ORDER In this civil revision petition assailed order dated 14.9.2012 passed in IA No. 763 of 2012 in as No. 771 of 2008 on the file of the Court of III Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, L.B. Nagar. The petitioners are the defendants 8 and 9 and the respondents are the plaintiff and remaining defendants in the suit. 2. The suit was filed for partition and separate possession of the plaint schedule properties. The defendants 8 and 9 filed the I.A. under Order XIV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to frame the following additional issues. 1. Whether the plaintiff is effectively ousted from the suit schedule properties against the interest of D1 to D4 and D6? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 3. The plea of the defendants 8 and 9 is that they purchased the• properties of the joint family of their vendors. In fact the plaintiff was ousted from the suit schedule properties thereby the defendants 1 to 4 and 6 alone became entitled to the properties. The claim of the plaintiff is that after the death of their father she became entitled to share in the properties as coparcener. According to her, the defendants 8 and 9, the subsequent purchasers, cannot take the plea of ouster in respect of any item of the schedule properties, which claim is available only to the other coparceners of the properties subject to law. It is further averred that the plea is barred by limitation. 4. The Court below dismissed the I.A. on the ground that the plea of ouster would be available only to the joint family members. Further by the date of filing of the suit, the sale deed in favour of the defendants 8 and 9 was only eight years old whereas by virtue of the Articles 109 and 110 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act in order to take the plea of ouster he should have been in possession of the property for at least 12 years subject to other relevant formalities. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners/defendants 8 and 9 would contend that the possession of their vendor prior to the sale of •the property in their favour also can be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the period of 12 years of possession to take the plea of ouster. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners/defendants 8 and 9 would contend that the possession of their vendor prior to the sale of •the property in their favour also can be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the period of 12 years of possession to take the plea of ouster. The Court below failed to appreciate the matter properly thereby its order is to be set aside and the plea as prayed for is to be granted. 6. Learned Counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff would submit that the question of taking the plea of ouster is available to the defendants 8 and 9 only when they got the possession of the property for 12 years or more claiming to be the absolute owners of the property. There is absolutely no basis to say that the vendor(s) of the defendants 8 and 9 were also in the possession of the property adverse to the interest of the other joint family members. Thereby the petition is misconceived. Further the Court below properly appreciated the matter. 7. By virtue of the Articles 109 and 110 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act in order to take the plea of ouster, the defendants 8 and 9 should have been in the possession of the property at least for 12 years claiming to be the absolute owners of the property openly, continuously and uninterruptedly to the knowledge of the other parties who got interest therein. What is important is that admittedly the defendants 8 and 9 purchased the property just eight years prior to the filing of the suit and ever since they have been in possession and enjoyment of the property. They cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession on behalf of their vendor(s) for the period prior to the sale in their favour. It appears that it is only basing upon some surmises and conjectures. No doubt by virtue of the sale, the defendants 8 and 9 would have stepped into the shoes of their vendor(s) in respect of the property. But unless their vendor(s) take the plea of ouster, there cannot be any basis for the defendants 8 and 9 to take the same plea. 8. No doubt by virtue of the sale, the defendants 8 and 9 would have stepped into the shoes of their vendor(s) in respect of the property. But unless their vendor(s) take the plea of ouster, there cannot be any basis for the defendants 8 and 9 to take the same plea. 8. In P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, (2009) 12 SCC 310 , the 2013(3) FR-F-9 Supreme Court considering possession of co-heirs of property held as follows: The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs. ... The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heir's title. ... It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. 9. In Kavitha Goud v. Nookala Sudarshan Reddy, 2004 (4) ALD 324 (DB) = 2004 (5) ALT 293 (DB), this Court held "In order to establish adverse possession in respect of a joint property or joint family property, ouster must be pleaded and proved". 10. Thus there is no prima facie material to uphold the claim of the defendants 8 and 9. In order to allow the petition, in fact there should be some basis but not mere surmises and conjectures. The Court below passed the order properly by reason of which I do not find any reason to interfere with the same. 11. The civil revision petition is therefore dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions pending if any shall stand closed.