JUDGMENT Per F.M.Reis, J.-Heard Shrt S.G. Desai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants and Shrt Nitin Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents. 2. The above appeal challenges the judgment passed by the Lower Appellate Court, whereby the appeal preferred by the respondents challenging the judgment and decree dated 31/07/2003 passed in Special Civil Suit No. 79/2001 came to be allowed and the suit filed by the respondents was partly allowed thereby declaring that the Will dated 9/02/1994 is null and void to the extent, it refers to the entire suit property and that it will be reduced to the disposable quota of late Calverto Saldanha. It was further inter alia declared that the respondents are the co-owners in respect of the suit property including the house and the well therein. The appellants were also restrained inter alia from transferring or mortgaging the suit property without the permission of the respondents or obstructing the possession of the respondents of the suit property house and well. 3. Shri S.G. Dessai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants has assailed the impugned judgment essentially on the ground that the Lower Appellate Court has failed to consider that the declaration sought under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is a discretionary relief and, as such, once the learned trial Judge has exercised its discretion fin refusing such declaration the question of any interference by the Lower Appellate Court would not arise. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that as the respondents have failed to produce any title document the question of granting any declaration of title in favour of the respondents would not arise. The learned Senior Counsel has taken me through the judgment of the learned trial Judge and pointed out that the learned trial Judge has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and has come to the conclusion that the respondents have failed to establish that they have interest in the suit property. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the appellants are claiming their right to the suit property on the basis of the Will which was executed by the said Calverto Saldanha who according to the appellants was the owner of the suit house. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the appellants are claiming their right to the suit property on the basis of the Will which was executed by the said Calverto Saldanha who according to the appellants was the owner of the suit house. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that the survey records also stand in the name of said Calverto Saldanaha and as such the question of claiming any right therein would not arise. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that the Lower Appellate Court has totally misconstrued the evidence on record and has essentially come to the conclusion that the appellants have established their right to the suit house. The learned Senior Counsel has further pointed out that as the respondents did not enter the witness box, the evidence recorded at the instance of the Power of Attorney cannot be looked into. The learned Senior Counsel further points out that it is well settled by the Apex Court in the judgment reported in 2005(2) SCC 217 that a power of attorney cannot depose on behalf of its principal. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that the affidavit dated 20/03/1990 and 10/011/1995 are dying declaration of said Calverto Saldana which have not been considered by the Lower Appellate Court whilst deciding the appeal preferred by the respondents. The learned Senior Counsel, as such, submits that there are substantial questions of law which arise in the present appeal which require consideration by this Court. The learned Senior Counsel in support of his submissions has relied upon the judgment reported in 1993 (2) SCC 199 in the case of American Express bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. & Ors., 1998 (9) SCC 719 in the case of Ram Das v. Salim Ahmed & Anr, 2005 (2) SCC 217 in the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani & Anr v. Indusind Bank Ltd. & Ors., and the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2001 (4) Bom. C.R. 286 in the case of Dinanath Badriprasad Shreshta v. Chandradevi Mahanprasad Upadhya. 4. On the other hand, Shri Nitin Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has supported the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel has pointed out that the appellant himself in the witness box as DW1 has admitted that the respondents are in possession of the suit house. C.R. 286 in the case of Dinanath Badriprasad Shreshta v. Chandradevi Mahanprasad Upadhya. 4. On the other hand, Shri Nitin Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has supported the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel has pointed out that the appellant himself in the witness box as DW1 has admitted that the respondents are in possession of the suit house. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the Lower Appellate Court has rightly relied upon an admission on the part of DW1 to the effect that the appellant does not wish to disturb the possession of the respondents herein. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the respondents are residing abroad and as such the power of attorney who was well conversant with the facts of the case has been examined to state the facts which were to his personal knowledge and not the facts which were to the personal knowledge of his principals. The learned Counsel further pointed out that there is a document of demarcation which was executed way back in the year 1955 wherein apart from the respondents and the said Calverto Saldanha their father namely Mariano was also present who sought for demarcation of property with the adjoining owners. The learned Counsel further pointed out that this itself raises an inference of title in favour of the respondents to the effect that the suit house belonged to the father of the Calverto Saldanha and the respondents and upon his death said right devolved upon his three sons equally. The learned Counsel further pointed out that said Calverto Saldanha was entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit house and as such the question of bequeathing the whole property in favour of the appellants does not arise. The learned Counsel further pointed out that it is well settled that any bequest in respect of the property where a person has no right is a nullity and as such the learned Lower Appellate Court had rightly declared the impugned Will as null and void to the extent of the share which did not belong to the testator Calverto Saldanha. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the learned trial judge has erroneously come to the conclusion that the appellants have failed to establish their right over the suit house. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the learned trial judge has erroneously come to the conclusion that the appellants have failed to establish their right over the suit house. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the electricity meter records stand in the name of the respondents which establishes inter alia that the respondents have ownership and possession over the suit property. The learned Counsel further pointed out that on the basis of the admission of DW1 itself the learned Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the ownership and possession of the suit property also belongs to the respondents. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants 'do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case and as such the above appeal deserves no consideration. The learned Counsel has taken me through the substantial questions of law proposed by the appellants and pointed out that no such substantial question of law arise in the present appeal and; as such, the appeal deserves to be rejected. 5. I have carefully considered the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties and I have also gone through the impugned Judgments and the records made available by the learned Counsel. 6. The first contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that the Power of Attorney holder of the Respondents had deposed on their behalf before the learned Trial Court. This contention has been rightly appreciated by the Lower Appellate Court whilst holding that the Power of Attorney examined by the Respondents was the brother of the Appellant No. 1, who has deposed on oath all the facts within his knowledge and thereby proved the case of the Respondents. The judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants would not be applicable to the facts of the present case as a party is not precluded from examining a Power of Attorney holder to depose the facts to his own knowledge. Apart from that, besides deposing "the facts to his knowledge, the Power of Attorney has also produced documentary evidence which has been duly proved and the Appellants have not raised, any objection to the authenticity or otherwise to such document. Apart from that, besides deposing "the facts to his knowledge, the Power of Attorney has also produced documentary evidence which has been duly proved and the Appellants have not raised, any objection to the authenticity or otherwise to such document. Hence, taking note of the fact that the Lower Appellate Court has found whilst appreciating the evidence on record that the Power of Attorney had deposed facts to his personal knowledge, the contention that the evidence of such Power of Attorney holder cannot be considered as advanced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, cannot be accepted. 7. The next contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants is that learned Trial Judge has exercised discretion in refusing relief in favour of the Respondents and, as such, the Lower Appellate Court was not justified to interfere in the Judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The said contention on the basis of the material on' record, cannot be accepted. The relief sought by the Respondents in the suit was to declare the Will dated 09.02.1994 as null and void and quash and set aside the Order dated 19.09.2000 passed in the Inventory Proceedings No. 80/2000. Besides the said relief, the Respondents have also sought for permanent injunction to restrain the Appellants, etc., from interfering with the suit property and the house and well or entering into any Agreement for sale or transfer in respect of the suit property. Under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, any person entitled to a legal character or to any right in any property, may institute a suit against the other person denying or interested to deny such title or right to claim a declaration. In the present case, the Respondents have also sought for a consequential relief of permanent injunction. Besides that, the declaration to rescind the partition in the Inventory Proceedings, is within the provisions of Article 1427 of the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code which. inter alia, provides that when there is an omission to join any of the co-heir in such proceedings and the other parties have acted in fraud and bad faith a suit to rescind such Judgment is maintainable. In the present case, the Lower Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that the Inventory Proceedings were filed to deprive the rights in the property to the Respondents herein. In the present case, the Lower Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that the Inventory Proceedings were filed to deprive the rights in the property to the Respondents herein. The Respondents are admittedly the brothers and/or legal heirs of the deceased Calverto Saldanha, who was the testator. The Appellants cannot claim to be the universal heir of the said testator. Hence, in the absence of a notifying the Respondents in the said Inventory Proceedings, any such proceedings are a nullity in law. Hence, it cannot be said that the learned Trial Judge had exercised its discretion in the legal manner without considering the said aspects which were noted by the Lower Appellate Court whilst disposing of the Appeal preferred by the Respondents. Hence, the contention of Shri Dessai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants that there was no case for interference in the discretion of the learned Trial Judge, cannot be accepted. Apart from that, the Respondents had also sought for a further and/or consequential relief and, as such, there was no question of refusing a declaration if at all the Respondents were otherwise entitled in law. 8. The next contention of Shri Dessai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants is to the effect that the Respondents have failed to establish their title to the suit property. The learned Lower Appellate Court has noted the admissions of DW1 to the effect that the Respondents were also in possession of the suit house situated in the suit property. The Lower Appellate Court has also taken note of the fact that there was an act of demarcation initiated by the father of Calverto Saldanha along with his brothers whose rights have devolved upon the Respondents herein. On