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2012 DIGILAW 1284 (GAU)

Banamali Singha v. State of Assam

2012-11-21

I.A.ANSARI, P.K.MUSAHARY

body2012
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order, dated 10.05.2006, passed, in Sessions Case No. 39(BGN)/1999, by the learned Sessions Judge, Bongiagaon, convicting the accused-appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default, suffer simple imprisonment for a period of six months. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be described as under : (i) On 02.09.1997, at about 2.30 p.m., Parama Roy (since deceased) was sleeping on a mat at the gateway of his house and his daughter, Konika Roy (PW 6), was plucking his gray hair. Accused-appellant, Banamali Singha, came on a bicycle carrying a dao in the carrier of a bicycle and, on reaching the house of Parama Roy, the accused-appellant hit Parama's head by the front wheel of his bicycle, while Parama was sleeping. The accused-appellant, then, dismounted from the bicycle, took out a dao from the carrier of the bicycle and inflicted two blows, on the neck of Parama, by means of the dao. When PW 6 offered resistance, she was pushed away. After giving blows with dao, as indicated hereinbefore, the accused-appellant took the dao and left the place by riding his bicycle. (ii) Having left the place of occurrence, the accused-appellant came, at about 3.45 p.m., on 02.09.1997 itself, to Bongaigaon Police Station, on his bicycle, carrying the dao in his hand and informed the police there that he had come to the police station having hacked Parama Roy, because Parama had abused him (accused-appellant) on the previous day. The accused-appellant also told the police that he was unsure if the man, whom he had assaulted, had or had not survived. The accused-appellant was, immediately, taken into custody. An entry, in this regard, was made in the General Diary of the said police station, the entry being General Diary Entry No. 80, dated 02.09.1997, at 3.45 p.m. (Ext. 7). Thereafter, the said dao (M. Ext. 3), which had blood stains, as well as the bicycle (M. Ext. 2) were seized by a seizure list, which is Ext. 4. (iii) PW 8, who had been entrusted with the investigation of the case, rushed to the place of occurrence and, on arriving there, found Parama lying dead. Inquest was held over the said dead body and inquest report was prepared. 2) were seized by a seizure list, which is Ext. 4. (iii) PW 8, who had been entrusted with the investigation of the case, rushed to the place of occurrence and, on arriving there, found Parama lying dead. Inquest was held over the said dead body and inquest report was prepared. The said dead body was also subjected to post mortem examination, which revealed that Parama Roy had died, because of two incised wounds, which had been inflicted on his neck. (iv) On the following day, i.e., on 03.09.1997, a written information was formally lodged with the police, at Bongaigaon Police Station, by Bolen Roy (PW 1), father of the said deceased, and treating the said written Ejahar as First Information Report (in short, 'FIR'), Bongaigaon Police Station Case No. 122/1997, under Section 302 IPC, was registered against the accused-appellant. On completion of the investigation, police laid charge-sheet, under Section 302 I.P.C, against the present appellant. 2. During trial, when a charge, under Section 302 IPC, was framed against the accused-appellant, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty thereto. 3. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether eight witnesses. The accused-appellant was, then, examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and, in his examination aforementioned, he denied that he had killed Parama Roy and/or committed the offence, which he was alleged to have committed, the case of the defence being that of total denial. 4. Having, however, found the accused guilty of the offence charged with, the learned trial Court convicted him accordingly and passed sentence against him as mentioned above. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence, passed against him, the accused, as a convicted person, has preferred the present appeal. 5. We have heard Ms. D. Borgohain, learned Amicus Curiae, and Mr. D. Das, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 6. While considering the present appeal, it is appropriate to, first, take into consideration the evidence of Kanika Roy (PW 6), daughter of the deceased, Parama Roy. According to the evidence of this witness, Parama Roy was her father and the accused belongs to Barson village, whom she knew. 7. D. Das, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 6. While considering the present appeal, it is appropriate to, first, take into consideration the evidence of Kanika Roy (PW 6), daughter of the deceased, Parama Roy. According to the evidence of this witness, Parama Roy was her father and the accused belongs to Barson village, whom she knew. 7. As regards the occurrence, PW 6 has