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2012 DIGILAW 1262 (RAJ)

Man Singh v. Ladu Singh

2012-05-14

PRASHANT KUMAR AGARWAL

body2012
Hon'ble AGARWAL, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The defendant-appellant has preferred this civil second appeal under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.8.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No. 3, Ajmer Camp at Kishangarh in Civil Regular Appeal No. 9/2008 whereby the learned Appellate Court has upheld and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 23.1.2008 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kishangarh (District Ajmer) in Civil Suit No.61/1997 whereby the learned trial Court has decreed the suit for eviction filed by the plaintiff-respondent. 3. The brief relevant facts for the disposal of this appeal are that the respondent filed the suit for eviction with the averment that the suit premises which is in the form of a vacant land is bonafidely and reasonably required by him so that he can construct a house on it for the residence of himself and his family members. It was also averred by him that he has no other house for the residence of himself and his family members and he is residing in rented houses from time to time since the year 1991 and before that he with his family members was residing in a house owned by his brother Shri Bhomraj. It was also submitted that the vacant land already available to him is not sufficient to construct a residential house, which may satisfy his requirement. The appellant by filing written statement denied the need shown by the respondent and it was specifically averred by him that the vacant land, which is already in the possession of the respondent, previously was in the tenancy of the appellant, but the respondent got it vacated from him on the pretext that the same is required by him to construct a residential house on it, but the respondent has failed to use it for the construction of house and, therefore, the requirement shown by the respondent cannot be said to be bonafide and reasonable. It was further submitted that in fact the respondent intends to construct a commercial complex on the suit property after getting it vacated from the appellant. It was also submitted that both the sons of respondent are presently residing permanently at Mount Abu and they are doing their own business there and have also constructed their own houses there. It was further submitted that in fact the respondent intends to construct a commercial complex on the suit property after getting it vacated from the appellant. It was also submitted that both the sons of respondent are presently residing permanently at Mount Abu and they are doing their own business there and have also constructed their own houses there. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed necessary issues and after hearing both the parties and appreciating and evaluating the evidence available on record, it was held by the trial Court that the requirement shown by the respondent is bonafide and reasonable and if decree is not passed in favour of him greater hardship will be faced by him in comparison to the appellant as the appellant made no efforts to take another premises on rent or otherwise for his use and occupation. It was also found by the trial Court that looking to the need shown by the parties partial vacation is not possible. Consequently, the suit filed by the respondent was decreed. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal under Section 96 of CPC before the First Appellate Court and the same was dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 21.8.2010. Still dissatisfied the defendant-appellant is before this Court by way of this second appeal. 4. After hearing both the parties, the appeal was admitted for hearing vide order dated 7.9.2011 on the following substantial questions of law: "(i) Whether the findings rendered by the Courts below with regard to Issue Nos. 4, 5 & 6 are perverse being based on non-consideration of material admission specially? (ii) Whether the courts below applied correct test in determining the reasonable and bonafide necessity, comparative hardship and partial eviction? (iii) Whether the landlord has a blanket power for seeking an eviction in spite of the fact that he had in possession huge accommodation and premises and the findings rendered by the courts below are perverse?" 5. It is pertinent to note that alongwith the appeal the appellant filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for the production of additional evidence in the form of certified copy of a sale deed dated 26.6.2007 and another application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment in the written statement on the basis of some subsequent events said to be developed during the pendency of the suit itself. Therefore, these applications are also to be considered and decided alongwith this appeal. It is further pertinent to note that reply and counter affidavit have not been filed by the respondent to both of these applications. 6. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that during the pendency of suit the respondent purchased a constructed house situated in Shivaji Colony of Kishangarh in the name of his daughter-in-law Smt. Madhu in the year 2007 by means of registered sale deed dated 26.6.2007, the certified copy of which has been filed alongwith the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and since then he and his wife are residing in this house and this fact being a subsequent event directly affecting the need shown by the respondent needs to be considered to adjudge the bonafide of the requirement shown. It was also submitted that although the respondent is residing in the purchased house since the year 2007, but it was not in the knowledge of the appellant in what capacity the respondent is residing in this house and it is only after the disposal of first appeal, the appellant could get the copy of the sale deed and it came into his knowledge that the house in which the respondent is presently residing was purchased by him in the name of his daughter-in-law and, therefore, the copy of the sale deed could not be produced by him during the pendency of the suit or the first appeal. It was further submitted that it is well settled legal position that in a eviction suit based on the ground of bonafide and reasonable necessity of the landlord, the requirement and need must continue to exist till the disposal of the litigation by the final Court and if during the pendency of the same, it is found by the Court that due to change of circumstances, the requirement of the landlord has come to an end, the Court can refuse to pass decree for eviction although the landlord was able to prove his requirement at the commencement of the litigation. It was submitted that the sale deed which has been submitted alongwith the application needs to be considered by this Court to determine the bonafide and reasonability of the requirement shown by the respondent and more particularly in the light of the fact the respondent has failed to controvert the facts mentioned in the application and the sale deed filed alongwith it. