Judgment : The defendants 3, 5 and 6 who lost their defence in both the Courts below are the appellants 1 to 3 in this second appeal. The 1st respondent/plaintiff filed the suit in the trial Court for recovery of money covered by Exs.A.1 to A.5 deposit receipts dated 11.06.1998 under which she made deposits of Rs.20,000/-, Rs.22,567/-, Rs.20,000/-, Rs.20,000/- and Rs.20,000/- respectively with the 1st defendant firm/2nd respondent on interest of 24% per annum with yearly rests. The defendants 2 to 6/appellants 1 to 3 and others have been partners. After death of the 2nd defendant, the defendants 7 to 9 were added as his legal representatives. After issuing legal notice Ex.A.6 dated 15.11.1999, the plaintiff filed the suit. Exs.A.7 and A.8 are postal acknowledgments of the defendants 1 and 3 dated 18.11.1999 and 19.11.1999 respectively. Ex.A.9 consists of returned registered notice covers of the defendants 2 and 4 to 6. None of the defendants gave any reply to Ex.A.6 notice. The defendants opposed the suit on various grounds. The defendants 3, 5 and 6 who are the appellants herein filed written statements in the trial Court contending that the 3rd defendant joined in the registered firm by name the 1st defendant on 16.10.1983 and retired from partnership on 31.03.1984 itself and that during the said period he was a minor represented by his father as guardian and that the 3rd defendant is no way concerned with the 1st defendant from 31.03.1984 onwards and that the 3rd defendant does not know business of the 1st defendant as he was dormant partner and that defendants 5 and 6 were dormant partners in the 1st defendant firm from 01.04.1990 to 03.03.1997 and that therefore they are not liable for the suit claim. After trial, the trial Court decreed the suit against all the defendants; and other defendants than the defendants 3, 5 and 6 did not file any appeal and the decree became final against other defendants. The defendants 3, 5 and 6 filed appeal before the lower appellate Court and the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal, driving the appellants to this second appeal before this Court. Both the Courts below rejected contention of the defendants 3, 5 and 6 mainly on Section 32(3) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (in short, the Act). 2. The defendants 3, 5 and 6 filed appeal before the lower appellate Court and the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal, driving the appellants to this second appeal before this Court. Both the Courts below rejected contention of the defendants 3, 5 and 6 mainly on Section 32(3) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (in short, the Act). 2. In this second appeal, it is contended by the appellant’s counsel that the Courts below erred in applying Section 32(3) of the Act to this case and should have upheld contention of the defendants 3, 5 and 6 relying upon proviso to Section 32(3) of the Act. 3. The only question which according to the appellants is the substantial question of law is whether Section 32(3) of the Act is applicable or proviso to Section 32(3) of the Act is applicable to proved facts in this case, or whether more of the above provisions is applicable; consequently whether the appellants are liable for the suit claim? 4. On the above point, both the counsel are heard, since this Court originally ordered notice to the 1st respondent/plaintiff before admission. According to the 1st respondent’s counsel, main Section 32(3) of the Act is applicable on the proved facts. 5. There is no dispute that the 1st defendant is a registered firm. It is stated to be in existence since 26.02.1968. The 3rd defendant examined himself as D.W.1. The 6th defendant examined himself as D.W.2. The 6th defendant and the 5th defendant are brothers. Ex.B.4 is certified copy of form registration certificate dated 26.02.1968. By then, none of the defendants 3, 5 and 6 was a partner. Ex.B.1 is Photostat copy of list of partners issued by Registrar of Firms in the relevant form. Ex.B.3 is income tax return in saral form together with Form No.16. From all this oral and documentary evidences, both the Courts below came to the conclusion that the 3rd defendant as a minor joined in the firm on 16.10.1993 and retired from the partnership firm on 31.03.1984; and that the defendants 5 and 6 joined in the 1st defendant firm on 01.04.1990 and ceased or retired as partners on 31.03.1997. The defendants 3, 5 and 6 were not in fact partners of the 1st defendant by the date 11.06.1998 when the plaintiff deposited amounts with the 1st defendant firm under Exs.A.1 to A.5. 6. The defendants 3, 5 and 6 were not in fact partners of the 1st defendant by the date 11.06.1998 when the plaintiff deposited amounts with the 1st defendant firm under Exs.A.1 to A.5. 