant 28th Ediction, Vol. (1) as also Article 592 of American Jurisprudence and other treaties. It also noticed the divergent views on this point of various High Courts and it distinguished the judgment given by the Lord Denning by pointing out a difference where letting is in respect of land and building and a building alone. In the case of a building alone, as soon as the building is destroyed by any means (except by the landlord where a different position may occur), there would not subsist tenancy where property is not in existence. The plea that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act will be applicable was repelled on the ground that if a building is governed by State Rent Act, the provisions of Transfer of Property Act cannot be invoked. The relevant portion is quoted below : “The tenancy of the shop, which was let out, was a super structure and what is protected by the State Rent Act is the occupation of the tenant in the super structure. If the argument of appellants counsel is accepted then it would mean that although the tenant on the destruction of the shop cannot put up a new structure on the old site still he would continue to squat on the vacant land. Under such situation it is difficult to hold that the tenancy is not extinguished on the total destruction of the premises governed by the State Rent Act. Under English Law in a contractual tenancy in respect of building and land the liability to pay the rent by the tenant to the landlord continues even on the destruction of the building whereas there is no liability of the tenant to pay rent to the landlord on the destruction of the premises governed by the State Rent Act. Under English Law in a contractual tenancy in respect of building and land the liability to pay the rent by the tenant to the landlord continues even on the destruction of the building whereas there is no liability of the tenant to pay rent to the landlord on the destruction of the premises governed by the State Rent Act. Therefore, the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra) does not lay down the correct view of law. This Court on number of times has held that any special leave petition dismissed by this Court without giving a reason has no binding force on its subsequent decisions. Therefore, the two aforesaid cases relied on by counsel for the appellant are of no assistance to the argument advanced by him.” It follows that rent control legislation relating to building, protects the accommodation and as soon as the accommodation i.e. super structure is demolished, the tenancy extinguishes. In para 24 of the report a note of caution has been added that a situation would be different where a landlord himself pulls down a building governed by State Rent Act. In such situation the provisions as contained in the State Rent Act would be immediately attracted and the Rent Control Court would be free to pass appropriate order, for re-construction In the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 there is no such provision like Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act which may empower any Court or authority to direct the landlord to construct the building demolished by him. Except that, it is not necessary for us to dwell upon this point any further in this regard in the present case. Here is a case where a new shop has already been constructed by the landlord as per the terms of compromise without intervention of Court and the tenant put into possession, therefore, any such direction is not called for. 18. Now, we are required to consider the ambit and scope of Section 24(2) of the Act, together with a its applicability to the facts and circumstances of the case. 19. Section 24 is in Chapter IV relating to “Regulation and Eviction”. This chapter as its heading shows deals with the eviction of tenant. Section 20 specifies the grounds for an eviction suit against a tenant. 19. Section 24 is in Chapter IV relating to “Regulation and Eviction”. This chapter as its heading shows deals with the eviction of tenant. Section 20 specifies the grounds for an eviction suit against a tenant. Section 21 deals with the release proceedings for release of a building under occupation of a tenant. Broadly speaking, release of a tenanted building can be sought on two grounds namely, (1) bona fide need of the landlord under Section 21(1) (a), and (2) where the tenanted building is in dilapidated condition under Section 21(1) (b). Tenant thus evicted from the building as consequence of its release under Section 21, has been given option of re-entry under specified circumstances. The idea of granting such right to outgoing tenant is to see that the release order is not abused by an unscrupulous landlord who fails to occupy it after release. The applicability of Section 24(2) is in issue. Section 24 is reproduced below : 24. The idea of granting such right to outgoing tenant is to see that the release order is not abused by an unscrupulous landlord who fails to occupy it after release. The applicability of Section 24(2) is in issue. Section 24 is reproduced below : 24. Option of re-entry by tenant.—(1) Where a building is released in favour of the landlord and the tenant is evicted under Section 21 or on appeal under Section 22, and the landlord either puts or causes to be put into occupation thereof any person different from the person for whose occupation according to the landlord’s representation, the building was required, or permits any such person to occupy it, or otherwise puts it to any use other than the one for which it was released, or as the case may be, omits to occupy it within one month of such extended period as the Prescribed Authority may for sufficient cause allow from the date of his obtaining possession or, in the case a building which was proposed to be occupied after some construction or reconstruction, from the date of completion thereof, or in the case of a building which was proposed to be demolished, omits to demolish it within two months or such extended period as the Prescribed Authority may for sufficient cause allow from the date of his obtaining possession, then the Prescribed Authority or, as the case may be, the District Judge, may, on an application in that behalf within three months from the date of such act or omission, order the landlord to place the evicted tenant in occupation of the building on the original terms and conditions, and on such order being made, the landlord and any person who may be in occupation thereof shall give vacant possession of the building to the said tenant, failing which, the Prescribed Authority shall put him into possession and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. (2) Where the landlord after obtaining a release order under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 demolishes a building and constructs a new building or buildings on its site, then the District Magistrate may, on an application being made in that behalf by the original tenant within such time as may be prescribed, allot to him the new building or such one of them as the District Magistrate after considering his requirements thinks fit, and thereupon that tenant shall be liable to pay as rent for such building an amount equivalent to one per cent per month of the cost of construction thereof (including the cost of demolition of the old building but not including the value of the land) and the building shall, subject to the tenant’s liability to pay rent as aforesaid, be subject to the provisions of this Act, and where the tenant makes no such application or refuses or fails to take that building on lease within the time allowed by the District Magistrate, or subsequently ceases to occupy it or otherwise vacates it, that building shall also be exempt from the operation of this Act for the period or the remaining period, as the case may be, specified in sub-section (2) of Section 2. 