Judgment : This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India aggrieved by order dated 21-07-2012 passed in I.A.No.692 of 2012 in O. A. No. 547 of 2011 on the file of A.P. Endowments Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short 'the Tribunal'). 2. The petitioner herein is also the petitioner in the I.A. and respondent in the O.A. whereas the respondent herein is also the respondent in the I.A. and petitioner in the O.A. For convenience sake, I refer the parties as arrayed in the O.A. 3. The petitioner filed the O.A. to declare the respondent as the encroacher of the petition schedule property (property) within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of and Section 118 of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (for short 'Endowments Act'), to direct the respondent to vacate the property and handover the possession of the property to him (the petitioner) and for costs. It is pleaded on behalf of the petitioner therein as follows: The petitioner is a single religious institution within the meaning of Chapter XIV of the Endowments Act. The petitioner is the absolute owner of the properties scheduled in the petition. The petitioner leased out to the respondent an extent of Ac.0-27 cents in S.No.642 of Tirumala Village on a monthly rent of Rs.10/- on 02-02-1984. The petitioner also leased out Ac.0-57 cents of land in S.No.592 belonging to it at the same place to the respondent on 18-10-1979. Both the leases expired by 19-07-1986. According to the petitioner thereafter the respondent was granted lease for the third time for the properties for three years for the period from 20-07-1983 to 19-07-1986 with altogether new terms which got no bearing on the terms and conditions pertaining to the earlier leases and which was also expired and not extended. But inspite of that, the respondent failed to vacate the properties. But inspite of that, the respondent failed to vacate the properties. On the other hand, the respondent filed O.A.No.15 of 1987 on the file of the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupati against the petitioner to declare that he got option to have the extension of leases from time to time for a period of six years each and for consequential injunction which was dismissed aggrieved by which he filed A.S.No.160 of 1997 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which was also dismissed with costs on 12-12-2006 following which he preferred S.L.P. in the Apex Court which was also dismissed on 20-04-2007 at the stage of admission itself. Further an extent of Ac.0-35 cents in the said survey numbers belonging to the petitioner was also encroached by the respondent as a result of which he has been in possession and enjoyment of Ac.1-19 cents of the petitioner's land. Further taking advantage of the said factors, the respondent indulged in constructing a building and has been running an educational institution therein under the name and style of "S.V.B.N.R. English & Telugu Medium School, Tirumala". Further on 12-06-2009 the petitioner issued a legal notice to the respondent calling upon him to vacate and deliver the possession of the property. But the respondent having received the notice did not comply with the demand. Hence, the petitioner filed the O.A. to grant the reliefs prayed for. 4. During the pendency of O.A. the respondent filed the Interlocutory Application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') against the petitioner for referring the matter for arbitration in terms of the corresponding lease agreements entered into between the parties and also for granting necessary stay meanwhile. In this context it is pleaded on behalf of the respondent as follows: In the corresponding lease deed No.2478/1975 dated 01-08-1975, which was executed in respect of the lease originally entered into from 20-07-1977, clause (5) was made therein to refer the matter to the Commissioner, Endowments for arbitration if any disputes or differences would arise between the parties thereto either in the matter of interpretation of several clauses, terms or stipulations or in the matter of giving effect to any or all of them during or at the expiry of the lease period. The lease was extended for a period of another six years from 19-07-1983 under registered lease deed No.3524/1979 dated 18-10-1979 incorporating the same arbitration clause. Later the lease period was extended for three more years from 20-07-1983 to 19-07-1986 under lease deed dated 02-02-1984 without incorporating any arbitration clause. In fact as the lease deed dated 02-02-1984 was only in consequence of the earlier lease deeds, the same arbitration clause would be applicable to it by reason of which the matter should be referred to an Arbitrator for settlement. It is also claimed that by virtue of Section 8 of the Act when such arbitration clause is there, the Tribunal or Court concerned with is under mandatory obligation to refer the matter accordingly. It is further claimed on behalf of the respondent that he filed W.P.No.9356 of 1998 before the High