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that necessary amendment is also required to be made in the written statement so that necessary pleadings regarding the purchase of residential house by the respondent can be taken in it and the Court can properly consider them. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that even according to the appellant himself the respondent alongwith his wife is residing in a house said to be purchased by him in the name of his daughter-in-law since 2007, but even then no steps were taken by him during the pendency of the suit or the first appeal to produce the copy of the sale deed and, therefore, he cannot be allowed to produce the same in this second appeal. It was further submitted that a suit for eviction based on bonafide and reasonable requirement shown by the landlord has to be decided by the Court on the basis of need shown on the date of the suit and the subsequent events can be considered only when it is found by the Court that the need shown by the landlord has completely been satisfied by some other means, but in the present case merely by purchase of a residential house by daughter-in-law of the respondent, it cannot be said that need shown by the respondent has been completely satisfied and the need shown by him for the suit premises has come to an end. It was further submitted that so far as amendment in the written statement is concerned, in the light of proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, no such amendment can be allowed at this stage of the proceedings. 8. It was further submitted that so far as amendment in the written statement is concerned, in the light of proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, no such amendment can be allowed at this stage of the proceedings. 8. On consideration of submissions made on behalf of the parties and also going through the record made available for my perusal as well as the relevant legal provisions and the case law, I am of the view that the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for production of additional evidence in the form of certified copy of the sale deed dated 26.4.2007 is required to be allowed and the copy of the sale deed be taken on record and it will be considered for disposal of this appeal. So far as the amendment in the written statement is concerned, I am of the view that amendment is not required to be made in the written statement, but the facts stated in the application to the extent that a residential house has been purchased by daughter-in-law of the respondent and since the year 2007, the respondent and his wife are residing in this house shall also be considered for the disposal of this appeal. Therefore, both the applications filed by the appellant are disposed of in the manner stated above. 9. So far as the merit of the case is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and decree on the following grounds: (I) From the evidence available on record and the admissions made by the respondent himself, it is clear that after the institution of the suit both the sons of the respondent alongwith their family members permanently shifted to Mount Abu and they are doing their respective business there and have also constructed residential houses, therefore, the need shown by the respondent for construction of a residential house for the use and occupation of his sons and their family members has come to an end and at the most it can be said that the respondent requires a residential house for himself and his wife. It is also an admitted fact that both the daughters of respondent are now married and they are living in their respective matrimonial homes and, therefore, the need shown by the respondent for the residence of his daughters also no more subsits. It is also an admitted fact that both the daughters of respondent are now married and they are living in their respective matrimonial homes and, therefore, the need shown by the respondent for the residence of his daughters also no more subsits. (II) The certified copy of the sale deed dated 26.6.2007 shows that a residential house consisting of three rooms; one hall, kitchen, lobby, latrine, bathroom etc. has been purchased in the name of one of the daughter-in-law of respondent Smt. Madhu W/o Padam Kumar Jain and since the time of purchase, respondent and his wife are residing in this house and it cannot be said that it is not sufficient and suitable for the requirement shown by the respondent more particularly, in the light of the fact that both the sons of respondent alongwith their family members are permanently residing at Mount Abu and at the most it can be said that they occasionally come to Kishangarh to reside with their parents. Thus, the requirement shown by the landlord for the suit premises has completely satisfied. (III) In his cross-examination the respondent has admitted that the requirement for construction of a residential house shown by him can be satisfied by constructing one story house on the vacant land already available to him, but he could not construct same because he does not have sufficient funds for it. According to the learned counsel this admission of the respondent is a clear indication of the fact that the alternative accommodation already available with him in the form of vacant land, which is adjacent to the suit premises, is suitable and sufficient for construction of a house to satisfy the requirement shown by the respondent, but even then he made no efforts to construct such a house and this shows that the requirement shown by the respondent is not bonafide and reasonable. It was also submitted that both the Courts below without considering the evidence available on record and more particularly the admissions made by the respondent himself in his cross-examination and also by misreading the evidence available on record have found that the requirement shown by the respondent is bonafide and reasonable. It was also submitted that both the Courts below without considering the evidence available on record and more particularly the admissions made by the respondent himself in his cross-examination and also by misreading the evidence available on record have found that the requirement shown by the respondent is bonafide and reasonable. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, it is well settled that even a finding of fact can be interfered in second appeal if it is a result of misreading of evidence or non-consideration of material evidence available on record. (IV) From the evidence available on record, it is clear that the house in which the respondent and his wife are presently residing has two rooms, one hall, one kitchen and one store and thus, the present requirement of the respondent can be fully satisfied by construction of a house on the vacant land already available to the respondent. The respondent has failed to show how he still needs the entire land measuring 194 square yards (including the suit premises measuring 130 square yards) in the light of the fact that the present requirement is only for the respondent and his wife only. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following cases: Mohd. Ismail vs. Dinkar Vinayakrao Dorlikar reported in (2009) 10 SCC193, Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram reported in AIR 1992 SC 700 , Jai Prakash Gupta (Dead) through LRs. vs. Riyaz Ahamad & Anr. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 197 , Alizan Mian vs. Naro Dusadh & Ors. reported in (2005) 12 SCC 214. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent supporting the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below submitted as below: (I) The normal rule of law is that the requirement of the landlord is to be considered as it was on the date on which the suit for eviction was filed and subsequent events can be considered only when the requirement shown by the landlord has come to an end completely. In the present case, at the time when the suit was filed by the respondent the requirement shown for the suit property was for construction of a house so that the respondent and his ten family members can reside in it because at that time both the sons of the respondent alongwith their family members and one unmarried daughter were residing with the respondent and all were residing in a tenanted premises. According to the learned counsel if during the pendency of the suit both the sons of respondent alongwith their family members have shifted to another place and have settled there and the unmarried daughter of respondent got married during this period, the requirement shown on the date of the suit cannot be said to be completely vanished, as the respondent and his wife are permanently residing at Kishangarh and their family members come to visit them regularly. Similarly, the requirement cannot be said to be come to an end only because a residential house has been purchased by wife of one of the sons of the respondent. There is no evidence available on record that the house has been purchased by the respondent and since the date of purchase the respondent and his wife are residing in the house so purchased. It was further contended that the well settled principle of law is that landlord is best judge of his requirement and the Court or tenant cannot advice him to satisfy his requirement in some other way. It was further submitted that there is concurrent finding of the Courts below that the respondent alongwith his family members was continuously residing in various tenanted houses since the year 1990 and he is still residing in a tenanted house. It is well settled that a landlord cannot be compelled to reside in a tenanted premises forever only to accommodate his tenant. It is for the respondent to decide of what measurement he wants to construct a residential house and he cannot be compelled to construct a house on the vacant land already available to him only by the reason that with the passage of time his requirement has decreased. It is for the respondent to decide of what measurement he wants to construct a residential house and he cannot be compelled to construct a house on the vacant land already available to him only by the reason that with the passage of time his requirement has decreased. (II) There is no such admission of the respondent in cross-examination that he does not have sufficient funds to construct a house even on the vacant land available to him and his requirement can be satisfied by construction of a house consisting of two rooms, one hall, kitchen and bathroom. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, even if such an admission has been made by the respondent it has to be read in the light of the fact that both the sons of the respondent alongwith their family members have shifted to some other place and a house is not required to be constructed for their regular residence. It was further submitted that in the light of the legal position that the requirement shown on the date of the suit is to be considered, the admission made by the respondent is of no adverse effect. (III) It is an admitted fact that even after filing of the present suit the appellant made no efforts to take some another premises on rent or otherwise for his use and occupation, although, suitable premises are easily available in the town of Kishangarh and this fact supports the concurrent finding of the Courts below that the requirement shown by the respondent is bonafide and reasonable. (IV) It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that if after passing of eviction decree during the pendency of the appeal landlord dies, the requirement shown by the landlord cannot come to an end and legal representatives of the deceased-landlord by supporting the decree passed in favour of the deceased landlord contest the appeal filed by the tenant. According to learned counsel for the respondent, in the present case the requirement of the respondent and his family members cannot be said to be completely eclipsed. In support of this submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the case of Shakuntala Bai & Ors. vs. Narayan Das & Ors. reported in (2004) 5 SCC 772 . 11. In support of this submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the case of Shakuntala Bai & Ors. vs. Narayan Das & Ors. reported in (2004) 5 SCC 772 . 11. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also gone through the record made available for my perusal as well as the relevant legal provisions and the case law relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties. 12. The following facts, which have been held concurrently proved by the Courts below, are relevant for thee disposal of this appeal: (I) A vacant land (Nohra), measuring 57' x 29' area total 194 square yards, of the owner ship of the respondent is situated in the town of Kishangarh. (II) A portion of this plot measuring 37' x 29' i.e. total 124 square yards is in the tenancy of the appellant at a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- w.e.f. 14.10.1984 and he is using it as a godown for storing waste material. (III) The remaining portion of the land measuring 20' x 29' i.e. 70 square yards is in the possession of the respondent and it is lying vacant. There is no evidence available on record that the portion of the land, which is in the possession of the respondent, previously was also in the tenancy of the appellant and the respondent got it vacated from the appellant on the pretext that is required for construction of a residential house. (IV) At the time of institution of the suit the respondent and his family members were residing in a rented house, but during the pendency of the suit both the sons alongwith their family members shifted to Mount Abu and started their respective business there and during the course of time they also constructed residential houses there whereas the unmarried daughter of respondent got married during the pendency of the suit. Another daughter of respondent was already married when the suit was filed. (V) The respondent has no vacant land other than the suit premises and the adjacent vacant land already in his possession and the respondent was continuously residing in various tenanted houses from time to time since the year 1990. Before 1990 the respondent alongwith his family members was residing in a house owned by his brother Shri Bhojraj. (V) The respondent has no vacant land other than the suit premises and the adjacent vacant land already in his possession and the respondent was continuously residing in various tenanted houses from time to time since the year 1990. Before 1990 the respondent alongwith his family members was residing in a house owned by his brother Shri Bhojraj. There is no evidence on record indicating that the house in which the respondent was residing before 1990 is in the joint ownership of him and his brother Shri Bhojraj. (VI) Although, both the sons of the respondent alongwith their family members are presently residing at Mount Abu, but they come to Kishangarh to visit and reside with their parents from time to time and there is no evidence that they have completely severed their relations with their parents. Similarly, both the married daughters of the respondent also visit their parental home from time to time. (VII) No efforts were made by the appellant even after institution of the suit to take any other premises for his use and occupation either on rent or otherwise although such premises are easily available in the town of Kishangarh. 13. A perusal of copy of the sale deed produced during the pendency of this appeal indicates that daughter-in-law of the respondent Smt. Madhu W/o Padam Kumar Jain has purchased a residential house situated in Shivaji Nagar at Kishangarh and it consists of three rooms, one hall, kitchen, lobby, toilet, bathroom etc, but there is no evidence that the sale consideration to purchase this house was provided by the respondent and the house infact has been purchased by him in the name of his daughter-in-law. If in the light of admission made by the respondent in his cross-examination, the contents of the sale deed are considered, it is clear since the purchase of this house, the respondent and his wife are residing in it. In his cross-examination, the respondent has admitted that at present he is residing in a house consisting of two rooms, one hall, one kitchen and one shore whereas the house purchased by the daughter-in-law of the respondent also have the same accommodation and this fact is clear indication of the fact that since the purchase of the house, the respondent is occupying in this house. This fact is also relevant to be considered that in his cross-examination the respondent has admitted that the requirement shown by him may be satisfied by constructing an one story house on the vacant land available to him, but he does not have sufficient funds for construction of such a house. 14. After narrating the facts alongwith the subsequent events relevant for the disposal of this appeal, it will be useful to state in brief the relevant well settled legal position, which is as under: (i) Mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the accommodation in the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of his own use and occupation is not decisive. It is for the Court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona fide. The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one. The word `required' signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show, the burden being upon him, that he genuinely requires the accommodation for the purpose of his residence. (ii) While considering the question of bonafides, what is necessary to bear in mind is that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough. The desire must be decided objectively and not subjectively. The burden lies upon the landlord to establish that he genuinely requires the premises for the purpose of his residence. (iii) The word `reasonable' connotes that the requirement or need is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be a mere desire. The word `requirement' coupled with the word `reasonable' means that it must be something more than a mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. (iv) The landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got freedom in the matter. Neither tenant nor Court can advise the landlord how he should adjust himself and satisfy his requirement in some other way. (iv) The landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got freedom in the matter. Neither tenant nor Court can advise the landlord how he should adjust himself and satisfy his requirement in some other way. (v) If it is found that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession that by itself would not be sufficient to negative the landlord's requirement shown for tenanted premises but in such a situation it is expected from the landlord to establish that the premises which is available is not sufficient and suitable