deposed that on the day of the occurrence, they had spread a mat at the gateway of his house and while her father was sleeping on the mat, she was sitting beside him and plucking his gray hair and, at that very moment, accused Banamali came on a bicycle with a curved dao and, on reaching Parama, he hit Parama's head by the front wheel of his bicycle and, then, the accused dismounted from his bicycle, took out the dao from the bicycle and inflicted two blows at the neck of her father. It is in the evidence of PW 6 that when she resisted, she was pushed away and after hacking her father, the accused took the dao, rode back the bicycle and left. It is also in the evidence of PW 6 that on hearing her cries, her grand-mother came and, later on, her co-villagers and police arrived there and that her father died after a little while and police took away her father's dead body, police noted down her statement and, then, sent her to the Magistrate, who, too, recorded her statement, which is Ext. 6. 8. In her evidence, PW 6 has deposed that M. Ext. 3 is the dao, which the accused had carried. 9. Though PW 6 was cross-examined by the defence, nothing could be elicited from her cross-examination to show that what she had deposed was untrue, unbelievable or false. Her evidence has, thus, remained intact and unshaken. Her evidence, therefore, inspires great confidence. 10. Closely lending support to the above evidence of PW 6, daughter of the said deceased, the doctor (PW 5), who had, on 03.09.1997, admittedly, conducted post mortem examination, on the said dead body, found as follows : 1. One incised wound 6" x 5" x 5" over the left lateral part of neck at the root. On dissection - left carotid, trachea, left clavicle 1st rib, scapula and apex of the left lung were cut. There was humothorax on left side. 2. One incised wound 6" x 5" x 5" over the left lateral part of neck at the root. On dissection - left carotid, trachea, left clavicle 1st rib, scapula and apex of the left lung were cut. There was humothorax on left side. 2. One incised wound 3" x 3" x 3" at the middle of left lateral neck cutting the muscles, great vessels and other soft tissues was found. Huge blood clots were found and the wounds were blood stained, which could not be washed away. 11. The doctor (PW 5) has deposed that the injuries were ante mortem in nature and, in his opinion, the death was caused due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of the injuries sustained by the said deceased and the injuries might have been caused by a sharp cutting weapon, such as, M. Ext. 3, that is the dao, which was alleged to have been seized from the possession of the accused-appellant. The doctor (PW 5) has also opined that the injuries, which had been sustained by the said deceased, were sufficient to cause death of a person in the ordinary course of nature. 12. Apart from the fact that the defence declined to cross-examine the doctor (PW 5), we, too, do not notice anything inherently improbable or incorrect in the evidence of the doctor (PW 5) and his evidence amply proves that the said deceased had sustained two incised wounds on his neck, which were severe enough to cause death of any person in the ordinary course of nature. 13. Thus, the unshaken evidence of PW 6, describing the occurrence, is fully corroborated by the medical evidence on record and we see no reason to disbelieve her evidence, which shows that it was the accused-appellant, who had caused the wounds, by means of dao, which the doctor (PW 5) found, the wounds having become the cause of death of Parama Roy. 14. Though the unshaken evidence of PW 6 coupled with the medical evidence on record, closely corroborating the evidence of PW 6, is, as indicated above, sufficient to sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant, there are, in the present case, certain other aspects, which need to be dealt with. 15. 14. Though the unshaken evidence of PW 6 coupled with the medical evidence on record, closely corroborating the evidence of PW 6, is, as indicated above, sufficient to sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant, there are, in the present case, certain other aspects, which need to be dealt with. 15. It is noteworthy that PW 3, who is an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and who was, at the relevant point of time, posted at Bongaigaon Police Station, has deposed that on 02.09.1997 (that is, the day of the occurrence), at about 3.45 p.m., while he was on duty at the said police station, a man, named Banamali Singha (i.e., the accused-appellant), came there on a bicycle carrying a blood stained dao in his hand and verbally said that he had come there after hacking, by means of the said dao, a man, whose name was Parama, and, at about 8.20 p.m., AK Deka, that is, the Investigating Officer (PW 8) seized, in his (PW 3's) presence, the said blood stained dao, the bicycle and a gamocha (i.e., country towel) and M. Ext. 2, 3 and 4 are the seized bicycle, dao and gamocha respectively. The defence left PW 3 almost untouched in his cross-examination and all the material aspects of the evidence of PW 3, thus, remained undisputed and unchallenged. 