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2012 DIGILAW 1267 (GAU)

Purna Sarma v. State of Assam

2012-11-09

I.A.ANSARI, INDIRA SHAH

body2012
JUDGMENT Indira Shah, J. 1. The appellant, charged for the offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, has been found guilty by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) No. 1, Kamrup, under the aforesaid penal provisions of law and has been sentenced to undergo, for the conviction under Section 302 IPC, imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 50,000/- and, in default, further rigorous imprisonment for 6 (six) months and to suffer, for his conviction under Section 201 IPC, rigorous imprisonment for a term of 5 (five) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, in default, further rigorous imprisonment for 6 (six) months. The judgement, dated 30.12.2006, passed by the learned trial Court, convicting and sentencing the accused-appellant, has been impugned in this appeal. Padmaja Devi, since deceased, used to work as a clerk in Assam Co-operative Apex Bank, North Lakhimpur Branch, and she used to reside in the rented house of Tankeswar Bora (PW 7). The accused-appellant, Sri Purna Sarma, a distant relative of the deceased, was employed as Deputy Accounts Officer in the Office of Public Health Engineering Department, Bokakhat. 2. The prosecution's case, in brief, is as under : (i) Padmaja Devi was killed by the accused by strangulating her, on 24.4.1996, at the Nepali Mandir guest house, at Guwahati. The dead body was, then, put inside a large trunk and, with the help of a rickshaw-puller and one of the boarders of the guest house, was carried, on a rickshaw, to Assam State Transport Station. The trunk, with the dead body concealed inside, was put in a Guwahati-North Lakhimpur bound bus. The bus reached, at 6-30 A.M., at North Lakhimpur, on 25.04.1996. The conductors (PW 12 and PW 13) of the said bus discovered that a trunk had been left in the dickey and there was none to claim the said trunk. They also noticed that one side of the trunk had got broken and a leg of a girl was visible. They reported the matter to their Assistant Superintendent, who, in turn, informed the police over telephone. The police, on receipt of the information, so lodged, over telephone, entered the information in the General Diary, being GD Entry No. 1023, dated 25.04.1996, and arrived at the Assam State Transport Corporation (ASTC) bus station. The bus was taken to the police station. The trunk was taken out and opened. The police, on receipt of the information, so lodged, over telephone, entered the information in the General Diary, being GD Entry No. 1023, dated 25.04.1996, and arrived at the Assam State Transport Corporation (ASTC) bus station. The bus was taken to the police station. The trunk was taken out and opened. The dead body of a woman, whose hands were tied behind her back with a rope, was recovered from the said trunk. A rope was also tied around the neck of the said dead body. Police held inquest on the dead body. The postmortem examination, conducted on the dead body, revealed death by strangulation. (ii) Sarab Ali, Sub-Inspector of Assam Police, lodged formally First Information Report (FIR) and North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No. 218/1996, under Sections 302/ 201 IPC, was accordingly registered. The Investigation Officer, then, visited the residence of deceased Padmaja Devi, at Khelmati, North Lakhimpur. One letter, addressed to the deceased, and some photographs, recovered from the house, were seized. Since the dead body was recovered from Guwahati-Lakhimpur bound bus, the Officer-in-Charge of Paltanbazar P.S. was also informed. (iii) During investigation, it was revealed that the accused-appellant had enticed the deceased by saying that he had arranged a better job for her, in the Defence, and took her to Guwahati to appear in an interview. The deceased had two LIC policies, one was from Golaghat Branch and the other from Tezpur Branch and, in both the policies, mother of the accused had been made the nominee. It was also revealed that after the death of Padmaja, brother of the accused-appellant had visited Jorhat Branch to claim the amount under the said LIC policy. The accused-appellant was arrested from Bokakhat and he led the police to the room, where he had committed the murder. One diary, belonging to the deceased, was also recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant and the entries, in the said diary, revealed that the accused-appellant had asked the deceased to appear in an interview, etc. His confessional statement, under Section 164 CrPC, was also recorded. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused-appellant. 3. At the trial, when charges, under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, were framed against the accused-appellant, he pleaded not guilty thereto. 4. During the trial, the prosecution examined altogether 29 (twenty-nine) witnesses. His confessional statement, under Section 164 CrPC, was also recorded. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused-appellant. 3. At the trial, when charges, under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, were framed against the accused-appellant, he pleaded not guilty thereto. 4. During the trial, the prosecution examined altogether 29 (twenty-nine) witnesses. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, denied the allegations levelled against him. He also retracted from his confessional statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and took the plea of alibi. Altogether, 3 (three) witnesses were examined as defence witnesses. 5. Considering the evidence on record, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as indicated above. Feeling aggrieved, the accused, as convicted person, has preferred this appeal. 6. The edifice of the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence and confessional statement of the accused-appellant. The success of the prosecution, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, depends on the availability of a complete chain of events so as not to leave any doubt, while arriving at the conclusion that the act has been done by the accused person. Circumstances of strong suspicion, without, however, any conclusive evidence, would not justify conviction and it is on this score that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence. 7. The law, as regards proof of an offence on the basis of circumstantial evidence, is fairly settled. In State of U.P. Vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, reported in (1992) SCC 86, the Supreme Court observed as under : This Court has, time out of number, observed that while appreciating circumstantial evidence, the Court must adopt a very cautious approach and should record a conviction only if all the links in the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused and every hypothesis of innocence is capable of being negative on evidence. Great care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. The circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But this is not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful, it might be. The circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But this is not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful, it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise. 8. The observations of the Supreme Court, in Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 628 , and Balwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1987) 1 SCC 1 , lend concurrence to the above observations made in Ashok Kumar Srivastava (supra). 