for the purpose for which he requires the tenanted premises. (vi) Whether the vacant premises available to the landlord is sufficient and suitable for his requirement or not will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case but mere being in possession of a vacant premises cannot negative the need shown by the landlord. Suitability of alternative accommodation available with the landlord has to been seen from convenience of the landlord and on the basis of totality of circumstances including profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background of the landlord. (vii) If a landlord is doing his business or is residing in a rented premises, he cannot be compelled to continue to do business or reside in the same rented premises forever only to accommodate the tenant. (viii The normal rule is that any litigation or a suit or original proceeding is to be tried in all stages on the cause of action and the rights and obligations of the parties are to be adjudicated upon, as they obtained or existed on the date of commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception that the Court may take notice of the subsequent events of facts or law which may have happened since the commencement of the lis and grant relief to the parties on the basis of altered condition which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on thee moulding of the relief. This rule is to be applied in cases where it is shown that the original relief claimed, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances has become inappropriate or that it is necessary to base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. In such a case, the Court must take a cognizance of the subsequent changes of the fact and law to mold the relief. Such consideration of subsequent events or developments must be taken when they had a material impact on those rights and obligations. (ix) The crucial date for deciding bonafides of the need shown by the landlord is the date of the suit/petition and subsequent developments and events occurred during pendency of suit/appeal can be taken into consideration only when the need of the landlord can be shown to be completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. The subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the landlord should have been completely vanished by such subsequent events. (x) The finding of fact can be interfered in second appeal only when it is perverse based on failure to take into consideration relevant evidence on record or a misreading thereof. 15. On consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, in the light of the fact as concurrently found by the learned Courts below and the subsequent events developed during the pendency of this lis and also the well settled legal position as referred above, I am of the view that the requirement shown by the respondent for the suit premises cannot be said to be completely eclipsed only by the reason that after the institution of the suit both the sons of the respondent alongwith their family members are now residing permanently at Mount Abu and they are also doing their respective business there and have also constructed residential houses for their use and occupation and the unmarried daughter of the respondent has also got married during pendency of the suit and the requirement shown by the respondent has now decreased to the extent of residence of respondent and his wife only. Similarly, no adverse effect can be drawn to the requirement shown by the respondent by the reason that during pendency of the suit a residential house has been purchased by one of his daughter-in-law in the year 2007 and since than the respondent and his wife are residing in the house so purchased. The normal rule of law is that the requirement of the landlord is to be considered as it was existed on the date on which the suit for eviction was filed and subsequent events can be considered only when the requirement shown by the landlord has come to an end completely. In the present case, at the most it can be said that the initial requirement shown by the respondent has decreased to some extent by the reason that presently the respondent and his wife only are permanently residing at Kishangarh in which the suit premises is situated and other family members only occasionally visit them from time to time. This fact cannot be forgotten that since the year 1990 the respondent alongwith his family members continuously resided in various tenanted houses from time to time and before that he was sharing a house owned by his brother Shri Bhojraj. Only by the reason that after purchase of a residential house by one of his daughter-in-law in the year 2007, the respondent alongwith his wife shifted in it for their residence, it cannot be held that initial requirement shown by the respondent for the suit premises has completely been satisfied. A person, who was residing in various tenanted premises from time to time for several years, if shifts in a house purchased by one of his family members, such person only by that reason, cannot be deprived of his right to evict his tenant from the tenanted premises, if he otherwise is entitled to do so. In the facts and circumstances of the case the need shown by the respondent cannot be questioned on this ground also that in his cross-examination he has admitted that he does not have sufficient funds for construction of a house even on the vacant land already available to him and if a house is now constructed on the land available, his requirement will be satisfied. I am of the view that the admission made by the respondent has to be read and interpreted in the overall facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, looking to the fact that the other family members of the respondent are not presently residing at Kishangarh and they occasio-nally come to there to visit their parents. The well settled legal principles is that the landlord is best judge of his requirement and he has got complete freedom in the matter and neither tenant nor Court can advise the landlord how he should adjust himself and satisfy his requirement in some other way. In the present case, if the respondent intends that a residential house is to be constructed on the land belonging to him including the suit premises his wish is to be honored and respected and the appellant cannot be allowed to say that if the respondent intends to construct a residential house he can do so on the land already available to him as the initial requirement has substantially decreased. It