16. Close on the heels of the evidence of PW 3, the Investigating Officer (PW 8) had deposed that on 02.09.1997, at about 3.45 p.m., accused Banamali Singha appeared, at the said police station, on a bicycle with a dao in his hand and informed there that a little while ago, he had dealt 4/5 blows on the neck of a person, namely, Parama, at Sedelipara, Selkajar, but was not sure whether the man had died or not and that the said person had scolded him on the previous day. It is in the evidence of PW 8 that a GD Entry was made in this regard and the accused was kept in the custody and on being entrusted with the investigation of the case, he seized the said dao. The said GD Entry has been proved by the Investigating Officer as GD Entry No. 80, dated 02.09.1997, which reads as under: Now, Sri Banamali Singh (i.e., the accused-appellant) son of Late Anil Kumar Singh, of village Borson, Police Station and District. The said GD Entry has been proved by the Investigating Officer as GD Entry No. 80, dated 02.09.1997, which reads as under: Now, Sri Banamali Singh (i.e., the accused-appellant) son of Late Anil Kumar Singh, of village Borson, Police Station and District. Bongaigaon, came on a bicycle to the police station carrying a dao in his hand and informed that a little while ago, he had given 4/5 blows on the neck of a man called Parama of village Sidilipara, Jelkajar, and is unaware whether the man had died or not, because the man had abused him on the previous day. On the information, so given, an entry was made and he was kept in police custody and to investigate the matter, Apurba Deka has been directed to do the needful. 17. Bearing in mind what is indicated above, when we come to the evidence of PW 1, Bolen Roy, who was the father of the said deceased, Parama, and who has been treated as the informant of this case, it is noticeable that according to his evidence, on the day of the occurrence, he was informed, at about 4.30 p.m., by a young man of his village that some mishap had taken place in his house and, on completing his work, he came home, where he found many people including police personnel present and saw his son's dead body wrapped by a bamboo mat, the said dead body having cut wounds and that police prepared a report, in this regard, which is Ext. 1, and he signed the same, the said report being the inquest report and he went to the police station and lodged there an Ejahar, which is Ext. 2. This Ejahar, which PW 1 had lodged, has been treated as the FIR of the case. 18. When the evidence of PW 1 (Bolen Roy), father of the said deceased Parama Roy, is considered in the light of the evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW 8), it clearly transpires that the investigation had already commenced on the strength of GD Entry No. 80, dated 02.09.1997, which has been proved as Ext. 7, and the police had arrived at the place of occurrence before Ext. 2 was lodged. No wonder, therefore, that Ext. 7, and the police had arrived at the place of occurrence before Ext. 2 was lodged. No wonder, therefore, that Ext. 2 was lodged on 03.09.1997, that is, on the following day of the occurrence; whereas the police had already visited the place of occurrence, held inquest over the said dead body and sent the said dead body, for post mortem, on 02.09.1997 itself and even Ext. 2 clearly indicates that the police were already present at the house of PW 1, when he arrived there and came to learn about the occurrence. 19. The investigation, in the present case, had, thus, commenced, as already pointed out above, on the strength of the said GD Entry (Ext. 7) and the contents of the said GD Entry ought to have been treated as the FIR. Logically, therefore, the contents of Ext. 2, which was lodged by PW 1, have been wrongly treated as the FIR. In fact, the contents of Ext. 2 ought to have been treated as the statement made, in writing, to the police by the informant during the course of investigation of the case by the police and, thus, the contents of Ext. 2, constitute nothing, but a statement, under Section 161 Cr.P.C., of PW 1. Being in the nature of a statement, made under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the consents of Ext. 7 were hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. and were not, therefore, admissible in evidence. 