Assam Civil Accounts Association Co-Operative Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd. v. Principal Accountant General (Audit)
2012-11-22
UJJAL BHUYAN
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Ujjal Bhuyan, J. 1. Heard Mr. BK Deb Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R. Debnath, learned Central Govt. counsel appearing for the respondent, Principal Accountant General (Audit), Assam. Petitioner is "The Assam Civil Accounts Association Co-operative Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd. Shillong" ("petitioner society" for short) a registered co-operative society, which was established and registered in the year 1927. Petitioner society is represented in the present proceeding by its Chairman and Secretary. Petitioner society has adopted a set of bye-laws to regulate its various activities. As the name itself suggest, petitioner society comprises of shareholder members who are employees either in Group B or C of the office of the Accountant General. Office of the Accountant General has been defined under bye-law 1(g) to mean any or all of the offices of the Accountant General (Audit) Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram, Shillong and Guwahati, Accountant General (A & E) Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram, Shillong and Accountant General (A & E) Assam, Shillong and Guwahati. 2. The objective of the petitioner society as mentioned in bye-law 3 is to encourage thrift and co-operation amongst the shareholders, to encourage savings of shareholders by making monthly contributions, to create funds to be lent to the shareholders on easy terms etc. Provision of loans is dealt with from by-law 50 to bye-law 59. According to the petitioner society (paragraph 25 of the writ petition), a good number of its members had received loans beyond normal admissibility on mortgage of life insurance policies, the premium of which are paid by the petitioner society upon contributions received from the concerned members. Loans availed of by the members are recovered through the employer by making deduction from their salaries. Some of the members of the petitioner society were subsequently allocated to and permanently posted at Guwahati in the establishment of Principal Accountant General (Audit) Assam (respondent herein). 3. A title suit was filed by one Shri G. S. Swer and 7 others, all members of the petitioner society seeking a declaration from the Civil Court that employees posted outside Shillong cannot contest election to the Board of Management of the petitioner society and that they should also not be treated as members of the petitioner society. The said suit was registered as Title Suit No. 7 (H) of 1999.
The said suit was registered as Title Suit No. 7 (H) of 1999. Though the petitioner society was made a defendant in the Suit, it decided not to contest the same. Ultimately, learned Munsiff, Shillong by the judgment and order dated 1.10.1999 decreed the suit declaring that members of the petitioner society who are permanently posted at Guwahati are not entitled to contest in the election to the Board of Management of the petitioner society and that shareholder members who are permanently posted at Guwahati had ceased to be members of the petitioner society by virtue of their permanent transfer and posting outside Shillong. This decision of the learned Munsiff was neither challenged by the petitioner society nor by anyone else before any higher forum and, therefore, it has attained finality. 4. The employees who were allocated to and permanently posted at Guwahati from Shillong alongwith other employees of the office of Accountant General (Audit) Assam have formed a co-operative society called "The AG Assam Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society Ltd." and have sought recognition from the authority of Guwahati. As some members of the above society were found to be members of the petitioner society, the office of the Accountant General (A & E) Assam requested the petitioner society to take appropriate action for proportionate distribution of assets and liabilities of those members who are posted at Guwahati and have taken membership of the new society. Thereafter, by communication dated 22.04.2008 issued from the office of the respondent, the petitioner society was informed that in view of the decision of the learned Munsiff, it has been decided that henceforth the office of the respondent would not affect any recovery of monthly subscription of the shareholder members of the petitioner society who have been permanently transferred to the office of the respondent. Though the petitioner society submitted a representation before the respondent requesting the latter to continue recovery of the dues of the members who had availed loans from the petitioner society, the office of the respondent by order dated 24.7.2008 declared that deduction of monthly contribution of shareholders in respect of the petitioner society through pay bills would be stopped after October, 2008.
In response to further representation of the petitioner, the office of the respondent informed the petitioner society by letter dated 9.4.2009 that it has been decided to stop deduction of recovery of loans/dues of the members of the petitioner society from their pay bills. 5. Aggrieved, the petitioner society is before this Court by way of the present writ petition challenging the above decision of the respondent. 6. The respondent (originally respondent No. 3, names of respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 4 having been struck off as per Court's order) has filed counter affidavit. Respondent has contended that after the judgment of the Civil Court dated 1.10.1999 and after cadre separation, bye-laws of the petitioner society would no longer be applicable to those members and shareholders posted in the office of the respondent. Therefore, petitioner society cannot seek recovery of its dues from such members posted at Guwahati through the office of the respondent. It is the categorical stand of the respondent that members of the petitioner society working in the office of the respondent have severed all links with the common cadre and have no connection with the petitioner society upon their permanent allocation to the office of the respondent. This fact coupled with the order of the Civil Court makes it very clear that all the members of the petitioner society consequent upon their permanent allocation to and posting at Guwahati have ceased to be members of petitioner society. Respondent has contended that petitioner society had granted loans to various members beyond permissible limit which it cannot now seek recovery through the office of the respondent. Respondent has further stated that petitioner society has not furnished the complete particulars of loans availed of by various members and the corresponding dues outstanding. Petitioner society having accepted the decision of the learned Munsiff, cannot now turn around and contend that those members now permanently posted at Guwahati would continue to remain its member and, therefore, they are subject to recovery of their dues through the office of the respondent by making deduction from their salary. According to the respondent, the writ petition is hit by the principle of approbate and reprobate and, therefore, should be dismissed. 7.
