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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 1304 (MP)

Mullu v. State of M. P.

2012-12-21

G.D.Saxena, S.K.Gangele

body2012
JUDGMENT Saxena, J. -- 1. This appeal has been preferred by the accused-appellant having being aggrieved by a judgment dated 13th July 2001 of conviction and sentence delivered in Sessions Trial No.61/2000 by the Special Judge (Dacoity) Bhind, convicting present appellant-accused Mullu for kidnapping one Jhalari Yadav, which is an offence punishable under section 364A of IPC and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.500/- and in default to serve additional one month’s rigorous imprisonment. 2. The facts, in short, just for deciding the case are that in the intervening night of 11th and 12th February 2000, abductee Jhalari Yadav had gone to his agriculture field at Achalpura, Police Station Mihona, District Bhind. At around 1-2 p.m., in night when he was sleeping, there some unidentified miscreants reached, who disturbed his sound sleep and after catching hold of his forearm compelled him to accompany with them to forest. In the morning, he identified the miscreants who kidnapped him and they were accused Mullu, absconded Mohkam Singh, Ramsnehi and Chhunna. The accused threatened him to cause death and against his will they confined him for a month in the forest, for recovery of ransom. After realization of the ransom amount, the accused released the abductee Jhalari Yadav. On 12th February 2000, after abudction of Jhalari Yadav, a written report (Ex.P-2) was lodged by Bhanwar Singh (PW4), his nephew against some unknown miscreants. The investigation was set into motion. Case dairy statements of complainant and other material witnesses were recorded. Recovery memo of the abductee was prepared and thereafter on 28th March 2000, his case dairy statement was recorded. Sole accused (appellant) was arrested. After investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the criminal Court. On committal, the trial was commenced. After recording evidence, the present accused-appellant was convicted and sentenced for commission of the alleged offence, hence this appeal. 3. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the judgment under appeal is against the law and procedure and therefore same is liable to be set aside. It is submitted that to prove the guilt against accused the prosecution examined chance/eye-witnesses, namely, Jhalari Yadav (PW1) the abductee,Jamuna Singh (PW2), younger brother of abductee, Nahar Singh (PW3), nephew of abductee Bhanwar Singh (PW4), the complainant, S.B. Singh (PW5), Sub-Inspector of Police Station Mihona/the Investigating Officer, and Munna Singh (PW6). It is submitted that to prove the guilt against accused the prosecution examined chance/eye-witnesses, namely, Jhalari Yadav (PW1) the abductee,Jamuna Singh (PW2), younger brother of abductee, Nahar Singh (PW3), nephew of abductee Bhanwar Singh (PW4), the complainant, S.B. Singh (PW5), Sub-Inspector of Police Station Mihona/the Investigating Officer, and Munna Singh (PW6). It is submitted that the statements of above witnesses do not telly with each other and in specific circumstances, the written report was lodged against unknown miscreants by a witness Bhanwar Singh (PW4). No test identification parade during investigation was conducted by the prosecution for identification of arrested accused. During investigation, no letter written by the accused or abductee or proof of delivery of ransom money was recovered. It is argued that the persecution case rests only on the testimony of interested witnesses Bhanwar Singh, Nahar Singh and Munna Singh, who did not support the prosecution version and were declared hostile. Therefore, as per learned counsel, the prosecution by evidence of these witnesses could not be able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts. It is prayed that by allowing the appeal, judgment under challenge may be set aside and the accused-appellant be acquitted of the offence. 4. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent-State contended that the prosecution succeeded to prove the guilt against accused-appellant by adducing evidence and there is no infirmity or illegality committed by the trial Court in awarding conviction and sentence against the accused. Hence, it is prayed that by dismissing the appeal, the judgment of the trial Court be upheld. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State. Also perused the record of the trial Court and the law applicable to the present case. 6. The question for consideration in this appeal is whether the ingredients of offence of kidnapping for ransom are proved by the testimony of abductee and eye-witnesses, and/or whether the learned trial Judge has committed any illegality in placing reliance on the said materials before reaching at the conclusion. 