Judgment :- N.V. Ramana, J. This criminal appeal by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), is directed against the order dated 13.07.2012, passed by the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, in M.P.No. 353 of 2012 in Crime No.1/2012 of NIA, granting bail to the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4. The facts of the case in brief are on credible information that one Morjen Hossain of Mohabatpur village, Kaliachak PS limits, Malda District, West Bengal, and others were smuggling counterfeit Indian currency notes of Rs.500/- and Rs.1,000/- denominations from Pakistan through India-Bangladesh borders and circulating them across India, the National Investigation Agency, lawfully intercepted the mobile phone numbers of the said persons with due permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, by. The intercepted telephonic conversations of the said persons which was recorded revealed that Morjen Hossain, Rakib Sheik, who worked at Patancheru in Medak District of Andhra Pradesh, along with others formed a group and indulged in smuggling and circulation of fake Indian currency notes of denominations of Rs.500/-and Rs.1,000/- in India as part of larger conspiracy to destabilize the monetary system in India. The said persons were raising funds for terrorist activities by way of earning genuine currency notes against the counterfeit currency notes circulated by them. Thereafter, the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs (Internal Security-I Division), IS-IV Desk, had given directions to the National Investigation Agency to register the case and to investigate the same vide Order No.11034/36/2011-IS-IV, dated 28.12.2011. Pursuant thereto, the Head Quarters of National Investigation Agency at New Delhi had given directions to their Hyderabad Branch to register the case. Based on that, a case was registered as Crime No.1/2012/NIA/HYD, dated 03.01.2012 against Morgen Hossain as accused No.1 and Rakib Shaik as accused No.2. They were arrested on 06.01.2012. During the course of investigation, he revealed the names of other accused, including the respondents-accused herein, and they were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. The National Investigation Agency after completion of investigation filed the charge sheet. While so, the respondents-accused filed application in M.P. No. 353 of 2012 for their release on bail, and the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, by an order dated 13.07.2012, granted bail to the respondents-accused No.3 and 4. The legality of the said order granting bail to the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 is questioned in this criminal appeal. While so, the respondents-accused filed application in M.P. No. 353 of 2012 for their release on bail, and the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, by an order dated 13.07.2012, granted bail to the respondents-accused No.3 and 4. The legality of the said order granting bail to the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 is questioned in this criminal appeal. The learned Assistant Solicitor General appearing for the appellant-NIA submitted that the respondents-accused in association with other accused, are indulging in circulation of fake Indian currency notes across the Indian territory, that are printed in Pakistan. The activities of the respondents-accused are not in their individual capacity, but are part of an organized network, conspired to destabilize the Indian economy and threaten the internal security of the country by raising funds for terrorist activities through such circulation of fake Indian currency notes. He further submitted that the activities of the respondents-accused fall within the ambit of “terrorist act” as described in Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and as such, they are liable for punishment under Sections 16 and 18 thereof. He further submitted that the legally intercepted phone calls of the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 with the other accused, shows their involvement in the circulation of fake Indian currency notes. Therefore, they are liable for punishment for the offences punishable under Sections 489-B, 489-C and 120-B I.P.C. He further submitted that the Court below in granting bail to the respondents-accused, committed a grave error in equating the respondents-accused with the other accused, who were released on bail. The respondents-accused herein are charged for offences punishable under Sections 489-B and 489-C read with Section 120-B I.P.C. and under Sections 16 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, which are grave and serious in nature and not bailable, while the other accused who were granted bail were charged for the offence punishable under Section 489-C I.P.C., which is not a serious offence. He further submitted that as per Section 43-D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, by application of modified Section 167 Cr.P.C., the judicial custody of the respondents-accused can be kept upto a period of 180 days. He further submitted that as per Section 43-D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, by application of modified Section 167 Cr.P.C., the judicial custody of the respondents-accused can be kept upto a period of 180 days. He further submitted that the respondents-accused though are residents of West Bengal, their houses are situated on the borders of Bangladesh, and there is every possibility that they may not turn up for trial, if they are released on bail. He further submitted that the investigation of the case is still at the nuptial stage, and as such, the Court below ought not to have granted bail to the respondents-accused. Hence, he prayed that the bail granted to the respondents-accused by the Court below be cancelled. The respondents-accused filed counter. The learned counsel for the respondents-accused reiterating the stand taken by the respondents-accused in the counter submitted that the respondents-accused were falsely implicated in the case. No material is placed by the appellant to show the prima facie involvement of the respondents-accused in the crime. The legally intercepted calls and the charge sheet filed against the respondents-accused