6. It is contended by the respondents’ counsel that the plaintiff as PW.1 deposed that she deposited the amounts with the firm after knowing the defendants 3, 5 and 6 are the partners and she did not know about retirement of the defendants 3, 5 and 6 from the partnership firm. Though cessation of the defendants 5 and 6 as partners was in about one year one month prior to Exs.A.1 to A.5 deposits, the 3rd defendant ceased to be partner of the firm about 14 years prior to the plaintiff’s deposit of amounts in the firm. It is contended by the appellant’s counsel that the plaintiff deposited the amounts in the firm not with any particular knowledge of the partners therein, but for the sake of high rate of interest offered by the 1st defendant firm. It is not stated by PW.1 as to the source of her information about the defendants 3, 5 and 6 were also partners by the date of Exs.A.1 to A.5. The plaintiff wanted to rely upon the abstract legal doctrine contained in Section 32(3) of the Act, on the ground that there was no publication of public notice of retirement of the defendants 3, 5 and 6 from the partnership firm. 7. Section 32 of the Act deals with retirement of a partner. Relevant portion of Section 32 to the extent necessary for the purpose of this second appeal is contained in Sub-Section (3) which reads as follows: “(3) Notwithstanding the retirement of a partner from a firm, he and the partners continue to be liable as partners to third parties for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the retirement, until public notice is given of the retirement: Provided that a retired partner is not liable to any third party who deals with firm without knowing that he was a partner.” 8. In Syndicate Bank v R.S.R. Engineering Works (2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases, 265), the Supreme Court while narrating scope of the above Sub-Section and explaining ThummalaRama Rao vs Chodagam Venkateswara Rao (AIR 1963 Andhra Pradesh 154)of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, observed as follows: “The Division Bench wrongly placed reliance on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Thummala rama Rao and others v Chodagam Venkateswara Rao and others AIR 1963 AP 154 . That was a vase where the suit was filed based on three promissory notes executed by three of the partners of a firm. Prior to the execution of the pro-notes, defendants 6, 7, 8 & 10 had retired from the partnership and the same was duly published in newspaper. It was in that context that the Court held that if a retiring partner who has not given notice in the mode specified under Section 72, wants to escape liability for any subsequent acts on behalf of the firs, it can only be on the basis of some other rule of law and not on the ground that public notice was given in a manner different from that prescribed under Section 72. It was further stated that the rule that makes a retiring partner liable for act done on behalf of the firm after retirement is based on estoppel, because the persons deal with it in the belief that all the partners of the firm still continue; but when the third parties in fact knew that some of the partners have in fact retired from the partnership, there is no scope for the application for the rule of estoppel to make the partners who had already retired, liable for the subsequent acts on behalf of the firm”. Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in JaniNautamlal Venishankar v Shri Vivekanand Co-operative Housing Society Limited (AIR 1986 Gujarat 162)explained the results that ensue in case proviso to Sub-Section (3) of Section 32 of the Act is applicable. In my opinion, the above case law under Section 32(3) of the Act becomes irrelevant in this matter as the liability under Exs.A.1 to A.5 deposit receipts was incurred by the 1st defendant firm long subsequent to retirement of the appellants/defendants 3, 5 and 6 from the 1st defendant firm. In my opinion, the above case law under Section 32(3) of the Act becomes irrelevant in this matter as the liability under Exs.A.1 to A.5 deposit receipts was incurred by the 1st defendant firm long subsequent to retirement of the appellants/defendants 3, 5 and 6 from the 1st defendant firm. Applicability of Section 32 (3) or its proviso arises only when the liability was incurred by the firm to a third party during the period when a particular partner was in the firm and he retired from the partnership before the firm discharged its liability to that third party. In the case on hand, the defendants 3, 5 and 6 became partners of the firm and also retired from the partnership even before the firm incurred liability to the plaintiff under Exs.A.1 to A.5. Therefore, I find that neither Section 32(3) of the Act nor proviso to Section 32(3) of the Act is applicable to facts of this case. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. I further find that the appellants/defendants 3, 5 and 6 are not liable for the suit claim. The Courts below erred in decreeing the suit against the appellants also. 9. In the result, the second appeal is allowed with costs through out setting aside the decree passed by the Courts below insofar as the appellants/defendants 3, 5 and 6 are concerned.