JUDGMENT By Court—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The appellants have challenged the order of eviction passed against them in the proceedings initiated under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956. Since both the petitionersappellants have identical facts in their cases, therefore, by taking facts of the case of writ petition being CWJC No. 3648 of 1997(R), both Letters Patent Appeals are decided. 3. As per the facts stated by the writ petitioners, Banmali Pramanik, father of the petitionersappellants was in possession of a piece of land since 1960 measuring 0.02.20 Hectares of land and he used to run hotel and sweet meat shop in the name and style of Subhankari Mistanna Bhandar. The said Bamnali Pramanik remained in possession till he was alive and thereafter the petitioners being his sons and daughter continued in possession and thereby acquired right and title by adverse possession in the land in question. However, in the year 1982 or prior to it, one proceeding was initiated under the Bihar Public Lands Encroachment Act, 1956 against the said Banmali Pramanik. That proceeding was dropped vide order dated 31st December, 1982. One other personShyam Bahadur Thakur, who was not a party in the proceeding initiated against Banmali Pramanik, preferred an appeal against dropping of the proceedings under the Act of 1956. Finding this situation, Banmali Pramanik preferred a writ petition before the Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court being CWJC No. 1204 of 1983(R), which was allowed by the learned Single Judge of this Court vide detailed order dated 8th January, 1990, wherein it has been held that the said Shyam Bahadur Thakur has no locus standi to challenge the order dropping the proceeding of eviction under the Act of 1956. Thereafter the petitioner, son of said Banmali Pramanik, was again served with a notice dated 27th December, 1994 for taking up the eviction proceeding against him. Thereafter the petitioner, son of said Banmali Pramanik, was again served with a notice dated 27th December, 1994 for taking up the eviction proceeding against him. The petitioner aggrieved against the said notice, preferred writ petition i.e., CWJC No. 1932 of 1995(R), which was allowed by Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court vide order dated 11th July, 1996 and the order dated 9th October, 1995 which was passed during the pendency of CWJC No. 1932 of 1995(R) for eviction of the writ petitioner was also quashed after observing that the Executive Engineer has not only flouted the interim order of this Court but has also had not given opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner before passing the order of eviction dated 9th October, 1995. However, the writ petitioner was directed to submit a fresh representation to the said authority and the authority was directed to dispose of the same within month and till such representation is decided , the petitioner's possession was protected by the same order dated 11th July, 1996. In pursuance of the order of this Court dated 11th July, 1996 passed in CWJC No.1932 of 1995(R), the petitioner submitted representation which was dismissed and eviction order was passed by the Circle Officer on 17th August, 1996. Aggrieved against the order dated 17th August, 1996, petitioner preferred writ petition being CWJC No. 2566 of 1996(R). Petitioner's this writ petition being CWJC No.2566 of 1996(R) was disposed of vide order dated 29th August, 1997 with permission to challenge the order dated 17th August, 1996 by preferring an appeal before the competent authority under the Act of 1956. The petitioner preferred appeal being BPLE No. 57 of 199798 before the Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum district, Jamshedpur. The Deputy Commissioner dismissed the petitioner's appeal vide order dated 5th December,1997. Aggrieved against the order dated 5th December, 1997, the petitioner preferred writ petition being CWJC No. 3648 of 1997(R), which has been decided by the learned Single Judge along with another writ petition being CWJC No.1251 of 1997(R), preferred by the brother and sister of the writ petitioner of CWJC No. 3648 of 1997(R). On identical facts and circumstances, both the writ petitions being CWJC No.3648 of 1997(R) and CWJC No. 1251 of 1997(R) have been dismissed by common judgment dated 3rd December, 2003. Hence, these Letters Patent Appeals. 4. On identical facts and circumstances, both the writ petitions being CWJC No.3648 of 1997(R) and CWJC No. 1251 of 1997(R) have been dismissed by common judgment dated 3rd December, 2003. Hence, these Letters Patent Appeals. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that from the facts mentioned above, it is clear that earlier eviction proceeding was initiated against the petitioners' father in both the cases under the provisions of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 and that proceeding has been dropped vide order dated 31st December, 1982 and that order attained the finality, therefore, no second proceeding could have been initiated by the respondents under the Act of 1956. In addition to above, when serious disputed question of title is involved, the proceedings under the Act of 1956 was not maintainable and the proper remedy for the State was to file a suit for declaration and possession. It is also submitted that in writ petition (CWJC No. 1204 of 1983(R)) as back as on 8th January, 1990, this Court already observed that the Government may either file a suit or take other appropriate proceedings, as may be available to it, to get it's right declared. Therefore, in that situation also the only remedy available with the State Government was to file a suit for declaration and possession, if the Government wanted to take possession of the land from the writ petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the Division Bench judgment of the Patna High Court, delivered in the case of Sri Kali Prasad Seal Vrs. State of Bihar and Ors. (1969[17] BLJR 254), wherein it has been held that Government could not have initiated the second proceeding after dropping of the first eviction proceeding under the Act of 1956. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the judgment of Single Bench delivered in the case of Maheshwari Devi Vrs. State of Bihar & Ors. ( 1988 BLJ 1051 ), wherein after considering Kali Prasad Seal's case , the Patna High Court held that in a case in which there had been earlier proceeding under BPLE Act, which were dropped, the same became final and no fresh proceeding could have been initiated in respect of the same land. 5. State of Bihar & Ors. ( 1988 BLJ 1051 ), wherein after considering Kali Prasad Seal's case , the Patna High Court held that in a case in which there had been earlier proceeding under BPLE Act, which were dropped, the same became final and no fresh proceeding could have been initiated in respect of the same land. 5. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the facts which are not in dispute clearly discloses that the petitioners or their predecessor are not claiming their title by way of transfer of property by the State or by anybody, who may be a rightful owner. The claim of the writ petitioners or writ petitioners' predecessor is only that they are in possession since 1960. Therefore, they cannot claim hostile title by adverse possession because before expiry of the period of limitation, in the year 1982 the respondents initiated proceeding of eviction and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners or their predecessor acquired hostile title against the State and remained in peaceful possession continuously for thirty years. It is submitted that once a proceeding for eviction was initiated then in that situation if time is consumed in getting the possession, the party in possession cannot claim benefit because of his possession during eviction proceedings nor he can be said to be in “peaceful possession” for acquiring hostile title. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made clear distinction between the claim of adverse possession over a private property and Government property in the case of R.Hanumaiah and another Vrs. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department and ors. ( [2010] 5 S.C.C. 203 ) and held that the period for limitation for adverse possession over a private land is twelve years whereas the period of limitation for claiming adverse possession against the State is thirty years as per the Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned counsel for the State also submitted that Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mandal Revenue Officer Vrs. Goundla Venkaiah and another ( AIR 2010 S.C. 744 ) held that even if summary proceeding initiated against the unauthorized occupant under the Encroachment Act has been dropped, inference cannot be drawn that the person in possession has perfected his possession, which can be said to be hostile qua the true owner. Goundla Venkaiah and another ( AIR 2010 S.C. 744 ) held that even if summary proceeding initiated against the unauthorized occupant under the Encroachment Act has been dropped, inference cannot be drawn that the person in possession has perfected his possession, which can be said to be hostile qua the true owner. Therefore, the judgments which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case, in view of the Supreme Court judgments, which clearly means that even dropping of the proceeding under the Land Encroachment Act will not give rise to presumption of any adverse possession. 6. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the facts of the case. Undisputedly, petitioners or their predecessor never claimed title to the property by virtue of any title deed. They are claiming the title by adverse possession. Admittedly, their claim was that they were in possession since the year 1960 only and the eviction proceeding was initiated against their predecessor in the year 1982, much prior to the expiry of the period of thirty years, which is the period of limitation for claiming adverse possession against the State Government. Since 1982 the eviction matter against petitioners' predecessor and thereafter against petitioners were pending in the Courts, may be, including because of filing the appeal by Shyam Bahadur Thakur, who was stranger to the proceedings initiated against Banmali Pramanik, but the appeal preferred by Shyam Bahadur Thakur against the dropping of the proceedings against Banmali Pramanik vide order dated 31st December, 1982 stands dropped on 8th January, 1990 , in view of the decision of this Court given in CWJC No. 1204 of 1983(R). Then in the year 1994 another notice was issued to the writ petitioners, which was challenged by the writ petitioners by filing CWJC No. 1932 of 1995(R). During pendency of the said writ petition, eviction order was passed by the Authority under