Nageshwar Prasad v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Dhanbad
2012-08-30
APARESH KUMAR SINGH
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT By Court.-Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has challenged the Award dated 26.9.2001 delivered in Reference Case No. 143/1993. (Annexure-4) by the Presiding Officer Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2 at Dhanbad wherein the reference has been answered in favour of the respondents-Management rejecting the claim of the petitioner that his date of birth should have been treated as 15.1.1939 instead of 10.2.1933. The reference is quoted herein below : 'Whether the action of the management in recording the date of birth of Shri Nageshwar Prasad. T.R. Miner as on 10.2.1933 in his service records is justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled?" 3. It is the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner was initially appointed in the month of February. 1964 under NCDC Ltd. at Giridih. while he was working in Shaft Mines in 1965 and his actual date of birth was recorded as 15.1.1939. which is evident from the School Leaving Certificate annexed as Annexure-l dated 25.6.1956. It is further contention of the petitioner that he had no knowledge that his date of birth had been recorded as 10th February, 1933 instead of 15th January. 1939. However, he submits that after coming into force of the circular dated 25.4.1986 in terms of NCWA III a procedure for determination and verification of the age of the employee was laid down according to which the case of the petitioner should have been determined by referring to the Medical Board. According to the petitioner he made an application dated 12.6.1987 annexed as Annexure- 2 for correction of his date of birth and thereafter again on 25.12.1990. but in vain. Thereafter, he raised an industrial dispute which was ultimately rejected on 14.6.1992. where after he approached the Patna High Court in CWJC No. 3429/1992 (R) in which vide order dated 26.7.1993. the concerned respondents were directed to refer the matter under Section 10(1) of the ID Act for reference before the Industrial Tribunal. The reference was made vide notification issued by the Ministry of Labour. Government of India dated 17/19.8.1933. which is quoted hereinabove. It is stated that he was forced to retire w.e.f. from 10.2.1993 treating his date of birth as 10.2.1933.
The reference was made vide notification issued by the Ministry of Labour. Government of India dated 17/19.8.1933. which is quoted hereinabove. It is stated that he was forced to retire w.e.f. from 10.2.1993 treating his date of birth as 10.2.1933. By assailing the impugned award it is submitted that the learned Tribunal has not considered the different circulars and school leaving certificate apart from the other documents which' conclusively show that the date of birth of the petitioner was 15.1.1939. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal has also failed to take into account that the respondents-employer was required to send the case for determination of the age of petitioner to the Apex Medical Board under circulars issued in terms of NCWA-3. As such the impugned award refusing his claim and answering reference in favour of the employer is bad in law and the petitioner should be granted all consequential benefits treating him to have retired on 15.1.1999 according to his real date of birth which has been refused by the Tribunal as well. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has also contended that the document as Exhibit-M-2 produced by the Management in the Labour Court has wrongly been relied upon by the Tribunal as the same are not authentic document and there is no signature of any employer. 5. The relevant provisions of Clause (B) of the Instruction No. 76 laying down procedure for determination/verification of age of employees is being quoted herein-below: "(B) Review determination bf date of birth in respect of existing employees: i(a) In the case of the existing employees Matriculation Certificate or Higher Secondary Certificate issued by the recognized Universities or Board or Middle Pass Certificate issued by the Board of Education and/or Department of Public Instruction and admit cards issued by the aforesaid Bodies should be treated as correct provided they were issued by the said Universities/Board/Institutions prior to the date of employment. i(b) Similarly. Mining Sirdarship Winding Engine or similar other statutory certificates where the Manager had to certify the date of birth will be treated as authentic provided that where both documents mentioned in (i) (a) and (i) (b) above are available the date of birth recorded in (i) (a) will be treated as authentic.
i(b) Similarly. Mining Sirdarship Winding Engine or similar other statutory certificates where the Manager had to certify the date of birth will be treated as authentic provided that where both documents mentioned in (i) (a) and (i) (b) above are available the date of birth recorded in (i) (a) will be treated as authentic. (ii) Wherever there is no variation is records such cases will not be reopened unless there is a very glaring and apparent wrong entry brought to the notice of the Management. The Management after being satisfied on the merits of the case will take appropriate action for correction through Determination Committee/Medical Board. (C) Age Determination Committee/Medical Board for the above will be constituted by the Management. In the case of employees whose date of birth cannot be determined in accordance with the procedure mentioned in (B)(i)(a) or (B) (1) (b) above the date of birth recorded in the records of the company namely. From B register, CMPF Records and Identity Cards (un-tampered) will be treated as final. Provided that where there is a variation in the age recorded in the records mentioned above the matter will be referred to the Age Determination Committee/Medical Board constituted by the Management for determination of age." 6. By referring to the aforesaid circular it is submitted that as per Clause B(i)(b) of the said instruction the petitioner had adduced the certificate of Class-VIII which should have been treated as authentic showing his date of birth as 15.1.1939 and he has also drawn attention to the document annexed as Annexure-2 dated 12.6.1987. there is entry in the educational qualification showing him as Class-VIII passed. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand has submitted that the impugned award is legal and proper in the eye of law and does not require any interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it does not suffer from, any .apparent error of law or of facts and there is no perversity or illegality in the same. It is further submitted that the statutory records namely Form-B Register maintained under Section 48 of the Mines Act. 1952 read with Rule 27 of the Mines Rules. 1955 and other documents containing the signature of the petitioner clearly show that he has admitted his date of birth as 10th February. 1933.