9. Thus, in order to found conviction of an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances have to be fully established in the sense that the chain of circumstances must be complete and must unerringly point to the guilt of the accused. The circumstances must not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused, but must also be inconsistent with every hypothesis of innocence of the accused. 10. Now, let us, briefly, recapitulate the evidence on record, which led to conviction of the accused-appellant. 11. Dr. Kiran Chandra Chetia (PW 4) conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased Padmaja Devi on 25.05.1996 and his findings are as follows: External appearance : Dead body of an average build female person aged about 27 years, Regor mostis - absent. Post-mortem staining present on right side of body, outer side of right breast, inner side of left thigh outer side of right thigh and legs. Post mortem staining is reddish blue in colour, face is congested. Blood stained fluid in the nostrils present. Injuries : Bruise mark on outer side of right and inner left wrist joints, present, size - 2" X " (right) and 1 " X " (left). Dislocation of both right and left wrist joints and ante-mortem in nature. 2. A transverse, contusions ligature mark around the neck present. A transverse, contusions ligature mark around the neck in the middle present. The mark is reddish brown in colour and within 1" (one inch). On dissection of ligature, mark blood stained fluid comes out. The thyroid cartilage and trachea fractured. 2. A transverse, contusions ligature mark around the neck present. A transverse, contusions ligature mark around the neck in the middle present. The mark is reddish brown in colour and within 1" (one inch). On dissection of ligature, mark blood stained fluid comes out. The thyroid cartilage and trachea fractured. The ligature mark injury is ante-mortem in nature. CRANIUM AND SPINAL CANAL Scalp - congested, skull and vertebrae - normal. Membrance - congested, Brain and spinal cord - congested. Liver - congested. Spleen - congested, Kidney - congested, Bladder - empty. THORAX Walls, ribs and cartilages - healthy. Pleurae - congested. Larynx and trachere - congested (blood stained frothy fluid present). Right lung - congested, left lung - congested. Pericar (dium) - congested. Heart chambers - empty. Vessels - normal, injury - as described. Disease or deformity - Nil. Fracture as described. Dislocation as described. ABDOMEN Vessel- healthy, peritoneum - healthy, stomach and its contents - healthy (empty). Small intestine and its contents - healthy (semi digested food particle present). Large intestine and its contents - healthy (faecal matter present). ORGAN OF GENERATION, EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL Vulva and Vagina - normal, vaginal smear shows no (microscopic examination) spermatozoa slide No.__of 25.04.96 - no sign of rape (NLCH Path Lab). No sign of pregnancy (uterus preserved). 12. In the opinion of the doctor, death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation. 13. There has been no dispute with regard to identification of the deceased, nature of the injuries sustained by her and the cause of her death. 14. PW 1, Maya Sharma, is elder sister of the deceased. She has deposed that in relation, the accused is her brother, Padmaja (deceased) used to reside, at Lakhimpur, in connection with her service at the Apex Bank and that she used to come to the house of PW 1 and PW 1, too, used to visit Padmaja's residence. PW 1 has also deposed that Padmaja came to the house of PW 1 on 16.04.1996. PW 1 requested Padmaja to give her (PW 1) some money as loan. Padmaja, then, told PW 1 that the accused had arranged a job for her in the Defence and she (Padmaja) was expecting to get her appointment letter within 2/3 days. Padmaja further told PW 1 that to procure the job, she (Padmaja) had to pay a handsome amount to the accused. 15. Padmaja, then, told PW 1 that the accused had arranged a job for her in the Defence and she (Padmaja) was expecting to get her appointment letter within 2/3 days. Padmaja further told PW 1 that to procure the job, she (Padmaja) had to pay a handsome amount to the accused. 15. It is in the evidence of PW 1 that on 18.04.1996, Padmaja left Lakhimpur along with Anita and Sunita, daughters of PW 1. Sunita came back home on 21.04.1996. On 22.04.1996, Anita also came back and told that the accused had called Padmaja, over telephone, to accompany him to Guwahati in connection with her (Padmaja's) new job and that the accused was to accompany Padmaja from Tezpur. 16. It is also in the evidence of PW 1 that on 25.04.1996, she (PW 1) was informed by the employees of the Co-operative Apex Bank that Padmaja, who had left for Guwahati on 22.04.1996, met with an accident on 25.04.1996 and, thereafter, PW 1 went to North Lakhimpur to see the dead body of the said deceased. 17. Corroborating the evidence of PW 1, Anita Sarmah (PW 2), daughter of PW 1, has deposed that Padmaja came to their house at Bihpuria from North Lakhimpur on 16.4.1996 and stayed with them. On 18.04.1996, PW 2 and her sister, Sunita, went along with Padmaja. While Sunita returned back home, PW 2 stayed with Padmaja. On 21.04.1996, PW 2 along with her aunt, Padmaja, enjoyed matinee cinema show and, thereafter, Padmaja was informed that there was telephone call for her, whereupon Padmaja went to her landlord's house, situated in the same compound, to receive the telephone call and, then, Padmaja told PW 2 that her mama (maternal uncle, i.e., the accused) was arranging a job for her in the Defence, that her mama had called her to Guwahati and that she was told to wait, at Tezpur Bus Station, wherefrom he (accused) would accompany her (Padmaja). PW 2 has further deposed that her aunt (Padmaja) told her not to disclose the matter, relating to her new job, to anybody. One 22.04.1996, PW 2, along with the deceased, boarded and travelled in the same bus up to Bihpuria. However, while PW 2 got down at Bihpuria, Padmaja proceeded towards Tezpur. 18. PW 7, Sri Tankeswar Bora, has deposed that Padmaja Devi (deceased) was his tenant. One 22.04.1996, PW 2, along with the deceased, boarded and travelled in the same bus up to Bihpuria. However, while PW 2 got down at Bihpuria, Padmaja proceeded towards Tezpur. 18. PW 7, Sri Tankeswar Bora, has deposed that Padmaja Devi (deceased) was his tenant. PW 7 has further deposed that many times Padmaj a told him that her elder brother had come to visit her. It is in the evidence of PW 7 that 4/5 days before the recovery of the dead body of Padmaja, Padmaja told him (PW 7) that her brother had come and, according to PW 7, Padmaja used to receive calls from his telephone. It is also in the evidence of PW 7 that a day, ahead of her departure from the rented house of PW 7, Padmaja received a telephone call and told him (PW 7) that her elder brother was seriously ill and she had been called and that she would go to Tezpur and, when the dead body of Padmaja was recovered, PW 7 went to Lakhimpur Police Station and identified the dead body as that of Padmaja. PW 7 has also proved the photograph of Padmaja's dead body. 19. While considering the evidence of PW 7, it needs to be noted that though PW 7 has deposed that Padmaja told him (PW 7) that her brother (accused-appellant) used to visit her, that a day ahead of her departure from the rented house of PW 7, Padmaja had received a telephone call and told him (PW 7) that she would go to Tezpur and though PW 7 has also proved the photograph of Padmaja's dead body, can the evidence of PW 7, in the absence of Padmaja, be relied upon? 20. While considering the question, posed above, it needs to be noted that, ordinarily, in