Court questioning the initiation of O.A.No.1 of 1988 which was disposed of by order dated 10-06-1999 by this Court directing to file necessary objections or explanations before the concerned authority following which the respondent filed objections in that O.A. seeking for the reference of the matter under the arbitration clause. But the petitioner without proceeding further filed I.A.No.1 of 2002 seeking for the amendment of the O.A. schedule which was allowed on 31-08-2002 without considering the arbitration clause against which C.R.P.No.4571 of 2002 was preferred which was disposed of by this Court vide orders dated 21-03-2003 setting aside the orders passed in the interlocutory application following which the petitioner withdrew the O.A.No.1 of 1988 which circumstance is to be taken in the present context also. 5. The Tribunal framed the following points for consideration: i. Whether there is an arbitration agreement available between the parties to the lis to refer the parties to the arbitration and if so u/s. 34 of the Act, 1940 or u/s. 8 of the Act, 1996? ii. 5. The Tribunal framed the following points for consideration: i. Whether there is an arbitration agreement available between the parties to the lis to refer the parties to the arbitration and if so u/s. 34 of the Act, 1940 or u/s. 8 of the Act, 1996? ii. If so, there is disentitlement in now seeking to refer the list to arbitration either because such an application to filed by the O.A. Respondent (petitioner herein) earlier either in O.A.1/88 having filed the counter therein admittedly in 1999 by raising the plea of arbitration clause to refer and not referred u/s. 34 of old arbitration Act that was applicable by then as stated in the present petition rejoinder, either before filing the counter in 1999 or after even while the O.A.1/88 was pending and before permitted for withdrawal of the O.A.1/88 in the year, 2007 to file fresh O.A. and either later or even before having filed O.S.No.15/87 wherein admittedly not raised the plea of arbitration clause to refer and no even sought for reference u/s. 34 of old arbitration Act that was applicable by then and admittedly went unsuccessful in the trial Court as well as first appeal as well as in SLP before the Supreme Court in the long legal battle till 2007-08 all through till now and even the O.A filed was on dt. 19.9.2009 before the Commissioner of Endowments as O.A.5/2009 and having challenged the present O.A. proceedings maintainability and jurisdiction at least twice before the Hon'ble High Court by writ petitions with no plea of arbitration clause availability therein to refer and thereby waiver if any from not raising the plea even in the writ petitions and otherwise even from the subject matter of the schedule property covered by the O.A. for eviction is larger in extent to the subject matter of the lease which is only a part of it even any arbitration clause applies to that extent of the lease land only covered and not for the rest? iii. To what relief? 6. For the respondent Exs.P-1 to P-3 were marked and for the petitioner Exs.R-1 to R-7 were marked without examining any witnesses to substantiate the respective claims. 7. iii. To what relief? 6. For the respondent Exs.P-1 to P-3 were marked and for the petitioner Exs.R-1 to R-7 were marked without examining any witnesses to substantiate the respective claims. 7. The Tribunal after considering the material available on record dismissed the application holding that the claim of the petitioner therein (the respondent in the O.A.) that in the third lease deed, which was quite distinct from the earlier lease deeds, no arbitration clause was incorporated by reason of which the question of referring the matter for arbitration for necessary disposal would not arise at all aggrieved by which the present C.R.P. has been filed. 8. Therefore the points to be considered here are - 1) Whether the third lease for three years from 20-07-1983 to 19-07-1986 marked as Ex.P-3 in fact should be taken as the renewal or extension of the earlier leases by reason of which the arbitration clause incorporated in the earlier lease deeds should be applied for that lease also so as to refer the matter to an Arbitrator for settlement? 2) Whether the order passed by the Tribunal is tenable or not. Point Nos.1 and 2: 9. Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which is relevant here, deals with the power to refer parties to an arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement. Clause (1) therein contemplates that judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. Thereby by virtue of this clause when an action is brought in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement before a judicial authority that authority has to refer the parties to arbitration subject to the limitation provided therein. This mandates that there should be arbitration clause to do so which might have been entered into by virtue of an agreement. Clause (2) contemplates that the application referred to in sub-sec (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. This mandates that there should be arbitration clause to do so which might have been entered into by virtue of an agreement. Clause (2) contemplates that the application referred to in sub-sec (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. Clause (3) contemplates that notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-sec (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made. 10. Here it is necessary to examine the relevant terms and conditions incorporated in the lease deeds. Clause (5) of the first and second lease deeds dated 01-08-1975 and 18-10-1979 which is common in clear terms provides "It is agreed that any dispute or difference arising between the parties hereto either in the matter of the interpretation of the several clauses terms or stipulations or in the matter of giving effect to any or all of them during or at the expiry of the lease period shall be referred to the arbitration of the Commissioner endowments." On the other hand in the third lease deed dated 02-02-1984 it is incorporated as follows: "Whereas the Management Committee, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams, Tirupati in their Resolution No.295 dated 4.9.1983 and Resolution No.387 dated 31.10.1983 communicated in proceedings Roc.PO4/2501/RO III/83 dated 1.12.1983 has renewed the lease in respect of vacant site more fully described in the schedule hereunto for a period of three years only commencing from 20.7.1983 to 19.7.1986" subject to the terms and conditions incorporated thereunder. On the other hand clause (1) of the terms and conditions thereunder reads "The lease is extended for a further period of three years from 20.7.1983 to 19.7.1986 by increasing rental at 10%." 11. Learned counsel for the respondent would contend that in fact the clause used as extended or renewed in the third lease deed for the extension of the earlier leases is very important as it makes abundantly clear that the terms of the original or prior leases were made applicable to the third lease also. Importantly as borne out by the third lease deed, the managing committee of the petitioner by the Resolutions No.295, dated 04-09-1983 and No.387 dated 31-10-1983 renewed the lease for the property. Importantly as borne out by the third lease deed, the managing committee of the petitioner by the Resolutions No.295, dated 04-09-1983 and No.387 dated 31-10-1983 renewed the lease for the property. Thereby in order to properly understand the terms and conditions incorporated in the third lease, those terms and conditions are also to be read in conjunction or in consonance with the prior lease deeds. According to him there is a difference between extension of lease in accordance with the covenant in that regard contained in the principal lease and renewal of lease, again in accordance with the covenant for renewal contained in the original lease because in the case of extension it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of lease executed as the extension of lease for the term agreed upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for extension. He claims that the intention of the Managing Committee in framing the third lease deed can be gathered only by making necessary reference to the lease deeds earlier executed. Further in view of the earlier lease deeds in consequence of which the latter lease deed was executed, the fact that some new conditions were incorporated in the latter lease deed would not seize the enforcement of the terms and conditions of the earlier agreements unless specific clause was made in that behalf in the latter lease deed. He relied upon the following decisions to substantiate his claim. SYED JALEEL ZANE v. P. VENKATA MURALIDHAR AND OTHERS ( AIR 1981 AP 328 ), STATE OF U.P. v. LALIJI TANDON ( AIR 2004 SC 32 ), CHAIRMAN AND M.D., N.T.P.C. LTD v. M/s. RESHMI CONSTRUCTINS, BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS ( AIR 2004 SC 1330 (1), STRACON INDIA LTD v. UTV SOFTWARE COMMUNICATIN LTD (AIR 2002 DELHI 209), MOHD. IMTIYAZ AHMED v. MOHD. HUSSAIN KHAN ( 2010(3) ALD 120 ) and SMT. KALPANA KOTHARI v. SMT. SUDHA YADAV ( AIR 2002 SC 404 ). 12. On the other hand learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the third lease deed was quite distinct from the prior lease deeds with regards to the relevant terms and conditions of the lease. HUSSAIN KHAN ( 2010(3) ALD 120 ) and SMT. KALPANA KOTHARI v. SMT. SUDHA YADAV ( AIR 2002 SC 404 ). 12. On the other hand learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the third lease deed was quite distinct from the prior lease deeds with regards to the relevant terms and conditions of the lease. The third lease deed is to be examined in the light of the wordings given in the suit in O.S.No.15 of 1997 and the corresponding proceedings which became final whereby the question of giving option to the respondent to have the extension of leases from time to time has been seized once for all. According to him the intention of the management in creating the third lease can be gathered on the basis of the distinction made while incorporating the relevant terms and conditions therein. What is significant according to him is that originally the lease for month to month was only granted which makes the intention of the management very clear in fact. He resisted the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. 