the Act of 1956 on 9th October, 1995, which was quashed by this Court in CWJC No. 1932 of 1995(R) vide order dated 11th July, 1996, as that order was passed in violation to the interim order passed in CWJC No. 1932 of 1995(R) and was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner. In the writ petition i.e., CWJC No.1932 of 1995(R) petitioner was directed to submit a representation before the concerned authority and authority was directed to decide the petitioner's representation. Therefore, petitioner after obtaining the order from this Court in his own writ petition being CWJC No.1932 of 1995(R) cannot contend that the authority to whom direction was given by the High Court in the writ petition of the petitioner himself, to decide the representation of the petitioner, said authority had no jurisdiction to decide it in view of earlier dropping of proceeding by the same authority. It is worthwhile to note that petitioner is not challenging the jurisdiction of the authority as such but his case is that second eviction proceeding was not maintainable. In fact, petitioner not only obtained that order of submitting representation before the competent authority but, in fact, submitted the representation before the authority and thereafter, when the order went against him and his appeal was dismissed then is raising the issue of resjudicata. The petitioner could have raised question of resjudicata in the writ petition CWJC No. 1932 of 1995(R) or by challenging the decision given in the said writ petition vide order dated 11th July, 1996 and admittedly petitioner did not challenge the decision dated 11th July, 1996, therefore, petitioner cannot raise the issue of resjudicata because the authority passed the order of eviction in pursuance of the direction of this Court in the petitioner's own writ petition. 7. Otherwise in the facts of this case question of resjudicata does not arise as, earlier proceedings under the Act of 1956 were dropped not after entering into merit of the case and deciding any question on merit in favour of the writ petitioner, which is apparent from the relevant portion of the order which has been quoted in the judgment dated 11th July, 1996 passed in CWJC No.1932 of 1995(R), which reads as under : “The B.P.L.E. Case no. 80(R) of 196869, 81(R) of 196869, 74(R) of 196869 , 73(R) of 196869 and 79(R) of 196869, were the court of Deputy Collector incharge Tata Zamindari Jamshedpur. The court showed its inability to pass any order in all these cases and advised the P.W.D. to move the appropriate court”. 8. Therefore, this was not a decision on merit, so as to bar subsequent proceeding, barred by principle of resjudicata or even by constructive resjudicata. The court showed its inability to pass any order in all these cases and advised the P.W.D. to move the appropriate court”. 8. Therefore, this was not a decision on merit, so as to bar subsequent proceeding, barred by principle of resjudicata or even by constructive resjudicata. In view of the above, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in Mandal Revenue Officer's case(supra) fully applies to the facts of the case and it cannot be held that the subsequent proceeding was not maintainable. 9. At this juncture, we may mention here that in Shri Kali Prasad Seal's case (supra), the facts were very different. In that case, the claim of the alleged encroacher was that he purchased one piece of land and constructed the house and it was the case of the State that a very small piece of land has been included in the house of the said encroacher. The Division Bench, in the facts and circumstances, held that the encroachment was negligible, if it is encroachment, and there was claim of title by adverse possession for a long period. But, here in this case, the claim of adverse possession was not sustainable, in view of the admitted fact that eviction proceedings for eviction of petitioner's predecessor was initiated within thirty years from claim of possession. Therefore, here in this case, it is not a case where there is any serious disputed question of fact involved in the matter, so as to require the State Government to file a suit for declaration of title and for possession. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in R. Hanumaiah's case (supra) has considered the issue of claim of adverse possession in detail in paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are very relevant for the purpose of deciding these Letters Patent Appeals. Therefore, these paragraphs (paragraphs19 to 23) are quoted hereunder: “19” Suits for declaration of title against the Government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects. The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the Government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the Government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the Government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the Government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the Government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the Government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the Government, is not available to any person or individual. The second difference is in regard to the period for which title and/or possession has to be established by a person suing for declaration of title. Establishing title/possession for a period exceeding twelve years may be adequate to establish title in a declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/possession for a period exceeding thirty years will have to be established to succeed in a declaratory suit for title against the Government. This follows from Article 112 of the Limitation act, 1963, which prescribes a longer period of thirty years as limitation in regard to suits by the Government as against the period of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire State and it is not always possible for the Government to protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments. Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protect its properties and maintain proper records, either due to negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession against the Government. Any loss of Government property is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements. “20” Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title and injunction against the Government, in a casual manner, ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to government properties. Instances of such suits against the Government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Instances of such suits against the Government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Whether the Government contests the suit or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a Government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his title by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit ( except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the Government or a statutory development authority), or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years. In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the presumptions available in favour of the Government, grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the Government by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted or admitted. “21” A court should necessarily seek an answer to the following question, before it grants a decree declaring title against the Government: whether the plaintiff has produced title deeds tracing the title for a period of more than thirty years; or whether the plaintiff has established his adverse possession to the knowledge of the Government for a period of more than thirty years, so as to convert his possession into title. Incidental to that question, the court should also find out whether the plaintiff is recorded to be the owner or holder or occupant of the property in the revenue records or municipal records, for more than thirty years, and what is the nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if he is in possession authorized or unauthorized; permissive; casual and occasional; furtive and clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed or implied (following a title). “22” Mere temporary use or occupation without the animus to claim owner or mere use at sufferance will not be sufficient to create any right adverse to the Government. In order to oust or defeat the title of the Government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the Government or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of the Government. In order to oust or defeat the title of the Government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the Government or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of the Government. To claim adverse possession, the possession of the claimant must be actual, open and visible, hostile to the owner (and therefore necessarily with the knowledge of the owner) and continued during the entire period necessary to create a bar under the law of limitation. In short, it should be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent. Mere vague or doubtful assertions that the claimant has been in adverse possession will not be sufficient. Unexplained stray or sporadic entries for a year or for a few years will not be sufficient and should be ignored. “23” As noticed above, many a time it is possible for a private citizen to get his name entered as the occupant of Government land, with the help of collusive government servants. Only entries based on appropriate documents like grants, title deeds, etc. or based upon actual verification of physical possession by an authority authorized to recognize such possession and make appropriate entries can be used against the government. By its very nature, a claim based on adverse possession requires clear and categorical pleadings and evidence, much more so, if it is against the Government. Be that as it may. 11. The facts of the case clearly indicate that here, in these cases, from the very beginning there was admission of the petitioner's predecessor that he was in possession of the property since 1960, less than thirty years, from the time of eviction proceeding against him therefore, petitioners or their predecessor could not have claimed title by adverse possession. The dropping of proceeding on earlier occasion was not on count of any finding in favour of the writ petitioners or their father but it was merely dropping of proceeding without deciding any issue. In view of the Supreme Court direction in the case of Mandal Revenue Officer (supra), the second eviction proceeding was maintainable. Therefore, in these facts and circumstances of the case, the leaned Single Judge has not committed any error in dismissing the writ petitions of writ petitioners. 12. There being no merit, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.