the absence of Padmaja corroborating the evidence of PW 7 that he was, indeed, told by Padmaja what he has deposed, the evidence of PW 7 would but be treated as hearsay. What is, however, of immense importance to note is that, in order to exclude a piece of evidence as hearsay, one has to bear in mind the distinction between the factum of information and truthfulness or veracity of such information. What is, however, of immense importance to note is that, in order to exclude a piece of evidence as hearsay, one has to bear in mind the distinction between the factum of information and truthfulness or veracity of such information. If, in a given case, the object is to merely establish that a statement was made by one person to another, it may not be hearsay; but if the object is to prove that what was started was true, then, it may become hearsay. Thus, when 'x', an eye witness of an occurrence of murder, comes to a police station and reports the occurrence to a police officer, the evidence given by the police officer, at the trial, in the absence of the evidence given by the informant, that he was given such an information is not hearsay if the object is merely to prove that such an information was, indeed, received by the police officer; but if the object is to prove that what the police officer had been reported was or was not true, then, the police officer's evidence as to what he was reported by 'x' would be hearsay unless 'x' appears as a witness at the trial and deposes not only that he had so reported the occurrence to the police officer, but also that what he had reported was true as he had witnessed the occurrence himself. (See Bisheswar Baori @ Khetrapal Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2002 (2) GLT 395). 21. In Subramaniam Vs. Public Prosecutor, reported in [1956] 1 WLR 965, the Privy Council, distinguishing the factum of statement from the factum of truth, observed and held that the state of mind of a man, charged with possessing ammunition contrary to certain regulations, could be proved by what had been told to him by certain terrorists into whose hands he had come. Referring to the observations, so made by the Privy Council in Subramaniam (supra), Lord Parker, Chief Justice, in Regina Vs. Wills [1960] 1 WLR 55, observed, Mr. de Silva, giving the advice of the Board, said: In ruling out peremptorily the evidence of conversation between the terrorists and the appellant, the trial judge was in error. Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person, who is not himself called as a witness, may or may not be hearsay. de Silva, giving the advice of the Board, said: In ruling out peremptorily the evidence of conversation between the terrorists and the appellant, the trial judge was in error. Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person, who is not himself called as a witness, may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible, when it is proposed to establish, by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that the statement was made, quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or of some other person in whose presence the statement was made. (Emphasis is added) In the opinion of this Court, that statement of the law is applicable to the present case. It is true that the Board were there considering the state of mind and conduct of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offence, but provided the evidence as to his state of mind and conduct is relevant, it matters not whether it was in regard to the conduct at the time of the commission of the offence or, as here, at a subsequent time, to explain his answers to the police and his conduct, when charged. Accordingly, that evidence, in the present case, was wrongly excluded. 22. In Sudip @ Tultul Choudhury, reported in 2010 (2) GLT 870, the question, which arose, was: When an informant or the person, who informs the Officer-in-Charge of a police station as regards commission of a cognizable offence, is not examined as a witness at the trial, because of the fact that his identity is not known, whether the evidence, given by the Officer-in-Charge of the police station concerned, as to what information he had received would or would not be hearsay? 23. Pointing out the distinction between the factum of information and truthfulness or veracity of such information, a Division Bench of this Court, in Sudip @ Tultul Choudhury (supra), observed, at paragraph 19 and 20, as under : 19. 23. Pointing out the distinction between the factum of information and truthfulness or veracity of such information, a Division Bench of this Court, in Sudip @ Tultul Choudhury (supra), observed, at paragraph 19 and 20, as under : 19. Thus, the evidence, given in the present case, by PW 12 (Investigating Officer) that he had received an information telephonically, at his police station, that Anil Gan of Central Road Extension had been murdered and that his dead body was lying, in his courtyard, is not wholly inadmissible in evidence in order to show as to what information PW 12 had telephonically received, which prompted him to visit the place of occurrence, though the informant's identity had not been determined and the informant was not examined. By proving as to what had prompted the police machinery to move into motion, what the evidence of PW 12 does is that it tells the Court as to what information he had received telephonically at his police station and why and how he happened to come to the place, where Anil Gan's dead-body was found lying. To the extent, therefore, as to what PW 12 had been told on telephone or to the extent as to what information PW 12 had telephonically received at his police station, the evidence, given by PW 12, is not inadmissible evidence even though the caller remains unidentified till date. With the limited use of the evidence given by PW 12, what is proved, in the absence of examination of the person, who had made the said telephone call, is the factum of information, namely, as to what information PW 12 had telephonically received. It does not, however, prove that the information, which PW 12 had received, was true. If the factum of truth of the information so given is required to be determined by the Court, then, the evidence given by PW 12, as to what he had been told, telephonically, by the caller, would be hearsay and inadmissible evidence. The Court has to, therefore, remain alive at the trial as to when a statement, attributed to any person, who is not examined as a witness, can be brought on record as a factum of statement made and not as proof of the truth of the statement made. 19. The Court has to, therefore, remain alive at the trial as to when a statement, attributed to any person, who is not examined as a witness, can be brought on record as a factum of statement made and not as proof of the truth of the statement made. 19. Thus, the evidence, given by PW 12, as to what he had been told by the telephone caller is, in the absence of the evidence of the caller, not inadmissible if the Court has to rely on the evidence of PW 12 to hold that PW 12 had received a telephone call to the effect that Anil Gan had been murdered. But the information, that Anil Gan had been murdered as aforesaid, is quite different from the question as to whether Anil Gan had, as a matter of fact, been murdered or not. When the information, so received by PW 12, made the police machinery move into motion and in order to ascertain the truth and also to investigate as to who was the offender, when the police proceeded from the said police station, arrived at the place of occurrence, examined the dead body of Anil Gan and held inquest thereon, investigation into the case must be held to have already commenced. Any information given thereafter, whether in writing or orally, to PW 12 by PW 1, as regards the occurrence, was nothing, but his (PW 1's) statement made to the police during investigation and such a statement stands on the same footing as does a statement of a witness under Section 161 Cr.PC. Such a statement is not substantive evidence nor can it be treated, or could have been treated, as FIR. 24. Thus, the evidence of PW 7, too, in the present case, same as in the case of Sudip @ Tultul (supra), has to be divided into two parts, namely, factum of information and truthfulness or veracity of the information. The prosecution has clearly proved the factum of information inasmuch as the evidence of PW 7, that Padmaja had told him that she would go to Tezpur, stands well proved by the evidence of PW 2, who accompanied Padmaja, boarded and travelled in the same bus from North lakhimpur up to Bihpuria. 