13. In fact the intention of the Managing Committee while entering into the third lease can be gathered in particular basing upon the terms and conditions mentioned therein with reference to the terms and conditions mentioned in the prior leases. It is necessary to extract the common terms and conditions incorporated in the earlier lease deeds and also those incorporated in the latter lease deed: Lease deeds dated 01-08-1975 and 18-10-1979: (1) The lessor hereby demises to the lessee all the plot of land described in the schedule to hold the same to the lessee from 20th day of July, 1971 the date of Board Resolution for six years playing therefore during the said term the yearly rent after Rs.10/- (Ten rupees only) on the first day of July in each year the first of such payments to be made on the 1st July 1972. (i) The lessee will during the term hereby granted to pay the lessor the yearly rent hereby reserved on the day in the manner herein before appointed. (i) The lessee will during the term hereby granted to pay the lessor the yearly rent hereby reserved on the day in the manner herein before appointed. (ii) (a) The Lessor will during the said term pay all rates taxes said charges of every description other than water and electric charges now payable or hereafter to become payable in respect of the devised premises or the building now in existence or erected hereafter together with any substantial improvements of a Permanent character effected by the lessor hereafter. (b) In respect of the buildings erected by the lessee on the demised premises all rates, taxes and charges of every description including of water and electric charges payable shall be paid by the lessee. (c) In respect of any substantial improvements of a permanent character that may be made by the lessee and referred to in clause (3) (ii) hereunder all rates and charges of every description shall be paid by the lessee. (iii) the lessee shall keep the building and other properties described in schedules in good condition and complete repairs. (iv) Subject to the covenant regarding renewal of the lease herein of the contained the lessee shall on the expiry of the term hereby reserved peacefully surrender possession of the demised premises with all the building etc. (3) The lessor hereby covenants with the lessee as follows: that the lessee paying the rent hereby reserved and performing and observing the covenants and conditions herein contained and on its part to be performed and observed shall and may peacefully and anietly hold possession and enjoy the said demised premises buildings and other properties during the said term in manner above said without any lawful interruption or disturbance by the lessor or any persons whomsoever. (ii) The Lessor shall pay the land tax now imposed or hereinafter to be imposed on demised premises described in schedule. (iii) The Lessee shall be at liberty with the consent of the lessor to construct a building or make improvements herein. (iv) The Lessor will at the request and the cost of the lessee at the end of the term of years hereby granted and soon from time to time thereafter of the end of such successive further terms of years as shall be granted execute to the lessee a new term and on such covenants and provisions as the lessor may then resolute. (4) That whenever such an interpretation would be necessary in order to give the fullest scope and effect legally possible to any covenant or contract herein contemned the expression lessor herein shall include its successors, administrations, assignees and the expression the lessee shall include its successors administrators and assignees. (5) It is agreed that any dispute or difference arising between the parties hereto either in the matter of the interpretation of the several clauses terms and stipulations or in the matter of giving effect to any or all of them during or at the expiry of the lease period shall be referred to the arbitration of the commissioner endowments. Lease deed dated 02-02-1984: 1. The lease is extended for a further period of three years from 20.7.1983 to 19.7.1986 by increasing rental at 10%. 2. The lessee shall execute a lease deed and get it registered at his cost. 3. It is open to the lessor to reduce the term of lease or terminate the lease at any time and the lessee shall deliver vacant possession of the site. 4. After the completion of lease period the lessee shall deliver vacant possession of the site to the lessor. 5. The lessee should not sub-let the premises to anyone under any circumstances. In such instance, the lease will e terminated. 