JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pankaj Naqvi, J.—This is plaintiff’s second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 5.5.2005 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 8, Allahabad in Civil Appeal No. 418 of 1993 whereby suit for injunction filed by the plaintiff-appellant has been dismissed. 2. Ram Harakh (since deceased and now represented by his legal representatives) filed a suit for permanent injunction stating that to the north of the land in dispute shown by letters ‘Aa’, ‘Ba’, ‘Sa’ and ‘Da’ in the plaint map, adjoins his old ancestral house prior to abolition of zamindari; the land in dispute and the house adjoin each other and a door opens in it; subsequent to abolition of zamindari, the land in dispute vested in his predecessor’s, as its owner; the land in dispute was being used as abadi to the knowledge of the village inhabitants and that of the Gram Sabha, since considerable period; the defendants have no concern with the same, even then they threatened to interfere with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession, hence the suit. 3. A written statement was filed stating that the defendants are in possession of the disputed for the last 30 years, in which they used to tether their cattle and for the purposes connected therewith; the plot in dispute is erstwhile ‘sehan’ and through the same a ‘nabdan’ also flows; the plaint map is contrary to the spot position; during consolidation the disputed land was earmarked as abadi for the defendants. 4. The trial Court upon consideration of evidence found that the plaintiff failed to adduce any material on record that the disputed land was given to him during consolidation, although in cross-examination he had stated that the disputed land was a chak of one Ram Gopal, but the possession was of the plaintiff and that during the consolidation the same was allotted to him. Thus, the trial Court disbelieved the case of the plaintiff on his own admission that on one hand, he admitted that the disputed land was a chak of one Ram Gopal but given to him subsequently and on the other, the same is in his possession for the last 30 years, thus, there was an inherent contradiction in his case. The trial Court further found that the defendants have a patta of the disputed land from the Gaon Sabha. The Court found no possession of plaintiff and dismissed the suit. 5. The trial Court further found that the defendants have a patta of the disputed land from the Gaon Sabha. The Court found no possession of plaintiff and dismissed the suit. 5. The Appellate Court found that the additional documents filed at the appellate stage are documents pertaining to consolidation and the same would have no bearing in respect of the disputed land, which is abadi; the Vakil Commissioner also reported that the sehan of the plaintiff is on the eastern side of the house, whereas in the plaint it was stated to be on the southern side of the house; the Commissioner further found that a ‘sadar darwaza’ of the plaintiff is on the eastern side. The plea of appellant/plaintiff that the disputed land had vested in them cannot be accepted, as only open land in front of ‘sadar darwaza’ (eastern side) stands vested in terms of Section 4 of the United Province Abadi Act, 1948. The Appellate Court further observed that settlement of disputed land (abadi) cannot be established by any consolidation document. Thus, the appellate Court found that the plaintiff-appellant has failed to prove that the disputed land belonged to him and dismissed the appeal and the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. 6. It was strenuously urged by Shri B. Malik, learmed counsel for the appellant that the documents filed by him at the appellate stage and admitted on 8.9.2003, if considered in proper perspective, would have resulted in the reversal of the decree of the trial Court and as the same was not adverted to, a grave miscarriage of justice has occasioned. He further submits that on the basis of the additional evidence such as Form 23, Form 41, Form 45, Consolidation Map for 1992-93, Khatauni from 1402 Fasli to 1406 Fasli and Khasra for 1405 Fasli the disputed land is now in appellant’s name and moreover, the patta in favour of the respondents has been cancelled on 12.5.1997. He further submits that the plaintiff/appellant had not taken the plea of Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and the findings of the Court below are perverse. 7. Per contra, submission of Shri Ashish Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents is that as the judgment of both the Courts is concluded by findings of fact, based on proper appraisal of evidence, the Courts below, committed no illegality in dismissing the suit. 8. 7. Per contra, submission of Shri Ashish Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents is that as the judgment of both the Courts is concluded by findings of fact, based on proper appraisal of evidence, the Courts below, committed no illegality in dismissing the suit. 8. Both the Courts have concurrently held that there was a material contradiction between the location of the disputed land, inasmuch as in paragraph 2 of the plaint, it is shown on the south of the adjoining house of the plaintiff/appellant, whereas the Commissioner in his report dated 25.4.1994 has opined that the ‘sehan’ (disputed land) with a ‘sadar darwaza’ is on the eastern side, therefore the disputed land cannot be on the south of the house of the plaintiff/appellant. Thus, the Courts below refused to give the benefit of the provisions of United Province Village, Abadi Act, 1948 to the plaintiff/appellant. 