25. The prosecution has clearly proved the factum of information inasmuch as the evidence of PW 7, that Padmaja had told him that she would go to Tezpur, stands well proved by the evidence of PW 2, who accompanied Padmaja, boarded and travelled in the same bus from North lakhimpur up to Bihpuria. 25. Logically, therefore, there is no difficulty in concluding that PW 7 was, indeed, told by Padmaja, a day ahead before her departure, that she would go to Tezpur. Whether the information, so given by PW 7, was or was not true remains without being determined and has to be, therefore, treated as hearsay inasmuch there is none other than Padmaja (since deceased) who could prove that PW 7 was, indeed, told by Padmaja what PW 7 has deposed. 26. Situated thus, what is admissible from the evidence of PW 7 is that he was, indeed, informed by Padmaja, a day ahead of her departure, that her brother was seriously ill and that she would go to Tezpur. This evidence, however, cannot be treated as the evidence of truth; but, in the face of the fact that the evidence of PW 2, who accompanied Padmaja up to Bihpuria, is found by us to be believable, we see no reason to disbelieve PW 7. 27. The evidence of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 7 are consistent and their evidence shows that the deceased received telephone call. PW 2 has specifically stated that the deceased left for Tezpur and, from Tezpur, she was to proceed to Guwahati along with the accused. Nothing has been elicited from the cross-examination of the said three witnesses to discard their evidence. 28. PW 10, Sri Tarun Bora, and PW 14, Sri Rishi Kumar Sarmah, were boarders of Nepali Mandir Guest House at Guwahati. PW 10 came to Guwahati in connection of treatment of her sister in B. Baruah Cancer Institute. He met PW 14, Rishi Kumar, who was also staying in the same guest house at the ground floor. 29. PW 10 has deposed that a Nepali man, along with a girl, came to stay, in the said guest house, next to his room. PW 10 identified the accused in the dock and said that the accused was the said Nepali man. 29. PW 10 has deposed that a Nepali man, along with a girl, came to stay, in the said guest house, next to his room. PW 10 identified the accused in the dock and said that the accused was the said Nepali man. PW 10 has also deposed that on 24.04.1996, the accused took leave from PW 10 and PW 10 saw the accused and a rickshaw-puller bringing out a big C.I. Sheet trunk from the upper floor of the said guest house. The accused told him (PW 10) that he had got his sister admitted in the hospital and he was leaving. It is in the evidence of PW 10 that he (PW 10), then, helped the accused in lifting and carrying the trunk to the rickshaw and he also found that the trunk was very heavy and asked the accused as to what was there in the said trunk. However, instead of replying to the query, so raised, the accused gave him a newspaper and asked him to go through it. Later on, Rishi Kumar (PW 14) told his brother (PW 10) that the accused had killed the girl and carried her dead body in the trunk. PW 10 could identify the photograph of the deceased, i.e. Ext. 1, as the sister of the accused, who had stayed at the said guest house with the accused as his sister. 30. PW 14, Sri Rishi Kumar Sarma, has deposed that on 23.04.1996, the accused came, along with a Nepali girl, to stay in the guest house, where PW 14 was also staying. PW 14 introduced himself to the accused and, on being asked, the accused told him that he had come from Sonitpur for some work. It is in the evidence of PW 14 that, in order to avoid further query of PW 14, the accused started talking with the girl. It is also in the evidence of PW 14 that on 24.04.1996, while PW 14 was cooking, he saw the accused carrying a big silver-coloured trunk from the upper floor of the said guest house and the accused and another person, while carrying the trunk, took rest for some time and, hence, PW 14 could guess that the trunk was very heavy. 31.. 31.. PW 14 has deposed that he (PW 14) did not see the girl (deceased) at the relevant time and that the accused did not return thereafter and that he (PW 14) came to know about the incident, when he (PW 14) returned to his village. PW 14, too, has identified the photograph of the said deceased as the girl, who stayed with the accused as his sister at the said guest house. 32. Although the accused was identified by PW 10 and PW 14 in the Court, no Test Identification Parade (TIP) was held and though the photograph of the deceased should have been mixed up with other photographs in order to import credibility to the version of PW 10 and PW 14, who claimed to have seen the deceased in company of the accused, the evidence of PW 10 and PW 14 cannot be disregarded inasmuch as their evidence has been corroborated by PW 21, Dr. N. Chakraborty, Orthopaedic surgeon, who has deposed that Padmaja Devi (deceased) was brought to his chamber as she had complained that she had pain in her buttock and that PW 21 advised her to get an X-Ray examination done. PW 21 has proved the Register, wherein the names of the patients were entered. The said Register, which contained the name of the said deceased, was seized by the police. PW 21 has also stated that Padmaja was accompanied by a person. 33. In the case of State of NCT of Delhi Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 600 , it has been observed that conducting the Test Identification Parade relates to the stage of investigation and the omission to conduct the same will not always affect the credibility of witness, who identifies the accused in the court. It is, no doubt, true that if the identification is made, for the first time, in court, not much evidentiary value can be attached to the identification of the accused in the court, where the identifying witness is a total stranger, who had just a fleeting glimpse of the person identified or who had no particular reason to remember the person concerned. 34. In the present case, the accused, along with the deceased, stayed in the guest house, where PW 10 and PW 14 were also staying. 