JUDGMENT : By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-State Bank of India has called in question the award dated 29-7-1999, passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as CGIT for brevity). By the said award, a direction has been issued to reinstate the respondent No. 2 in services of the bank with all the backwages. It is contended that the respondent No. 2 was engaged for certain casual work of the Bank. He was paid wages for the period he has worked in the Bank. The respondent No. 2 was not appointed on any post, but has worked in different capacities for certain days. However, the respondent No. 2 was discontinued from the service as no work was available for him. When certain posts became available, the respondent No. 2 was given an opportunity to appear before the Selection Committee for the purposes of his regular employment. After interview, since the respondent No. 2 was not found fit for grant of employment on regular basis, the fact was brought to his notice by letter dated 13-1-1986. The proceedings were done by the respondent No. 2, challenging the action of discontinuance in service alleging it to be a retrenchment, in violation of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short) and when the reconciliation proceedings failed, the matter was referred to the Central Government. The dispute was referred to the CGIT by the Central Government vide reference order dated 21-9-1990. A statement of claim was filed by the respondent No. 2 of which the reply was submitted by the petitioner, raising legal and valid grounds, but instead of considering the grounds so raised by the petitioner, holding that the respondent No. 2 has worked for more than 240 days in a year, the award was granted in favour of the respondent No. 2 by the CGIT. Since such an award could not have been granted, this writ petition is required to be filed. 2. A return has been filed by the respondent No. 2 and an application for dismissing the petition for non-compliance of the provisions of section 17-B of the Act has been filed. However, instead of considering the said application and deciding the same, the writ petition is finally heard. 2. A return has been filed by the respondent No. 2 and an application for dismissing the petition for non-compliance of the provisions of section 17-B of the Act has been filed. However, instead of considering the said application and deciding the same, the writ petition is finally heard. In the return, it is contended by the respondent No. 2 that no error was committed by ( the CGIT in granting the relief to the respondent No. 2. In fact, the respondent No. 2 has worked with effect from 24-12-1983 continuously upto 31-1-1985, and thereafter his services were orally terminated, therefore, it was a retrenchment as defined in section 2(oo) of the Act without making compliance of section 25-F of the Act. Having failed to do so, the CGIT has rightly held that the petitioner has violated the provisions of the Act and has directed retrenchment of respondent No. 2 in service. It is contended that in the given circumstances, the relief claimed by the petitioner cannot be granted. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 4. First of all, this has to be seen what was the reference made by the appropriate Government and how the reference has been decided. The reference made by the appropriate Government reads thus :- "Whether the action of the State Bank of India, Region I, Bhopal in retrenching Shri Shyam Singh Chauhan, ex messenger, w.e.f. 1-2-1985 without complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is justified ? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to and from which date?" 5. It is to be seen now what was the nature of the services rendered by the respondent No. 2 and whether the same satisfied the definition of continuous service as given in section 25-B of the Act, which read thus :- "25B. Definition of continuous service. It is to be seen now what was the nature of the services rendered by the respondent No. 2 and whether the same satisfied the definition of continuous service as given in section 25-B of the Act, which read thus :- "25B. Definition of continuous service. - - For the purposes of this Chapter thus :- (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer - (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calender months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than - (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than - (i) ninety-five days, in the case of workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case." 6. The evidence was produced by the petitioner and respondent both before the CGIT. A statement of days of working of respondent No. 2 has been produced before this Court also as Annx.P. According to the petitioner itself, the respondent No. 2 has worked for about 217 days upto 23-12-1984. According to the petitioner, the respondent No. 2 was not engaged after this date. An affidavit was filed by the respondent No. 2 before the CGIT along with a statement of days on which he has discharged the duties. According to the petitioner, the respondent No. 2 was not engaged after this date. An affidavit was filed by the respondent No. 2 before the CGIT along with a statement of days on which he has discharged the duties. According to him for even a period of 12 calendar month just preceding the date of discontinuance he has worked for more than 240 days. The respondent No. 2 was put for cross-examination before the CGIT, but not a single question is asked in this respect. It appears that the petitioner has counted only the days for which the wages was paid to the respondent No. 2 on account of his working, but has not counted the days which fall in between those days as holidays. It is not clear from any statement that there were no holidays. The law is well settled in this respect. While considering the artificial breaks in service, the Apex Court has considered whether the Sundays and the holidays, which fall in between the working days for which the wages is paid could be counted for computing the period of 240 days as is provided in section 25-B of the Act or not. In the case of Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation vs. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 458 , the Apex Court has categorically held that such Sundays and other holidays, by contract or statute, should be treated as days on which the employee actually worked under the employer for the purposes of section 25-F read with section 25-B of the Act. As per the enunciation of law by the Apex Court, if these days are counted, it will be clear that the respondent No. 2 had worked for more than 240 days and, therefore, his discontinuance from employment would amount to retrenchment and nothing else. The CGIT though has not given specific finding in this respect, but merely because of this reason, the award passed by the CGIT cannot be said to be bad in law. 7. Now the second question is whether the respondent No. 2 could be directed to be reinstated in service even when he was put for selection for employment in the Bank services, but was not found fit for such employment by the Selection Committee. 7. Now the second question is whether the respondent No. 2 could be directed to be reinstated in service even when he was put for selection for employment in the Bank services, but was not found fit for such employment by the Selection Committee. Such a submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted because the reference made to the CGIT by the appropriate Government was not with respect to such selection or non-selection of respondent No. 2. The question which was to be decided by the CGIT was whether there was retrenchment of respondent No. 2 from the employment of the Bank or not. Once such a question is answered in affirmation, the natural consequence was direction for reinstatement of the respondent No. 2. 8. When such a direction for reinstatement is given and an award is passed in that respect, it will lead to grant a benefit of backwages as well in case the CGIT is satisfied by the material available before it that the respondent No. 2 was unemployed throughout after his discontinuance from employment by the petitioner Bank. To that effect, affidavits were filed by the respondent No. 2 and no material was brought on record by the petitioner to show that the respondent No. 2 was gainfully employed during the aforesaid period. Another aspect is that when the writ petition was filed before this Court, it was necessary on the part of the petitioner to comply with the provisions of section 17-B of the Act in terms of the order dated 2-11-1999. By making an application, it has been complained by the respondent No. 2 that such an interim direction is not being complied with in appropriate manner as the respondent No. 2 was not being paid the wages or the allowances continuously. A reply has been filed by the petitioner and only this much is indicated that upto 4-8-2000 certain amounts were paid to the respondent No. 2, but hence after whether the amount was being paid or not, has not been certified. This being so, the award passed by the CGIT cannot be said to be bad, with respect to the grant of backwages. 9. This being so, the award passed by the CGIT cannot be said to be bad, with respect to the grant of backwages. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied on a decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Faridabad vs. Siri Niwas, 2004(8) SCC 195 and has contended that the burden was on the workman to show that he has worked continuously for 240 days and since such a burden was not discharged by the respondent No. 2, the finding could not have been recorded against the petitioner by the CGIT. The Apex Court was dealing with a complex question of proving the specific allegations which were made with respect to the provisions of section 25-F and 2.5-N read with section 25-B of the Act. However, the Apex Court has again categorically said in paragraph 13 of the report that the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872, would not be applicable in the industrial adjudication, but the burden of proof lies on the workman, who claims that he has worked. However, it was not said by the Apex Court that even if that burden is discharged by the workman by placing on record his affidavit with details of the working days, even then, it would not be taken into consideration if it goes unrebutted. Here in the case in hand, the respondent No. 2 has filed his affidavit and has annexed with it the statement of working days. He was available for cross-examination by the Management of the petitioner Bank, but not a single question was asked in that respect. Nothing has been brought on record to indicate that such a statement made on affidavit by the respondent No, 2 was erroneous. On the other hand, upon showing of the petitioner itself, the respondent No. 2 has worked for a period of 217 days excluding the Sundays and holidays. Such a statement itself was found to be incorrect by this Court, therefore, the petitioner would not be benefited by the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation (supra), which according to this Court is not applicable in the facts and circumstances available in the case in hand. 10. Such a statement itself was found to be incorrect by this Court, therefore, the petitioner would not be benefited by the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation (supra), which according to this Court is not applicable in the facts and circumstances available in the case in hand. 10. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed his reliance in the case of Jagbir Singh vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and another, (2009) 15 SCC 327 and has contended that as an alternative relief, instead of directing reinstatement of respondent No. 2 and payment of backwages, the compensation may be awarded to the respondent No. 2 and the award may be satisfied. The Apex Court was dealing with a situation where the award passed by the Labour Court was set aside by the High Court and such an order was challenged in an appeal before the Apex Court. The Apex Court substituted the award by grant of compensation. However, these are not the situation available here. The award was already passed by the CGIT long back. Interim stay granted by this Court was not fully complied with as complained by the respondent No. 2, inasmuch as, provisions of section 17-B of the Act were not complied with by the petitioner. In the considered opinion of this Court, it would not be justified to direct payment of compensation only to the respondent No. 2 instead of allowing reinstatement in terms of the award passed by the CGIT. Even otherwise, in the case referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner, the Apex Court has considered that in all such cases where the Court has upset the award of reinstatement, the compensation was awarded. Here in the case in hand, this Court is of the opinion that award is just and proper and the same is to be affirmed, therefore, such an alternative relief claimed by the petitioner cannot be granted. 11. In view of the foregoing discussions, there is no force in the writ petition. The same deserves to be and, is, hereby dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.