It is further submitted that the statutory records namely Form-B Register maintained under Section 48 of the Mines Act. 1952 read with Rule 27 of the Mines Rules. 1955 and other documents containing the signature of the petitioner clearly show that he has admitted his date of birth as 10th February. 1933. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that Ext. M-1 which is annexed as Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit is the first and original service-sheet of the petitioner-workmen maintained by National Development Corporation showing his date of appointment at Giridih Colliery as 1.7.1957 and also bearing the signature of the petitioner showing his date of birth as 10.2.1933. It is further submitted that the Form-B register as Ext. M-3 produced before the learned Tribunal also contains signature of the petitioner showing his date of birth as 10.2.1933 along with the signature of the record keeper and the manager of the colliery. Learned counsel for the respondent also submits that the same document M-2 relied upon by the petitioner shows his date of birth as 10.2.1933 and so is the document maintained by CMPF authorities. The contention of the petitioner that he started working at Karharbari Colliery in the year 1964 stands demolished by the Management-respondents on the basis of Ext. M-1, M-2 and M-3. which clearly show that he was appointed on 1.7.1957 at Giridih Colliery. Regarding the certificate contained an Annexure-1 to the writ application which is as Ext.-W-3. it is submitted that the same are irrelevant as it was not produced at the time of his appointment and the respondents are not bound by the entry made in the service book made on the declaration of the petitioner himself. The contention of the petitioner is that the matters should have been referred to the Apex Medical Board is being refuted on the ground that as per the Instruction No.76 referred to hereinabove only in, the case of variation in recording the date of birth in statutory records the claim of the petitioner for age determination, can be referred to the Apex Medical Board. However since the date of birth of the petitioner was consistently recorded as 10.2.1933 there was no occasion referring it to the Apex Medical Board. It is further submitted that School Leaving Certificate of a non-matriculate is not recognized under the Instruction No.76 of the JBCCI.
However since the date of birth of the petitioner was consistently recorded as 10.2.1933 there was no occasion referring it to the Apex Medical Board. It is further submitted that School Leaving Certificate of a non-matriculate is not recognized under the Instruction No.76 of the JBCCI. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that learned Tribunal has taken into account all the relevant material evidence produced by the rival parties and the carne to a definite conclusion of a finding of fact that no case has been made out on behalf of the petitioner-employee to establish his claim that his date of birth should be treated as 15.1.1939 as against 10.2.1933 since the learned Tribunal has arriving at a finding of fact, which cannot be said to be perverse or suffering from any apparent error on the face of record. 8. As has been settled by several judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, one of which is being quoted herein-below as delivered in the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 the scope and width of the power under Article 226 of the High Court exercising the writ of certiorari has been discussed. The proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of exercise of power of certiorari has held the field till date and has been followed in subsequent judgments of' the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts (para 7 and 8 are relevant) : "Para 7 :- The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Court in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued wherein exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly as for instance it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice.
A writ can similarly be issued wherein exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly as for instance it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is however no doubt that the jurisdiction, to issue 'a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellants Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record cart be corrected by a writ but not an error of fact however grave it may appear to be, In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly if a finding of fact is based on no evidence that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases however we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on, a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. Para No.8: It is of course not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means.
It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. Para No.8: It is of course not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be even in disregard of it or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases. the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certioriari is an error of law and the said error must on the whole be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certioriari. In our opinion it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
In our opinion it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened." 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the award as well as relevant materials. From perusal of the impugned award, it appears that the documents; which have been taken into account by the learned Tribunal are the first service record of the employment of the workmen, which is as Ext.-M-2 and Form-B register which is marked as Ext. M-3. On the other hand the contention of the petitioner-employee that his case was required to be referred for determination to the Apex Medical Board, does not seem to be sustainable in view of the specific provisions of the instructions contained at Clause (C), which has been quoted hereinabove. According to the said instruction in the case of employees whose date of birth cannot be determined in accordance with the procedure mentioned in are B(i)(a) or B(i)(b) above the date of birth recorded in the records of the company namely. Form B register, CMPF Records and Identity Cards (un-tampered)- will be treated as final. It is further stated therein that where there is a variation age in the records the matter will be referred to the Age Determination Committee/Medical Board constituted' for the said purpose. However, Clause (B) relied upon by the petitioner also does not apply to him as the certificate said to have been adduced by the petitioner is a Transfer Certificate and not in the nature of a certificate of Mining Sirdarship. Winding Engine or similar other statutory certificates over which a Manager had to certify that the date of birth be treated as authentic.
Winding Engine or similar other statutory certificates over which a Manager had to certify that the date of birth be treated as authentic. Further as has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents the petitioner employee being a non-matriculate the certificate relied upon by him from Class-VIII was not produced at the time of appointment of the petitioner and he had not been able to make out a glaring case of variation in the consistent records maintained by the employer and duly signed by the petitioner as well. Learned Tribunal has taken into account the aforesaid facts and also held in view of the Instruction No. 76 of JBCCI that there was no scope for the concerned workman to be referred to the Apex Medical Board for age determination as he had not been able to show any such inconsistency in the service records by the employer. Since in all service records and other official records the date of birth of the concerned workman was recorded as 10.2.1933, there was no reason at all to consider the claim of the concerned workman for reference to the Apex Medical Board for age determination. In view of the said finding of fact recorded on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties it does not appear that it suffers from any error apparent on the face of record or of law or a case of illegality or perversity has been made out on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner also appears to have been raised the dispute regarding the date of birth almost at the fag end of his service. 10. In that view of the matter. I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned Award. Accordingly this writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.