34. In the present case, the accused, along with the deceased, stayed in the guest house, where PW 10 and PW 14 were also staying. PW 10 and PW 14 had the occasion to introduce themselves to the accused and they had sufficient interaction with each other. They even noticed the accused leaving the said guest house without Padmaja, whom the accused had introduced to them as his sister and, while leaving the said guest house, the accused was carrying a trunk, which was very heavy and, besides the help of a rickshaw-puller, which the accused had hired for carrying out the said trunk, even PW 10 helped him (accused) in carrying the said trunk and though PW 10 specifically asked the accused as to what the said trunk contained, the accused did not reply thereto. Moreover, after departure of the accused, within a short time, they came to know that the dead body of a girl was found, in trunk, at Lakhimpur, and her photographs were not only recognized, but also identified by PW 10 and PW 14 to be of Padmaja. These two witnesses also identified the accused-appellant as the person, who had, accompanied by Padmaja, stayed at the said guest house. It needs to be borne in mind that the present one was not a case of 'fleeting glimpse'. There was sufficient interaction between PW 10 and PW 14, on one hand, and the accused, on the other, and it was, therefore, not unnatural for these witnesses to identify the accused and also the photograph of the said deceased. In the circumstances, indicated hereinbefore, the identification of the accused and also of the said deceased by PW 10 and PW 14 can be safely relied upon. 35. The other circumstance, which sheds light on the involvement of the accused-appellant, is the shop, wherefrom the accused purchased the trunk. PW 18, Birendra Kumar Bhowal, is the owner of a shop, at Tezpur, who also manufactures trunks. It is in his evidence that the accused was known to him as he (accused) was earlier working in the Municipality Board at Tezpur and used to visit his shop to collect Municipal taxes. The accused visited his shop prior to the occurrence, on 21.04.1996, and placed order for a trunk measuring 36 inches in length. It is in his evidence that the accused was known to him as he (accused) was earlier working in the Municipality Board at Tezpur and used to visit his shop to collect Municipal taxes. The accused visited his shop prior to the occurrence, on 21.04.1996, and placed order for a trunk measuring 36 inches in length. Although PW 18 was not present at the time of delivery of the trunk, he stated that his son had delivered the trunk to the accused. Thus, the fact that the accused got the said trunk made and brought at Tezpur stands well proved by the evidence of PW 18. 36. PW 8 (Mitradev Sarmah), brother of the deceased, was serving, at Itanagar, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. From his evidence, the police got the clue that the accused was involved in commission of the offence of murder. PW 8 got information, over telephone, about the recovery of the dead body of his sister, Padmaja, whereupon he came to North Lakhimpur and found the dead body at the police station. Next day, he went to a PCO near Shyam Hotel to contact his relatives staying at various places. The owner of the PCO, Zameshed Ali, told him (PW 8) that Padmaja (deceased) was close to him as she used to visit the PCO for making STD calls. It is in the evidence of PW 8 that the owner of the PCO asked him (PW 8) as to whether he (PW 8) had a brother at Bokakhat and also as to who P. Sarma (Purna Sarma @ Tike, i.e., the accused) was. It is in the evidence of PW 8 that Zamshed told him (PW 8) that on 19.05.1996, Padmaja made two telephone calls to Bokakhat from his PCO. From the numbers given by Zamshed, PW 8 confirmed that both the said telephone calls had been made to Public Health Engineering Department, Bokakhat, where the accused had been serving as Junior Accounts Officer. PW 8 has further deposed that he was aware of the fact that the deceased had conversation with the accused earlier too and he had warned her that the accused was not a man of good character, whereupon Padmaja told him that she had some transactions with the accused, which could not be discussed at that moment, and that she would tell him (PW 8) about the matter later. 37. 37. On 26.04.1996 (i.e., after the incident), PW 1 (Maya Sarma), sister of both, PW 8 and the said deceased, told PW 8 that the accused had arranged a job for Padmaja in Defence and that Padmaja had gone to Guwahati in connection with the said job. PW 8, then, passed the said information to the police. On 30.04.1996, PW 8, along with police, visited the house, where the said deceased used to reside on rental basis. PW 8 told the police that Padmaja used to maintain a dairy and insisted upon the police to search for the diary to get some clue. However, the diary was not recovered from the said house; but, much later, the diary was recovered from a drain near Nepali Mandir, Guwahati, at the instance of the accused. 38. Sub-Inspector, Md. Sarab Ali, one of the Investigating Officers, who is PW 24, has deposed that PW 8 informed the police that Purna Sarmah (accused) of Bokakhat had assured the deceased to arrange a job for her. PW 24, accordingly, sent a message to the Officer-in-Charge, Bokakhat Police Station. The accused was arrested at Bokakhat and brought to North Lakhimpur by PW 24. Following the interrogation of the accused, the accused led the police to Nepali Mandir, Guwahati, and the room at the said guest house, where the murder had been committed. The disclosure statement of the accused-appellant was recorded and proved, during the trial, as Ext. 29. PW 24 seized the Register, maintained by the guest house, Nepali Mandir. The diary, maintained by the deceased, was recovered, on being shown by the accused, from a drain near the said guest house. As per the disclosure statement of the accused, the Investigating Officer visited the chamber of Dr. R. N. Chakraborty (PW 11) and seized the Patient Register maintained there. The relevant entry, in respect of the said deceased, was proved at the trial. The accused also led the police to the shop, wherefrom he had purchased the trunk, which was used for dispatching the dead body of Padmaja and, thereafter, the accused was forwarded to the court and his confessional statement, under Section 164 CrPC, was recorded. 39. The relevant entry, in respect of the said deceased, was proved at the trial. The accused also led the police to the shop, wherefrom he had purchased the trunk, which was used for dispatching the dead body of Padmaja and, thereafter, the accused was forwarded to the court and his confessional statement, under Section 164 CrPC, was recorded. 39. Before entering into the question as to whether the confessional statement, recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, under Section 164 CrPC, can or cannot be relied upon, we would like to mention here that from the diary of the deceased, seized by the police, it was revealed that the deceased had two LIC policies. PW 8 has deposed that the Nominees, in the said policies, were the mother of the accused. The entries in the diary, proved by the evidence of PW 8, show that the said deceased had kept the amount to secure her job in the Defence. 40. PW 19, Someswar Bora, Lower Division Assistant, in the office of Executive Engineer, was also running LIC Agency in the name of his nephew, Dipak Raj Konwar. PW 19 has deposed that the accused invited him to his office, at Golaghat, to open a LIC policy and when he visited the accused, the accused told him that he (accused) wanted to get the LIC policy in the name of his sister, Padmaja Devi. The accused also told PW 19 that it would be convenient to open the policy at Golaghat, because his sister, Padmaja, would be transferred to Golaghat. All the initiatives for opening the LIC policy were taken by the accused. PW 19 was also told by the accused that Padmaja had lost her parents and, hence, his mother (i.e., the mother of the accused) would be the nominee in the policy. However, before all papers, along with receipts, could be handed over to the policy holder, PW 19 came to know about the murder of Padmaja from the newspaper. PW 19, then, handed over all the papers to the Branch Manager. It is in the evidence of PW 19 that, while Purna Sarmah (accused) was in jail, a person, who introduced himself as younger brother of Puma Sarmah, came to enquire about the LIC policy receipt. PW 19 proved all the documents relating to the LIC policy of the deceased. It is in the evidence of PW 19 that, while Purna Sarmah (accused) was in jail, a person, who introduced himself as younger brother of Puma Sarmah, came to enquire about the LIC policy receipt. PW 19 proved all the documents relating to the LIC policy of the deceased. In this regard, it is also worth pointing out that PW 28 (Md. Abdus Hamid), who used to work as an Assistant Administrative Officer, LIC. Jorhat Divisional Office, has deposed that as per the direction of Senior Divisional Manager, he handed over the documents, relating to LIC policy, to the police at Paltanbazar Police Station. 