7. The bare reading of section 364A of IPC, which is reproduced as under, indicates that kidnapping for ransom would be attracted when the kidnapper makes a demand to pay a ransom. “364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc. 7. The bare reading of section 364A of IPC, which is reproduced as under, indicates that kidnapping for ransom would be attracted when the kidnapper makes a demand to pay a ransom. “364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc. -- Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes, hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or [any foreign State or international, inter-Governmental organisation or any other person] to do or abstain from doing any act to lay a ransom, shall be punishable with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.” 8. The abduction is defined in section 362. The provision envisages two types of abduction i.e. (i) by force or by compulsion; and/or (ii) inducement by deceitful means. The object of such compulsion or inducement must be going of the victim from any place. In the case of Malleshi v. State of Karnataka [ AIR 2004 SC 4865 ], same aspect of the matter has been dealt with by the apex Court observing as under : “The offence of abduction is a continuing offence. This section was amended in 1992 by Act XLII of 1993 with effect from 22.5.1993 and it was subsequently amended in 1995 by Act XXIV of 1995 with effect from 26.5.1995. The section provides punishment for kidnapping, abduction or detaining for ransom. To attract the provisions of section 364A what is required to be proved is (1) that the accused kidnapped or abducted the person; and (2) kept him under detention after such kidnapping and abduction; and (3) that the kidnapping or abduction was for ransom. Strong reliance was placed on a decision of the Delhi High Court in Netra Pal v. The State (NCT of Delhi) [2001 Cri.LJ 1669], to contend that since the ransom demand was not conveyed to the father of PW2, the intention to demand was not fulfilled. To pay a ransom as per Black’s Law Dictionary means “to pay price or demand for ransom”. To pay a ransom as per Black’s Law Dictionary means “to pay price or demand for ransom”. The word “demand” means “to claim as one’s due”; “to require”; “to ask relief”; “to summon”; “to call in Court”; “An imperative request preferred by one person to another requiring the latter to do or yield something or to abstain from some act”. “An asking with authority, claiming”. The definition as pointed out above would show that the demand has to be communicated. It is an imperative request or a claim made. Netra Pal’s case (supra), was one where a child was kidnapped. The Court found as a fact that since the victim was a child, demand for ransom could not have been made to him and only the demand to pay the ransom could have been made to his guardians. In that factual background it was held that the offence was not under section 364A but was under section 362 of the IPC. Accordingly conviction of the accused was altered to offences relatable to sections 363 and 365 of the IPC. In the instant case as the factual position found by the trial Court and the High Court goes to show, the object of abduction was for ransom. This was clearly conveyed to the victim PW2. He was even conveyed the amount to be paid. It cannot be laid down as a strait-jacket formula that the demand for payment has to be made to a person who ultimately pays. By way of illustration it can be said that a rich businessman is abducted. He is told that for his release his family members have to pay a certain amount of money; but money actually belongs to the person abducted. The payment for release is made by the persons to whom the demand is made. The demand originally is made to the person abducted or kidnapped. After making the demand to the kidnapped or abducted person merely because the demand could not be conveyed to some other person, as the accused is arrested in the meantime, does not take away the offence out of the purview of section 364A. It has to be seen in such a case as to what was the object of kidnapping or abduction. The essence of abduction as noted above is causing to stay in isolation and demand for ransom. It has to be seen in such a case as to what was the object of kidnapping or abduction. The essence of abduction as noted above is causing to stay in isolation and demand for ransom. The demand in the present case has already been made by conveying it to the victim. In Netra Pal’s case (supra), the High Court noted that there was no demand to pay. The factual position in that case as noted above is that the victim was a child to whom no demand could have been made. In that background the High Court took the view that section 364A has no application as no demand has been communicated. The position factually is different here. Ultimately the question to be decided is “what was the intention? Was it demand of ransom?” There can be no definite manner in which demand is to be made. Who pays the ransom is not the determinative fact, as discussed supra.” 9. From the decisions in the cases of Netrapal (supra), and Malleshi (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that before an offence can be said to be covered under section 364A IPC, there must be the factum of kidnapping or abduction and that such kidnapping or abduction must be for a ransom. The demand for ransom is also required to have been conveyed. 