20. Having settled that the contents of GD Entry No. 80 (Ext. 7) constituted the FIR, it is the stage to take note of the law relating to evidentiary value of a first information report, which may have been lodged by an accused so as to determine as to when the contents of a first information report, lodged by an accused, would be admissible in evidence and also as to when the contents of such a first information report can be treated as inadmissible in evidence. The law regarding value and use of the first information report, lodged by an accused, stands succinctly laid down by the Supreme Court, in Aghnoo Nagasia Vs. The law regarding value and use of the first information report, lodged by an accused, stands succinctly laid down by the Supreme Court, in Aghnoo Nagasia Vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1996 SC 119), wherein the relevant observations read as follows : The first information report recorded under Section 154 Code of Criminal Procedure as such is not substantive evidence, but may be used to corroborate the informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under Section 145 of the Act if the informant is called as a witness. Where the accused himself gives the first information, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is non-confessional, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant. But a confessional first information report by the accused to a police officer cannot be used against him in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Where the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statements, proof of the confession is prohibited by Section 25. The confession includes not only the admission of the offence, but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of Section 25 is lifted by Section 27. {Emphasis is added} 21. A careful reading of the above observations, made in Aghnoo Nagasia (supra), reflects the position of law thus: First Information Report, recorded under Section 154 Code of Criminal Procedure, is not substantive evidence, but the same may be used to corroborate the informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under Section 145 of the Act if the informant is called as a witness at the trial. Where the accused himself gives the First Information, the fact of his giving the information will be admissible against him as evidence of his 'conduct' under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Where the accused himself gives the First Information, the fact of his giving the information will be admissible against him as evidence of his 'conduct' under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is non-confessional, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant; but if the first information report, given by an accused to a police officer, is confessional in nature, the same cannot be used against him, because of the bar imposed by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Such a confession will include not only the admission of the offence, but also all other admissions of incriminating facts relating to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part of such confessional statement can be received in evidence except to the extent that the ban of Section 25 is lifted by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 22. Thus, the FIR, containing the confessional statement, is not admissible in evidence except as a conduct of the accused-appellant or unless the confession can be shown to have led to the discovery of a fact within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 23. Coupled with the above, at the time of making of the statement aforementioned, the accused-appellant was not under police custody. In the case of State of UP Vs. Deomond Upadhaya ( AIR 1960 SC 1125 ), the Supreme Court has, however, held, "When a person not in custody approaches a police officer investigating an offence and offers to give information leading to the discovery of a fact having a bearing on the charge, which may be made against him, he may appropriately be deemed to have surrendered himself to the police and may be deemed to be in the "custody" of the police officer within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In the case of Aghnoo (supra), it was assumed that the appellant was constructively in police custody. 24. In the case of Aghnoo (supra), it was assumed that the appellant was constructively in police custody. 24. What becomes abundantly clear from the law laid down, in Deomond Upadhaya (supra) and Aghnoo (supra), is that when a person, not being in custody, approaches a police officer and offers to give information leading to the discovery of a fact, which has a bearing on the charge, which may be made against him, he may be deemed to have surrendered himself to the police and may be deemed to be in the "custody" of the police officer within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act or may be treated to be constructively in police custody 25. From the contents of the FIR in the present cases, it becomes clear that the FIR contains confession by the accused-appellant that he had given, on Parama Roy, blows by means of the dao, which he had carried to the police station and which has been proved as M. Ext. 3. 26. In the present case, there can be no dispute, as already pointed out above, that the FIR, in the present case, contains confessional statement and, hence, the contents of the FIR are not admissible in evidence except to the extent that it was the accused, who had himself produced the dao (M. Ext. 3), which was the weapon of offence. 