41. PW 5, Sri Chandra Prasad Sharma, a member of the Executive Committee, Nepali Mandir, Guwahati, and PW 7, Rajesh Thakuri, Secretary of Nepali Mandir Prabhondak Samitee, have deposed that the accused, on being brought by the police, led them to the upstairs of the lodge to show the room, where the murder had been committed. On being asked by the police about the diary of the deceased, the accused told the police that he had torn the diary and it was thrown from upstairs to the drain at the backside of the lodge. The police found the said diary on the basis of the statement, so made by the accused, and the diary was seized in presence of PW 5 and PW 7. 42. Sections 17 to 23 of the Evidence Act deals with admission. The law as to confession is embodied in Section 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 25 bars proof of a confession made to a police officer and Section 26 prohibits proof of confession made by any person, while he is in the custody of a police officer. Confession, leading to discovery of a fact, which is dealt with under Section 27, is an exception to the rule of exclusion of confession made by an accused, while in the custody of a police officer. 43. With regard to the scope of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court, in State of NCT of Delhi Vs. Confession, leading to discovery of a fact, which is dealt with under Section 27, is an exception to the rule of exclusion of confession made by an accused, while in the custody of a police officer. 43. With regard to the scope of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court, in State of NCT of Delhi Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 600 , observed and laid down as under: In the Full Bench judgement of seven Judges in Sukhan v. the crown which was approved by the Privy Council in Pulkun Kotayya's case, Shedi Lal, CJ, as he then was, speaking for the majority, pointed out that the expression 'fact' as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act includes only the physical fact which can be perceived by the senses but also the psychological fact or mental condition of which any person is conscious and that it is in the former sense that the word used by the Legislature refers to a material and not to a mental fact. It is clear therefore that what should be discovered is the material fact and the information that is admissible is that which has caused that discovery so as to connect the information and the fact with each other as the 'cause and effect'. The information which does not distinctly connect with the fact discovered or that portion of the information, which merely explains the material thing discovered is not admissible under Section 27 and cannot be proved. At one time, it was held that the expression 'fact discovered' in the Section is restricted to a physical or material fact, which can be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact (Sukhan v. Crown, Rev. V. Ganee). Now, it is fairly settled that the expression 'fact discovered' includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this. There is one more point which we would like to discuss, i.e., whether pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. There is one more point which we would like to discuss, i.e., whether pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. Though in most of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself leads the police officer to the place where an object is concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that there should be such pointing out in order to make the information admissible under Section 27, it could very well be that on the basis of information furnished by the accused, the Investigating Officer may go to the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material object. By doing so, the Investigating Officer will be discovering a fact, viz., the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the information about it. In other words, where the information furnished by the person in custody is verified by the police officer by going to the spot mentioned by the informant and finds it to be correct, that amounts to discovery of fact within the meaning of section 27. Of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished was the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. 44. In the present case, the information, furnished by the accused to the police officer that he had purchased the trunk from the shop of PW 18, is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The diary of the said deceased was also recovered in pursuance of the information given by the accused and is, therefore, admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 45. PW 16, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, recorded the confessional statement of the accused. Confessions are considered reliable, because no rational person would make admission against his interest unless prompted by his conscience to tell the truth. "Deliberate and voluntary confession of guilt, if clearly proved, are among the most effectual proofs in law" (Taylor's Treatise on the Law of Evidence Vol.-I), However, before acting upon a confession, the Court must be satisfied that it was freely and voluntarily made. "Deliberate and voluntary confession of guilt, if clearly proved, are among the most effectual proofs in law" (Taylor's Treatise on the Law of Evidence Vol.-I), However, before acting upon a confession, the Court must be satisfied that it was freely and voluntarily made. A confession, by hope or promise of advantage, reward or immunity or by force or by fear induced by violence or threats of violence, cannot constitute evidence against the maker of confession. The confession should have been made with full knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession. If any doubt is entertained by the Court that these ingredients are not satisfied, the court should eschew the confession from consideration. So also the authority recording confession - be it a Magistrate or some other statutory functionary at the pre-trial stage - must address himself to the issue whether the accused had come forward to make the confession in an atmosphere free from fear, duress or hope of some advantage or reward induced by the persons in authority. (See Privy Council's decision in P. Narayana Swami Vs. Emperor). 46. Section 164 CrPC is a salutary provision, which lays down certain precautionary measures to be followed by a Magistrate, while recording a confession so as to ensure voluntariness of the confession. 