does not reveal that the crime money allegedly collected by the respondents-accused through circulation of fake Indian currency notes is flown to Pakistan. He denied that the presence of the respondents-accused cannot be secured for trial because they reside on the borders of Bangladesh in West Bengal. He denied that the investigation of the case is at the initial stage and submitted that the entire investigation of the case is over and charge sheet is also filed, and as such, there is no need to keep the respondents-accused in custody for a period of upto 180 days in view of the provisions of Section 43-D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, by application of modified Section 167 Cr.P.C. He submitted that since the Court below, after considering the charge sheet and the material filed by the appellant, came to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out against the respondents-accused to deny bail, and accordingly granted bail to them, which does not call for interference by this Court in appeal. Thus he prayed that the criminal appeal be dismissed. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-NIA and the learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material on record. Thus he prayed that the criminal appeal be dismissed. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-NIA and the learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material on record. In the light of the arguments advanced, the questions that arise for consideration in this criminal appeal are: (1) Whether this criminal appeal filed by the appellant-NIA under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, against the order passed by the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, granting bail to the respondents-accused, lies to a single Judge or Bench of two Judges of the High Court? (2) Whether the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was justified in granting bail to the respondents-accused, and whether the appellant-NIA has made out any grounds to cancel the bail granted to the respondents-accused? In re question No.1: Normally an order granting or refusing bail is an interlocutory order and no appeal would lie against such order. However, as per the provisions of Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, an appeal lies to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. Under the NIA Act, there is a clear departure in the matter of granting of bail from that of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions regarding bail are contained in Sections 436 to 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no provision for appeal in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions of the NIA Act are in clear contra-distinction with that of the Code of Criminal Procedure as NIA Act is a special enactment. Now the issue that falls for consideration before us is, as per Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, appeal lies to the High Court, in the case of granting or refusal of bail. There is lot of ambiguity on this issue, whether appeal lies to a single Judge of the High Court or a Division Bench of the High Court, and we were informed that against the orders of the Special Court granting or refusing bail, in some cases, criminal petitions are filed before a single Judge and in some cases, criminal appeals are filed before a Division Bench of this Court, and the Registry is numbering them. In view of this confusion, we are of the view that there should be an authoritative pronouncement on this aspect. In view of this confusion, we are of the view that there should be an authoritative pronouncement on this aspect. Before we deal with this issue, it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section 21 of the NIA Act, which reads as follows: Appeals: - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a bench of two Judges of the High Court and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal. (3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. (5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of ninety days. From a reading of the above provision, it becomes evident that under sub-section (1) of Section 21, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court, both on facts and on law. Under sub-section (2), every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court. Sub-section (3) provides that except as provided in sub-sections (1) and (2), no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order, including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. Under sub-section (2), every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court. Sub-section (3) provides that except as provided in sub-sections (1) and (2), no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order, including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. However, sub-section (4) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. In ShaikhState of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar (2003) 8 SCC 50 ), on which the counsel for the appellant placed reliance, the Apex Court, considered the self-same question, as is involved in this appeal, in the light of the provisions of Section 34 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). The facts in the said case before the Apex Court were -a FIR was lodged, basing on which, a case in Crime No. I-09 of 2002 for the offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 337, 338, 435, 120-B, 34, 153-A, 302 and 307 IPC; Sections 141, 151 and 152 of the Indian Railways Act; Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act and Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act, were registered against the respondent and others. The police filed charge sheet against the accused before the Additional Sessions Judge, Panchmahals at Godhra, inter alia stating that the investigation is still continuing. As the investigation was still going on, the bail applications moved by the accused were rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge. Questioning the said rejection orders, the accused filed bail applications under Sections 439 Cr.P.C. before the High Court. While the matter stood thus, as the investigation revealed that the accused also committed offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), the police filed applications before the Additional Sessions Judge, for adding Sections 3 and 4 of POTA to the main charge sheet. The accused, who were in judicial custody, were also informed about the same. The accused, who were in judicial custody, were also informed about the same. In the counter filed to the bail applications, it was contended by the State of Gujarat that in view of addition of Sections 3 and 4 of POTA to the main charge sheet, and having regard to the provisions of POTA, the accused have to first approach the Special Court for grant of bail, and they can approach the High Court only after a decision by the Special Court. However, a learned Judge of the Gujarat High Court, allowed the bail applications moved by the accused under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and directed the State to release them on bail. The State carried the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, it was argued on behalf of the State that the accused having not applied for bail under Sections 3 and 4 of POTA, it was not open to the learned Judge of the High Court to entertain their bail applications and grant bail, and having regard to the provisions of Section 34(2) of POTA, only a Bench of two Judges of the High Court, could grant bail in respect of an offence under POTA, and since the learned single Judge has granted bail in exercise of the power under Section 439 read with Section 482 Cr.P.C, the order granting bail is illegal and without jurisdiction. To consider the above argument, the Apex Court referred to the provisions of Section 34 of POTA, which is parimateria, with Section 21 of the NIA Act, read as follows: Appeals:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a bench of two Judges of the High Court. (3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. (3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. (5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days: The Apex Court, interpreted the above Section 34 of POTA Act, which is parimateria, with Section 21 of the NIA Act, as follows: Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of POTA lays down that an appeal shall from any judgment, sentence or order not being an interlocutory order of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and law and in view of sub-section (2), the appeal has to be heard by a Bench of two Judges. Normally, an order granting or refusing bail is an interlocutory order and no appeal would lie. However, in view of sub-section (4) of Section 34 an appeal shall lie to the High Court against such an order. Under the scheme of POTA, there is a clear departure in the matter of grant of bail from that of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions regarding bail in the Code of Criminal Procedure are contained in Sections 436 to 439. Sub-section (1) of Sections 439 confers power upon the Court of Sessions and the High Court to grant bail to any person accused of having committed a non-bailable offence. Sub-section (2) of Section 439 deals with cancellation of bail and provides that any person who has been released on bail under Chapter XXXIII may be arrested and committed to custody. There is no provision for appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure against an order granting bail. Sub-section (2) of Section 439 deals with cancellation of bail and provides that any person who has been released on bail under Chapter XXXIII may be arrested and committed to custody. There is no provision for appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure against an order granting bail. (emphasis supplied) While rejecting the contention of the respondents-accused that the power of the High Court to grant bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. has not been taken away by POTA, and as such, the learned single Judge had the jurisdiction to grant bail to the respondents-accused in exercise of the power conferred by the said provision, the Apex Court held as follows: The apart, if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is accepted, it would mean that a person whose bail under POTA has been rejected by the Special Court will have two remedies and he can avail any one of them at his sweet will. He may move a bail application before the High Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. in the original or concurrent jurisdiction which may be heard by a single Judge or may prefer an appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 34 of POTA which would be heard by a Bench of two Judges. To interpret a statutory provision in such a manner that a court can exercise both appellate and original jurisdiction in respect of the same matter will lead to an incongruous situation. The contention is therefore rejected. In the present case, the respondents did not choose to apply for bail before the Special Court for offences under POTA and consequently, there was no order of refusal of bail for offences under the said Act. The learned single Judge exercising powers under Section 439 read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. granted them bail. The order of the High Court is clearly without jurisdiction as under the scheme of the Act the accused can only file an appeal against an order of refusal of bail passed by the Special Court before a Division Bench of the High Court and, therefore, the order under challenge cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. The order of the High Court is clearly without jurisdiction as under the scheme of the Act the accused can only file an appeal against an order of refusal of bail passed by the Special Court before a Division Bench of the High Court and, therefore, the order under challenge cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. (emphasis supplied) In Redaul Hussain Khan v. State of Assam (2009 (3) GLT 855), the accused were charged for the offences punishable under Sections 120(B), 121, 121(A) IPC read with Section 25(1B)(A) of Arms Act and Sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and the NIA Act. They were remanded to judicial custody. However, without approaching the Court of Sessions under Sections 437 Cr.P.C. as the Special Court was not constituted, they moved