27. In the case at hand, what will not be admissible is the fact that it was the accused-appellant, who had caused injuries to Parama This apart, though, on the basis of the said confession made by the accused-appellant, the Investigating Officer came to the place of occurrence and, having found Parama's dead body, held inquest thereon, the fact remains that even before the Investigating Officer had come to the house of the said deceased and found his dead body lying there, PW 6 had already seen her father, Parama, being killed and his dead body had not only been seen by his daughter (PW 6), but also by other neighbours. In such circumstances, a fact, which was already within the knowledge of many others, cannot be said to have been discovered. 28. With regard to the above, one may refer to the case of Jaffer Hussein Dastgir Vs. In such circumstances, a fact, which was already within the knowledge of many others, cannot be said to have been discovered. 28. With regard to the above, one may refer to the case of Jaffer Hussein Dastgir Vs. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1970 SC 1934 ), wherein the appellant was charged under Sections 379/ 34 IPC for committing theft of a parcel containing diamonds along with the two other persons. In the course of investigation, the police went to a newspaper office, where they learnt that one of the co-accused had come to put in an advertisement, respecting the recovery of the diamonds, stating that it was in his possession and left 'an address' with the newspaper. The police could not trace that co-accused, but later, as a result of information furnished by the appellant to the police, the panchas and the police were taken to a place, where the diamonds were recovered from the other co-accused. 29. On the question whether the statement of the appellant was admissible in evidence against him under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court, in Jaffer Hussein Dastgir (supra), while declining to accept the statement of the appellant as admissible in evidence under Section 27, pointed out that under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, no confession made by an accused to a police officer can be admitted in evidence against him and an exception to this is, however, provided by Section 27, which makes a statement, which may even amount to confession, admissible in evidence against the accused notwithstanding the fact that he was in custody of the police officer, when he made the incriminating statement. Section 27 is a proviso to Section 25 and makes admissible so much of the statement of the accused, which leads to the discovery of a fact, deposed to by him and connected with the crime irrespective of the question whether the statement is confessional or otherwise. The Supreme Court has also pointed out that the essential ingredient of Section 27 is that the information, given by the accused, must lead to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information and, secondly, only such portion of the information given, as is distinctly connected with the said recovery, is admissible against the accused and, thirdly, the discovery of the fact must relate to the commission of some offence. The Supreme Court has further pointed out that the embargo, on statement of the accused made before the police, will not apply if all the conditions, mentioned hereinbefore, are fulfilled. The Supreme Court observed that if an accused, charged with theft of articles or receiving stolen articles, within the meaning of Section 411 IPC, states to the police, "I will show you the articles or receiving stolen articles at the place where I have kept them" and the articles are actually found there, there can be no doubt that the information given by him led to the discovery of a fact, i.e., keeping of the articles by the accused at the place mentioned and that the discovery of the fact, deposed to in such a case, is not the discovery of the articles, but the discovery of the fact that the articles were kept by the accused at a particular place. 30. The Supreme Court has clarified, in Jaffer Hussein Dastgir (supra), thus: The discovery of a fact would not mean the discovery of a fact, which was known to others; rather, discovery of a fact, in the context of Section 27, would mean, a fact, which was unknown to the police officer and came to be discovered by him on the basis of the accused person's statement, which may or may not amount to confession. Viewed from this angle, it becomes abundantly clear that in the case at hand, though PW 6 had already seen her father, Parama Roy, being hacked to death and Parama's dead body had been seen by his other neighbours before the police arrived at the place of occurrence, the fact remains that the police officer, in the present case, did not know about the existence of the said dead body or the fact that Parama's dead body had been lying on the gateway of his house. 