According to the respondent, the writ petition is hit by the principle of approbate and reprobate and, therefore, should be dismissed. 7. Petitioner society in its rejoinder affidavit has generally reiterated the averments made in the writ petition and has tried to contend that the decision of the Civil Court was in the context of election to the Board of Management of the petitioner society and cannot be stretched to contend that members permanently posted at Guwahati had ceased to be its members. As the relevant bye-law of the petitioner society has not been amended to exclude members posted in the office of the respondent from the membership of the petitioner society, such members would continue to remain its members and, therefore, the stand taken by the respondent is not justified. 8. Mr. Deb Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent has misunderstood the judgment of the Civil Court which was rendered in the context of election to the office bearers of the petitioner society. He submits that unless the bye-laws of the petitioner society are amended, members even on permanent posting under the respondent would continue to remain its member and under Rule 76 of the Central Govt. Accounts (Receipts and Payment) Rules, 1983, respondent has a duty to make deduction from the non-attachable portion of a Government servant's salary on account of dues of co-operative society. In the above background, he submits that a direction may be issued to the respondent to make deduction from the monthly pay bills of those members of the petitioner society who had availed loans from it and are presently posted under the jurisdiction of the respondent. 9. Mr. Debnath, learned Central Govt. counsel on the other hand submits that the writ petition itself is not maintainable. According to him, writ petition lacks adequate material particulars such as the names of the members serving under the respondent who had availed loans from the petitioner society, the amounts of loan taken, their loan account numbers, dues outstanding against each of the loanee etc. He further submits that as per the own statement of the petitioner society, it had given loans to members more than what was permissible. Therefore, it cannot now try to redeem its position through the office of the respondent.
He further submits that as per the own statement of the petitioner society, it had given loans to members more than what was permissible. Therefore, it cannot now try to redeem its position through the office of the respondent. In any case, the petitioner society having supported the stand of the plaintiffs in the title suit and having accepted the decision of the Civil Court which has declared that members permanently posted at Guwahati had ceased to be members of the petitioner society, cannot now turn around to contend that such employees would continue to remain members of the petitioner society for the purpose of recovery of the dues. He, therefore, contends that the writ petition is hit by the principle of approbate and reprobate. In support of his submission, Mr. Debnath has referred to two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court- (1) (1992) 4 SCC 683 R.N. Gosain Vs. Yashpal Dhir (2) (1995) 1 SCC 85 Mahinder Kumar Gupta & Ors. Vs. Union of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 10. The submissions made have been considered. 11. It is an admitted position that the title suit was filed by members of the petitioner society. When notice of the suit from the Civil Court was received, petitioner society decided not to contest the proceedings. As has already been noticed above, learned Munsiff in the suit decreed that the shareholder members of the petitioner society who are permanently posted at Guwahati had ceased to be members of the petitioner society by virtue of their permanent transfer and posting. This finding of the Civil Court was not challenged by the petitioner society before any higher forum. As such, the said finding has attained finality. As a matter of fact, going by its conduct, it would not be wrong to say that petitioner society had endorsed such finding. The fact that the bye-laws of the petitioner society has not been amended in tune with the Civil Court order would not make any difference. It is for the petitioner society to make the necessary amendment in its bye-laws. For its failure to do so, it cannot contend that the bye-laws would continue to remain operative even in the face of the decree of the Civil Court. 12.
It is for the petitioner society to make the necessary amendment in its bye-laws. For its failure to do so, it cannot contend that the bye-laws would continue to remain operative even in the face of the decree of the Civil Court. 12. Therefore, the position which emerges is that those members of the petitioner society who have been permanently allocated to and posted at Guwahati under the respondent are no longer members of the petitioner society. Reliance on Rule 76 of the Central Govt. Accounts (Receipts and Payment) Rules, 1983 appears to be misplaced as it would be the duty of the respondent to make deduction from the salary of those employees under his jurisdiction who have outstanding dues of co-operative societies of which they are presently members. Since the members of the petitioner society now permanently posted at Guwahati are no longer its members, respondent cannot be compelled to make deduction from their salary for recovery of their cooperative dues. Petitioner society has itself admitted in paragraph 25 of the writ petition that it had extended loans to a good number of those members beyond the admissible amount. That being the position, it cannot now seek realization of such amount through the office of the respondent. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.N. Gosain (supra) had observed that law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate, which principle is based on the doctrine of election, which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. The essence of the principle is that after taking an advantage under an order, a party may be precluded from saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside. In the case of Mahinder Kumar Gupta & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition filed by an association on the ground that association cannot file a writ petition as it has no fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution. 14.
In the case of Mahinder Kumar Gupta & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition filed by an association on the ground that association cannot file a writ petition as it has no fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution. 14. On a perusal of the writ petition and in view of the discussions made above, the Court is of the view that no fundamental or legal right of the petitioner society has been violated or infringed by the respondent. Writ petition is also lacking in material particulars. 15. Therefore, the conclusion of the above discussion is that it is not open to the petitioner society to seek realization of the outstanding dues of its erstwhile members now serving under the respondent through the office of the respondent. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that no case for interference is made out by the petitioner society. In the circumstances, this Court is not inclined to intervene in the matter as prayed for by the petitioner society. 17. Notwithstanding the above, it would be open to the petitioner society to take recourse to such other legal provision as may be available and permissible under the law for recovery of the outstanding dues. Writ petition accordingly stands dismissed, subject to the observations made above. There shall however be no order as to cost. Petition dismissed