bail applications directly to the High Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. A learned single Judge of the High Court, considered the question whether a High Court can invoke the provisions of Section 439 Code of Criminal Procedure, for the purpose of granting bail to a person, who is in custody on the allegation of having committed an offence under the NIA Act, or for cancelling bail already granted to such an accused by a Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, or by some other Court of competent jurisdiction, which is subordinate to the High Court, and having regard to the provisions of Section 21(4) of the NIA Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court in ShaikhState of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar, which interpreted the provisions of Section 34(4) of POTA, which is parimateria with Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, dismissed the bail applications moved by the accused holding thus: … once the investigation, under the scheme of the NIA Act, is taken over by the Agency, it is the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, which can authorize further detention of an arrested accused. When such an arrested accused applies for bail to the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, the source of power to consider such an application for bail lies in Section 437 and not Section 439 of the Code. When such an arrested accused applies for bail to the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, the source of power to consider such an application for bail lies in Section 437 and not Section 439 of the Code. Even a High Court cannot invoke its powers under Section 439, to grant bail if it has been refused by the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, nor can the High Court, in exercise of its power, under Section 439, cancel bail if bail has been granted to such an accused by the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be. If the bail has been refused or granted by the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, the aggrieved party may, however, prefer an appeal, in terms of Section 21, to the High Court. Such an appeal has to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and in such an appeal, the merit of the order, granting or refusing bail, can be questioned. (emphasis supplied) The above view taken by a learned single Judge of the Gauhati High Court was approvingly quoted by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in JayantaKumar Ghosh v. State of Assam (2010) 4 GLT 1)and Sri Jibangshu Paul v. National Investigation Agency (NIA) (Criminal Appeal No.29 of 2011 dt. 27.07.2011). In Yoonusv. Deputy Superintendent of Police (Crl.A.No.2225 of 2010 dt. 23.10.2010), a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, also having considered the provisions of Section 21 of the NIA Act, held as follows: An order rejecting or granting bail is an appealable order u/s 21(4) of the NIA Act and the appeal from such order lie to the High Court u/s 21(4) of the NIA Act. Such appeal shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court as stipulated by Section 21(2) of the NIA Act.It is without knowing that legal position, as against the order rejecting bail applications by the Magistrate, fresh bail applications were filed before this Court. The Registry also, without knowing the legal position, numbered the petitions as bail applications and posted before the single Judge and accordingly it was disposed. The Registry also, without knowing the legal position, numbered the petitions as bail applications and posted before the single Judge and accordingly it was disposed. (emphasis supplied) In view of the judgment of the Apex Court, interpreting Section 34(4) of POTA, which is parimateriawith Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, we hold that the interpretation placed on Section 34(4) of POTA by the Apex Court, would apply mutatis mutandis to Section 21 (4) of the NIA Act. Thus, it draws us to an irresistible conclusion that the present appeal under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, which is against the orders passed by the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, granting bail to the respondents-accused would lie to the Division Bench of the High Court. Accordingly, we answer issue No.2 holding that this appeal under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, filed by the appellant-NIA against the order passed by the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, granting bail to the respondents-accused lies to a Division Bench of the High Court. In re question No.2: The second issue that falls for our consideration is whether the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, was justified in granting bail to the respondents-accused. Ordinarily, the discretion exercised by the lower Court in granting or refusing bail would not be interfered with, unless the order suffers from irrelevant considerations and is not supported by any material on record, then the appellate Court will interfere with the orders granting or refusing bail. It is well settled by catena of decisions rendered by the Apex Court that the power of cancellation of bail is required to be exercised with due care and circumspection. The High Court under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, exercises the power of an appellate Court. An appeal is a proceeding taken to rectify an erroneous decision of the Court by submitting the question to a higher Court. In view of the express language used in Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail, the appeal would lie both on facts and on law. In view of the express language used in Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail, the appeal would lie both on facts and on law. Therefore, even an order granting bail can be examined on merits by the High Court without any kind of fetters imposed on its powers and it can come to an independent conclusion whether the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, was justified in granting bail to the respondents-accused. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees life with dignity. Undoubtedly, national security is of paramount importance. Without protecting the safety and security of the nation, individual rights cannot be protected. Both national interest and individual dignity are core values of the Constitution. It is, therefore, obligatory on the part of the Court to exercise its judicial discretion guided by law. But not merely on assumptions and presumptions, much less on apprehensions, without sufficient material to constitute an offence charged. It is necessary for the Court dealing with an application for bail to consider the following circumstances among others before, granting bail. (1) The nature of accusation and severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. (2) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (3) Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charges. Even though the Courts have to take the above into consideration for granting bail, the said factors themselves cannot be taken into consideration in isolation ignoring the well guided principles laid down by the Apex Court and the facts and circumstances of each case. In the light of the above, we shall examine whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge was justified in granting bail to the respondents-accused. The case of the appellant is that upon credible information that accused No.1, namely Morjen Hossain of Mohabatpur village, Kaliachak Police Station Limits, Malda District West Bengal, in association with other accused, is indulging in circulation of fake Indian currency notes, by smuggling from Pakistan, they intercepted the phone calls of the accused and arrested accused No.1 on 06.01.2012 from his native village at Mohabatpur. On making searches, they found that accused No.1 was in possession of fake Indian currency notes worth Rs.2,000/-, and on interrogation, accused No.1 confessed that he procured the fake Indian currency notes from accused No.18-Shareef Sheik, who is a Bangladeshi national. Thereupon, they arrested accused No.18, and on his interrogation, he revealed that he circulated the fake Indian currency notes through his associates present in various parts of the country by paying them commission. That in exchange of Rs.1,00,000/- fake Indian currency notes, his associates would deposit amounts ranging between Rs. 30,000/- and Rs.35,000/-. That one of his associates, namely accused No.12-Mohd. Hussain, resident of Moradabad District, Uttar Pradesh, deposited the amounts in his bank A/c. No. 0293010469883 of United Bank of India, Kaliachak Branch, Malda District; bank A/c. No. 91001009337929 of Axis Bank, Patancheru Branch, Medak District, of accused No.2-Mohd. Anwar Sheik and; bank A/c. No. 20048612045 of SBI Ramachandrapuram, Medak District, of accused No.3-Mohd. Anwar Sheik. That accused No.1 used to withdraw the amounts from the said accounts by making use of the ATM cards of accused Nos. 2, 3 and 12. That accused No.3-Mohd. Anwar Sheik is one of the persons of the network formed by accused No.1. That accused No.3, along with accused No.4-Sajibul Haque, and accused Nos. 5 and 6 worked for Ramky Infrastructure, at Patancheru, Medak District, and stayed together. When accused Nos. 3 and 4 were arrested on 06.01.2012, they were found to be in possession of Rs. 500/- and Rs.1,000/-denomination of fake Indian currency notes with Sl. No. 8BS 963409 and 9AT 936887 respectively. Accused No.17-Mohammed @ Sheik @ Anwar @ Ashraf, a Pakistani national is also involved in the circulation of fake Indian currency notes. They are investigating the involvement of accused Nos. 17 and 18 through the mechanism of MLAT request. Since the fake Indian currency notes circulated across India and seized from the accused originated from Pakistan, they along with the legal tender of Pakistan have sent the seized fake Indian currency notes to Security Printing and Minting Corporation India Limited, for examination and report. Thus, according to the appellant, the respondents-accused along with accused No.1 and other accused are punishable for the offences under Sections 489-B, 489-C r/w Section 120-B IPC and Sections 16 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The offences for which the respondents-accused Nos. Thus, according to the appellant, the respondents-accused along with accused No.1 and other accused are punishable for the offences under Sections 489-B, 489-C r/w Section 120-B IPC and Sections 16 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The offences for which the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 are charged are scheduled offences and come within the purview of investigation by the National Investigation Agency. It is the contention of the appellant-NIA that the acts of respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4, namely circulation of fake Indian currency notes, is resulting in loss and damage to government property, and using the money realized by them through such circulation of fake Indian currency notes, for raising funds for terrorist activities, which constitute terrorist act, within the meaning of Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and for such acts, they are liable for punishment under Sections 489-B, 489-C r/w Section 120-B and Sections 16 and 17 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. While considering an application for bail, the Courts need not search to see whether there would be evidence against the accused to convict him or them after trial. While examining so, the Court should not be meticulous in examination of the evidence on record. In an appeal filed against an order granting bail, this Court can certainly examine whether there is any material on record to come to the conclusion that there is prima facie case made out against the accused, which disentitles them to grant of bail, and as such, the bail granted to them has to be cancelled. In the light of the above discussion, we have to look into whether the appellant-NIA has made out any prima facie case for cancellation of the bail granted to the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 by the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge. A perusal of the charge sheet filed and the material collected by the appellant-NIA against respondents-accused in its entirety, discloses that the only charge against respondent No.1, who is