6. Te lessee should pay Rs.38-50 immediately towards the first year from 20.7.1983 to 19.7.1984 and for the subsequent years before the commencement of the year or earlier without fail. 7. The lessee should not encourage his friends, relatives or others to reside in the premises doing any unlicenced business, if such cases are noticed, the lease will be terminated. 8. The site leased out should be used for the purpose of English and Telugu Medium school which is dedicated for the service of society. 9. The lessee should not encroach upon the premises of others or allow others to usurp into the premises leased to him. He should not encourage any antisocial activity. 10. The lessee should not give room for any complaints and in such cases the verdict of the lessor is final and the lessee should act accordingly. 11. The lessee should pay electrical, water consumption and sanitary charges as per demands from time to time served from TTDs departments. 12. He should not encourage any antisocial activity. 10. The lessee should not give room for any complaints and in such cases the verdict of the lessor is final and the lessee should act accordingly. 11. The lessee should pay electrical, water consumption and sanitary charges as per demands from time to time served from TTDs departments. 12. Any act of misconduct, breach of trust or willful violation of conditions above stipulated and those imposed from time to time will result in the termination of lease." 14. On the examination of those terms and conditions it is very categorical that the third lease is quite distinct from the earlier leases. Though it was noted in the third lease that the lease was renewed or extended, it was clarified specifically that it was done subject to the terms and conditions incorporated therein which are quite distinct from the terms and conditions of the earlier lease deeds. This aspect of distinction or agreement has been well analysed in the following decisions: 15. In SYED JALEEL ZANE's case (1 supra), a question was considered as to whether renewal of a lease agreement subject to same terms and conditions incorporated in an earlier agreement should be read in conjunction with those earlier terms and conditions. It is observed by the Supreme Court considering various factors that a document of lease containing a clause of renewal has to be read as a whole and as an effort made to ascertain the intention of the parties while entering into the contract. No single clause or term should be read in isolation so as to defeat the other clauses. The interpretation must be reasonable, harmonious, and be deduced from the language in the document. 16. In STRACON INDIA LTD's case (4 supra), subsequent lease agreements were executed modifying only payment schedule between the parties therein inspite of which a question arose about the terms of the subsequent lease. The Delhi High Court held that when the subsequent agreement was made on the basis of the original agreement, the terms and conditions of the original agreement were to be taken into consideration. 17. The Delhi High Court held that when the subsequent agreement was made on the basis of the original agreement, the terms and conditions of the original agreement were to be taken into consideration. 17. In LALIJI TANDON's case (2 supra), the Supreme Court held: "Where the principal lease executed between the parties containing a covenant for renewal, is renewed in accordance with the said covenant, whether the renewed lease shall also contain similar clause for renewal depends on the facts and circumstances of each case regard being had to the intention of the parties as displayed in the original covenant for renewal and the surrounding circumstances. There is a difference between an extension of lease in accordance with the covenant in that regard contained in the principal lease and renewal of lease, again in accordance with the covenant for renewal contained in the original lease. In the case of extension it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of lease executed; as the extension of lease for the term agreed upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for extension. However, option for renewal consistently with the covenant for renewal has to be exercised consistently with the terms thereof and, if exercised, a fresh deed of lease shall have to be executed between the parties. Failing the execution of a fresh deed of lease, another lease for a fixed term shall not come into existence though the principal lessee in spite of the expiry of the term thereof may continue by holding over for year by year or month by month, as the case may be." 18. In RAMAKRISHNA THEATRE LTD. v. M/S. GENERAL INVESTMENTS AND COMMERCIAL CORPN. LTD. (AIR 2003 KARNATAKA 502), it is observed: "A right once waived by a party in respect of the course to be adopted for settlement of a dispute between himself and the other side is lost forever and cannot be reclaimed or re-agitated later on, on being visited by the consequences that followed such waiver of the right to a specific course to which he was entitled to as a matter of right. This is so because when a party to an arbitration agreement gives up his right to refer