31. What logically follows from the above discussion is that out of the statement, which constitutes General Diary Entry No. 80 (Ext. 7), the statement of the accused-appellant that a little while ago, he had given 4/5 blows on the neck of a man called Parama of village Sidilipara, Jelkajar, is relevant inasmuch as acting upon this statement of the accused-appellant, the police came to Parama's house and found his dead body lying there with cut injuries on his neck. 7), the statement of the accused-appellant that a little while ago, he had given 4/5 blows on the neck of a man called Parama of village Sidilipara, Jelkajar, is relevant inasmuch as acting upon this statement of the accused-appellant, the police came to Parama's house and found his dead body lying there with cut injuries on his neck. The fact, so discovered, by the police officer was a fact, which was not known to the police officer and the discovery of this fact confirmed the correctness or truthfulness of the statement, which the accused-appellant had made, namely, a little while ago, he had given 4/5 blows on the neck of a man called Parama of village Sidilipara, Jelkajar. 32. One needs to note that Section 27 speaks of discovery and not invention. While invention means when someone designs or creates something new, discovery means, something or someone that is discovered. When America was discovered by Vasco De Gama, it was not that America did not exist, but it was not known to Vasco De Gama that America existed. Similarly, when Section 27 speaks of discovery, it means that a relevant fact may be known to others, but was not to be known to the police officer and the police officer must discover the fact on the basis of the accused-person's statement, which may or may not amount to confession, while the accused person is in custody. 33. The scope of Section 27 may be explained by two illustrations. An accused, 'X', assaults a person, 'Y', and kills him in his bedroom, the assault and the killing having been seen by a person, Z, who does not come forward to give evidence and nobody knows that Z was an eye-witness to the occurrence of assault and killing of 'Y' by 'X'. The accused, 'X', in such a case, states before the police that he has killed 'Y' and left his dead body in the bedroom. 34. Though the fact, that 'X' had assaulted and killed 'Y', may not be relevant, the said portion of the statement, having not led to the discovery of any fact, the statement of 'X', that he had left the dead body of 'Y' in his bedroom, is, obviously, relevant inasmuch as acting on this information, police officer goes to the residence of 'Y' and finds his dead body lying on the floor of his bedroom. This finding confirms the correctness and truthfulness of the statement, which had been made by 'X' to the police officer, and would, therefore, be admissible, because the fact, that 'X' knew as to where the dead body of 'Y' was, was a fact discovered in such a case, and the fact that 'Z' was a witness to the said murder of 'Y', which was unknown to 'X', could not make any material difference, because the police did not know that 'Y' was lying dead in his bedroom. This indicates that the lack of knowledge or information, within the ambit of Section 27, has to be of police and this knowledge or information has to be furnished to the police by the statement of the accused. 35. Yet another illustration can be that 'X' enters into the rented room of 'Y' in a hotel and kills him there and leaves 'Y's dead body in his room at the hotel. The accused, 'X', then, goes to the police officer, A, and confesses to have killed 'Y' and 'X' also informs the police that he has left 'Y's dead body inside the room of the hotel, where 'Y' was staying. Acting on the said statement of the accused, 'X', the police officer, 'A', proceeds towards the hotel. Before, however, the police officer, 'A', could reach the hotel, one of the bearers of the hotel finds 'Y's dead body, reports the matter to the management and the management, in turn, informs the police of the area concerned about the murder and the police takes away the dead body of 'Y' and, when the police officer, 'A', arrives at the hotel, he does not find the dead body and he comes to know that the dead body of 'Y' was found lying in the room at the hotel. 36. In such a case, the fact, which the police officer, 'A', had discovered was the fact that the accused knew that the dead body of 'Y' was in the rented room of the hotel. Thus, what was discovered confirmed the correctness and veracity of the statement of the accused, 'X'. In the circumstances, there is no reason for taking the view that Section 27 would not be applicable. 37. Thus, what was discovered confirmed the correctness and veracity of the statement of the accused, 'X'. In the circumstances, there is no reason for taking the view that Section 27 would not be applicable. 37. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that Section 27 speaks of a person, accused of an offence, who is in the custody of a police officer and makes a statement, which may or may not amount to confession, to the police officer. There are only two players in the provisions of Section 27 and this journey of Section 27 starts from Section 25, which makes confession of the accused, while he is in the custody of a police officer, inadmissible in law. If, however, the truthfulness of the confession, made to the police officer, is confirmed by a fact, which is discovered on the basis of the statement, which the accused had made, even if such a statement amounts to confession, such discovery of fact would be admissible in evidence to the extent that the information relates to discovery of fact. This is precisely what the scope of Section 27 is. We are fortified in coming to this conclusion from the decision of the Calcutta High Court, in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs Vs. Lalit Mohan Singha Roy (AIR 1922 Cal. 342), where a Division Bench of the High Court has taken the view that the word, 'discovery', appearing in Section 27, refers to the police officer and not to others, even if others already knew the fact, which the police officer discovers. In this regard, the Calcutta High Court has relied upon the decision, in Abu Shikdar Vs. Queen Empress, 11C 635 : Ind. Dec (NS) 1182. 38. In Abu Shikdar (supra), the statement made by the accused to the police officer was held inadmissible in evidence by taking recourse to Section 27, because the fact, which was said to have been discovered, was already known to another police officer. 39. In short, the contents of the FIR, i.e., the GD Entry (Ext. 7), in the present case, cannot be taken to have led to the discovery of any fact, for, a fact to be discovered, within the meaning of Section 27, has to be within the exclusive knowledge of the accused and/or his associates or co-accused. 40. 39. In short, the contents of the FIR, i.e., the GD Entry (Ext. 7), in the present case, cannot be taken to have led to the discovery of any fact, for, a fact to be discovered, within the meaning of Section 27, has to be within the exclusive knowledge of the accused and/or his associates or co-accused. 40. In the case at hand, the accused-appellant was, in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, can be deemed to have been in police custody, when he surrendered at the said police station and produced the dao (M. Ext. 3) as weapon of assault. Though the said weapon, namely, dao (M. Ext. 3) has not been chemically examined, yet the evidence of PW 6 shows that (M. Ext. 3) is the weapon of offence. 41. Thus, in the light of the decision of Aghnoo (supra), the production of the weapon of offence (M. Ext. 3) by the accused-appellant to the police is relevant as his conduct, within the meaning of Section 8 of the Evidence Act. (See also Ganesh Bora Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2004 (Supp) GLT 651). 42. It, thus, becomes abundantly clear that the statement, which the accused-appellant had made, at the said police station, before the police amounted to confessional statement, but this confessional statement, having not led to the discovery of any fact as discussed above, was, otherwise also, inadmissible in evidence. The act of appearance of the accused-appellant at the police station and his act of handing over of the blood stained dao (M. Ext. 3) to the police were evidence of his conduct, which is relevant within the meaning of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, particularly, when the said dao (M. Ext. 3) has been proved, in the light of the unquestioned evidence of PW 6 as the weapon of offence. 43. Hence, even if the confessional statement, which the accused-appellant had made, in the first information report is kept excluded from the purview of our consideration, the unshaken and undisputed evidence of the daughter of the said deceased, coupled with the medical evidence on record, and the evidence that it was the accused-appellant, who had produced the weapon of offence (M. Ext. 3), we do hold that the learned trial Court was correct in coming to the conclusion that in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, as reflected by the evidence on record, the accused-appellant had been proved, beyond reasonable doubt, to have intentionally caused the death of Parama Roy and committed thereby the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC. 44. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we do not find that the conviction of the accused-appellant and/or the sentence, passed against him, suffered from any infirmity, legal or factual. 45. We, therefore, uphold the conviction of the accused-appellant and the sentence, which has been passed against him. The appeal accordingly fails and the same shall stand dismissed. 46. With the above observations and directions, this appeal stands disposed of. 47. Let the learned Amicus Curiae be paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- for the valuable assistance rendered to this Court. Send back the LCR.