47. In the present case, the confessional statement of the accused was recorded under Section 164 CrPC. The accused, in his statement, recorded under Section 313 CrPC, retracted from his confession. The approach of court to convict a person, in the light of confession or a retracted confession, has been dealt with in Barat Vs. State of U.P., reported in (1971) 3 SCC 950 , as under : Confession can be acted upon if the court is satisfied that they are voluntary and that they are true. The voluntary nature of the confession depends upon whether there was any threat, inducement or promise and its truth is judged in the context of the entire prosecution case. The confession must fit into the proved facts and not run counter to them. When the voluntary character of the confession and its truth is accepted, it is safe to rely on it. Indeed a confession, if it is voluntary and true and not made under any inducement or threat or promise, is the most patent piece of evidence against the maker. Retracted confession, however, stands on a slightly different footing. When the voluntary character of the confession and its truth is accepted, it is safe to rely on it. Indeed a confession, if it is voluntary and true and not made under any inducement or threat or promise, is the most patent piece of evidence against the maker. Retracted confession, however, stands on a slightly different footing. As the Privy Council once stated, in India it is the rule to find a confession and to find it retracted later. A court may take into account the retracted confession. And must weigh the two to determine whether the retraction affects the voluntary nature of the confession or not. If the court is satisfied that it was restricted, because of an after-thought or advice, the retraction may not weigh with the court if the general facts proved in the case and the tenor of the confession as made and the circumstances of its making and withdrawal warrant it user. All the same, the courts do not act upon the retracted confession without finding assurance from some other sources as to the guilt of the accused. Therefore, it can be stated that a true confession made voluntarily may be acted upon with slight evidence to corroborate it, but a retracted confession requires the general assurance that the retraction was an after-thought and the earlier statement was true. 48. From the observations, made in Barat (supra), it is clear that confession can be acted upon and be made the basis for conviction of an accused if the court is satisfied that the confession is voluntary and true. A confession, in order to be accepted and relied upon, must fit into the proven facts and not run counter to the proven facts. Retracted confession stands on a slightly different footing and, in the case of a retracted confession, the court has to be satisfied that the retraction was because of an after-thought or advice so as to make the court either discard or not readily rely upon the retracted confession. Retraction of a confession may not weigh with the court if the general facts proved in the case and the tenor of the confession coupled with the circumstances of making the confession and withdrawal warrant its user. The court shall not act upon retracted confession without having an assurance from the other sources as to the guilt of the accused. Retraction of a confession may not weigh with the court if the general facts proved in the case and the tenor of the confession coupled with the circumstances of making the confession and withdrawal warrant its user. The court shall not act upon retracted confession without having an assurance from the other sources as to the guilt of the accused. Confession, made voluntarily, may be acted upon with some evidence to corroborate it; but a retracted confession requires general assurance that the retraction was an after-thought and the earlier confession was true. 49. In the present case, the accused was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, on 10.05.1996, at 10-00 A.M., for recording his confession. Though on the same day, his confession was recorded, the fact remains that the Chief Judicial Magistrate (PW 16), in his deposition, has stated that he gave the accused statutory warning and 3 hours and 30 minutes for reflection and that the accused was kept in his court-room under supervision of a peon. It transpires from the evidence of PW 16 that he (PW 16) made it clear to the accused that he (PW 16) was a Magistrate and not a policeman, the accused was not bound to confess and that if he chose to confess, his confession would be used as evidence against him. The accused replied by saying that he was aware of the fact that PW 16 was not a policeman; otherwise also, the accused, being an educated person, cannot but be held to have known that PW 16, as Chief Judicial Magistrate, was not a policeman, particularly, when PW 16 also made it clear to the accused that he was not bound to confess, but if he chose to confess, his confessional statement might be used against him as evidence, and, to the statement, so made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the accused responded by saying that he was aware of the same. The accused, being an educated person, cannot be said to have not understood that he was not bound to make confession and that if he chose to make confession, the same might be used against him as evidence. PW 16 has also deposed that he enquired from the accused if anybody had intimidated or compelled him to confess. To the queries, so made, the accused replied in the negative. PW 16 has also deposed that he enquired from the accused if anybody had intimidated or compelled him to confess. To the queries, so made, the accused replied in the negative. The accused was also asked as to why he had come to confess and the reply of the accused was that he was repenting and, that is why, he wanted to confess his guilt. There is nothing in the evidence on record that these answers were unwillingly or involuntarily given by the accused. The accused was also informed by PW 16 that he knew that he was free to make or not to make any confession. Though the confession was recorded on the same day, on which the accused was produced before PW 16, the fact remains that the accused was a literate person, there is absolutely nothing on record to show that he was beaten, tortured, intimidated, threatened or unduly influenced. In these circumstances, the time for reflection, given to the accused, was adequate. Though PW 16 did not tell the accused that if the accused declined to make confession, he (accused) would not be remanded to police custody again, this omission, on the part of PW 16, cannot be said to have caused any prejudice to the accused, when there is nothing, in the evidence on record, to show that the accused had been, in any manner, ill-treated or threatened by the police. In fact, neither in the trial Court nor in this appeal, it has been contended, on behalf of the accused-appellant, that the accused-appellant was not aware of the fact that even if he had chosen not to make any confession, he would not be given to the custody of the police. There is nothing in the evidence on record indicating, even remotely, that the accused was, in any manner, induced, ill-treated, threatened or intimidated by the police to make confession. It is worth mentioning, in this regard, that it was not even suggested to the Investigating Officer, who had produced the accused before PW 16, that he (Investigating Officer) had, in any manner, induced, ill-treated, threatened or intimidated the accused to make the judicial confession. It is worth mentioning, in this regard, that it was not even suggested to the Investigating Officer, who had produced the accused before PW 16, that he (Investigating Officer) had, in any manner, induced, ill-treated, threatened or intimidated the accused to make the judicial confession. Though PW 1, PW 2 and PW 7 did not personally know if the accused had really called the said deceased and was supposed to meet the said deceased at Tezpur, the fact of the matter remains that the evidence on record discloses, as we would proceed further, that the accused was, indeed, present at Tezpur and he had got a trunk made and bought at Tezpur. 