JUDGMENT Mr. A.N. Jindal, J.: (Oral) - The secondary evidence qua two registered mortgage deeds dated 9.6.1953 and 20.4.1960 has been sought by the plaintiff/petitioners in a suit for declaration claiming ownership of the land in dispute by way of efflux of time. Certified copies of the deeds are already on record. The trial court dismissed the application of the petitioner/plaintiff on 26.10.1998 on the ground that the petitioner had failed to prove the loss of aforesaid mortgage deeds. However, it held that the documents in question were quite relevant to settle the controversy between the parties. The trial court also observed that sometimes the receipt with regard to payment of money is written on the back of the mortgage deed itself to show the factum of redemption of the property. 2. None appears on behalf of the respondents to oppose the revision petition. Since this petition is pending for the last 14 years, therefore, the same cannot be kept pending anymore as the trial has been stalled. 3. In order to refute the observations made by the trial court, learned counsel for the petitioner has stated at bar that no payment was made to the plaintiff by the respondents so as to redeem the land in dispute, nor any such entry was made on the back of the mortgage deeds. He further submitted that the reply filed to the application for leading secondary evidence also does not indicate such fact. In any case, if the defendants have taken a plea with regard to payment of money, the same can be proved by way of leading evidence to the additional/secondary evidence sought to be produced by the plaintiff/petitioner. 4. As regards the proof of loss of a document, it was observed in the case of Basant Singh and others Vs. Brij Raj Saran Singh and others AIR 1935 Privy Council 132, that loss can never be proved absolutely. Where there is no doubt that a document existed and from which a copy was taken, the evidence of loss of the original deed which was not seen for many years was sufficient to satisfy the provisions of Section 65 of the Act, so as to make copy admissible. 5. Even otherwise, the registered mortgaged deeds dated 9.6.1953 and 20.4.1960 being 30 years old documents were per se admissible and statutory presumption was attached to them. 5. Even otherwise, the registered mortgaged deeds dated 9.6.1953 and 20.4.1960 being 30 years old documents were per se admissible and statutory presumption was attached to them. The Privy Council in the aforesaid case i.e. Basant Singh (supra) made the following observations in this regard:- “Section 90 of the Evidence Act clearly requires the production to the Court of the particular document in regard to which the Court may make the statutory presumption. If the document produced is a copy, admitted under Section 65, as secondary evidence, and it is produced from proper custody and is over thirty years old, then the signatures authenticating the copy may be presumed to be genuine, but it is not sufficient to justify the presumption of due execution of the original.” 6. In the instant case, the documents sought to be produced by way of secondary evidence are public documents i.e. registered mortgage deeds. The defendants have not taken the plea with regard to payment of mortgage money to the plaintiff or her predecessor and, as such, the plea set up by the petitioner with regard to loss has to be accepted in the absence of such counter-allegations. 7. Resultantly, this petition is allowed, impugned order is set aside and the trial court is directed to proceed in accordance with law. ---------0.B.S.0------------