the dispute to arbitration, a right comes to vest in the other party to take recourse to the other remedies that are open to him in law and when such a recourse is resorted to by the other party, the party who had waived his right to settle the dispute in an arbitration proceedings cannot be permitted to turn around and contend that he is entitled to the remedy of arbitration and the recourse to the suit by the other party under the common law is bad. The petitioner-defendant is stopped from taking up such a stand by his own conduct and the principle of law that no party to a legal proceeding can be permitted to approbate and reprobate in the matter of defending a cause has general application to all matters and the choice of the legal process to which one can stake claim in defending his legal rights is also governed by the said general principle." 19. What emerges from the principles referred above is that the intention of the parties to the agreement is to be gathered with regards to the application of the subsequent lease agreements in consonance with the earlier lease agreements. So the title given for those agreements may not be important always because that is to be decided with regards to the relevant terms and conditions incorporated therein. Where the principal lease executed between the parties containing a covenant for renewal, is renewed in accordance with the said covenant, whether the renewed lease shall also contain similar clause for renewal depends on the facts and circumstances of each case regard being had to the intention of the parties as displayed in the original covenant for renewal and the surrounding circumstances. There is a difference between an extension of lease in accordance with the covenant in that regard contained in the principal lease and renewal of lease, again in accordance with the covenant for renewal contained in the original lease. In the case of extension it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of lease executed; as the extension of lease for the term agreed upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for extension. In the case of extension it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of lease executed; as the extension of lease for the term agreed upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for extension. But option for renewal exactly in accordance with the covenant for the renewal has to be exercised in accordance with the terms thereof whereas a fresh deed of lease shall have to be executed between the parties for the coming into force of the lease for another term. On the other hand when once the right of reference is waived by a party that right is lost to him forever as it gives a right to the other party to take recourse to other remedies available to him. The RAMAKRISHNA THEATRE LTD's case (7 supra) deals with waiver of an option available for reference to arbitration which exactly is not the case here. However in the context of the present case when the terms incorporated in the third agreement are quite distinct from the terms incorporated in the earlier agreements, it makes the intention of the management very clear that the third one was not the renewal of the earlier agreements. In other words it was altogether a new agreement for a particular period. Thereby simply because it was stated that the lease was renewed or extended, that does not give a picture akin to the plea of the respondent. Apart from that the final decision arrived at in O.S.No.15 of 1987 filed in the same context which was dismissed and the corresponding proceedings which became final, will have bearing upon the claim and entitlement of the respondent. In view of the findings given in those proceedings denying his plea to grant the declaration to have the option of renewing the lease from time to time, he is in fact estopped from raising the plea of application of the arbitration clause. When there is no renewal the application of the terms of the earlier leases does not arise at all. Having agreed to the distinct terms and conditions of the third lease deed and executed it, he cannot be allowed to take a different plea. In other words he is not permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time. Viewed from any angle, there is no basis to uphold the claim of the respondent. Having agreed to the distinct terms and conditions of the third lease deed and executed it, he cannot be allowed to take a different plea. In other words he is not permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time. Viewed from any angle, there is no basis to uphold the claim of the respondent. The principles laid down in the decisions cited are not helpful to the plea of the respondent. On the other hand they uphold the plea of the petitioner. The Tribunal properly examined the matter. I find no grounds to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal thereby. 20. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs. 21. Consequent upon the dismissal of the C.R.P, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.