20. Its sub-section (2) was referred during the course of argument. On an analysis of sub-section (2) of Section 24, it is clear that for its applicability the following requirements are to be fulfilled : There should be a release order under sub-section (1) (b) of Section 21 in favour of the landlord; The said release order should authorise to demolish a building and construct a new building or buildings; The new building should be constructed on the site of the old building; The District Magistrate on an application moved by the original tenant within the time as has been prescribed allot him the new building; and The tenant shall be liable to pay the rent of the such building as per the formula provided therein. 21. On the fulfilment of the conditions specified in sub-section (2) of Section 24 cumulatively, the building shall be subject to the provisions of the Act qua such tenant against whom the release order was passed. 21. On the fulfilment of the conditions specified in sub-section (2) of Section 24 cumulatively, the building shall be subject to the provisions of the Act qua such tenant against whom the release order was passed. It further provides that if such tenant fails to exercise the operation of re-entry or subsequently ceases to occupy the newly vacated building or otherwise vacates it the building shall be exempt from the operation of the Act. 22. Now, the next relevant section is 2(2) of the Act. It exempts from the operation of the Act, such new buildings for a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is complete, except for certain provisions specified therein. It is not in dispute that sub-section (2) of Section 24 applies in its letter. However, it was submitted that its spirit is applicable. 23. A plain reading of sub-section (2) of Section 2 would show that except in the following cases, the Act shall not apply to a building during the period of ten years from the date on which its construction has completed. They are — (1) as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, (2) sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, (3) sub-section (2) of Section 24, (4) Section 24-A, (5) Section 24-B, (6) Section 24-C and (7) sub-section (3) of Section 29. 24. It is not the case of the tenant that his case falls in any of the aforesaid exceptions except sub-section (2) of Section 24. Section 24 provides the operation of re-entry by tenant under the circumstances specified therein. 25. The Scheme of the sub-section (2) of Section 24 is crystal clear. It extends the benefit of the old tenancy to such tenancy which is subject to a release order obtained by a landlord on the ground that the building is in a dilapidated condition and requires demolition and reconstruction. Legislators were conscious about the fact that as soon as a building is demolished, the tenancy of a building comes to an end. They have taken conscious decision to protect a specified class of tenants who has to vacate the building on the ground that it is in a dilapidated condition and requires demolition and reconstruction. Legislators were conscious about the fact that as soon as a building is demolished, the tenancy of a building comes to an end. They have taken conscious decision to protect a specified class of tenants who has to vacate the building on the ground that it is in a dilapidated condition and requires demolition and reconstruction. The said benefit has been provided to a limited class of tenants and it cannot be extended, on the plain language of Section 2(2) of the Act, to such tenants who fall outside the specified class. Any other interpretation given to Section 2(2) and Section 24(2) of the Act would be violative of the principles relating to interpretation which provides that where the language is plain and simple, the Court should not venture under the guise of interpretation to give a different colour and meaning to the plain language. When the words of Statute are clear, plain, unambiguous i.e. they are reasonably suggestible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences, as laid down by catena of decisions such as Nelson Motis v. Union of India and others, AIR 1992 SC 1981 at page 1984, Gurudevdatta Vksss Maryadit and others v. State Of Maharashtra and others, AIR 2001 SC 1980 at Page 1991, State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, AIR 2005 SC 294 , page 296, Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, AIR 2005 SC 648 etc.. 26. The language of sub-section (2) of Section 2 makes it crystal clear that only such buildings which are specified in the various provisions referred therein would not be covered by the operation of the Act. This being not the case of the tenant that a release order was obtained against him under Section 21(1) (b) or the demolition or reconstruction took place in pursuance of such release order, we see no reason to hold the applicability of sub-section (2) of Section 24 in the facts of the case. If the tenant’s contention is accepted, it would be doing violence to the plain language of Section 2(2) and Section 24 of the Act. The main thrust of the tenant’s argument is that the principles underlying Section 24 (2) would be applicable cannot be accepted. The tenant vacated the earlier shop voluntarily under a compromise. At the best the rights of the parties shall flow from the said compromise. The main thrust of the tenant’s argument is that the principles underlying Section 24 (2) would be applicable cannot be accepted. The tenant vacated the earlier shop voluntarily under a compromise. At the best the rights of the parties shall flow from the said compromise. There is no indication in the said compromise that the new shop would still be governed by the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 notwithstanding the fact that the shop in question is a new construction exempt from the operation of the Act under Section 2(2) thereof. 