perusal of the said Act of Demarcation. I find that there is a specific averment to the effect that the demarcation was effected by the authorities between two adjoining properties. In such proceedings, the said Calverto Saldanha along with his brothers and his father Mariano Saldanha, also intervened as owners of the suit property. No doubt, an act of demarcation by itself may not be a document of title, Nevertheless, it can always create an interference of title coupled with other material on record. In the present case, the Lower Appellate Court upon appreciation of its evidence on record has found that the Respondents were also in possession of the suit property. No doubt, an act of demarcation by itself may not be a document of title, Nevertheless, it can always create an interference of title coupled with other material on record. In the present case, the Lower Appellate Court upon appreciation of its evidence on record has found that the Respondents were also in possession of the suit property. The electrical connection stands in the name of the Respondents. There is also material to establish that the Respondents had carried out repairs to the suit house. This evidence coupled with the admissions of DW1 to the effect that the Respondents are occupying part of the house and that he is not, seeking their eviction, justifies the finding of the Lower Appellate Court that the suit house and the property belonged in co-ownership to the said Calverto Saldanha and his two brothers. Under Section 110 of the Evidence Act, when a question is whether a person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner. In the present case, on perusal of the Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, the learned Judge after coming to the conclusion that there was sufficient material on record to establish that the Respondents were also in possession of the suit house proceeded to consider as to whether the Appellants had brought any evidence to establish that they were not the owners of the suit house. The learned Judge has noted that the DW1 himself has admitted that he did not have document to establish that the testator Calverto Saldanha was the exclusive owner of the suit property and the house. Apart from that, the learned Judge has minutely scrutinized the documents on record and has found that there was no material adduced by the Appellants to establish that the Respondents who were also in possession of the suit house were not the owners of the suit property. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants relying upon the Survey Records, which stand in the name of Calverto Saldanha, contended that he was in possession of the suit house and property. I am afraid that such submissions cannot be accepted. It is well settled that the entries in the Revenue Records cannot create a title. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants relying upon the Survey Records, which stand in the name of Calverto Saldanha, contended that he was in possession of the suit house and property. I am afraid that such submissions cannot be accepted. It is well settled that the entries in the Revenue Records cannot create a title. Apart from that, the admission of DW1 himself that the Respondents were in possession of part of the house, would rebut any such presumption. 9. A presumption of an origin of lawful title can be drawn in order to separate possession which continued for a longer period and was quietly enjoyed when no actual proof of title is forthcoming. The matter is one of presumption based upon the policy of law. A presumption should be allowed to fill in gaps disclosed in the evidence. It is a completion of a right to which the circumstances clearly point out where time had obliterated the records of the original commencement of title. The longer period from which such grant might be reasonably supposed to have occurred less force is in the objection that the title could not have been lawful. In the present case, the circumstances which establish that the suit property belonged to the ancestors of the Respondents and the said Calverto Saldanha, can be fairly supposed from the year when the said demarcation was carried out way back in the year 1935 wherein the said Calverto, has father as well as the other brothers were also present as owners of the suit property. Hence, such possession of the Respondents along with the said Calverto of the suit house would clearly disclose that said Calverto was only a co-owner along with his brothers of the suit property. The Lower Appellate Court has, as such, rightly considered the said aspect to come to the conclusion that the Respondents were entitled to the relief granted. 10. The Judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, in the case of Dinanath Badriprasad Shreshta v. Chandradevi Mahanprasad Upadhya (supra) is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. The Judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, in the case of Dinanath Badriprasad Shreshta v. Chandradevi Mahanprasad Upadhya (supra) is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said proceedings, the plaintiff therein, who was contending that he is having title of the property was occupying the house along with other person to whom the allotment was made as he had paid the initial contribution. The contention of such person that he had also contributed in paying for the grant besides the initial deposit, was not accepted. Considering that the documents of a allotment was in favour of the Defendants therein and the claim of the plaintiff that there was a family arrangement was not accepted as the plaintiff and the defendants did not belong to the same family, the learned Division Bench found that such declaration of title could not be given to the plaintiff therein. This is not the situation in the present case as rightly the Lower Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that the Appellants have not brought any document of title or any other material to establish that the said Calverto Saldanha was the exclusive owner of the suit property and the suit house. Once such finding of fact has been arrived at by the Lower Appellate Court upon appreciation of evidence on record. it is not open to this Court in a Second Appeal to come to any contrary conclusion. The Lower Appellate Court has rightly found that the learned Trial Judge has misconstrued the evidence on record and has come to the conclusion that the Respondents have not established their ownership to the suit house and the property. The learned Trial Judge had failed to take into account the relevant provisions of Jaw applicable to the