9. Shri B. Malik, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently urged that at no stage the appellants/plaintiffs ever claimed the benefit of Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. This is factually incorrect as it was a specific case of the plaintiff in the plaint that the disputed land abutting the house is in their possession prior to abolition of zamindari, and after abolition of zamindari, the same stood vested in his predecessors as absolute owners thereof. Further, para 7 of the memo of appeal No. 418 of 1993 is quoted below : “pwafd fookfnr Hkwfe ekSds ij vkcknh ds #i esa tehUnkjh mUewyu ds iwoZ ls iquZoknhx.k oknhx.k mi;ksx esa djrs pys vk jgs gSA ,slh lwjr esa xkWao lHkk dks izfroknh ds i{k esa iV~Vk djus dk dksbZ oS|kfud vf/kdkj ugha izkIr gksrk gS D;ksafd /kkjk&9 tehaUnkjh mUewyu ,DV ds vUrxZr mlesa oknhx.k dk LoRo vkcknh ds #i esa iz;ksx djus dk dkuwuu fufgr gks x;k gS vkSj mls iV~Vk djus dk xkWao lHkk dks dksbZ oS|kfud vf/kdkj ugha izkIr gSA” Thus, in view of the aforesaid facts, it cannot be contended that a plea of Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was not raised by the appellants. The plea was raised, but repelled on evidence. 10. Shri Malik further submits that the appellant had filed a copy of the order dated 12.5.1997 in evidence of the fact that the patta of the respondent-defendants was cancelled and thereafter the disputed land has been given to him. 11. The plea was raised, but repelled on evidence. 10. Shri Malik further submits that the appellant had filed a copy of the order dated 12.5.1997 in evidence of the fact that the patta of the respondent-defendants was cancelled and thereafter the disputed land has been given to him. 11. This Court is of the view that once it is found that the appellant has not been able to prove his possessory title, then the cancellation of patta of the respondent-defendants stood cancelled on 12.5.1997 by the Gaon Sabha, would be of no consequence and benefit to the appellant-plaintiff, as he had to stand on his own legs. Moreover, from the said documents title to an abadi land cannot be established, as it is settled principle that consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction over abadi land. On this issue there is no perversity in the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court. 12. Shri Malik placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention : (i) Jayadev Tripathy alias Panda v. Dilip Kumar Panda and others, AIR 2004 Ori 196; (ii) Km. Rakhi and another v. Ist Additional District Judge, Firozabad and others, AIR 2000 All 166 ; (iii) M/s. Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. etc. v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2000 All 177 ; (iv) Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, AIR 2002 SC 665 ; (v) State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, AIR 2002 SC 671 ; and (vi) Jayaramdas and sons v. Mirza Rafatullah Baig and others, (2004) 10 SCC 507 . 13. The first decision, as is evident from paragraph 12 thereof, is an authority for the proposition that once additional evidence has been accepted, the other side is to be granted an opportunity to file rebuttal evidence. This proposition cannot be disputed and moreover, would not apply on the facts of the present case, as respondent-defendants are not claiming infringement of the said right. 14. The second decision is an authority on the point that if a trial Court refuses to admit any evidence, then it is always open for the party concerned to file the same at the appellate stage and in case the appellant does not file the same, even at the appellate stage, then the said documents cannot be considered by the appellate Court. The appellant’s documents were admitted on 8.9.2003 and their effect was considered. 15. The appellant’s documents were admitted on 8.9.2003 and their effect was considered. 15. The decision of the Apex Court in M/s Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. etc. v. State of U.P. and others (supra) relates to U.P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, which will have no bearing whatsoever on the issues raised in the present appeal. 16. The fourth decision of the Apex Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal (supra) is an authority for the proposition that the rights of the parties stands crystallized on the date of the institution of suit and the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the reliefs subject to the following conditions being satisfied: - “(i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise.” This principle cannot be disputed, but would not apply on the facts of the present case. The findings given by the both the Courts below are that the plaintiff on his own assertions has failed to prove his possessory title. Assuming, there was a subsequent acquisition of title at the appellate stage, the same would not relate back to the date on which the suit was filed; if this is permitted, it would mean that the plaintiff can file a suit for a relief for which he has no cause of action, but can claim a cause of action at the appellate stage on account of a subsequent event. This cannot be accepted. Subsequent events are relevant only for moulding the final relief. Moreover, the Court finds that the effect of the alleged subsequent event was considered by the appellate Court and the plea was rejected on a relevant consideration. 17. The last authority is for the proposition that while filing additional evidence relevance thereof is to be pleaded so that the opposite party may have an opportunity to meet the same. Moreover, the Court finds that the effect of the alleged subsequent event was considered by the appellate Court and the plea was rejected on a relevant consideration. 17. The last authority is for the proposition that while filing additional evidence relevance thereof is to be pleaded so that the opposite party may have an opportunity to meet the same. The lower appellate Court in the present case considered the additional evidence and rejected the same on the ground that as it relates to a disputed land, which is a “abadi”, the same cannot be proved by consolidation documents. No perversity could be attributed to this approach. 18. No substantial question of law arises. The appeal is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 C.P.C. with costs. ———————