10. To prove the guilt against the accused, the prosecution examined Jhalari Yadav (PW1), the abductee, who deposed that ten months ago on the day of incident, he went to his agricultural field for watching the standing crops. At about 2 a.m., when he was sleeping on wooden bed, by that time, he heard unusual noise. So, he woke up and removed quilt from his mouth. He was surprised to see some miscreants who were surrounding his bed. They pulled him down from bed on the earth and asked for a firearm. He showed ignorance and said that he was having only a stick. Then miscreants asked the way towards river and also threatened him to kill. The miscreants forced him to enter into the deep river. After crossing river, the miscreants took him away with them. In day light, he recognized the miscreants as accused Mullu Singh, Mohkam Singh, Ramsnehi and Chhunna. The above abductors confined him for a month in a secret place in the forest. The miscreants forced him to enter into the deep river. After crossing river, the miscreants took him away with them. In day light, he recognized the miscreants as accused Mullu Singh, Mohkam Singh, Ramsnehi and Chhunna. The above abductors confined him for a month in a secret place in the forest. He stated that after receiving ransom money by his brother, he was released from confinement of the abductors named above. In cross-examination, he stated that abductor Chhunna and Mullu are alive and rest abductors, namely, Mohkam and Ramswaroop are died. 11. Jamuna Singh (PW2) younger brother of abductee Jhalari deposed that ten months ago his brother Jhalari went to his field and as usual was sleeping there but in the morning he was not found available at that place. He searched him at nearby places but could not find him available. After fifteen days of the incident, he came to know that Mohkam Singh Gang made the kidnapping of his brother. Other accused Ramnaresh, Mullu, Chhunna @ Shri Kant were the other members of that Gang. He made payment of Rs. One lac in two instalments for safely release of his brother to the abductors. He stated that the abductors threatened for causing death of his brother, if the ransom amount was not delivered to the abductors. 12. Nahar Singh (PW3) in his Court statement supported the version of Jamuna Singh (PW2) that his uncle Jhalari was abducted near about ten months ago. He stated that one person came to him and inform that his uncle was not at the field. So he rushed to the field and saw only wearing clothes of his uncle lying on the spot. He also saw the matchbox and signs of resistance towards the way leading to bank of river. He also heard that Rs. One lac as ransom amount was demanded for release of his uncle Jhalari by the dacoits. He was informed by Gulab, the inhabitant of village that accused Chhunna and Mullu abducted his uncle. 13. Bhanwar Singh (PW4) deposed that one year ago in the month of February (Maha month Hindu Calendar) his uncle Jhalari was captured and after one month on Shiv Ratri Festival, he could be got relieved from clutches of the miscreants. In cross-examination, he admitted that his uncle went to his agricultural field for watching the standing crops. 13. Bhanwar Singh (PW4) deposed that one year ago in the month of February (Maha month Hindu Calendar) his uncle Jhalari was captured and after one month on Shiv Ratri Festival, he could be got relieved from clutches of the miscreants. In cross-examination, he admitted that his uncle went to his agricultural field for watching the standing crops. As on next day up to 9 a.m., his uncle did not return back from field, he searched him at nearby places and at agriculture field also. In case of his non-availability, he submitted written report (Ex.P-2) to Police Station Mihona. After few days of the incident, he knew that accused Ramnaresh and Mullu made kidnapping of his uncle and his uncle was released after payment of ransom amount. 14. Munna Singh (PW6) deposed that one year ago in month of February, his uncle Jhalari was taken away from agricultural field and after twenty days of the incident he came to know that Jhalari was released from confinement of the miscreants after receiving ransom amount after one month on Shiv Ratri Festival. In cross-examination, he admitted that his uncle was abducted by Mullu Tamoli and Ramnaresh Brahmin. 15. S.B. Singh (PW5) stated that at the relevant time he was posted as Assistant Sub-Inspector at Police Station Mihona. During investigation of Crime No.23/2000, he prepared spot map (Ex.P-3) on 28th March 2000 and recorded case dairy statements of Jhalari, the abductee, Jamuna Singh (PW2), Nahar Singh (PW3) and Bhanwar Singh (PW4). 16. In the light of the aforesaid discussions on the factual and legal aspects of the matter, the prosecution case stands established from the ocular and other evidence on record that on the day of incident at about 2 a.m., in night when the abductee was sleeping at his agriculture field on wooden bed, he ceased from sleep due to hearing some unusual murmuring and when he removed quilt from his mouth he saw some miscreants surrounding his bed who pulled him down on the earth and asked for a gun. He replied that he was having a only wooden stick. The miscreants then compelled him to go and took him away with them. In day light he recognized the miscreants as accused Mullu Singh, Mohkam Singh, Ramsnehi and Chhunna. The above abductors confined him for a month in a secret place in the forest. He replied that he was having a only wooden stick. The miscreants then compelled him to go and