facts of the present case. It would also be material to note that even the learned Trial Judge at para 30 of the Judgment dated 31.07.2003. has found that the contention of the Appellants that the said Calverto Saldanha was title holder of the suit property and was in possession of the same for the period of more than 30 years and as such had attained prescriptive right in respect of the suit property was rejected. has found that the contention of the Appellants that the said Calverto Saldanha was title holder of the suit property and was in possession of the same for the period of more than 30 years and as such had attained prescriptive right in respect of the suit property was rejected. The learned Judge has taken note of the fact that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are in possession and enjoyment of the house which is situated in the suit property and it was not in dispute that till date, the Respondents are in occupation of the suit house. The learned Judge found that such claim of title by adverse possession cannot be accepted once the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are in physical occupation of the suit house. Hence, the fact that the Respondents were also in possession of the suit house was accepted even by the learned Trial Judge. Thus the inference drawn by the Lower Appellate Court has not at all been considered by the learned Trial Judge despite of coming to the conclusion that the Respondents were also in possession of the suit house. 11. A person cannot bequeath what he does not own and in case he chooses to do so. it would amount to a nullity. In the present case, the Lower Appellate Court has found that the testator Calverto Saldanha was entitled to only one third share in the suit property and as such, the question of bequeathing the whole property would not arise. It is trite law that no one can confer better title, than he has. Nemo dat quod non habet, goes the legal maxim. Even on perusal of the Will. I find that the Appellants were not declared as universal heir of the said Calverto Saldanha and, consequently. the question of initiating the Inventory Proceedings without making the legal descendants of said Calverto Saldanha as parties stands vitiated and. as such, the Lower Appellate Court was justified to declare the Order in such proceedings as null and void. On going through the Will. what has been bequeathed is the disposable share of the said deceased Calverto Saldanha and all his right and interest in the said property. 12. The Judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants in the case of American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. & Ors. On going through the Will. what has been bequeathed is the disposable share of the said deceased Calverto Saldanha and all his right and interest in the said property. 12. The Judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants in the case of American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. & Ors. (supra) is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case nor the Judgment in the case of Ram Das v. Salim Ahmed & Anr.(supra). In the present case, the Lower Appellate Court has not relied upon the witness of the Appellants to grant the reliefs in favour of the Respondents. On the contrary, the Lower Appellate Court has drawn an inference in law after coming to the conclusions that the Respondents were also in possession of the suit house to consider as to whether the Appellants have established that said Calverto Saldanha, the testator, was the exclusive owner of the suit property. Hence, the said Judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 13. In the Judgment of the Apex Court reported in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani & Anr. v. Indusind Bank Ltd. & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court found that the Power of Attorney does not have personal knowledge of the facts which the Appellants therein had to establish especially the burden cast on such party as to the extend of the share purchased from the independent source of income if any. Considering the facts in the present case as referred to herein above, the Power of Attorney has produced documentary evidence as well as stated facts to his personal knowledge and not facts which were to the knowledge of the principal. Hence, the said Judgments would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. Considering the facts of the case and the material on record. I find that the Lower Appellate Court was justified to interfere in the Judgment of the learned Trial Judge and allow the Appeal preferred by the Respondents and declare the Will dated 09.02.1994 as null and void to the extent to which refers to the whole suit property and that it would be reduced to the disposable share of the testator Calverto Saldanha. The learned Judge was also justified to declare the Judgment in the Inventory Proceedings No. 80/2000 as null and void and declared that the Respondents are also co-owners or interested persons and also grant the permanent injunction. 15. On perusal of the substantial question of law proposed to be framed by the Appellants. I find that no substantial question of law arises in the present Appeal for the aforesaid reasons. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence in a Second Appeal to come to any contrary conclusion. The Lower Appellate Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and I find no perversity in any such findings arrived at by the Lower Appellate Court. The affidavits referred to by the learned Senior Counsel of Shri Calverto Saldanha is not evidence nor can they be relied upon to advance the case of the Appellants. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the said documents are dying documents, cannot be accepted. In any event, the contents of such documents have not been proved. Hence, non-consideration of the said affidavit as such cannot lead to a conclusion that there was any perversity in the findings of the Lower Appellate Court; 16. A substantial question of law ordinarily would not arise from the findings of fact arrived at by the fact findings Courts. The High Court jurisdiction in terms of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code is undoubtedly limited. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence in exercise of powers under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code to come to any contrary conclusion. 17. Hence, I find for the reasons stated herein above, that there are no substantial questions of law which arise for consideration in the above Appeal. As such, the above Appeal stands dismissed.