27. It is useful to notice one judgement of the Apex Court namely Lal Chand and another v. District Judge, Agra, 1999 (2) ARC 678, under the very Act with which we are concerned and also relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties. Facts of the case are similar. The tenant vacated one room in his occupation voluntarily upon an understanding that he would be put back into possession after reconstruction. The tenant was again inducted into possession as tenant. The landlord contended that he would get exemption period of ten years granted under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 to a new construction (room). While the tenant contended that he would continue to be statutory tenant and the exemption period of ten years to such new construction would not be applicable. In this factual background, the Apex Court examined the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as also Section 20(4) and held that once the building stood demolished by an agreement, the statutory rights of the tenant came to end as there was no provision which provided for continuance of any rights of statutory tenancy, in a situation of voluntary surrender and full reconstruction of the premises. Its paragraph 14 which is relevant is reproduced below : “Under the new Act of 1972, Section 24(2) states that whenever a landlord obtains a building for demolition or reconstruction and follows a particular procedure for release, it will be open to the erstwhile statutory tenant to apply to the competent authority to allow him to re-occupy the premises newly constructed, with the same rights of statutory tenancy. But, there is no similar provision like Sub-clause (2) of Section 24 in the old Act. But, there is no similar provision like Sub-clause (2) of Section 24 in the old Act. Indeed, even as per the new Act, a case of an agreement entered into voluntarily for demolition and re-induction, does not fall under Section 24(2). The result is that once the building stood demolished before 1970 by an agreement, the statutory rights of the tenant came to an end as there was no provision of the old Act which provided for continuance of any rights of statutory tenancy, in a situation of voluntary surrender and full reconstruction of the premises. For the aforesaid reasons the judgment of the High Court as well as of the trial Court do not warrant any interference. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.” 28. The learned counsel for the tenant tries to distinguish it on the ground that in the case on hand, in the compromise it was mentioned that the building is in a dilapidated condition and the proceeding though not related to release proceedings under Section 21(1) (b), was pending before the Prescribed Authority. On a careful consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion that the distinction pointed out by him is no distinction. The material fact that the building was demolished completely and the tenant after reconstruction was permitted to occupy it remains there. 29. The argument of the tenant runs counter to the Scheme of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. In this regard, clauses (b) and (c) to Explanation 1 to Section 2(2) is of some assistance. A conjoint reading of the clauses (b) and (c) would show that a new construction includes building which has been raised in place of an existing building which has been wholly or partially demolished as also where a substantial addition has been made to an existing building and the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof, the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of said addition. It follows that if a major portion of a building is demolished and replaced by a “new construction”, the old existing construction which becomes minor part of the building would also be treated as new construction and existing part of the building would not exempt from the operation of the Act. If that is so, it does not follow to reason where a building has been completely demolished and replaced by a new building, why such building shall not be exempt from the operation of the Act. 30. We may also notice one decision of this Court relied upon by the landlord in Naseem Ahmed v. IV the ADJ, 2001 ARC 226 . 31. A contrary view appears to have been taken by another learned Single Judge in the case of Prakash Chand Mehta (supra). The following has been held therein, after reproducing Section 24(2) : “On the same principle, it is to be held that in case under agreement, tenant voluntarily vacates the tenanted accommodation for demolition and new construction and after demolition and new construction, newly constructed premises is let out to the tenant, the Act would continue to apply to the building in dispute. In the instant case, exactly the same thing has happened. In my opinion, inspite of altogether new construction, the Act continued to apply to the shop in dispute.” 32. It appears that the aforesaid observations have been made without assigning any reason. The attention of the Court was not invited towards the statutory provisions i.e. Section 2(2) of the Act. The binding precedent in the case of Naseem Ahmed (supra) as also of the Apex Court in the case of Lal Chand and another, were not placed before the Court. The learned Single Judge was bound by the earlier pronouncements of this Court and of Apex Court as well. It is, therefore, difficult for us to agree with the judgment delivered in the case of Shri Prakash Chand Mehta (supra). It is not a good law. The said case was decided more on equitable considerations than legal. 33. The learned Single Judge was bound by the earlier pronouncements of this Court and of Apex Court as well. It is, therefore, difficult for us to agree with the judgment delivered in the case of Shri Prakash Chand Mehta (supra). It is not a good law. The said case was decided more on equitable considerations than legal. 33. For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred to us by holding that the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 will not apply to new construction where under the agreement, a tenant voluntarily vacates the tenanted accommodation for demolition and new construction and after demolition and new construction, newly constructed premises is let out to the tenant. To put it differently, a new construction after demolition shall be exempt from the operation of provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as provided under Section 2(2) of the Act notwithstanding the fact that the tenant who was earlier in occupation of the existing building voluntarily agreed to vacate it and in lieu thereof the landlord agreed to let the new construction out to such tenant after reconstruction. 34. Let the file be placed before the appropriate Bench/learned Single Judge for passing appropriate orders in the matter with our aforesaid decision. ——————