took him away with them. In day light he recognized the miscreants as accused Mullu Singh, Mohkam Singh, Ramsnehi and Chhunna. The above abductors confined him for a month in a secret place in the forest. After receiving ransom money from his brother, he was released from the confinement of the abductors named above. In cross-examination, the abductee has categorically mentioned in the Court that abductors Chhunna and Mullu are alive while rest abductors Mohkam and Ramswaroop are no more. Jamuna Singh (PW2) younger brother of the abductee while corroborating his statement deposed that in the morning when the abductee was not found, he searched him at nearby places and after fifteen days of the incident he came to know that Mohkam Singh’s Gang made the capture of his brother. Other accused Ramnaresh, Mullu, Chhunna @ Shri Kant were the members of that Gang. He stated that he made payment of Rs. One lac in two instalments to get released his brother from the abductors. He stated that the abductors threatened for causing death of his brother if the ransom amount was not delivered to them. Nahar Singh (PW3) in his Court statement supported the version of Jamuna Singh (PW2) that his uncle Jhalari was abducted near about ten months ago and he lodged the report (Ex.P-2) of the incident on next day at Ajnar Police outpost. He also heard that Rs. One lac as ransom amount was demanded for release of his uncle by the dacoits and he was informed by one Gulab of the village that accused Chhunna and Mullu abducted his uncle. Similar is the statement of Bhanwar Singh (PW4) in support of the abductee. 17. The next contention of the accused-appellant is that the report (Ex.P-2) of the incident lodged by Bhanwar Singh (PW4) did not indicate the name of the abductors and therefore the false implication of the accused prima facie reveals. 18. This argument raised by the learned counsel does not find support from the decision of the apex Court in the case of Mahesh v. State of M.P. [ (2011)9 SCC 626 ], wherein it has been held : “We find that the aforesaid first information report was submitted by PW1 who was not an eye-witness to the incident. 18. This argument raised by the learned counsel does not find support from the decision of the apex Court in the case of Mahesh v. State of M.P. [ (2011)9 SCC 626 ], wherein it has been held : “We find that the aforesaid first information report was submitted by PW1 who was not an eye-witness to the incident. Although it has come in evidence that he was informed about the incident by PW2, PW4 and PW5 immediately on his reaching the place of occurrence of the incident, yet since he was not the eye-witness to the incident, he may not have stated the said fact in the first information report for which it cannot be said that the entire prosecution case should falter. Besides, it is an established law that so far as the first information report is concerned, it is only a report submitted informing the police about the commission of the crime. It is not required that the said first information report should contain a detailed and vivid description of the entire incident. Further, it cannot be expected from the informant, especially, when the informant is a relative of the injured/deceased to give each and every minute detail of the incident in the first information report. Therefore, PW1 who had filed the information with the police not being an eye-witness, it cannot be said that non-mentioning about the role played by the present appellants in the first information report would be in any manner fatal to the case of the prosecution.” 19. Next submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused is that no TIP during investigation was conducted for identification of the arrested accused by the abductee or eye-witnesses. This type of argument has been discussed and answered in the case of Sheo Shankar Singh v. State of Jharkhand and another [ AIR 2011 SC 1403 ], wherein it has been held that : “It is fairly well-settled that identification of the accused in the Court by the witness constitutes the substantive evidence in a case although any such identification for the first time at the trial may more often than not appear to be evidence of a weak character. That being so a test identification parade is conducted with a view to strengthening the trustworthiness of the evidence. That being so a test identification parade is conducted with a view to strengthening the trustworthiness of the evidence. Such a TIP then provides corroboration to the witness in the Court who claims to identify the accused persons otherwise unknown to him. Test identification parades, therefore, remain in the realm of investigation. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not oblige the investigating agency to necessarily hold a test identification parade nor is there any provision under which the accused may claim a right to the holding of a test identification parade. The failure of the investigating agency to hold a test identification parade does not, in that view, have the effect of weakening the evidence of identification in the Court. As to what should be the weight attached to such an identification is a matter which the Court will determine in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. In appropriate cases the Court may accept the evidence of identification in the Court even without insisting on corroboration. The decisions of this Court on the subject are legion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to refer to all such decisions.” 