accused No.3 is that at the time of his arrest on 06.01.2012, he was found in possession of Rs.500/-fake Indian currency notes with Sl. A perusal of the charge sheet filed and the material collected by the appellant-NIA against respondents-accused in its entirety, discloses that the only charge against respondent No.1, who is accused No.3 is that at the time of his arrest on 06.01.2012, he was found in possession of Rs.500/-fake Indian currency notes with Sl. No. 8BS 963409 and that he has allowed accused No.1 to use his bank A/c. No. 2004861205 of SBI, Ramachandrapuram, Medak District, to deposit and withdraw the amount therefrom through his ATM card; while the charge against respondent No.2, who is accused No.4 is that at the time of his arrest on 06.01.2012, he was found in possession of Rs.1,000/- fake Indian currency note with Sl. No. 9AT 936887. The fake Indian currency notes seized from the possession of accused Nos. 3 and 4 were sent for comparison to Currency Note Press, Nasik, unit of SPMCL, and report was received from them confirming the seized notes to be counterfeit notes. Except this material, there is no material placed by the appellant-NIA to show that the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 have indulged in large-scale circulation of fake Indian currency notes. However, the counsel for the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 contends that the alleged fake Indian currency notes seized from accused Nos. 3 and 4 are fancy notes and not meant for circulation. Whether the notes seized from the possession of the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 are fake notes or fancy notes not meant for circulation, is a matter for trial, and it is for the appellant-NIA to establish before the Special Court by adducing evidence. Even though, the appellant-NIA to prove the conspiracy and terrorist activities against the respondents, sought to rely on the legally intercepted phone calls said to have made by accused No.3 from Phone No. 9032358281 to Phone Nos. 9593658491 and 9733086152 and accused No.4 from Phone No. 9032969225 to Phone No. 9735588715, existing in the name of accused No.22, the report as regards comparison of their voice, is awaited from CFSL, Chandigarh. There no other material collected by the appellant-NIA to show that respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 are involved in a deeper conspiracy to destabilize the economy of the country and are facilitating accused No.1 to raise funds for terrorist activities. Admittedly, the respondents-accused Nos. There no other material collected by the appellant-NIA to show that respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 are involved in a deeper conspiracy to destabilize the economy of the country and are facilitating accused No.1 to raise funds for terrorist activities. Admittedly, the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 were in jail for more than six months, and after expiry of the said period, and considering the fact that no material was produced by the appellant-NIA to show the involvement of the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 prima facie in circulation of fake Indian currency notes and funding the terrorist organizations, the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge has granted them bail subject to the condition of their not meddling with the evidence and co-operating with the investigation, when required. In spite of adjourning the matter three times, the appellant-NIA, except stating that investigation is still going on and respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 are border residents of Bangladesh and if they are released on bail they would not turn up for investigation and securing their presence for facing trial would be difficult as there is every possibility of their crossing the borders of Bangladesh, have not produced any material, much less report from the CFSL, in relation to the voice calls which they have intercepted and sent for comparison with the voice of the accused. They have also not produced any material to show that the respondents-accused have jumped bail or made any attempts to cross the borders of Bangladesh or have not co-operated with the investigation or threatened the prosecution witnesses or tampered with the evidence. In that view of the matter, the contention of the appellant-NIA that the respondents-accused may flew away from the country, in our opinion, cannot be kept in an ivory tower. The individual liberty is restricted by large social interest and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. The appellant-NIA failed to demonstrate before this Court that by grant of bail to the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 prejudice is caused to the State or to the security of the State, and on the other hand, it is their case that the accused are co-operating with the investigation and attending to the Court on every date of adjournment. The appellant-NIA failed to demonstrate before this Court that by grant of bail to the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4 prejudice is caused to the State or to the security of the State, and on the other hand, it is their case that the accused are co-operating with the investigation and attending to the Court on every date of adjournment. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, has exercised its discretion judicially, cautiously and considering the material available on record granted bail to the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4, and no interference is warranted with such an order passed by the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge granting bail to the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4, and more particularly when the appellant-NIA failed to point out any serious infirmity in the discretion exercised by the Special Court/Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge. Accordingly, we answer question No.2 holding that the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, in the fact and circumstances of the case, was justified in granting bail to the respondents-accused Nos. 3 and 4. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the criminal appeal, and the same is accordingly dismissed.