is also legal requirement that the alternative accommodation available to the landlord is sufficient and suitable for his requirement and it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether from the alternative accommodation available, his requirement can be satisfied or not. In the present case, the vacant land already available with the respondent is only 70 square yards, which cannot be said to be a sufficient and suitable alternative accommodation for the construction of a residential house for the use and occupation of respondent and his wife and also for occasional use and accommodation of other family members. The respondent cannot be compelled to construct the house on the land available only to accommodate the appellant forever. This fact is also pertinent to decide the question of sufficiency and suitability of the vacant land available that the suit premises (in the form of vacant land) is situated adjacent to the vacant land available to the respondent and the appellant is using the same for storing waste material. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent cannot be compelled to construct a residential house at a place nearby of which a business of storing waste material i.e. of a `Kabadi' is being carried on by the appellant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent cannot be compelled to construct a residential house at a place nearby of which a business of storing waste material i.e. of a `Kabadi' is being carried on by the appellant. The suitability of alternative accommodation available with the landlord has to be seen from convenience of the landlord and on the basis of totality of the circumstances including profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background of the landlord. As the respondent with his family members has resided since the year 1990 in various rented premises from time to time and before that he was sharing a house owned by his brother and it is only in the year 2007 that a residential house has been purchased by one of his daughter-in-law, it cannot be held that the requirement or need shown by the respondent to construct his own residential house is his mere desire insufficient to pass a decree for eviction. I am of the considered view that the requirement shown by the respondent is bonafide and reasonable and he genuinely requires the suit premises for his use and occupation. Even after purchase of a house by his daughter-in-law, the respondent still has a wish to construct a residential house of his own, his wish has to be honored and it cannot be advised that he and his wife may continue to reside in that house as they are presently residing. The requirement shown by the respondent cannot be said to be adversely effected by this admission of the respondent also that at the time of admission he did have sufficient funds to construct a house even on the vacant land available to him because it is for the respondent to arrange for funds for construction of a house when the occasion arises. It is not a legal requirement that the landlord must have sufficient funds at the beginning of the litigation and continue to have the same throughout the pen-dency of the litigation. Such funds are required only when the suit premises are vacated and before that it is wholly irrelevant whether the landlord has sufficient funds or not to construct a house. 16. Such funds are required only when the suit premises are vacated and before that it is wholly irrelevant whether the landlord has sufficient funds or not to construct a house. 16. So far as the question of comparative hardship is concerned, it is an admitted fact that even after institution of the suit, no efforts were made by the appellant to take any other premises for his use and occupation either on rent or otherwise although, such premises are easily available in the town of Kishangarh in which the suit premises is situated. It is well settled that if efforts are not made by the tenant to take any other premises for his use and occupation, the question of comparative hardship cannot be decided in his favour. Otherwise also, the suit premises is a residential plot which is being used by the appellant for storing waste material only whereas the requirement of the respondent is for construction of a house and if question of hardship is decided against the respondent, more hardship will be caused to him in comparison to the appellant as he can take alternative accommodation on rent or otherwise for his use and occupation. So far as partial eviction from the suit premises is concerned, looking to the nature of the use carried on by the appellant and requirement shown by the respondent and the measurement of the suit premises, it cannot be held that requirement of both the parties will be satisfied if the appellant is evicted from a part of the suit premises. 17. The result of all these discussions is that none of the substantial question of law framed by this Court can be answered in favour of the appellant. The findings of the learned Courts below cannot be said to be perverse or illegal only on the ground that the admissions made by the respondent in his cross-examination was not properly considered. As already held even in the light of the admissions made by the respondent the requirement shown by him cannot be held to be completely vanished. The findings of the learned Courts below cannot be said to be perverse or illegal only on the ground that the admissions made by the respondent in his cross-examination was not properly considered. As already held even in the light of the admissions made by the respondent the requirement shown by him cannot be held to be completely vanished. Although, the landlord does not have a blanket power for seeking eviction if he has in possession sufficient and suitable alternative accommodation for his use and occupation, but in the present case from the evidence available on record and the need shown by the landlord, it cannot be said that the vacant land already available with him and the residential house purchased by his daughter-in-law in the year 2007 are sufficient and suitable to completely satisfy the need shown by the respondent and these subsequent events have rendered the initial requirement shown by the respondent as non-existent. Consequently, the appeal being meritless is, hereby, dismissed with costs throughout. The stay application is also dismissed. Two months time is granted to the appellant to vacate the suit premises and handed over the peaceful possession of the same to the respondent.