20. As seen above, in present case the abducee Jhalari Singh Yadav spent near about a month in custody of the accused. Therefore, there should not be any mistaken identification on his part because he had full opportunity of knowing the miscreants which he proves by identifying the accused-appellant in dock during trial. Same is termed to be substantial evidence. 21. Lastly, the contention of the appellant-accused is that during investigation no letter written by the accused or abductee or proof of delivery of ransom money was recovered. 22. In the present case witness Jamuna Singh (PW2) had clearly stated in his statement before the Court that he made payment of Rs. One lac in two instalments to get released his brother from the abductors. He further stated that the abductors threatened for causing death of his brother if the ransom amount was not delivered to them. 22. In the present case witness Jamuna Singh (PW2) had clearly stated in his statement before the Court that he made payment of Rs. One lac in two instalments to get released his brother from the abductors. He further stated that the abductors threatened for causing death of his brother if the ransom amount was not delivered to them. Although the investigation did not make any attempt to collect the proof of payment of ransom amount paid to accused abductors but in the light of the decision of the apex Court in the case of Malleshi (supra), the failure on the part of the Investigating Officer in non-seizing of letter of demand for recovery of ransom and non-collecting of proof of payment of ransom to abductors would not be sufficient to reject the version given by the eye-witnesses. At this stage it would be relevant to refer relevant paras of the said decision. “It cannot be laid down as a straitjacket formula that the demand for payments has to be made to a person who ultimately pays. By way of illustration it can be said that a rich businessman is abducted. He is told that for his release his family members have to pay a certain amount of money; but money actually belongs to the person abducted. The payment for release is made by the persons to whom the demand is made. The demand originally is made to the person abducted or kidnapped. After making the demand to the kidnapped or abducted person merely because the demand could not be conveyed to some other person, as the accused is arrested in the meantime, does not take away the offence out of the purview of section 364A. It has to be seen in such a case as to what was the object of kidnapping or abduction. The essence of abduction as noted above is causing to stay in isolation and demand for ransom.” 23. Thus, it is clear from evidence of abudctee Jhalari Singh (PW1) and his brother Jamuna (PW2) that after abduction and confinement in a secret place, a demand for ransom was made by the abductors for release of the abductee and for release of the abductee, the ransom amount of Rs. One lac in two instalments was paid to the abductors. So, all ingredients of the offence are successfully proved. One lac in two instalments was paid to the abductors. So, all ingredients of the offence are successfully proved. As already pointed out above to attract the provisions of section 364A of IPC, the prosecution has to prove that the accused kidnapped or abducted a person and that the kidnapping was for ransom. For the purpose of getting paid a ransom, a demand has to be made and communicated and unless the price of retrieval or rescue is made, the question to pay a ransom would not arise. From discussions of the evidence, the essential ingredient to attract the provisions of section 364A is very much available here which show that a demand was made by the abductors on the abductee and his relations asking for the payment of ransom. “To pay” means to set in motion the demand for payment which has to be communicated to the person from whom the demand to pay is made. Unless that is done prosecution cannot succeed in covering its case under section 364A of IPC. In this case, what we find is that the demand for ransom was raised on abductee and the family of the kidnapped which was communicated. Thus, offence under section 364A of IPC is proved from the evidence on record. 24. At this juncture, learned counsel appearing for appellant-accused seeking benefit of section 427 of CrPC prays that the sentence of imprisonment awarded under the impugned judgment and maintained by this Court may be directed to run concurrently with the previous sentence of imprisonment passed against the same accused in a separate judgment while deciding S.T. No.408/2000 against him by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Lahar, District Bhind. 25. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State on this point raised above. 26. The sole question raised in this case is whether the sentence awarded to the appellant-accused can be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively and whether exercise of the power conferred on the Court under section 427 of CrPC to order concurrent sentence is warranted under the facts and circumstances of the present case? 27. Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as under : “427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. 27. Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as under : “427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. -- (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence : Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately. (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.” 28. In the case of Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [ AIR 1991 SC 2296 ], the apex Court held : “Sub-section (1) of section 427, CrPC provides for the situation when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or life imprisonment. In other words, sub-section (1) of section 427, CrPC deals with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term is subsequently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for life. In such a situation, the first sentence, being for a fixed term, expires on a definite date which is known when the subsequent conviction is made. Sub-section (1) says that in such a situation, the date of expiry of the first sentence which the offender is undergoing being known, ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the Court directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence. Obviously, in cases covered by sub-section (1) where the sentence is for a fixed term, the subsequent sentence can be consecutive unless directed to run concurrently. Sub-section (2), on the other hand, provides for an offender “already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life” who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life. Obviously, in cases covered by sub-section (1) where the sentence is for a fixed term, the subsequent sentence can be consecutive unless directed to run concurrently. Sub-section (2), on the other hand, provides for an offender “already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life” who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life. It is well settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse [ AIR 1961 SC 600 ], and reiterted in Maru Ram [ AIR 1980 SC 2147 ], that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. This being so at the stage of sentencing by the Court on a subsequent conviction the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be no question of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub-section (1) of section 427. As rightly contended by Shri Garg, and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being understood to mean as sentence to serve, the remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might. It is this obvious situation which is stated in sub-section (2) of section 427 since the general rule enunciated in sub-section (1) thereof is that without the Court’s direction the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecutively. The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is provided for in sub-section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on sub-section (1) if there be no express direction of the Court to that effect. The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is provided for in sub-section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on sub-section (1) if there be no express direction of the Court to that effect. Sub-section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general rule enacted in sub-section (1) of section 427 that a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry of the first sentence unless the Court directs it to run concurrently. The meaning and purpose of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 427 and the object of enacting sub-section (2) is, therefore, clear.” 29. In the light of the legal propositions of law indicated above, it is clear that the sentencing Court has the discretion to direct concurrency. The investiture of such discretion, presupposes that it will be exercised on sound principles and not on impulses, whims or humour. Indisputably, the discretion therefore clearly lies with the Court to make the sentence in the subsequent trial to run concurrently with the sentence in the previous one. On perusal of the present case, it appears that the appellant has already been sentenced to life in another case. Keeping in view the principles laid down by the apex Court, in the opinion of this Court, ends of justice would be served if the sentence of imprisonment passed on subsequent conviction against the appellant is directed to run concurrently with his earlier life sentence. 30. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction and sentence of the accused for the commission of offence under section 364A of IPC, and dismissing the appeal preferred by him, it is directed that the sentence as awarded by the trial Court and affirmed by this Court herein under the judgment shall run concurrently with the previous life sentence of the appellant-accused in S.T. No.408/2000. 31. Appellant is in jail even after suspension of his impugned sentence by this Court since he is already booked in another crime. 32. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Superintendent of the Jail concerned. The lower Court’s record be sent back.