50. Before proceeding further, it needs to be noted that there is no impediment in founding conviction of an accused on the basis of his own confession if the Court finds that the confession has been made voluntarily and that the confession is true. 51. It clearly transpires from what have been pointed out above that the confession, in the present case, was, in the light of the evidence on record, a voluntarily made confession. In order, however, to judge if the confession was true, one of the means open to the Court is that the Court shall compare the confession with the catalogue of the events, which surface from the evidence on record, and if the confession fits into the evidence on record and the surrounding circumstances, the Court can treat the confession to be true. Reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Sankaria Vs. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1978 SC 1248 ), wherein the Supreme Court observed as under : ....If the first test is satisfied, the Court must, before acting upon the confession, reach the finding that what is stated therein is true and reliable. For judging the reliability of such a confession, or for that matter of any substantive piece of evidence, there is no rigid cannon of universal application. Even so, one broad method, which may be useful in most cases for evaluating a confession may be indicated. The court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and probabilities of the case. Even so, one broad method, which may be useful in most cases for evaluating a confession may be indicated. The court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and probabilities of the case. If, on such examination and comparison, the confession appears to be a probable catalogue of events and naturally fits in with the rest of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances, it may be taken to have satisfied the second test. (Emphasis added) 52. In the circumstances, as discussed above, we see no reason to reject the confession of the accused as involuntarily made confession. 53. The confession, which the accused-appellant made, receives support and corroboration, on every material aspect, from the evidence on record inasmuch as the evidence on record, otherwise also, shows that the accused did make a telephone call to Padmaja asking her to meet him at Tezpur. The evidence on record shows that the accused got a huge C.I. Sheet trunk made at Tezpur and he had stayed with the deceased at Nepali Mandir Guest House, at Paltanbazar, Guwahati. The evidence on record also corroborates the confessional statement of the accused that he, accompanied by Padmaja, had visited the clinic of Dr. R. N. Chakraborty and she had been advised by the doctor to have an X-Ray examination done. In tune with the evidence on record, the confession, in question, also shows that the accused had informed Padmaja that she would have to appear in an interview for recruitment in the Defence. The evidence on record further shows that the accused took the heavy truck, in question, with the help of a rickshaw-puller to the ASTC bus station, and the trunk was left inside the bus. Even the evidence of PW 10 and PW 14 shows that the trunk, which the accused carried from the said guest house, was a heavy one. The confession, thus, receives sufficient corroboration from the evidence on record. 54. What logically follows from the above discussion is that the judicial confession, in the present case, was voluntary and true and the confession of the accused-appellant is sufficient to be made the basis of his conviction for offences punishable under Section 302 and 201 IPC. 55. Coupled with the above, we may, now, sum up the circumstances, which appear against the accused-appellant. 55. Coupled with the above, we may, now, sum up the circumstances, which appear against the accused-appellant. The circumstances are as under : (i) Firstly, the accused, being a cousin of the said deceased, used to visit her and he actively helped her to open LIC policies, wherein he put his mother's name as nominee and, after the death of the said deceased, brother of the accused did go to the LIC office to enquire about the insurance policy (PW 19 & PW 28). (ii) Secondly, the accused lured the deceased by saying that he was capable of arranging a better job in the Army for the said deceased and collected some money from the deceased for the same (Established from the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 8 and the contents of the diary of the deceased). (iii) Thirdly, the accused asked the deceased to accompany him to Guwahati from Tezpur. The deceased accordingly left for Guwahati and met the accused at Tezpur (Evidence of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 7). (iv) Fourthly, the deceased was at Guwahati. She was treated by PW 21 (doctor). She was seen, along with the accused, by PW 10 and PW 14 at the guest house of Nepali Mandir, at Guwahati. (v) Fifthly, the dead body of the deceased was found in a trunk loaded in ASTC bus and the conductor, having seen the dead body, reported the matter to the superintendent, ASTC (PW 20). (vi) Sixthly, the place, i.e., shop, at Tezpur, wherefrom the accused purchased the trunk, was found at the instance of the accused. The shop owner (PW 18 and PW 26) confirmed that the accused had got the trunk made from their shop. The diary, used by the deceased, was recovered from a drain, nearby the said guest house, at the instance of the accused. The conduct of the accused is relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. (vii) The accused confessed his guilt and his confessional statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC. This confessional statement, we find, voluntary, true and reliable. 56. In addition to the above, the evidence of landlord (PW 7) and PW 1, PW 2 and PW 8 prove that the accused used to call the deceased, over telephone, and it is after receiving his call that the deceased left her place of residence. 57. This confessional statement, we find, voluntary, true and reliable. 56. In addition to the above, the evidence of landlord (PW 7) and PW 1, PW 2 and PW 8 prove that the accused used to call the deceased, over telephone, and it is after receiving his call that the deceased left her place of residence. 57. In the light of the above discussion, it can be safely held that the circumstances, established by satisfactory evidence, are so clinching and unerring so as to lead to the lone conclusion, unaffected by reasonable doubt, that it was the accused and none else, who had intentionally killed the said deceased and committed thereby offence of murder and also too all steps to cause disappearance of the evidence so as to screen himself from being punished. 58. Situated thus, it becomes abundantly clearly, and we hold, that the accused-appellant has been rightly found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 and 201 IPC. Neither his conviction needs interference nor do we see any reason to interfere with the sentences, which have been passed against him. There is no merit in this appeal and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 59. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal stands dismissed. 60. Send back the LCR. Let an amount of Rs. 5,000/- be paid to Ms. P. Bhattacharya, learned amicus curiae, for her valuable assistance rendered to this Court in this proceeding. Appeal dismissed.